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Cognition and Hermeneutics: Convergences in the Study of Translation

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Editor's Introduction: The Emergence of 4EA Cognitive Science out of Hermeneutics

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1   First Remarks

Cognitive science has arguably been around since antiquity, in works like Plato's *Meno* and Aristotle's *De anima*, and flourished in Enlightenment rationalism, through the work of René Descartes, Baruch Spinoza, John Locke, Nicolas Malebranche, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, David Hume, Immanuel Kant, Pierre Cabanis, and others. But modern cognitive science has come to us in two distinct traditions.

The first, emerging in the 1950s, was computational, based on the premise that the human brain is a meat computer that somehow generates not only thought but what Noam Chomsky (1965) called generative transformations and what Jerry Fodor (1975) called a 'Language Of Thought' (LOT). Many of the pioneers in the development of the theory of computation and then the digital computer were involved in

theorizing the cybernetics of neural functioning and the modeling of neural networks in computer architecture. This first tradition is of no concern to us here.[1]

The second tradition, emerging in the 1990s and becoming an extremely widespread and influential interdiscipline in the new millennium, is the one we highlight in this special issue, as it does issue out of hermeneutics—indirectly, via Husserlian and Merleau-Pontyan phenomenology.[2] It is generally known as 4EA cognitive science, the four Es for *embodied, embedded, extended,* and *enactive*, the A for *affective*. Arguably, in fact, the intellectual history from Herder instructing his readers to "feel their way into everything"[3] in 1774 (section 2) through Schleiermacher and Dilthey to Husserl and Merleau-Ponty to 4EA cognitive science constitutes a kind of em-

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1 "Of no concern to us here" does not mean, of course, that computational cognitive science is defunct: "Over the last six decades," according to one pair of neurocomputationalist authors, "computationalism—in its various classicist, connectionist, and neurocomputational incarnations—has been the mainstream theory of cognition" (Piccinini/Bahar 2013: 454). The authors cited provide a useful overview of those six decades.

2 For a useful history of the emergence of 4EA cognitive science out of phenomenology, see Gallagher/Varela (2003); Gallagher (2004) tracks the emergence of cognitive science out of hermeneutics. I am especially indebted to Gallagher (2004: 162) for the connection between Dilthey's *Zusammenhang* and Husserl's *Lebenswelt*.

3 A 30-year-old Herder wrote that in reading a text, in order to *mitzufühlen* ("share in feeling") the author's whole soul, you should not track the words alone, but: "gehe in das Zeitalter, in die Himmelsgegend, die ganze Geschichte, fühle dich in alles hinein—nun allein bist du auf dem Wege, das Wort zu verstehen" (Herder 1774/1967: 37)/"go into the age, into the clime, the whole history, feel yourself into everything—only now are you on the way towards understanding the word" (transl. Forster 2002: 292).

bodied, embedded, enactive, and extended bulking up of affect:

- first into das *Gefühl des Fremden* ("the feeling of the foreign") in Schleiermacher in 1813 (section 2),
- then into a collectivized feeling for the *Zusammenhang des Lebens* ("nexus of life") in Dilthey in 1910 (section 3),
- then into a whole felt *Lebenswelt* ("life-world") in Husserl in 1936 (Section 4),
- then into Merleau-Ponty's 1961 assertion that things "sont une annexe ou un prolongement d[u corps] lui-même, elles sont incrustées dans sa chair, elles font partie de sa définition pleine et le monde est fait de l'étoffe même du corps" (Merleau-Ponty 1961/1964: 19) ("are an annex or prolongation of [the body] itself; they are incrusted into its flesh, they are part of its full definition; the world is made of the very stuff of the body," transl. Dallery 1964: 163) (section 5),
- and on into the affectively experienced embodiment, embeddedness, enactivity, and extendedness of cognition in the 4EA canon around the turn of the millennium (section 5).

In Herder what one feels is only superficially the meaning of a text: actually, more deeply, and more complexly one is feeling the author who wrote the text, his or her affective and attitudinal embodiment in the writing of the text, as channeled primarily by prosody. In Schleiermacher what the target reader of a translation feels is the experience of reading the source text, as simulated by the translator—again, with a series of human bodies lurking behind the series of textual screens, so that what one feels is the translator's reembodying and reembedding of the source reader's reembodiment of the source author. Reading Schleiermacher backwards from the

perspective of 4EA cognition, one might say that for him the primal scene of translation is embedded and extended embodiment as experienced affectively. In that sense the embodied affective *Nachahmung/Nachbildung* ("simulation") that the translator builds for the target reader stands in for all the other conceptual innovations in this history. The *Zusammenhang des Lebens* ("nexus of life"), the *Lebenswelt* ("life-world"), and the *prolongement d[u corps] lui-même* ("prolongation of [the body] itself") are all simulacra, in that they are not physical entities but phenomenological ones; but in another sense they are *not* simulacra, not mere fantasies, because we *feel* them as realities, as *our* reality. The engine driving this history is the Kantian and especially post-Kantian notion that we have no reliable access to the *Ding an sich* ("thing in itself"); what we take to be reality is a social construct. What the German Romantics and post-Romantics added to the Kantian Copernican Hypothesis was the insistence that the force transforming social constructs into realities was feeling, the affect organizing lived experience.

2   The A in 4EA Cognitive Science: Herder and Schleiermacher on Hermeneutical Affect

The founding moment of modern hermeneutics is contested; some attribute it to Friedrich Schleiermacher, others to Wilhelm Dilthey. As Forster (n.d.) argues persuasively, however, Schleiermacher's pioneering hermeneutical theorization draws heavily from the thought of a very young Johann Gottfried Herder, who in his mid- to late twenties—the late 1760s and early 1770s—was already laying the theoretical ground-

work for German Romanticism.[4] Certainly if we agree with Roy (1997) and Crouter (2006) that Schleiermacherian hermeneutics is fundamentally feeling-based, the founding moment for that theory came in 1774, when Herder suggested that understanding requires "feeling yourself into everything":

> *Ganze Natur* der Seele, die durch Alles *herrscht*, die alle übrige Neigungen und Seelenkräfte *nach sich modelt*, noch auch die gleichgültigsten Handlungen *färbet*—um diese mitzufühlen, antworte nicht aus dem Worte, sondern gehe in das Zeitalter, in die Himmelsgegend, die ganze Geschichte, fühle dich in alles hinein—nun allein bist du auf dem Wege, das Wort zu verstehen […]. (Herder 1774/1967: 37)

> *The whole nature* of the soul, which *rules* through everything, which *models* all other inclinations and forces of the soul *in accordance with itself*, and in addition *colors* even the most indifferent actions—in order to share in feeling this, do not answer on the basis of the word but go into the age, into the clime, the whole history, feel yourself into everything—only now are you on the way towards understanding the word. (Transl. Forster 2002: 292)

In order *mitzufühlen* ("to share in feeling") the whole nature of an author's soul, you need *dich in alles hineinzufühlen* ("to feel yourself into everything"). Almost exactly a century after Herder, in 1873, Robert Vischer (1847–1933) would rename and reframe *das Sich-Hineinfühlen* ("the feeling oneself into") as *die Einfühlung* ("empathy")—an embodied phenomenology that is sometimes dismissed as prescientific, though since the 1990s there has also been a 'hard' empirical branch of brain science called the social neuroscience of empathy.

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4   Forster (n.d.) also argues that Schleiermacher's hermeneutical thought arose out of intelligent and thoughtful engagements with German Protestant theology (especially Johann August Ernesti [1707–1781]) and Jena Romanticism (especially Friedrich Schlegel [1772–1829]).

Those neuropsychologists and neurophysiologists do find empirical evidence of empathic response. But then the social neuroscience of empathy is the empirical study of responses to facial expressions, gestures, and other body language: empathy in face-to-face encounters. Hermeneutics begins as the empathic study of *texts*. Isn't that a problem?

Another potential problem would be that, as Herderian textual hermeneutics is reformulated by Friedrich Schleiermacher (1959, Duke/Forstman 1977a in English), one must not only feel one's way into a text but must "become" the author, "inhabit" the author's mind, and, while writing, also inhabit the mind of the "immediate reader." How does that happen, exactly? Is it some kind of mystical fusion of souls?

A third potential problem is that for both Herder and Schleiermacher, "feeling one's way into" a textual meaning always had to be supported by extensive linguistic, literary, and historical research. The idea was that a research-based understanding of an author's meaning was only possible because the researcher's reading of inert facts on the page was and is guided by the community, through *collectivized* feeling. The reader was to fill in the cognitive gaps left by the affective vagueness of feeling through research based on the guidance provided by communally organized feeling (see Robinson 2013b: ch. 6). Louis Roy's (1997: 217–18) intervention is important:

> Throughout his major writings, Schleiermacher consistently uses the word *Gefühl*, "feeling," to characterize prereflective consciousness. For him, *Gefühl* has a meaning different from ordinary feelings such as sensations, emotions, sentiments, or unconscious states, which are often subjectivistic. […]

> In the inner life of the human self, this stable feeling is by no means merely subjective, since it has to do as much with the general (*allgemeine*) as with the individual self-consciousness. By "general," Schleiermacher means that the experience (*Erfahrung*) is "expected of

everyone" (*jedem … zugemutet*, sec. 3.2). In Henrik Steffens's definition, borrowed by Schleiermacher, feeling is "the immediate presence of the whole, undivided personal experience" (sec. 3.2n). Far from being subjectivistic, this sense of personal existence is always intimately bound up with the awareness of the world and the awareness of God (secs. 30.1, 32.3).

What Roy fails to explain, however, presumably because Schleiermacher can't explain it either, is how being "always intimately bound up with the awareness of the world and the awareness of God" makes "this sense of personal existence" "far from […] subjectivistic." What exactly is "general (*allgemeine*) […] self-consciousness"? Calling "undivided personal experience" "the immediate presence of the whole" is really no solution: it just invokes an apparently mystical "immediate presence" without tracking where that "presence" comes from or how it emerges from psychosocial mediation to conjoin a community. Indeed hermeneutical theorists often allude to that "communal" or collective feeling without explanation, presumably on the assumption that we have all experienced it and so do not need to be walked through it; or perhaps because it is such a nebulous preconscious social ecology that theorists find it difficult to trace its contours and trajectories. As a result, Hans-Georg Gadamer (1960/1990, 188–201; transl. Weinsheimer/Marshall 1989, 184–95) famously critiqued Schleiermacherian hermeneutics on the grounds that Schleiermacher had apparently shifted midway through his decades-long process of theorization from a language-based ("grammatical") hermeneutics to a psychological hermeneutics, and "psychological" hermeneutics is mystical mumbo-jumbo.[5]

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5   It is in fact quite common for students of twentieth-century hermeneutics simply to take over the "subjectivizing" view of Schleiermacher's late hermeneutics—or even, by extension, of his hermeneutics

In fact there is no evidence that Schleiermacher made any such leap; but neither did he solve the apparent problem, or even recognize the problem. Common sense-based intuition says that people communicate and organize behavior either through language or not at all; "intuitively," therefore, Gadamer must be right. The subtraction of verbal communication from the hermeneutical equation must leave mysticism as the only "explanation."

In some sense the two-century intellectual history that I track here from Herder and Schleiermacher through Dilthey to Husserl and Merleau-Ponty and on finally to 4EA cognitive science is a concerted attempt to solve the *hows* of Herderian/Schleiermacherian hermeneutics. How is affect communalized? How does that communalized affect stabilize hermeneutical situations—the research-based events where the reader is expected to feel his or her way into the writer's intention and the writer is expected to feel her or his way into the reader's interpretation—and how does that stabilization facilitate reliable interpersonal and intergroup communication?

Setting aside that problematic for now, in the expectation that we will see a solution take shape over the course of this Introduction, let us turn to the specific strategies Schleiermacher proposed for translators—strategies that are grounded in that larger socioaffective framework that remained nebulous in his mind, and might have taken on greater clarity in his 1813 Academy address on the different methods of translating had he worked out the full vision, but

tout court—from Kimmerle (1959; transl. Duke/Forstman 1977b) and/or Gadamer (1960; transl. Weinsheimer/Marshall 1989) and present it as the truth about Schleiermacher; see e.g. DiCenso (1990: 83–85).

that are still worth a look in advance of the full hermeneutical-becoming-phenomenological-becoming-cognitivist history.

Everyone knows the general trajectory of the Academy address, of course, in its movement toward the binary choice between "bringing the author to the reader" (bad) and "taking the reader to the author" (good) (see Schleiermacher 1813/2002: 74; transl. Robinson 1997/2014: 229), since that is what Lawrence Venuti (1995: 20) has popularized with the terms "domesticating" and "foreignizing," respectively. What that popular story misses, however, is the specific *feeling*-based hermeneutical strategies that Schleiermacher outlines.

The basic situation in and through which the need for those strategies arises is that the translator is tasked with mediating between the affective-becoming-conative-becoming-cognitive (attempted) stabilizations of understanding effected by *two* communities—the source culture and the target culture—and that those stabilizations inevitably diverge and conflict. Schleiermacher's solution to that problem in his Academy address is that the target-textual representation of the source-cultural stabilization is only a feeling-based *Nachahmung/Nachbildung* ("simulation") (Schleiermacher 1813/2002: 76 in German, Robinson 1997/2014: 230 in English). Target readers should *feel* as if they were participating in a source-cultural stabilization, but they aren't, and can't be—at least not through the target text alone. They're participating in a target-cultural hermeneutical stabilization that simulates a source-cultural hermeneutical stabilization.

A foreignizing translation is one kind of simulation, with a simulated *Gefühl des Fremden* ("Feeling of the Foreign") mixed in as the hermeneutical norm; a domesticating translation is another kind of simulation, with an overwhelmingly local flavor that is equally simulated and equally normativized, though in the opposite direction. Schleiermacher's idea is that

what the foreignizing translator simulates for (and ideally in) the target reader is the *Gefühl* ("feeling") a non-native source reader has of reading the source text with only a mediocre command of the source language (Schleiermacher 1813/2002: 78; Robinson 1997/2014: 231): to that sort of reader, the source text always *feels foreign*, and so the simulated reproduction of that text in the target language should feel foreign as well. What the domesticating translator simulates, by contrast—though Schleiermacher condemns this latter simulation in extreme, illogical, and even hysterical ways[6]—is the *Gefühl* ("feeling") the polyglot has in reading the same source text: to that sort of reader, the source language always *feels familiar*, and so the simulated reproduction of the source text feels comfortably familiar as well.

The argumentative trajectory through Schleiermacher's Academy address that lays the groundwork for the A in a 4EA cognitive science of translation, in other words, runs from (1) the socioaffective stabilization of communication (mutual understanding through reliable intending and interpreting) in two cultures, the domestic and the foreign, and (2) the translator's simulation for and in the target reader of the affective responses various non-native source-reader types have to the source text, to (3) the binary choice between domesticating and foreignizing. The almost exclusive focus on (3) in discussions of Schleiermacher over the past few decades has tended to occlude (1) and (2) almost entirely; but then Schleiermacher himself only mentions (2) in passing, and deals with (1) only in the vaguest possible terms. My *Schleiermacher's Icoses* (Robinson 2013b) is an attempt to outline

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6   See Robinson (2013b: ch. 2) for a close reading of Schleiermacher's "extreme, illogical, and even hysterical" attacks on domesticating translation.

(and critique) the entire trajectory; but that discussion lacked the two-century aftermath that I'll be tracking here.

3   A Collectivized A and a First Step Toward One or More Es in 4EA: Dilthey's *Zusammenhang des Lebens*

Wilhelm Dilthey (1833–1911) was the renowned holder of Hegel's chair in philosophy at the University of Berlin (1883–1908) and the nineteenth century's premier advocate of Schleiermacherian hermeneutics. Some even regard him as the founder of modern hermeneutics, since by the 1860s Schleiermacher was largely forgotten and Dilthey recovered and revived his work. (He was Schleiermacher's first biographer and editor of his letters.) Dilthey's hermeneutical project, to which he devoted his entire academic career, was a complex all-fronts theorization of the philosophy of the humanities, based on the lived experiential subjectivity of historically embedded and embodied hermeneuts (all of us). That collectively organized and narrativized body of lived experience was what Dilthey called *der Zusammenhang des Lebens* ("the nexus of life"). It might be assimilated to German Romantic thinking of 'culture' or to post-Kantian thinking of social constructivism—but the phenomenological formation and structure that he elaborates for the *Lebenszusammenhang*, while here and there a bit clunky, was extraordinarily influential for Edmund Husserl and his student Martin Heidegger, and, as we'll see in my article at the end of the special issue, for Walter Benjamin as well.

Complex and tensile as it is conceptually, Dilthey's *Zusammenhang des Lebens* is crippled by the traditional dualistic thinking of subject and object and of the spiritual and the physical. The most radical (and influential) part of the treatise

is Part III, titled "Plan for the Continuation of the Formation of the Historical World in the Human Sciences" (transl. Makkreel/Oman 2002), which begins with a series of "Drafts for a Critique of Historical Reason." This is the first paragraph:

> Der Zusammenhang der geistigen Welt geht im Subjekt auf, und es ist die Bewegung des Geistes bis zur Bestimmung des Bedeutungszusammenhanges dieser Welt, welche die einzelnen logischen Vorgänge miteinander verbindet. So ist einerseits diese geistige Welt die Schöpfung des auffassenden Subjektes, andererseits aber ist die Bewegung des Geistes darauf gerichtet, ein objektives Wissen in ihr zu erreichen. So treten wir nun dem Problem gegenüber, wie der Aufbau der geistigen Welt im Subjekt ein Wissen der geistigen Wirklichkeit möglich mache. (Dilthey 1910/1927: 191)

> The nexus [M/O: "connectedness"] of the world of human spirit dawns in the subject and yet there is a progression of spirit that connects the particular logical processes whereby the overall meaning of this world is determined. On the one hand, this world of spirit is the creation of the apprehending subject; on the other hand, there is a progression of spirit directed at an objective knowledge of the world. Thus we confront the problem of how the formation of the world in the subject makes possible the knowledge of spiritual reality. (Transl. Makkreel/Oman 2002: 213; my modification)

On the one hand, spirit and subjectivity; on the other, logical determinations of the meaning of the world and objective knowledge of the world. His insistent concern is to distinguish the humanities—in German the *Geisteswissenschaften*, or "spiritual sciences"—from the natural sciences; the spiritual sciences not only study spirit but are guided by spirit—not a divine spirit but the human spirit. (*Geist* can also mean "mind" and "ghost.") Put differently, the nexus of the spiritual or mental world (*der Zusammenhang der geistigen Welt*) pervades the nexus of life (*der Zusammenhang des Lebens*), which is the organized socially constructed world that interests and fuels the humanities; there is also a *Zusammenhang* or nexus of the physical world, which pervades the natural sciences. He

doesn't expressly label the latter a *Zusammenhang des Totes* ("nexus of death"); but it is clear that spirit is equated strongly with life, and the natural sciences study things lacking in that spirit. (Biology studies living things, but tends to study them reductivistically, reducing them to mechanisms.)

And yet, as he says, there is also a "Bewegung des Geistes darauf gerichtet, ein objektives Wissen in ihr zu erreichen" ("a progression of spirit directed at an objective knowledge of the world"). In what sense is that humanistic knowledge of the world to achieve objectivity? He delves into that project in the next paragraph:

> Das Verstehen ist ein Wiederfinden des Ich im Du; der Geist findet sich auf immer höheren Stufen von Zusammenhang wieder; diese Seligkeit des Geistes im Ich, im Du, in jedem Subjekt einer Gemeinschaft, in jedem System der Kultur, schließlich in der Totalität des Geistes und der Universalgeschichte macht das Zusammenwerken der verschiedenen Leistungen in den Geisteswissenschaften möglich. Das Subjekt des Wissens ist hier eins mit einem Gegenstand, und dieser ist auf allen Stufen seiner Objektivation derselbe. Wenn durch dies Verfahren die Objektivität der im Subjekt geschaffenen geistigen Welt erkannt wird, entsteht die Frage, wieviel dies beitragen kann zur Lösung des Erkenntnisproblems überhaupt. (Dilthey 1910/1927: 191)

> Understanding is a rediscovery of the I in the Thou; spirit rediscovers itself at ever higher nexus-levels [M/O: "levels of connectedness"]; this selfsameness of spirit in the I and the Thou, in each subject of a community, in each cultural system, and finally, in the totality of spirit and universal history, makes possible the cooperation of the various functions of the human sciences. The knowing subject is, here, one with its object, and this holds for all stages of its objectification. If, in this way, we can recognize the objectivity of the world of human spirit as created in the subject, then the question arises how much this can contribute to solving the problem of epistemology in general. (Transl. Makkreel/Oman 2002: 213; my modification)

Der Zusammenhang, which Makkreel/Oman here plausibly translate "connectedness," is morphologically a "together-hang"; *das Zusammenwerken*, which they equally plausibly translate "cooperation," is morphologically a "together-working." Implicit in Dilthey's repetition of *Zusammen-* "to-gether-" compounds throughout the book is that any one of them can plausibly and usefully be mapped onto any other. Here we can assume that each together-hang (Dilthey's main keyword in the book) is a together-working. To hang together is to work together. The 'coherence' or 'connectedness' of the *Zusammenhang* (and both of those are common translations of the German noun) is achieved through working together. I have my own structured psychic nexus, and you have yours; but then as we work together I find my nexus embedded in yours, and you find yours embedded in mine, and our nexuses begin to seem to hang together. The more we work together with others, the more extensive the together-hangs or nexuses become, in the nexus-levels of "this selfsameness of spirit in the I and the Thou, in each subject of a community, in each cultural system, and finally, in the totality of spirit and universal history." That *Selbigkeit* "selfsameness" makes academic *Zusammenwerken* "cooperation" possible among the various humanistic (inter)disciplines; but it was *Zusammenwer-ken* "working together" in social circles (including academic ones) that made the levels of the *Zusammenhang* possible in the first place.

Notice there not only the oneness of the subject with its object but Dilthey's explanation of that oneness in terms of "stages of objectification." Does that mean, as social-constructivists plausibly tend to say, that our socially constructed world *feels* to us like objective reality? Or does it mean that the subjectivity of the *Zusammenhang des Lebens* ("nexus of life") and the socially constructed world to which it seems to refer

is a reified phantasm? Surely it doesn't mean that the "spiritual" subjectivity of culture, of social construction, of the humanities as a structured map of reality somehow *becomes* an objectivity, an empirical object such as science studies, or what Kant called *der Ding an sich* ("the thing in itself")? The next three stages in this history, from Husserl through Merleau-Ponty to 4EA cognitive science, would say that 'the subject is one with its object' simply demonstrates the uselessness of the binary discourse of subject and object. Merleau-Ponty will say that "le monde est fait de l'étoffe même du corps" (Merleau-Ponty 1961/1964: 19) ("the world is made of the very stuff of the body," transl. Dallery 1964: 163); 4EA cognitivists will speak of embeddedness and enactivity; all of them are essentially saying that X is one with Y, this with that, but with far more flexibility and mutability than the dualistic discourse of subjects and objects will allow Dilthey. I will recur to the question of what makes a *Zusammenhang des Lebens/Erlebnisses* ("nexus of life/experience") objective or 'factical' in my article in this volume (pp. 243–316).

The spiritual-physical dualism trips him up as well:

> Auf dem Boden des Physischen tritt das geistige Leben auf; es ist der Evolution als deren höchste Stufe auf der Erde eingeordnet. Die Bedingungen, unter denen es auftritt, entwickelt die Naturwissenschaft, indem sie in den physischen Phänomenen eine Ordnung nach Gesetzen entdeckt. Unter den phänomenal gegebenen Körpern findet sich der menschliche, und mit ihm ist hier in einer nicht weiter angebbaren Weise das Erleben verbunden. Mit dem Erleben aber treten wir aus der Welt der physischen Phänomene in das Reich der geistigen Wirklichkeit. Es ist der Gegenstand der Geisteswissenschaften, und die Besinnung über diesen […] und ihr Erkenntniswert ist ganz unabhängig vom Studium ihrer physischen Bedingungen. (Dilthey 1910/1927: 196)

> The life of spirit manifests itself on the base of what is physical and represents the highest evolutionary stage on earth. The conditions under which the life of spirit emerges are developed by natural sci-

ence in that it discovers a lawful order in physical phenomena. The human body appears among other phenomenologically given bodies, but it has a special relation to lived experience that cannot be further specified. With lived experience we move from the world of physical phenomena into the realm of spiritual reality, which is the subject matter of the humanities and of reflection on them […] The cognitive value of this realm is fully independent of the study of their physical conditions. (Transl. Makkreel/Oman 2002: 217)

The spiritual-physical binary is of course another version of the mind-body binary, which is another version of the subject-object binary. Dilthey struggles valiantly against the limitations of that dualizing discourse, but with very mixed results. The physical is the base and the spiritual rests on that base, as "the highest evolutionary stage on earth." The natural sciences study physical bodies and other physical phenomena, and while the spiritual sciences (a literal translation of *die Geisteswissenschaften* "the humanities," which Makkreel/Oman misleadingly translate "the human sciences"[7]) study the hu-

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7   Makkreel/Rodi (2002: 4), as editors of the English translations of the three parts of Dilthey's *Aufbau/Formation*, opine that "the human sciences include both the humanities and the social sciences, and each provides the opportunity to study human behavior, interaction, and cooperation up close. Some human sciences such as psychology and history are primarily descriptive; others such as economics and sociology are more systematic." I would disagree here. "The human sciences" are loosely affiliated with the humanities, but draw their empirical methodology from the natural sciences, especially evolutionary psychology, evolutionary biology, biochemistry, and the neurosciences. Any discipline that uses scientific method to quantify human reality empirically is by definition ruled beyond the pale of *die Geisteswissenschaften* ("the humanities"). History is emphatically one of the humanities, and, to the extent that it is sometimes included among the social sciences, it is a humanistic social science. There is a humanistic psychology (Freud, Skinner), a humanistic sociology (Znaniecki, Goffman, Bourdieu), a humanistic anthropology (Mead, Bateson, Turner), etc. Because the word 'science' in English implies

man spirit *and not* the human body, the human body "has a special relation to lived experience that cannot be further specified." That is just sad. That special relation to lived experience will figure strongly in Husserl's last work, and even more brilliantly in Merleau-Ponty's last work, and will be most intricately specified in 4EA cognitive science. Dilthey found himself unable to go there, and unwilling to specify that that special relation could not be further specified *by him*. I will, however, return in passing to this sentence in my contribution to the volume (pp. 243–270), as *nicht weiter angebbare Weise* ("not further specifiable way") is a kind of negative affordance, like Walter Benjamin's *unübersetzbar* ("untranslatable") and *unmittelbar* ("immediable").

Dilthey's model is also strongly supported by the *Gefühl/* feeling-based hermeneutics of German Romanticism. Dilthey says specifically that logic and epistemology have for too long been taken to be the foundation of "die Wirklichkeitserkenntnis" (Dilthey 1910/1927: 45) ("the conceptual cognition of reality," transl. Makkreel/Oman 2002: 66), and that a hermeneutical rethinking and reframing of that scientific orientation must begin by grasping "die elementaren Operationen, die dem diskursiven Denken voraufliegen" (ibid.: 45) ("the elementary operations that precede discursive thought"; ibid.: 66) as the true foundation of science. Those elementary operations that are "für die logischen Formen bestimmend" (ibid.: 45) ("determinative for the logical forms"; ibid.: 66), he says, would include "Bedingungen aus dem Strukturzusammenhang des gegenständlichen Auffassens, Fühlens und Wollens" (ibid.: 45) ("conditions from the structural nexus of

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the use of scientific method, 'humanistic social science' seems internally contradictory; *Wissenschaft* in German covers all research methodologies, and should not be reflexibly translated into English as 'science.'

the objective grasp, of feeling and of willing"; ibid.: 66; translation modified). If we were to simplify that formulation and say that the human haptic, affective, and conative orientation to the world conditions what we take to be reality, however, Dilthey would warn that "dagegen ist es ein Doppelsinn des Wortes, wenn wir vom Gefühl der Ähnlichkeit, dem Gefühl der Wirklichkeit reden" (ibid.: 47) ("it is an equivocation to speak of a feeling of similarity, a feeling of reality"; ibid.: 68). In what follows it becomes clear that he does not mean that the human haptic, affective, and conative orientation to the world *does not* condition what we take to be reality—only that it's much more complicated than that.

Just how complicated, of course, will become increasingly pressing in the phenomenological ruminations of Edmund Husserl and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and *a fortiori* in 4EA cognitive science; it does seem inescapable here that Dilthey is groping for something like enactive embodiment, and so (as it seems to us in hindsight) gesturing forward to that future formulation. He is himself, however, not quite up to the task. He remains over-committed to an atomistic logic of definition, so that certain phenomena that seem to resemble feelings are not feelings. Awareness of an obligation in the carrying out of a course of action, for example, may *feel* like a feeling, but if it partakes of neither pleasure nor pain it's not a feeling—even though, he adds tellingly, "so leicht auch aus dem Zusammenhang des Lebens ein solches Gefühl des Schmerzes, der Einschränkung hintritt" (Dilthey 1910/1927: 47) ("such a feeling of pain or of restriction can readily insinuate itself from the nexus of life" (transl. Makkreel/Oman 2002: 68; translation modified). Given the hermeneutical protophenomenology and indeed protoenactivism of Dilthey's keyword *der Zusammenhang des Lebens* ("the nexus of life"), it is unfortunate that Makkreel/Oman opted to translate it here

as "the context of life," as if it were simply a matter of being alive in a "context"; but Dilthey himself has only barely seized the tail end of an insight that Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, and the 4EA cognitivists will develop brilliantly over the century to come. For Dilthey *the individual* feels no pleasure or pain in the *Innewerden* ("reflexive awareness") of an obligation, so it's not a feeling—but those feelings can *hintreten* ("step in" or "insinuate themselves" as I've translated the verb; Makkreel/ Oman have "supervene") from the *collective* nexus of life, or from Husserl's life-world. By Merleau-Ponty and 4EA cognitive science, the recognition has dawned that "the world is made of the very stuff of the body" (transl. Dallery 1964: 163)—that it is precisely by interacting with the environment and codetermining its affordances that the individual contributes to the formation of a collective cultural *Zusammenhang des Lebens* "nexus of life."

That later working-out of Dilthey's insight would suggest that he is overly bent on distinguishing not only feeling from reflexive awareness but the individual from the life-world:

> Und wie hier Innewerden von Gefühl nicht zureichend unterschieden ist, so wird für die Erlebnisse, in denen ein Fremdes, sei es wirklich oder erdichtet, verstanden wird, der Ausdruck Nachfühlen als zu eng verworfen werden müssen: es handelt sich hier vielmehr um ein Nacherleben, in welchem der ganze psychische Zusammenhang eines fremden Daseins von dem Einzelgegebenen aus aufgefaßt wird. (Dilthey 1910/1927: 47)

> And because reflexive awareness is not sufficiently distinguished from feeling here, the expression "re-feeling" must be rejected as too narrow for those lived experiences in which another's state, be it actual or fictitious, is understood. What is involved here is rather a re-experiencing in which the entire psychic nexus of another's existence is apprehended on the basis of a particular given. (Transl. Makkreel/ Oman 2002: 68-69)

Note the explosive potential there: "die Erlebnisse, in denen ein Fremdes [Gefühl], sei es wirklich oder erdichtet, verstanden wird" refers not just to the lived experiences in which "another's state" (real or imagined) is understood, as Makkreel/Oman render it, but to the understanding of *any foreign feeling*, any feeling that does not originate in the individual. That could indeed include empathy for another human being—the feeling of another's affective body state, which, because it is other, and only *sensed* or intuited by the individual, ostensibly doesn't count as a feeling. We now know, of course, that the mirror neurons in the human brain make that nice line between my feeling and your feeling extraordinarily difficult to draw: feelings tend to 'flow' mimetically between and among bodies.

And pay particular attention to the telling parenthetical qualification *sei es wirklich oder erdichtet*, which Makkreel/Oman accurately render "actual or fictitious," but could also be "real or imagined," "real or invented," "real or fabricated," or even something like "real or poeticized." The question Dilthey fails to ask is: who is the *Erdichter*? If the *fremdes Gefühl* ("foreign/alien feeling") is *erdichtet* ("imagined"), who is doing the imagining? Conceivably it could even be an actual *fremder Dichter* ("foreign poet"): you read a poem in a foreign language or in translation and are affected by the feelings it fleshes forth, even though they aren't real but were invented by the poet (and/or the translator). But of course you are imagining and fabricating them as well. As you read you are participating in the enactive fleshing forth of those feelings.

To my knowledge Dilthey never mentioned his great mentor Schleiermacher's Academy address on translation, where as we've seen the translator is described as involved in a *Nachahmung* or *Nachbildung* of 'the' source reader's experience of the source text, and thus, presumably, of the source

author's *Erdichtung* ("imagination, invention, fabrication") of *fremde Gefühle* ("foreign/alien feelings"). What Dilthey is describing here, however, could plausibly be read as an extension of Schleiermacher's focus on the translator to the target reader, who would thus be understood as participating in a *Nachfühlen* ("re-feeling") or *Nacherleben* ("re-experiencing") of the translator's *Nachahmen/Nachbilden* ("simulating") of those feelings. Engaging that scene through 4EA cognitive science, we might want to reframe it not so much as a series of re-experiencings but as co-experiencing. Or, coming out of the Extended Mind Thesis (Clark/Chalmers 1998; see Robinson 2013b), we might want to reframe it as what Hanna Risku and Florian Windhager (2013/2015) call "extended translation."

Even more radically, in fact, we might identify the *fremdes Gefühl* as co-experienced with the nonhuman environment. In what John Ruskin called "the pathetic fallacy" (1856/1972: n.p.), for example, we may co-experience the cheerful burbling of a brook or the mournful soughing of the pines, 'fallaciously' but all-too-humanly projecting affect onto nonhuman entities. Or, to return to translating and interpreting, the interpreter's work will be shaped in unsuspected ways by co-experiencing the space in which s/he works: the conference interpreter's auditorium, the liaison interpreter's factory floor or city street, or even mournfully soughing pines. The in-house translator's work will be shaped by co-experiencing the workplace, the freelancer's work by the home workspace, or the coffee shop, or the airport gate area, etc. It seems silly to say that we project 'feelings' onto workspaces, of course; but we do co-experience those spaces, and we do feel that shared experience.

Dilthey comes closer to recognizing and theorizing all this later in his section on feeling:

So ist das Gefühl gleichsam das Organ für die Auffassung unserer eigenen wie fremder Individualitäten, ja durch die Einfühlung in die Natur von Eigenheiten derselben, die kein Wissen erreicht. Die dem Wissen unzugängliche Tiefe scheint sich aufzutun in ihm. Auf der Grundlage des gegenständlichen Auffassens vollzieht sich gleichsam eine Wendung in diese Tiefe. Jenes bestimmte vom Gefühl aus den Gegenstand, gleichsam vorwärts dringend ihn zu erreichen; die Gefühle messen inmitten der Wechselwirkung unserer Selbst und der Gegenstände die Kraft unseres Selbst, den Druck der Welt, die Energie der Personen um uns her. (Dilthey 1910/1927: 52–53)

Thus feeling is, as it were, the organ for the grasping of our own and other/foreign individualities and, through empathy with nature, even for the grasping of properties of nature that no knowledge can reach. Depths that are inaccessible to knowledge appear to reveal themselves in feeling. On the basis of objective grasp is effectuated, as it were, a turn into these depths. The grasp determined the object from the perspective of feeling, pressing forward to reach it, as it were; in the midst of the interplay between ourselves and objects, feelings measure the productive force of the self, the pressure of the world, and the energy of the persons around us. (Transl. Makkreel/Oman 2002: 74; translation modified)

Makkreel/Oman misleadingly render *eine Wendung in diese Tiefe* there as "this turn inwards"; I have retranslated that literally as "a turn into these depths."[8] Those depths to which feelings

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8   It strikes me that claiming to have "retranslated that literally as 'a turn into these depths'" may provoke the protest: "how can 'a turn into these depths' be a literal translation, when it is completely idiomatic in English?" Yes, occasionally translating a phrase literally produces the closest natural target-language equivalent. It also strikes me that the assumption that an idiomatic translation can't possibly be literal is conditioned by *der Zusammenhang des Übersetzens* ("the [normative] nexus of translation"). Because it's so rare, we assume that a literal translation that is also the closest natural equivalent must be impossible—and the slight feeling of unease or discomfort or reluctance that we experience at that apparent cognitive dissonance is a good example of what Dilthey describes as "aus dem Zusammenhang des Lebens ein solches Gefühl des Schmerzes, der Einschränkung hin-

give us access may be in ourselves, but may also be in other people, in nature, and in built spaces. *Die Einfühlung in die Natur* ("empathy with nature") is a much more empathic account of our felt co-experience with nature than Ruskin's term "the pathetic fallacy": sure, logically (and ontologically) it's fallacious to think that a brook might be cheerful and pines might be mournful, but the empathic co-affective co-experience ("feeling extended") of nature is a part of the Romantic *Zusammenhang des Lebens* ("nexus of life"), and one that might ideally condition a far more sustainable relationship with nature than the Anthropocene—that Enlightenment/ neoliberal *Zusammenhang des Lebens* ("nexus of life") based on cold rational utility—has so far proved capable of.

I have also retranslated *das gegenständliche Auffassen*, which in Makkreel/Oman is "objective apprehension," as "objective grasp." The objects in question for Dilthey were not stable material objects to be "apprehended" empirically and studied scientifically but centuries of practical knowledge grasped through "common sense." As is common in English translations of German philosophical works, Makkreel/ Oman want to elevate common body-related words like *auffassen* "to grasp" into lofty philosophical terms like "apprehension"; in this case that means stranding other embodied activities, like *vorwärts dringen ihn zu erreichen* ("pressing forward to reach it [the object]") without necessarily actually laying hands on it, in the easily ignored peripheries of analogy. Reaching into those depths of nature in haptic quest of objects is not only fully embodied but, as the 4EA cognitive scientists will begin saying nearly a century after Dilthey, em-

tritt" (Dilthey 1910/1927: 47) ("such a feeling of pain or of restriction insinuate[ing] itself from the nexus of life," transl. Makkreel/ Oman 2002: 68; translation modified from "[…] can readily supervene from the context of life").

bedded and enactive as well; and the reach is explicitly launched *vom Gefühl aus* ("from out of feeling"), which is to say, out of affect.

4 A Second Step Toward the Es in 4EA: Husserl's *Lebenswelt*

It is well known (see Carr 1986: 56–57 and 74–77) that Dilthey's 1910 concept of the *Zusammenhang des Lebens* ("nexus of life") was a primary inspiration for the theorization of *die Lebenswelt* ("the life-world") in the last major work by Edmund Husserl (1859–1938), *Der Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und transzendentale Phänomenologie*—written in 1936, first published posthumously in German in 1954, and translated by David Carr in 1970 as *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology.* That monograph is generally taken to be Husserl's masterwork, and the life-world is its defining keyword, used 300 times in the book. The life-world is the world we all live in, in the phenomenological sense that we experience it together, and bring its "objectivity" into being through intersubjective lived experience. Because human beings are constantly generating the life-world by living (in) it collectively, by sharing the having of it with others, it is a dynamic horizon that changes as we live it and it lives with us.

A longish quotation or two will not only demonstrate the organic *Zusammenhänge* ("connections") between Dilthey's *Zusammenhang des Lebens* and 4EA cognitive science but begin to tie together the disparate strands of this history:

> So sind wir konkret leiblich, aber nicht nur leiblich, als volle Ich-Subjekte, je als das volle Ich-der-Mensch im Wahrnehmungsfeld u.s.w., und, wie weit immer gefaßt, im Bewußtseinsfeld. Also wie immer Welt als universaler Horizont, als einheitliches Universum der seienden Objekte bewußt ist, wir, je Ich der Mensch und wir

miteinander, gehören als miteinander in der Welt Lebende eben zur Welt, die eben in diesem „Miteinander-leben" unsere, die uns bewußtseinsmäßig seiend-geltende Welt ist. Wir, als im wachen Weltbewußtsein Lebende, sind ständig aktiv auf dem Grunde der passiven Welthabe, wir sind von da, von im Bewußtseinsfeld vorgegebenen Objekten affiziert, den oder jenen sind wir, unseren Interessen gemäß, zugewendet, mit ihnen in verschiedenen Weisen aktiv beschäftigt; sie sind in unseren Akten „thematische" Objekte. Beispielsweise nenne ich das betrachtende Auslegen der Eigenschaftlichkeit des wahrnehmungsmäßig Erscheinenden; oder unser zusammenfassendes, beziehendes, aktiv identifizierendes und unterscheidendes Tun; oder auch unser aktives Bewerten, unser Entwerfen von Vorhaben, uns er handelndes die vorgehabten Wege und Ziele Verwirklichen. (Husserl 1936/1954: 110–11)

Thus we are concretely in the field of perception, etc., and in the field of consciousness, however broadly we may conceive this, through our living body, but not only in this way, as full ego-subjects, each of us as the full-fledged "I-the-human." Thus in whatever way we may be conscious of the world as universal horizon, as coherent universe of existing objects, we, each "I-the-human" and all of us together, belong to the world as living with one another in the world; and the world is our world, valid for our consciousness as existing precisely through this "living together." We, as living in wakeful world-consciousness, are constantly active on the basis of our passive having of the world; it is from there, by objects pregiven in consciousness, that we are affected; it is to this or that object that we pay attention, according to our interests; with them we deal actively in different ways; through our acts they are "thematic" objects. (Carr 1970: 108–9; translation modified slightly)

It is clear there just how much Husserl took from Dilthey. For Husserl being "concretely in the field of perception, etc., and in the field of consciousness, however broadly we may conceive this, through our living body" is very close to what for Dilthey is being in the nexus of life or of lived experience, and there perceiving not empirical objects directly—Kant's *Ding an sich* "thing in itself"—but *Nachfühlen/Nacherleben*, or what Dilthey elsewhere calls *ein Nachbilden des Schaffens* (1910/

1927: 220), "a simulation/re-creation of creation," which exists in "the field of consciousness" and is experienced "through our living body." This also means being "conscious of the world as universal horizon, as coherent [*einheitliches*] universe of existing objects," which is to say as *objects existing coherently* (*zusammenhängende Objekte*, as Dilthey would say) not in extrahuman materiality but in our understanding of them. In the same way, for Dilthey "Erlebnis bezeichnet hier jede Art von Verbindung einzelner Erlebnisse in Gegenwart und in Erinnerung" (1910/1927: 221) ("'lived experience' designates every kind of linking of specific experiences in the present and in memory," transl. Makkreel/Oman 2002: 242), and "Ausdruck einen Phantasievorgang, in welchem das Erlebnis hineinscheint in die historisch fortentwickelte Welt der Töne" (ibid.: 221) ("'expression' designates an imaginative process in which lived experience illuminates the historically evolved world of tones"; ibid.: 242). Just as for Dilthey the hermeneutical nexus or intertwining of life is the "autobiographical" phenomenology of the individual's entire life as experienced historically, so too for Husserl the life-world is the total experience of "each 'I-the-human'"; and as for Dilthey "das Erlebnis hineinscheint in die historisch fortentwickelte Welt der Töne, in der alle Mittel, Ausdruck zu sein, sich in der historischen Kontinuität der Tradition verbunden ist" (ibid.: 221) ("lived experience illuminates the historically evolved world of tones, in which all the ways of being expressive have been connected in the historical continuity of the tradition"; ibid.: 242), so too for Husserl, even more explicitly than in Dilthey, "we, […] all of us together, belong to the world as living with one another in the world; and the world is our world, valid for our consciousness as existing precisely through this 'living together.'"

There are also hints here of extended and embedded enactivity: "it is from there, by objects pregiven in consciousness, that we are affected; it is to this or that object that we pay attention, according to our interests; with them we deal actively in different ways; through our acts they are 'thematic' objects." It's not quite clear there how those objects *came to be* "pregiven in consciousness"; that is the etiology of enactivity that Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1961/1964; Dallery 1964 in English) will explore in brilliant detail in "Eye and Mind," and that Varela/Thompson/Rosch (1991) will first theorize as enactivity and Clark/Chalmers (1998) will begin to explore as extended mind (see Robinson 2013a). The 4EA radical embodied cognitive science for which Chemero (2009) advocates would insist that the "we-subjectivity" of which Husserl writes includes not just all humans but our relational engagements with the spaces/places/environment(s) in which we live and function; that is not yet spelled out here, in 1936.

Husserl's anticipation of embodied embeddedness also seems to hint at affect, at Herderian/Schleiermacherian *Gefühl* ("feeling"), which is always an intensely extended production of two or more living bodies. This returns us via Brian Massumi to Spinoza, who "defined the body in terms of 'relations of movement and rest.' He wasn't referring to actual, extensive movements or stases. He was referring to a body's *capacity* to enter into relations of movement and rest. This capacity he spoke of as a *power* (or potential) to affect or be affected. The issue, after sensation, perception, and memory, is *affect*" (Massumi 2002: 15). And those "relations of movement and rest" were effectively transitions from one event to the next, which in turn were "accompanied by a variation in capacity" (ibid.), affective shifts in the bodily intensity of the experience of change. Indeed "for Spinoza, the body was one with its transitions" (ibid.). Those transitions are specifically

felt, "experienced" in the sense of being mapped affectively-becoming-cognitively, but mostly nonconsciously.

It's not quite clear in the Husserl passage, however, whether the "thematics" of this phenomenological organization and mobilization of objects (and "the world") for and through and as our activity has what Wilhelm Dilthey called *eine Richtung* (1910/1927: 221) ("a directionality," transl. Makkreel/Oman 2002: 241). A follow-up quotation from the next page may make that clearer:

> Selbstverständlich gilt das nicht nur für mich, das je einzelne Ich, sondern wir im Miteinanderleben haben Welt im Miteinander vorgegeben, als die für uns seiend-geltende, zu der wir im Miteinander auch, zur Welt als Welt für uns alle, als der in diesem Seinssinn vorgegebenen, gehören. Und als im wachen Leben immerzu fungierend, sind wir auch miteinander fungierend, in mannigfachen Weisen des im Miteinander Betrachtens gemeinsam vorgegebener Objekte, miteinander Denkens, miteinander Bewertens, Vorhabens und Handelns. Hierbei also auch derjenige Wandel der Thematik, in der die irgendwie ständig fungierende Wir-Subjektivität thematisch gegenständlich wird, wobei auch die Akte, in denen sie fungiert, thematisch werden, obschon immer mit einem Rest, der unthematisch, der sozusagen in Anonymität bleibt, nämlich als die für diese Thematik fungierenden Reflexionen. (Husserl 1936/1954: 111)

> Obviously this is true not only for me, the individual ego; rather we, in living together, have the world pre-given in this together, belong, the world as world for all, pre-given with this ontic meaning. Constantly functioning in wakeful life, we also function together, in the manifold ways of considering, together, objects pregiven to us in common, thinking together, valuing, planning, acting together. Here we find also that particular thematic alternation in which the we-subjectivity, somehow constantly functioning, becomes a thematic object, whereby the acts through which it functions also become thematic, though always with a residuum which remains unthematic—remains, so to speak, anonymous—namely, the reflections which are functioning in connection with this theme. (Carr 1970: 109)

A "theme" is a recurring idea or motif; the directionality that Dilthey mentions is a meaningful sequencing of such recurrences, based on the kind of recursive repetition in which the anticipation of events to come brings current events into alignment with the sequence. What Carr translates as a "thematic alternation" in Husserl's German is *derjenige Wandel der Thematik* ("that change/transformation of the theme"): the only missing element in Husserl's borrowing from Dilthey's directionality is the collective imposition of a *coherent sequence* on that *Wandel* ("change/transformation"). A narrativity might in fact be thought of as one type of thematics—a sequenced type. And it is significant there that the collective participatory construction of a life-world not only thematizes objects as meaningfully available for the organization and facilitation (affordance) of action but thematizes the we-subjectivity as well, as meaningfully vailable for the performance of those thematized acts. As we'll see in my "Affordances" article, this is very close to Anthony Chemero's (2009) theorization of affordances as a key relational element in radical embodied cognitive science.

5   A Final Step and Arrival at 4EA Cognition: Maurice Merleau-Ponty on Visuality

The last step in the two-century journey from a 30-year-old Herder in 1774 to the development of 4EA cognitive science in the early 1990s comes in 1961, with the last piece of writing that the great French phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908–1961) saw in print before he died: "L'œil et l'esprit" (1961/1964), or "Eye and Mind" (transl. Dallery 1964). This long essay—also published in book form in France—is in fact widely considered to be Merleau-Ponty's most brilliant contribution to the phenomenological thought that three

decades later led to the birth of 4EA cognitive science, as Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson, and Eleanor Rosch (1991) developed their theory of enactivism out of Merleau-Ponty's late work in *The Embodied Mind*. To what extent "Eye and Mind" was directly inspired by Husserl's last book is not clear; we do know, however, that Merleau-Ponty read substantial parts of the unpublished *Krisis* manuscript in 1939, the year after the founding phenomenologist's death.

One of the interesting facts about that intellectual trajectory is that in "Eye and Mind" Merleau-Ponty's vision sounds mystical, but as later cognitive scientists develop it, it comes to seem like painfully obvious common sense. For example:

> Tout ce que je vois par principe est à ma portée, au moins à la portée de mon regard, relevé sur la carte du « je peux ». Chacune des deux cartes est complète. Le monde visible et celui de mes projets moteurs sont des parties totales du même Être. (Merleau-Ponty 1961/1964: 17)

> Everything I see is on principle within my reach, at least within reach of my sight, and is marked upon the map of the "I can." Each of the two maps is complete. The visible world and the world of my motor projects are each total parts of the same Being. (Transl. Dallery 1964: 162)

"La carte du « je peux »" ("the map of the 'I can'") is a metaphor for something—but what? Where does that map exist? What is the "Être" ("Being") of which those two worlds are "parties totales" ("total parts")? The key term that Varela/Thompson/Rosch (1991) assign the theory in *The Embodied Mind* is "enactivism," which they explicitly coin in order to "emphasize the growing conviction that cognition is not the representation of a pre-given world by a pre-given mind but is rather the enactment of a world and a mind on the basis of a history of the variety of actions that a being in the world performs" (Varela et al. 1991: 9). As Thompson later develops the theory, it is predicated on

the deep continuity of life and mind. Where there is life there is mind, and mind in its most articulated forms belongs to life. Life and mind share a core set of formal or organizational properties, and the formal or organizational properties distinctive of mind are an enriched version of those fundamental to life. More precisely, the *self-organizing* features of mind are an enriched version of the self-organizing features of life. The self-producing or "autopoietic" organization of biological life already implies cognition, and this incipient mind finds sentient expression in the self-organizing dynamics of action, perception, and emotion, as well as in the self-moving flow of time-consciousness.

From this perspective, mental life is also bodily life and is situated in the world. The roots of mental life lie not simply in the brain, but ramify through the body and environment. Our mental lives involve our body and the world beyond the surface membrane of our organism, and therefore cannot be reduced simply to brain processes inside the head. (Thompson 2007: ix)

Strikingly, one can easily arrange a cento of "purple"—apparently mystical—passages from "Eye and Mind" and juxtapose them with passages by cognitive scientists saying almost the exact things a half century later (typically without quoting or even mentioning Merleau-Ponty):

Passage 1:

[Les choses] sont une annexe ou un prolongement d[u corps] lui-même, elles sont incrustées dans sa chair, elles font partie de sa définition pleine et le monde est fait de l'étoffe même du corps. (Merleau-Ponty 1961/1964: 19)

Things are an annex or prolongation of [the body] itself; they are incrusted into its flesh, they are part of its full definition; the world is made of the very stuff of the body. (Transl. Dallery 1964: 163)

By using the term *embodied* we mean to highlight two points: first that cognition depends upon the kinds of experience that come from having a body with various sensorimotor capacities, and second, that these individual sensorimotor capacities are themselves embedded in a more encompassing biological, psychological and cultural context. By using the term *action* we mean to emphasize once again that

sensory and motor processes, perception and action, are fundamentally inseparable in lived cognition. Indeed, the two are not merely contingently linked in individuals; they have also evolved together. (Varela et al. 1991: 172–73)

Asked by Helen Fielding, "If the painter, for Merleau-Ponty, relies solely on vision, then what is the relation of touch to vision for him, and how could a painter achieve a relation between touch and vision that would not forget the flesh?", Luce Irigaray (2004: 390) replies: "In my opinion, Maurice Merleau-Ponty does not forget only the flesh that precedes vision but also the flesh present in vision. When I talk about the tactile in seeing itself, I try to remember that the flesh intervenes in vision. Our culture has wanted to master life, thus flesh, including through seeing." This misses the passage I've just quoted, according to which "Things are an annex or prolongation of the body itself; they are incrusted into its flesh," and several others like it:

> A quoi bon, quand toute l'affaire est de comprendre que nos *yeux de chair* sont déjà beaucoup plus que des récepteurs pour les lumières, les couleurs et les lignes[?] (Merleau-Ponty 1961/1964: 25; emphasis added)

> But how would this help us when the real problem is to understand how it happens that our *fleshly eyes* are already much more than receptors for light rays, colors, and lines? (Transl. Dallery 1964: 165; emphasis added)

> Toute technique est « technique du corps ». Elle figure et amplifie la structure métaphysique de notre *chair*. (Merleau-Ponty 1961/1964: 33; emphasis added)

> Every technique is a "technique of the body." A technique outlines and amplifies the metaphysical structure of our *flesh*. (Transl. Dallery 1964: 168; emphasis added)

> Les peintres ont souvent rêvé sur les miroirs parce que, sous ce « truc mécanique » comme sous celui de la perspective, ils reconnaissaient la métamorphose du voyant et du visible, que est la définition de notre *chair* et celle de leur vocation. (Merleau-Ponty 1961/1964: 34; emphasis added)

> Artists have often mused upon mirrors because beneath this "mechanical trick," they recognized, just as they did in the case of the trick of perspective, the metamorphosis of seeing and seen which defines both our *flesh* and the painter's vocation. (Transl. Dallery 1964: 168–69; emphasis added)

> toute *chair*, et même celle du monde, rayonne hors d'elle-même. (Merleau-Ponty 1961/1964: 81; emphasis added)

> All *flesh*, and even that of the world, radiates beyond itself. (Transl. Dallery 1964: 186; emphasis added)

But it also misses what cognitive scientists have done with Merleau-Ponty on the embodiment, embeddedness, extendedness, enactivity, and affectivity of all cognition. Perhaps that is understandable? The strong focus on embedded embodiment and enactivity in Varela et al. (1991) would seem to point strongly to the tactility that Irigaray (2004) stresses; but in fact Varela and his colleagues don't isolate touch for special consideration among those "sensorimotor capacities" mentioned in the quotation to which this note refers (they discuss "tactile awareness" briefly on p. 55), and Merleau-Ponty's three mentions of touch (including one in Passage 4, below) are all problematically tangential to his theory of vision.[9]

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9   For a more intensive engagement with touching and vision, see Jean-Luc Nancy (1992/2008), Rand (1992/2008), Librett (1997), and Derrida's book-length deconstruction *Le toucher, Jean-Luc Nancy* (2000), translated into English by Christine Irizarry as *On Touching—Jean-Luc Nancy* (2005), and Robinson (2023a: 196–211) for discussion.

Passage 2:

Cette extraordinaire empiétement, auquel on ne songe pas assez, interdit de concevoir la vision comme une opération de pensée qui dresserait devant l'esprit un tableau ou une représentation du monde, un monde de l'immanence et de l'idéalité. (Merleau-Ponty 1961/1964: 17)

This extraordinary overlapping, which we never give enough thought to, forbids us to conceive of vision as an operation of thought that would set up before the mind a picture or a representation of the world, a world of immanence and of ideality. (Transl. Dallery 1964: 162)

Organisms do not passively receive information from their environments, which they then translate into internal representations. Natural cognitive systems […] participate in the generation of meaning […] engaging in transformational and not merely informational interactions: *they enact a world.* (Di Paolo et al. 2010: 39)

4EA cognitive science, primed by the hermeneutical and phenomenological traditions—and, as my borrowings from Brian Massumi suggest, by Baruch Spinoza, who inspired Antonio Damasio (2003) and the somatic-marker hypothesis as well—fights an all-fronts war on the mainstream subject-object binary in Western thought. It's not that the world exists in serene material isolation from organisms and is merely registered by those organisms, and thus that the mental representations stored in the organisms' brains are "subjective" pictures made of immaterial stuff that is radically different from the material stuff it represents; rather, "the world" (aka "natural cognitive systems") works with us, relationally, participatorily, "in the generation of meaning." We are in "the world," part of its natural cognitive systems, and it/they is/are in us. This notion will feature prominently in my "Affordances" article, in the discussion of Anthony Chemero's relational model of affordances in his radical embodied cognitive science.

Passage 3:

Mon mouvement n'est pas une décision d'esprit, un faire absolu, qui décréterait, du fond de la retraite subjective, quelque changement de lieu miraculeusement exécuté dans l'étendue. Il est la suite naturelle et la maturation d'une vision. Je dis d'une chose qu'elle est mue, mais mon corps, lui, *se* meut, mon mouvement *se* déploie. […] Visible et mobile, mon corps est au nombre des choses, il est l'une d'elles, il est pris dans le tissu du monde et sa cohésion est celle d'une chose. Mais, puisqu'il voit et se meut, il tient les choses en cercle autour de soi […]. (Merleau-Ponty 1961/1964: 18–19)

My movement is not a decision made by the mind, an absolute doing which would decree, from the depths of a subjective retreat, some change of place miraculously executed in extended space. It is the natural consequence and maturation of my vision. I say of a thing that it is moved; but my body moves itself; my movement deploys itself. […] Visible and mobile, my body is a thing among things; it is caught in the fabric of the world, and its cohesion is that of a thing. But because it moves itself and sees, it holds things in a circle around itself. (Transl. Dallery 1964: 162–63)

It is important to emphasize here that movement is *ontologically irreducible*. With movement, we enter into another order of reality: in classical terms, movement cannot be a mode or an attribute; it is always substantial and necessarily engages the essence of the subject. It is thus not possible to conceive of the movement of animals as something that accrues to them because of their special situation, because of a need, because of something external to their essence. It is quite intrinsic to movement that it does not and cannot arise from something foreign to it; movement is not a mere contingent modality; it is not possible to enter into the sphere of movement if one is not already in it. Of course an empirical movement can start, but that is because it has always already started, because it is preceded by a form of fundamental, constitutive *mobility*, by what we should call a transcendental mobility. We may add that if movement never starts, it never stops, either; so that rest is not a negation of movement, but a constitutive moment of movement. A being that in its essence is movement can no more leave movement than it can enter it. Thus, a being can *move* itself only if it is able to move *itself*, in other words, to bring itself forward within the realm of mobility. A being can enter

> into movement empirically only on the condition of being characterized by a fundamental mobility: it *has* a movement only insofar as it *is* in some sense movement. (Barnabas 2010/2014: 89–90)

Merleau-Ponty and Barnabas there are both working to undo the commonsensical (originally Cartesian) dualism whereby I first think of a goal that I want to achieve and then instruct the muscles of my body to move in order to take steps to achieve that goal. The apparent mysticism of assertions like "A being can enter into movement empirically only on the condition of being characterized by a fundamental mobility: it *has* a movement only insofar as it *is* in some sense movement" may remind us of the Laozian *Daodejing* and its principle of 無爲 *wuwei* ("without acting") or 爲無爲 *weiwuwei* ("acting without acting"). Indeed, as I suggested in *The Dao of Translation* (Robinson 2015: ch. 2), Ritva Hartama-Heinonen's (2008: 256) "abductive" theory of translation seems implicitly (and apparently unawares) to support a mystical interpretation of Daoist 爲無爲 *weiwuwei*:

> Abduction is, nevertheless, action without effort, and requires *letting* the sign address the mind (*CP* 2.228), or as earlier stated concerning the translator's part of the contrast, *not* intervening (Gorlée 1994: 222). Abductive thought therefore entails "a surrender to the Insistence of an Idea" (*CP* 4.581), in translating, an "unconditional surrender" to the sign (Gorlée 1994: 194). Characteristic of the descriptions above is also the aspect of finding single solutions to problems. But abduction is an attitude that covers all action and every step, and it is inseparable: a feeling that integrates and permeates, and flows into a habit, that of abductive thought. In this light, translating is not about my thinking and finding and solving; it is about letting thoughts I have create wider alliances. (Ritva Hartama-Heinonen 2008: 256; italics in original)

The unresolved tension in that passage, however, is between "letting *the sign* address the mind" in the beginning of the passage and "letting *thoughts I have* create wider alliances" at the

end. The second sentence, "Abductive thought therefore entails 'a surrender to the Insistence of an Idea' (*CP* 4.581), in translating, an 'unconditional surrender' to the sign (Gorlée 1994: 194)," itself enacts that tension: in Peirce, we surrender "to the Insistence of an *Idea*," but in Hartama-Heinonen's supervisor Dinda L. Gorlée we surrender "to the *sign*." Which is it? Do we surrender to something inside us or something outside us? Do we let a subjective orientation "create wider alliances" or let an object in the world "address the mind"? "Unconditional surrender" seems to suggest that source-textual signs are the vitalistic agents that do all the translating, and all the translator has to do is to surrender to the work undertaken by that agency—and indeed that is how Gorlée explicitly frames the situation (see Robinson 2016), and Hartama-Heinonen's "abductive" theory of translation seems to lean strongly in that direction as well.

But in the 4EA cognitive science proclaimed here in the transition from Merleau-Ponty to Barnabas, and in the relational affordance theory of Anthony Chemero explored in my "Affordances" article, reality lies *in the tension*. We don't surrender unconditionally to signs, or to anything else "outside" "us"; we work together. The Extended Mind Thesis of Clark/Chalmers (1998) posits the collaboration between the individual and the world, because the world is in us and we are in the world. In Merleau-Ponty's terms, "my body is a thing among things; it is caught in the fabric of the world, and its cohesion is that of a thing. But because it moves itself and sees, it holds things in a circle around itself" (transl. Dallery 1964: 163). The *Zusammenhang* ("cohesion") of my body is the cohesion of the "fabric of the world" in which it is "caught"; and even though my body's ability to move and see tends to *arrange* "things in a circle around itself," that is a localized perspective, not an ontological hierarchy.

In the purview of 4EA cognitive science, the best line in that passage from Hartama-Heinonen is "But abduction is an attitude that covers all action and every step, and it is inseparable: a feeling that integrates and permeates, and flows into a habit, that of abductive thought." If "abduction" is understood broadly as finding oneself "caught in the fabric of the world," that "feeling that integrates and permeates" is embodied, embedded, and extended affect-becoming-mind, and in enacting the world it "flows into a habit, that of abductive thought." As I pointed out in *The Dao of Translation* (2015: 75, 174–75), that tendency to "flow into a habit" is the interpretation that Roger Ames and David Hall (2003) place on Daoist 無爲 *wuwei* and other 無-*wu* ("without") forms: it's not that the individual *declines to act* but that action has become habitual, and so the individual *seems* to act without decision, without volition.[10]

One more transitional passage from Merleau-Ponty to 4EA cognitive science:

Passage 4:

[Le corps] est un soi, non par transparence, comme la pensée, qui ne pense quoi que ce soit qu'en l'assimilant, en le constituant, en le transformant en pensée—mais un soi par confusion, narcissisme, inhérence de celui qui voit à ce qu'il voit, de celui qui touche à ce qu'il voit, de celui qui touche à ce qu'il touche, du sentant au senti—un

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10 Ironically, Hartama-Heinonen attacks the habit-based Peircean model of translation offered in *Becoming a Translator* (Robinson 1997/ 2020) as a "straitjacket" (Hartama-Heinonen 2008: 245), because, she says, habit imposes "anti-creative routines" (ibid.: 256). My sense, *pace* Hartama-Heinonen, is that "flow[ing] into a habit, that of abductive thought" temporarily *submerges* creativity in routines without stifling it. The kind of habitualized translation activity that *feels* like "letting the sign address the mind" is still intelligent activity— still both critical and creative.

soi donc qui est pris entre des choses, qui a une face et un dos, un passé et un avenir […]. (Merleau-Ponty 1961/1964: 18–19)

[The body] is a self, not by transparency, like thought, which never thinks anything except by assimilating it, constituting it, transforming it into thought—but a self by confusion, narcissism, inherence of the see-er in the seen, the toucher in the touched, the feeler in the felt— a self, then, that is caught up in things, having a front and a back, a past and a future […]. (Transl. Dallery and Smith 1993: 124)[11]

It is this larger proprioceptive system that goes numb in [Leo] Tolstoy [in the journal entry that Viktor Shklovsky quotes in "Искуство как прием" (1925/1929: 11) ("Art as Device," transl. Robinson 2008: 88), where he can't remember whether he wiped the dust off a sofa]: he is like Sacks's [1985: 44–53] Christina [who suffered damage to her proprioceptive system and couldn't feel her own body] in the sense that he cannot feel his body, but the body that he cannot feel is not the one encased in his skin (which for most of his long life is healthy and athletic) but the social body of ideosomatic regulation, the body politic. He can't feel the body of other people, the body he shares with other people. Because he cannot feel what they are feeling, he doesn't know what he himself is feeling; because he doesn't share collective feelings and because the circulation of meaning and value through the ideosomatic body politic is where *reality* comes from, nothing makes sense to him. This ideosomatic proprioceptive system doesn't just coach us to act in normative ways, to apply "common sense" or "practical reason" (read: group norms) to every tiny decision we make; it coaches us to see the world through group eyes, to construct our social and natural environments as they have been constructed by the collective. This homeostatic stabilizing effect of millions of minute somatic mimeticisms, this continual dissemination of tiny empathetic regulatory adjustments through the population, is the proverbial glue that holds

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11   Michael Smith's edits in Carleton Dallery's translation are for the most part relatively light, and I have by and large opted to stick with Dallery's original translation. Here, however, Dallery's eye seems to have skipped over "de celui qui touche à ce qu'il touche": he goes straight from "inherence of the one who sees in that which he sees" to "through inherence of sensing in the sensed" (Dallery 1964: 163).

society together. Not to feel this ideosomatic proprioception is not to feel alive, not to feel real; as Tolstoy himself writes, "If no one had seen or had seen unconsciously, if the whole complex life of many people passes unconsciously, then it is as if that life had never been." "Seeing" here means being available for the somatic exchange, for mutual visual/somatic modeling, for the reciprocal mimetic observation and simulation of body language that circulates meaning and value; but even when someone is seeing you wipe the furniture, if you don't *feel* what they are feeling as they see you, they might as well not have been there at all. (Robinson 2008: 107–8)

My ruminations on Tolstoy's journal remark about the obliterating effect of not remembering whether he wiped the dust off a sofa or not, following on David Bohm's (1992: 53) musings on "collective/participatory *thinkings and feelings, thoughts and felts*—or what I would prefer to call the *proprioception of the body politic*" (Robinson 2008: 106)—begin to suggest some 4EA unpackings of Merleau-Ponty's (1961/1964: 18–19) otherwise cryptic remarks on having "a self by confusion, narcissism," a self by "inherence of the see-er in the seen, the toucher in the touched, the feeler in the felt." In what sense exactly can the see-er inhere in the seen? As I explain in the final sentence of that long quotation, "'seeing' here means being available for the somatic exchange, for mutual visual/somatic modeling, for the reciprocal mimetic observation and simulation of body language that circulates meaning and value": seeing is collective in the sense that we "*feel* what [others] are feeling as they see [us]," and the circulation of that feeling through the group lends a sense of reality to experience. The "inherence of the see-er in the seen," one might paraphrase Merleau-Ponty, makes the scene feel real only through the inherence of "the toucher in the touched" and of "the feeler in the felt."

There are at least two implications to that:

Implication 1. Just as—again, as Bohm (1992: 53) notes—there is a difference between a "thinking" and a "thought," between the performance of a cognitive action in the present and its retrieval from storage in memory of the past as an *Ausdruck eines Erlebnisses* ("expression of a lived experience") to guide current/imminent action, so too is there a difference between a "feeling" and a "felt," between the performance of an affective action in the present and its retrieval from storage in memory of the past to guide (thinking about) current/imminent action.

    Implication 2. "Thoughts" and "felts" are collectivized, rendered plausible and therefore "real," which is to say in my terms *icotized*,[12] through preconscious group vetting in the somatic exchange; and the present-moment action of thinking, touching, and feeling too is constitutive of the "self" only insofar as it is plausibilized by the group. This would be how what Bohm calls "the proprioception of thought" (and "felt") comes to be undergirded by the proprioception of the body politic, or what I have since come to call regulatory icosis.

6   Where is Translation in All This?

As you will have noticed, translation appears briefly and passingly in those first four sections—in Schleiermacher and Hartama-Heinonen—but what I have mainly tried to do there is to set up a history linking hermeneutics to cognitive science,

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12   Icotic theory began to emerge as an extension of somatic theory in early drafts (from about 2009) of what eventually became Robinson (2016a); see also (Robinson 2013b, 2016b, 2016c, 2017, and 2019). Icosis, my coinage from Aristotle's εἰκώς/*eikōs* ("plausible"), τὰ εἰκότα/*ta eikóta* ("the plausibilities"), is the group plausibilization of opinions as "truths" or "realities" or "identities," by means of the mimetic circulation through the group of somatic response.

as a foundation for the articles in this volume, which will specifically engage the convergences between cognitive translation studies (CTS) and translational hermeneutics (TH).

And indeed the link-ups between specific transitional moments in this introductory history and the TH-CTS convergences are potentially endless. Since I have been working on Walter Benjamin's 1923 essay "Die Aufgabe des Übersetzers" for my commentary *Translation as a Form* (Robinson 2023b) and another article (Robinson 2022c), as well as my article at the end of this volume, I am particularly attentive to the connectivity between that essay and moments in this history:

- (section 2) Benjamin notes of the relationship between what is intended in the source text and the way it is intended that *Man pflegt dies in der Formel auszudrücken, daß die Worte einen Gefühlston mit sich führen* (Benjamin 1923/1972: 17) ("We tend to formulate this by saying that words carry a feeling-tone," transl. Robinson 2023: 129);

- (section 3) Benjamin tacitly cites Dilthey, without quotation marks or explicit attribution, in saying of the intertwining of the translation with the power of the source text's translatability that *Er darf ein natürlicher genannt werden, und zwar genauer ein Zusammenhang des Lebens* (Benjamin 1923/1972: 10) ("That intertwining can be called natural; more precisely it is an intertwining of life," transl. Robinson 2023c: 36);[13] and

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13   Note that Martin Heidegger also adopted the term *Zusammenhang des Lebens* in the fifth chapter of *Sein und Zeit/Being and Time* (§77). His *magnum opus* was first published in 1927, four years after the publication and six years after the writing of Benjamin's "Aufgabe." Heidegger took the term directly from Dilthey, and used it in roughly the same sense as Dilthey; one year later, in 1928, he was elected Husserl's successor as Professor of Philosophy at the University of Freiburg.

- (sections 4 and 5) while Husserl's *Krisis* and Merleau-Ponty's "Eye and Mind" were not published until 14 and 21 years after Benjamin's death, respectively, the concern with what Samuel Weber trenchantly calls *Benjamin's -abilities* (2008)—(un)translatability, (in)communicability, (im)mediability, reproducibility, criticizability, and so on—attributes those -abilities not to the personal skills or capabilities of the individual but, as we'll see in the issue's final paper, to the embodied, embedded, extended, enactive, and affective affordances yielded by a larger future-directed phenomenology of life not unlike that fleshed out by Dilthey, and more distantly kin to the thought of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty.

7 Contributions

The six articles gathered here cover a broad spectrum of convergences between Translational Hermeneutics (TH) and Cognitive Translation Studies (CTS). In a sense the first three explore the actual TH/CTS convergences and the last three explore applications that illustrate those convergences more obliquely; but each also imagines and implements those respective tasks differently.

We begin with Sigrid KUPSCH-LOSEREIT's detailed and methodical comparison of TH with CTS, "Verstehen als Resultat kognitiver Prozesse: Eine konzeptuelle Neuausrichtung der Übersetzungshermeneutik?" ("Understanding as the Result of a Cognitive Process: A Conceptual Realignment of Translational Hermeneutics?"). As that title suggests, Kupsch-Losereit compares the hermeneutic and cognitive science models of text comprehension processes and sees CTS as superior and therefore even as a substitute for TH. While the TH is more humanistically unruly and the CTS

strictly scientific, both models/paradigms can coexist in an eclectic constellation of theories. We therefore speak of a new paradigm of understanding theory that connects them and shows similarities. The differences between them, she suggests, fall into four categories:

- *divergent conceptualizations:* pre-understanding, prejudice, intuition, subjectivity, original, loyalty, equivalence, the merging of horizons in classical TH, alterity, diversity, cultural difference, discursive regularity in more recent TH; inference, scene, frame, visualization, change of focus, displacement, culture-specific prototyping in CTS
- *text/discourse:* the search for the hidden meaning of a text (TH) vs. the study of regularities in and real-world classifications of discourse (CTS)
- *processing of meaning:* passive (TH) vs. active (CTS)
- *procedures of understanding:* intuitive and subjective (TH relies on subjectivity's intuitive ability to grasp connections quickly and holistically) vs. analytical (CTS)

As should be implicitly clear there, Kupsch-Losereit gravitates more strongly in her own work in the direction of CTS, where she mainly highlights Eleanor Rosch's prototype theory.

Next comes Roberto WU's "Translating Practices: Situated Bodies between Cognition and Expression," which touches briefly on 4EA (embodied, embedded, enactive, extended, and affective) cognitive science as a far more humanistic cognitivism than we find in Kupsch-Losereit, and far closer to hermeneutics. Indeed for Wu "4EA cognition theories stress corporeality and affectivity as necessary components of meaning in one's practices," but also, because those practices "are interpretively oriented, as they are founded on one's facticity and are historically directed toward a horizon of possibilities, they should be taken as hermeneutical phe-

nomena." It's not quite that 4EA cognitive science *is* hermeneutics; but certainly the convergences between the two amount to a massive overlap. "In this sense," he adds, "hermeneutics broadens the sense of embodiment, insofar as it encompasses pre-predicative and non-thematic layers of meaning." Wu is most strongly oriented in his paper toward the hermeneutics of Martin Heidegger, specifically Heidegger's strong orientation to situatedness and historicity, but also his "failure to assign a nuclear role to the body." Wu also argues that "being situated involves historical issues that require an analysis of the structural propagation of dominion and violence"; to that end in his third section he addresses "feminist, postcolonial, and decolonial studies."

The third article, Masoud POURAHMADALI TOCHAHI's "Translation Consciousness and Translation-Specific Double Intentionality," takes the primary convergence between TH and CTS to lie in phenomenology—but unlike sections 3 and 4 of this introduction, which explore phenomenology in roughly that transitional role as it moves from *late* Husserl to Merleau-Ponty, Tochahi focuses his attention on the phenomenological formalism of *early* Husserl. Despite that formalistic focus, his study elucidates the "translation consciousness" of his title, and particularly the "double intentionality" of that consciousness.

The fourth article, "A Cognitivist Risk-Management Approach to Steiner's Hermeneutic Motion" by Mehrnaz PI-ROUZNIK, is still interested in the convergences between TH and CTS, but now with a much more specific focus, or a pairing of two specific foci, which suggests that her article might be thought of as the issue's first "practical application." She wields risk-management theory as a cognitivist methodology, and brings it to bear on Steiner's Hermeneutic Motion, in order to ask not only what risks translators might face in each

of Steiner's four moves but how risk-management might be used to explain the four-stage trajectory of Steiner's model.

The fifth article, "Hermeneutics as a Route to Translating Auditory Aspects of Emotion in Silvina Ocampo's Fictional Worlds: An Analysis of 'Okno, el esclavo'" by Silvina KATZ and Séverine HUBSCHER-DAVIDSON, again situates itself in the confluence between TH and CTS, with a focus on the translation of "sound sensations (noise, music, silences)" in literature, and specifically on "emotion-eliciting auditory/kinaesthetic aspects in Silvina Ocampo's haunting short story 'Okno, el esclavo'." Katz and Hubscher-Davidson straddle disciplinary methodologies in their analytical approach to those auditory and kinesthetic phenomena, using both literary close reading and computer-aided qualitative data analysis. They are especially interested in "the story's emotional impact and embodied reader experience" en route to "a deeper understanding of the translator's daunting cognitive and affective task when (re)interpreting the soundscape of Ocampo's atmospheric worlds." "While cognitive translation studies (CTS) may provide insights into this delicate mental processing of sensory information," they note, "translational hermeneutics (TH) can offer useful information regarding the conditions surrounding our understanding of and immersion in a text's sensory dimension."

Finally, my article on "The Affordances of the Translator" closes the issue with a detailed look at cognitive affordance theory as applied to Walter Benjamin's essay "The Task of the Translator" (1923/1972). After a look at Aleksei Procyshyn's article arguing for an affordance-theoretical reading of Benjamin, showing not only that it doesn't quite work but that Procyshyn has hit on the least dynamic of Anthony Chemero's types of affordance theory, I set out first to theorize the most dynamic and then to find a way of applying

it to Benjamin. That takes me first to Benjamin's borrowing of Wilhelm Dilthey's hermeneutical concept of *der Zusammenhang des Lebens* ("the nexus/intertwining of life") and Edmund Husserl's adaptation of that concept as the basis for his late (posthumously published) theorization of *die Lebenswelt* ("the life-world"), then to Benjamin's celebration of Friedrich Hölderlin's radically etymological-literal translations of Pindar and Sophocles as an exemplar of translational affordances. The result is not exactly a translational affordance that Benjamin articulates, but it is arguably implicit in his championing of Hölderlin's translations of Pindar and Sophocles as "prototypes of their Form."

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Essays | Aufsätze

Verstehen als Resultat kognitiver Prozesse. Eine konzeptuelle Neuausrichtung der Übersetzungshermeneutik?

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Abstract: During the last decades, cognitive science-oriented research in TS has begun to apply a new model of understanding. This cognitive paradigm neurophysiologically models translation processes as the networked integration of perceptual, linguistic and conceptual knowledge. This integrative process, frequently presented as a neuronal flow, is subjective-individual and always strategic-constructive, since only cognitive processes, so-called inferences, can interrelate linguistic and paralinguistic knowledge. Consequently, understanding is a constantly updated text- and knowledge-guided process in which linguistic utterances, cultural, social-interactive, situational, affective and cognitive factors interact with and complement each other. And from this follows a change in the basic hermeneutic paradigm of the subjective, passive understanding of the text by the translator, who intuitively determines the meaning of a text to be translated within a static accumulation of linguistic and factual knowledge. Understanding as a subjective-individual sense-making process in the translation-hermeneutic conception is specified more precisely in the cognitive-

scientific paradigm as a traceable process and described as an active and dynamic mental process, as networked integration performance. Since understanding thus always requires a new organisation and networking of the neuronal pathways, there is also a constant shift of meaning that is reflected/produced in each new translation. Within this framework a new model of comprehension can be applied in so far as the understanding of the source text and the planning of a target text are the results of cognitive inferring processes and depend on interactive and communicative experiences, translation strategies and the ability of the translator to consider the prospective reader. On the basis of new cognitive-scientific insights into understanding, the search for the so-called fusion of horizons becomes obsolete. Translational hermeneutics gives preference to understanding differently over understanding better; it is receptive to the otherness and the diversity of own perspectives and experiences. Examples of French-German translations show that a translational hermeneutics understood in this way provides the framework for textual understanding and interpretation in both the receptive and productive phases of translation.

1 Untersuchungsgegenstand und Problemstellung

Es ist ein Gemeinplatz, das Verstehen des Ausgangstextes (AT) als Voraussetzung für eine erfolgreiche Übersetzung anzusehen und die Übersetzung als eine der Textwahrnehmung und dem Textverstehen nachgeordnete Etappe, die auf dem Ergebnis des Textverstehens beruht. Infolgedessen kommt dem Begriff Verstehen als humanbezogene Dimension im Übersetzungsprozess zentrale Bedeutung zu. Aber was heißt Verstehen und welchen Stellenwert hat der subjektive Faktor in der wissenschaftlichen Betrachtung des Übersetzungsvorgangs, da Autor und Leser unterschiedliche Zeichen in unterschiedlicher Weise und gemäß unterschiedlicher Verwendungsregeln benutzen? Gemittelt wird nicht, was der Autor

sagt, sondern das, was der Translator verstanden hat, was der Autor gesagt hat und das, was er auf der Basis des von ihm Verstandenen für den Leser (re)produzieren kann.

Mein Beitrag stellt die Translationstheorie vor unter dem Aspekt kognitiver und translationshermeneutischer Forschung zum Textverstehen. Untersuchungsgegenstand meines Beitrags sind Modelle, welche Übersetzungshermeneutik, *translational hermeneutics* (TH), und kognitive Prozessstudien, *cognitive translation studies* (CTS), zur Darstellung von Textverstehensprozessen entwerfen.[1] Diese theoretischen Bezugsrahmen – Hermeneutik und kognitionswissenschaftliche Forschung – können zur methodologischen sowie theoretischen Selbstreflexion der Translationswissenschaft beitragen, da sie beide den Verstehensprozess sowie die Frage nach dem Textsinn als Bestandteil der übersetzungsrelevanten Reflexion und der übersetzerischen Kompetenz betrachten.

2   Das hermeneutische Verstehensmodell

Die herkömmliche Auffassung, die von der Lesekunst der Hermeneutik entwickelt wurde, geht davon aus, dass im Text der Sinn enthalten ist, den es aufzuspüren gilt.[2] Die herme-

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1   Cercel (2013: 16–23) stellt definitorische Merkmale der Übersetzungshermeneutik zusammen. Alves/Jakobsen (2021) geben in ihrem Handbuch einen umfassenden Überblick über den neuesten Stand der Forschung zu kognitiven Übersetzungsstudien (CTS) als Terminus für unterschiedliche Ansätze und Modelle der Kognition. Siever (2015: 141–166) erläutert „das verstehenstheoretische Paradigma" und seine unterschiedlichen Ansätze, Modellvorstellungen und Methoden. Delisle (1984: 235) betrachtet die Verstehenskompetenz als eine der Komponenten der übersetzerischen Kompetenz.

2   Frege (1892: 25–50) unterscheidet zwischen der Bedeutung eines Zeichens/eines Satzes, d. i. der Gegenstand, auf den das Zeichen verweist, seine Proposition, und dem Textsinn, die Art der Darstel-

neutische Fragestellung, historisch aus dem Desiderat im Bereich der Exegese erwachsen, hat sich in Richtung auf eine allgemeine Verstehens- und Bedeutungsproblematik hin erweitert. Hermeneutische Erörterungen, verstanden weniger als Erkenntnisart denn als Methode[3], beziehen sich auf übermittelte textuelle Einheiten. Ihr Bestreben geht dahin, durch einen gegebenen Ausdrucksbestand hindurch den Zugang zur Wirklichkeitssphäre, auf die er verweist, zu gewinnen., um sie sodann mit dem Selbstverständnis des Interpreten zu vermitteln. Eine erste Stufe der Interpretation besteht darin, den immanenten Sinn eines Textes zu erfassen, wobei dem Leser eine rezeptive und passive Rolle beim Verstehen zukommt. Für das Übersetzen jedoch ist ein Begriff des Verstehens erforderlich, der den Besonderheiten dieses Verstehens, über die Grenzen von Sprachen und Kulturen hinweg, gerecht wird. Die sprachphilosophische (Gadamer) sowie die philologisch, textdeutend orientierte Hermeneutik (Schleiermacher) haben als Voraussetzung für interkulturelles Verstehen ein Konzept entworfen mit zwei Komponenten, denen sie Vorrang einräumen: das Vorverständnis, das Wissen um Tradition und Wirkungsgeschichte, in denen der Übersetzer steht, sowie die Vorurteilsstruktur allen Verstehens, d. i. das Einrücken des Übersetzers in das Überlieferungsgeschehen.[4]

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lung von Sachverhalten. Wir wollen i. F. unter ‚Sinn' die Seite der Äußerung verstanden wissen, die sich im Zusammenwirken mit der illokutiven Seite der Sätze, ihrer Präsuppositionen und des Kontextes ergibt, sowie weitere sinntragende Komponenten des Textes und des Diskurses in der Sender-Empfänger-Beziehung.

3   Erst Friedrich Schleiermacher etablierte die Hermeneutik als umfassende Verstehenstheorie, die in der Folge methodische Grundlage für alle historischen Geisteswissenschaften wurde.

4   Vgl. Vasilache (2003: 52–64) zum Konzept des Vorverständnisses für das interkulturelle Verstehen und wie es dieses beeinflusst.

Der Übersetzer muss danach, um möglichst den dem AT-Autor näherkommenden Sinn zu verstehen, den Text lesen im Wissen um die Wirkungsgeschichte oder die historische Wirkung desselben.[5] Es gibt zwei Horizonte: den des interpretierten Werks (historischer und gesellschaftlicher Kontext) und den des Lesers/Übersetzers, der immer befangen bleibt in seinem Vorwissen, seinen Vorurteilen, seinen Vormeinungen und die ihn leitenden Interessen. Zu den Faktoren, die den Verstehensprozess entscheidend beeinflussen, gehört v. a. das Vorwissen des Translators: Sach- und Sprachwissen, Weltwissen und Erfahrung, Textwissen, Interaktionswissen. Diese Wissensfaktoren spielen eine große Rolle insofern, als sich der Autor des Textes und der Übersetzer in unterschiedlichen historischen, sprachlichen oder kulturellen Kontexten bzw. Umgebungen befinden und hier die kulturelle und sonstige Differenz zwischen Autor/Text und Übersetzer/Übersetzung immer wieder erneut die Nichttrivialität der Verstehensanstrengung belegt. Weitere Faktoren steuern auf unterschiedlichen Analyseebenen die verstehende Lektüre des Übersetzers:

- Bedeutung von Einzelwörtern: lexikalische/dominante Bedeutung und spezifische Verwendungsform des Wortes im Zusammenhang des AT als Ausdruck von Inhalten; Der AT wird als rein semiotisches System betrachtet, der holistische Blick auf das Diskursfeld des Textes und der Figuren bleibt in der Analyse unberücksichtigt.

- Erschließung der latenten Sinnstruktur eines Textes durch Aktivierung bestimmter Wortbedeutungen im

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5   Cercel (2013: 149–218) gibt einen sehr guten Überblick sowohl über Tradition und die geschichtliche Entwicklung der Übersetzungshermeneutik seit Schleiermacher als auch über die theoretischen Grundlagen des Verstehens.

Sinne der Realität möglicher Lesarten auch ohne den Kontext der Situation zu kennen.[6] Der Schwerpunkt liegt auf Untersuchungen zu lexikalisch-syntaktischen Verstehensproblemen und der Fixierung auf Oberflächenstrukturen des AT.[7]

- Art der Darstellung, das Wie: Mitteilung von Sachverhalten und/oder Sinnstiftung.
- Sprachgestus, der bestehen kann aus der Verwendung von Sondersprachen, Alltagssprache, Dialekten, Redewendungen etc.
- Semantischer Zusammenhang des ganzen Textes, z. B. Isotopien.
- Vertextungsstrategien, logischer Zusammenhang, intertextuelle Bezüge oder Zitate.

Das Verstehensmodell der TH stützt sich demnach textbezogen auf sprachliche Repräsentationen von Bedeutung, auf die Gegebenheiten auf Textebene und auf die vertrauten Kategorien textbezogener Übersetzung wie Original, Äquivalenz, ‚Treue‘, Tradition. Bedeutung und Sinn eines Textes sind etwas Vorhandenes, das es lediglich zu entdecken gilt. Der Übersetzer richtet im hermeneutischen Verstehensakt die Singularität, die Andersartigkeit des AT an sprachlichen und textuellen Aspekten aus, wobei er sich bewusst ist, dass seine Subjektivität und seine personal-, gesellschaftlich- und zeitlich-historische Gebundenheit konstitutiv für Überset-

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6   Auch bei Schleiermacher findet sich kein Hinweis auf unterschiedliche Situationen.

7   Bayer-Hohenwarter (2017) zeigt, dass die Fixierung auf die Oberflächenstrukturen des AT anstatt der Beachtung der Quelltext-Ebene häufig der Grund für erfolgloses Übersetzen ist.

zungen sind.[8] Dem Verstehen sind also insofern Schranken gesetzt, als das Eigene und das Fremde als Dimensionen zunächst bestehen bleiben, findet jede Äußerung doch im Rahmen eines geschichtlichen wie kulturellen Kontextes statt, den es zu überbrücken gilt. Der Übersetzer erschließt den Sinn des AT zunächst aus seiner eigenen Situation heraus, bleibt ihr verhaftet, eignet sich danach das Andere im Verstehen an, holt das Fremde in die eigene Sprache herüber und verkennt gerade damit das Andere in seiner Andersheit. Und hier werden eine konkrete und detaillierte, auf übersetzerische Praxis abzielende Anleitung zum Textverstehen und Teilschritte der Vorgehensweise des Übersetzens genannt: „den Gegenwartshorizont bewusst vom historischen Horizont des Textes abheben" (Steinbach 1992: 86), und nach dieser Teilphase des Verstehens die Abgrenzung in der Horizontverschmelzung aufheben. Dazu leiht der Übersetzer dem Anderen weniger sein Ohr, er spricht im Namen des Anderen, spricht für ihn, ‚bevormundet‘ ihn, wird Fürsprecher einer anderen Kultur. Einen fremdsprachigen Text verstehen heißt, ihn sich vermöge einer Übersetzung in unserer Sprache zu eigen machen und damit in seiner Andersheit zu erkennen. Das Beteiligtsein am Sinn des Textes, die partizipierende Tätigkeit des Übersetzers äußert sich im emotionalen Mit- und Nachvollzug zu der im Text besprochenen Sache. Das zunächst intuitiv Verstandene und die identifikatorische Solidarität mit der offen gelegten Mitteilung des Autors

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8   Robinson (2001) weist nach, dass Subjektivität kein festumrissenes, einheitliches Konzept ist. Er stellt die unterschiedlichen geistigen, sozioökonomischen, psychosozialen Kräfte und Einflüsse zusammen, welche die innere Vielfalt, Fragmentarität und Streuung der Subjektivität prägen, die dann das Verstehen und die individuelle Handlungsfähigkeit des Übersetzers im Prozess der Übersetzung bestimmen.

bevor man übersetzt (so Stolze 2003: 174–181), äußert sich in der Horizontverschmelzung, in der die eigene Welt mit dem fremden Horizont, der historisch-situativen Präsenz des AT verschmilzt.

Durch verschiedene methodische Vorgehensweisen und Strategien wird versucht, die Verstehens- und Deutungsergebnisse des jeweiligen Übersetzers/Textinterpreten abzusichern und zu einer plausiblen und intersubjektiv akzeptierten Textdeutung zu kommen:

- Annahme einer (Autor-)Intention als regulativer Idee,
- philologisch kontrolliertes Vorgehen (z. B. Textvergleiche, Überprüfung von Wortverwendungsweisen, usw.),
- Einbeziehung der Rezeptionsgeschichte und
- Rekonstruktion des Entstehungszusammenhangs des Textes einschließlich des (historischen) Erwartungshorizontes.

Hermeneutik verbleibt also nicht im Bereich der vorwissenschaftlichen Heuristik, sondern verbindet hermeneutische Erfahrung und methodische Erkenntnis. Es geht darum, die den Übersetzer leitenden Interessen aufzuspüren, den Inhalt einer Aussage auszulegen.

Es bleibt ein Problem bestehen für das interkulturelle Verstehen: Die Einforderung eines Konsenses, welche das Fremde überwinden, die Differenz der Sprach- und Weltansichten minimieren will, berücksichtigt nicht die Möglichkeit der Inkommensurabilität verschiedener Weltansichten, steht somit der Idee eines Dialogs entgegen und verkennt die Andersheit, die sie überwinden will. Die Translationshermeneutik, die zudem das Neue häufig in alte Narrative einbettet, ist Zeichen extremer Subjektivität. Die Welt des AT und die Übersetzung erweitern unter diesen Aspekten eben gerade nicht den Horizont des Verständnisses, die Übersetzung projiziert vielmehr nur die eigenen Überzeugungen und Vorur-

teile (s. auch Ricœur 2005: 129), deutet das Andere mit Kategorien des Eigenen und verwischt die Unterschiede zwischen dem Eigenen und dem Fremden, der Differenz der Sprach- und Weltansichten auf der praktischen Ebene.[9]

Die Intention des Verfassers ist hermeneutischer Ausgangspunkt und die Rekonstruktion des ursprünglichen Sinnzusammenhangs, in dem der Autor gelebt hat (Leben, Werk, Zeit, Kultur, Umwelt).[10] Die Konkretion des wirkungsgeschichtlichen Bewusstseins hat Vorrang im Zieltext (ZT). Die Meinung des Verfassers oder das Verständnis des ursprünglichen Lesers ist allerdings keine Norm, sie werden je nach Gelegenheit des Verstehens neu aufgefüllt. Daher rührt der Geschehenscharakter des Verstehens und die Fortsetzung des Überlieferungsgeschehens, das durch Sprache als das Medium der hermeneutischen Erfahrung charakterisiert ist. Tradition und Wirkungsgeschichte haben Vorrang vor der kritischen Reflexion des Bewusstseins – auch der Reflexion von der Vorurteilsstruktur allen Verstehens.[11] Ein zentraler Punkt der TH ist also das enge Verhältnis von Verstehen und der Überwindung von Verschiedenheit/Fremdheit, von Verstehen und übersetzerischer, unumgänglicher Subjektivität sowie das Postulat, dass „der subjektive Faktor für jede Übersetzung ein konstitutives Merkmal ist" (Steinbach 1992: 79)

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9   Vgl. Vasilache (2003: 60–65) zur Kritik an der Horizontverschmelzung.

10   Cercel (2013: 204–208) weist auf neuere Literatur, welche das Festhalten an der Rekonstruktion der Autorintention als klassisches hermeneutisches Vorgehen aufgibt.

11   Gadamer (⁶1990: 284ff. und 366), definiert den Prozess der Interpretation als Wirkungsgeschichte. Für ihn (ebd.: 293) ist Verstehen allerdings „nicht so sehr eine Methode, […], vielmehr etwas, das das Darinstehen in einem Überlieferungsgeschehen zur Voraussetzung hat."

und nur er zu positiven übersetzungswissenschaftlichen Ergebnissen führen kann (vgl. Cercel 2013: 301–329). Die latente Sinnstruktur eines Textes erschließt sich demnach subjektiv-intuitiv, unkontrolliert, und translatorische Hermeneutik wird als ein Verfahren angesehen, das ein subjektives Sich Hineinversetzen in den Ursprungs- und Entwicklungszustand des zu übersetzenden Textes und ein Einverständnis in der Sache ermöglicht; Die Unterschiede zwischen dem Eigenen und dem Fremden werden verwischt, die Legitimität von interkultureller Interpretation in Frage gestellt.[12] Damit droht Verstehen und hermeneutisches Übersetzen der intuitiven, interpretatorischen Beliebigkeit des Übersetzers überlassen zu bleiben. Erst die neuere hermeneutisch orientierte Übersetzungstätigkeit arbeitet der Gleichsetzung entgegen von Hermeneutik mit ungebändigter Subjektivität, intuitiver Handlungskompetenz und unreflektierter zielsprachlicher Assoziationen, die ohne Kontextualisierung auf der semantisch-sprachlichen Ebene Entsprechungen sucht. Der Vorrang der Intuition und wertenden Stellungnahme gegenüber analytischen Verfahren im Verstehen wird aufgegeben; so fordert Cercel (2010 und 2013: 329–333) die kritische Reflexion der übersetzerischen Subjektivität und eine intersubjektive Nachvollziehbarkeit von subjektiv getroffenen Übersetzungsentscheidungen durch kognitionswissenschaftlich objektivierende, methodisch kontrollierte und formalisierbare Darstellungen mentaler Abläufe (und auch die Begrün-

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12 Der so definierte subjektive Faktor als Besonderheit von Prozessen des Sinnverstehens verwirft die Anwendung nachprüfbarer Verfahren der Analyse. Die Frage stellt sich, wie die hermeneutische Erkenntnis objektiv gesichert sein kann, wenn das subjektive Bewusstsein im Versuch sinnverstehender Auslegung scheinbar autonom Erkenntnis setzt.

dung von konkreten Übersetzungsentscheidungen).[13] Der translatorischen Hermeneutik geht es um die Deutung individualisierter Sinngebilde und den einzelfallspezifischen Problemkontext. In diesem Sinn versucht Radegundis Stolze ihrer text- und autorzentrierten Texterschließung eine wissenschaftliche Begründung hermeneutischer Subjektivität zu geben, indem sie sich an sprach- und textlinguistischen Beschreibungs- und Strukturierungsprozessen orientiert, die eine Verschränkung von Textkonstituenten und Sinnkonstitution ermöglichen sollen. Ihr zufolge enthalten Sätze ihre „Gebrauchsanweisung" bei sich, das heißt eine Anweisung bezüglich des Zwecks, der anhand ihrer verfolgt wird. Aber diese Regelsysteme von Sätzen/Diskursarten (Lehren, Rechtfertigung, Kontrollieren, Bewerten, Beschreiben, Erzählen, Befehlen etc.) sind in unterschiedlichen Sprachen jeweils ungleichartig und können daher nicht ein und demselben Gesetz unterworfen werden. Stolze möchte die ersten Impulse intuitiv-kreativer Einfälle und das in der rezeptiv verstehenden Phase des Übersetzungsaktes intuitiv gewonnene Verstehen eines Textes absichern und begründen mit dem Instrumentarium von drei textlinguistischen Kategorien: Thematik, Semantik und Lexik (vgl. Stolze 1992: 89–194; 2003: 186–201; 2009: 29f.: s. hierzu auch Cercel 2013: 127–130).[14] Subjektive translatorische Entscheidungen basieren demzufolge

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13 Schneider (²2009: 17–27) unterscheidet subjektives und objektives Verstehen, dem er methodologischen Vorrang einräumt. Zur „Intersubjektivität bei Habermas" vgl. ders. (2009: 295–303).

14 Cercel (2013: 347) verweist kritisch darauf, dass „Verstehen im Übersetzungsprozess laut hermeneutischer Aussage zunächst nicht durch aufwändige Analysen des ganzen Originaltextes gesichert" ist, eher isotopische Ebenen und problematische Stellen untersucht werden und die so gewonnenen intuitiven Einsichten nachträglich auf textlinguistischer Basis überprüft werden.

– über translatorische Kompetenzen, Lebens- und Erfahrungswelt des Übersetzers hinaus – auf einem propositionalen Verstehen, das sich oberflächlich an linguistischen Strukturen orientiert und seine Begründung findet in sprachwissenschaftlich nachprüfbaren Aspekten des AT (Sprachsystem, Sprachverwendung).

Eine Kritik dieses Modells, das dem Rezipienten eine passive Rolle beim Verstehen zuweist, erwuchs aus der vielleicht wichtigsten Neuorientierung der Übersetzungswissenschaft, dem Wechsel von produkt- zu prozessorientierter Forschung. Neue handlungstheoretische Ansätze (vgl. Holz-Mänttäri 1984, Vermeer 1990, Reiß-Vermeer ²1991, Nord 1993 u. a.) stellen den Übersetzer als Primärinterpreten in den Mittelpunkt des wissenschaftlichen Interesses und die rezipientenseitige Aufnahme des Textes wird zusammen mit einer funktionalen, zieltextorientierten Untersuchungsperspektive in der Übersetzungswissenschaft Grundlage für eine Theorie des translatorischen Handelns. Diese Arbeiten untersuchen die Beziehungen zwischen den Formen der Redeverwendung und ihrer kommunikativen Funktion, die als Zweck/Skopos des kommunikativen Handelns beschrieben wird. Die Verknüpfung von sprachlichen Ausdrucksformen in einer konkreten soziokulturellen Situation mit ihrer kommunikativen Funktion stellt innerhalb einer Gesellschaft meist eine Regularität dar. Sprachliche Kommunikation verläuft also in bestimmten Kontexten, unter bestimmten äußeren Bedingungen, mit bestimmten Intentionen, wobei sich jeder Äußerung, die in eine raum-zeitliche, durch Institutionen und Interaktionssysteme definierte Situation eingebettet ist, ein kommunikatives Ziel zuordnen lässt. Verstehen – und Verständigung – kann nur gelingen, wenn die Partner die tradierten Sprachnormen und situationsangemessenen Handlungsmuster kennen sowie die Regeln der Bedeutungsver-

wendung von Wörtern in kulturell-pragmatischen Handlungszusammenhängen.[15] Folgerichtig orientiert sich die Übersetzung an den Verstehensvoraussetzungen, den Erwartungen, der Lebenssituation, den sozialen und interaktionellen Mustern sowie dem Sprachgebrauch des Zielrezipienten. Ein neues Verstehensmodell war notwendig geworden und es fand sich in neueren kognitionswissenschaftlichen Studien.

3   Das kognitionswissenschaftliche Verstehensmodell

Das translatorische Handlungskonzept entwickelte ein neues dynamisches Modell des übersetzungsrelevanten Textverstehens. An die Stelle von Verstehen als Nachvollzug der Sinnintention eines Autors schiebt sich in neueren kognitionswissenschaftlichen ausgerichteten Studien Verstehen als Sinnzuweisung durch den Übersetzer.[16] Zeitgleich zu dieser neuen Untersuchungsperspektive der übersetzerischen Praxis entwickelte sich die kognitive Semantik. In empirischen Studien

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15   Habermas (²1975: 216ff.) weist mit dem Terminus *Sinnhaltigkeit* bzw. Sinn hin auf die Analyse von sachbezogenem, intentionsgerichtetem, funktionsorientiertem und situationsadäquatem Sprachgebrauch im Rahmen von sozialen Handlungen.

16   Pavlova (2021: 140f.) listet „Kognitive Forschungen des Textverstehens im Überblick" auf. Das von Alves/Jakobsen (2021) herausgegebene Handbuch vermittelt den aktuellen Wissensstand in *Cognitive Translation Studies* (CTS): die diversen Typen und unterschiedlichen Modelle der kognitiven Prozesse, die wichtigsten Themen der noch jungen Teildisziplin CTS sowie Beiträge zu dem Bezug von kognitiv-translatorischem Handeln zu Konzepte und Methoden in Nachbardisziplinen (u. a. Linguistik, Psycholinguistik, Neurowissenschaft, Anthropologie, Pragmatik, Kontaktlinguistik). Die interdisziplinäre Schnittstelle Kognition und translatorische Hermeneutik wird nicht behandelt.

zur Begriffsbildung fand Eleanor Rosch (1973 und 1975) heraus, dass Wortbedeutungen sich aus wahrgenommenen, anschaulichen, prototypischen Details und Szenen ergeben. Aus dem bild- und gestalthaften Prototyp kristallisiert sich ein konzeptuell-begriffliches Gebilde heraus, das hinwiederum je nach Situation und Kontext in den lexikalischen Zusammenhang eingebunden wird. Für die verschiedenen Kulturkreise ist von unterschiedlicher Verarbeitung der Wahrnehmung auszugehen, die in Abhängigkeit zur lebenspraktischen Problembewältigung zu sehen ist.[17] Daraus erwuchs die sog. Prototypensemantik, die seit den 80er Jahren (vgl. Lakoff 1987 und Taylor 1989) in der Sprachwissenschaft und auch in der Translationswissenschaft (Schäffner 1993) erfolgreich angewendet wird. Prototypen haben innerhalb einer Sprachgemeinschaft überindividuelle, kollektive Geltung. Die kognitive Semantik wurde unterstützt durch den sog. Konnektionismus, der den Zusammenhang zwischen neuronalen und kognitiven/mentalen Prozessen als theoretische Grundlage für Verstehensvorgänge nachweist. Er beschreibt die Fähigkeit der Neuronenströme im menschlichen Gehirn, separate Operationen parallel und unabhängig voneinander auszuführen und diese weitgehend autonomen Operationen permanent miteinander zu kombinieren, z. B. bereits repräsentierte Referenzen im Diskurs aufeinander zu beziehen. Grundbausteine der sprachlichen wie außersprachlichen Informationsverarbeitung sind über Synapsen vernetzte Neuronenströme, Engramme, welche, je häufiger sie neuronal gelenkt einen teilweise gebahnten Weg finden, Wissenseinheiten in systematischen Zusammenhängen verknüpfen und im Langzeit-

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17   Vgl. die beispielhaften Untersuchungen der kognitiv und sprachlich unterschiedlichen Verarbeitung von Farbwahrnehmungen in den verschiedenen Kulturen von Ellis/Young (1991) und Lakoff (1987).

gedächtnis abspeichern.[18] Die kognitive Semantik erfasst folgerichtig Wort- und Textinhalte nicht mehr als isolierte Einheiten, sondern als in prototypischer Weise abgespeicherte Bedeutungen, in denen Wissen über die Welt mit einem Ausdruck konventionell verbunden ist und der Gebrauch dieses Ausdrucks in kulturspezifischen Verwendungskontexten und Anwendungssituationen.[19] Sprach-, Erfahrungs-, Welt- und Interaktionswissen werden demnach sprach- und kulturspezifisch in geordneten, systematischen Zusammenhängen und typischen Konstellationen erfasst, sog. *scenes* (z. B. Restaurantbesuch, Begrüßung, Einkauf etc.). Diese *scenes* umfassen die Gesamtheit von erlebten Situationen, Erfahrungen, typischen Konstellationen, institutionellen Strukturen, Wahrnehmungsmustern, Wertvorstellungen, Verhaltensweisen, Konventionen, sowie der für die Kommunikation relevanten so-

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18 Kupsch-Losereit (2008: 107–111) und Schwarz-Friesel (³2008: 99–126) äußern sich ausführlich zum konnektionistischen System, welches als neuronales Netzwerk die Interaktion von Weltwissen und Textinformation abbildet.

19 Ergänzend sei hingewiesen auf die Einführung dieses Bandes, Abschnitt 2, in der Douglas Robinson Dilthey's *Zusammenhang des Lebens* erörtert. Schon Dilthey hat auf Zusammenhänge hingewiesen, welche im Sinn von „*Erlebniszusammenhang*" oder „*Lebenszusammenhang*" Erfahrungen sinnvoll ordnen, wobei die Erfassung der Lebenswirklichkeit als subjektives Erleben in einem Dreierschritt erfolgt: 1. Erleben, 2. Ausdruck und 3. Verstehen. Dilthey blieb allerdings eine wissenstheoretische Klärung dieser drei Begriffe und ihres Zusammenhangs schuldig. Der CTS geht es dagegen nicht um das individuelle *Nacherleben* einer Lebenswelt, die dem Übersetzer/Leser fremd ist, sondern um aktive mentale Prozesse und um objektivierende, methodisch kontrollierte und formalisierbare Darstellungen, die es ermöglichen, einen Ausschnitts von Lebenswelt innerhalb eines kontextabhängigen Sinnzusammenhangs (Schrift, Sprache, Gesten, Mimik, Kunstwerke, architektonischer Stil, Gesetze, Ordnungen, religiöse Vorstellungen etc.) zu verstehen.

zialen Interaktionen und Handlungen, also sich wiederholende, zusammenhängende Ausschnitte der Realität, mit denen
wir durch eigene Erfahrung oder die anderer vertraut sind.
Sprachliche Stimuli aktivieren ganze Szenarien an Sachverhalten, die im Gedächtnis abgespeichert sind. Die sprachliche
Form, die mit einer bestimmten Szene verbunden ist, also die
Repräsentation solchen stereotypen sprachgebundenen Wissens, das System linguistischer Wahlmöglichkeiten, bezeichnet man als *frame*. Fillmore (1977) hat mit seiner *Scenes-and-
frames*-Semantik darauf aufmerksam gemacht, dass Textinhalte und unser Textverstehen weitgehend szenisch visualisiert
werden. Beim Übersetzen ruft ein ausgangstextlicher *frame*
Assoziationen, *scenes* hervor, die im ZT wiederum andere
frames und eventuell auch andere *scenes* evozieren. Für den
Verstehens- und Produktionsprozess des Übersetzers bedeutet das: Die sprach-/kulturbedingte Welterfahrung (*scene* 1) eines Textproduzenten wird vom Übersetzer unter Berücksichtigung von Zielsetzung und lebensweltlicher Verwendungssituation des Rezipienten modifiziert (*scene* 2) und unter
Berücksichtigung kulturspezifischer Vertextungskonventionen in einem Text (*frame* 2) festgehalten (vgl. Floros 2003: 45–
49). Wichtig ist daher, dass der Übersetzer im Verstehensprozess Textelemente in Form von *scenes* visualisiert, für die er
ZS-frames mit entsprechender ZS-Textfunktion sucht. Beim
Verstehensprozess operieren wir nicht auf einer statischen
Ansammlung von Sprach- und Sachwissen, sondern auf den
Inhalten unserer Kenntnisse mit Hilfe von Prozeduren, die
als kognitive Prozesse ablaufen, meist Inferenzen; Diese bestehen aus mentalen Schlussfolgerungen (setzen eine Zeichenkette zu vergangenen Erfahrungen im Umgang mit den
Zeichen in Bezug, erkennen Muster und Ähnlichkeit, schlie
ßen z. B. aus der Beschreibung der Kleidung oder der Verkehrsmittel auf eine bestimmte Epoche) und Problemlö

sungsoperationen (schlussfolgerndes Operieren über im AT implizite Inhalte, wie z. B. mentale Verarbeitung von Präsuppositionen, Erkennung von Anspielungen und direkten Zitaten aus anderen Texten, mentale Wiederherstellung von nicht explizit Genanntem).[20] Verstehen ist demzufolge das Resultat kognitiver Prozesse, die inferierend Textinhalte mit dem Wissen über sprachliches Handeln sowie mit Erfahrungs- und Weltwissen verknüpfen, um einen kohärenten und in sich stimmigen Textsinn zu erhalten. Verstehen ist ein integrativer, subjektiv-individueller Prozess, der auf einer vernetzten Integrationsleistung beruht, da die neuronalen Verknüpfungen sich jeweils neu organisieren auf der Basis ihrer erlernten Erfahrung.[21] Wir lernen oder konventionalisieren also nicht Bedeutungen für Einzelwörter, sondern sprachliche Äußerungen im Hinblick auf das Verstehen sozialer Zusammenhänge, Zielsetzungen und textvermittelndem Handeln, auf Orientierungen und Ziele.[22] Erst kraft ihrer Konventionalisierung und kontextuellen Bindungen – in Situationen, Handlungszusammenhängen, Wirklichkeitsbezügen, Lebensformen – haben sie Bedeutung, in deren Folge Verstehen zustande kommt: „The only really reliable way to learn a new

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20 Der pure Vergleich von eigenem und fremdkutlurellem Sprach- und Weltwissen, stellt an sich noch keine kognitive Operation dar. Er geht der Inferenz voraus, dem entscheidenden Paradigma des Verstehensprozesses.

21 Vgl. Lehr (2021: 294–309) zu den subjektiven Faktoren (Emotionen, Motivation, Stellung zum Text, Persönlichkeit des Translators) und zur Bedeutung von Emotionen des Übersetzers bei Textanalyse und übersetzerischen Entscheidungen.

22 Verstehensprozesse laufen daher automatisch ab bei formalen Elementen einer Äußerung und deren systematischer Bedeutung wie z. B. bei bestimmten Morphemen (fr. Partizip-Präsens- und Gerundium-Endungen auf fr. *-ant* oder englische Verlaufsformen auf *-ing*) oder bei Verbalaspekten (fr. *imparfait* vs. *passé défini*).) etc.

word, in fact, is in context, as used by someone else in a real situation" (Robinson [3]2012: 91). Dies ist auch der Grund dafür, dass Textverstehen und Übersetzung nicht streng zu trennen sind, denn manche mentalen Operationen, die verstärkt in der Phase ‚Textübersetzen' zutage treten, werden bereits in der vorgelagerten Phase initiiert. Das Textverstehen des Übersetzers ist also teilweise schon Beginn der Aufstellung einer translatorischen Strategie: Diese Etappen der kognitiven Tätigkeit sind nicht gänzlich voneinander getrennt.

Verstehen ist folglich ein text- wie wissensgeleiteter Prozess, in dem sozial-interaktive, situative, affektive, kognitive und sprachliche Faktoren interagieren und sich wechselseitig ergänzen (vgl. Kupsch-Losereit 2008: 105–113). Es ist ein Ereignis zwischen Interaktions- bzw. Kommunikationspartnern, weil kognitive Prozesse nicht universell, sondern kulturspezifisch, situationsangemessen und partnerbezogen ablaufen. Verstehen heißt nämlich auch, einer Orientierungserwartung entsprechen. Angesichts der Abhängigkeit jeder mentalen und sprachlichen Operation von vorausgegangenen Operationen wird Sinnkonstitution und Verstehen immer im Rahmen einer Handlungswahrnehmung und unter den Bedingungen sozialer Interaktion bzw. Kommunikation erfolgen. Neuere Forschung belegt, dass das Verstehen des Translators und damit seine kognitiven Strategien abhängig sind von den Zielsetzungen sowie den Erwartungen, mit denen der AT gelesen wird (z. B. einer bestimmten Textsorte, Textzweck und Textintention).

Die kognitionswissenschaftliche Erkenntnis von Verstehen belegt zusammen mit handlungs- und diskurstheoretischen Ansätzen der Übersetzungswissenschaft, dass Verstehen immer eine aktive Auseinandersetzung mit situativ relevanten Textmerkmalen ist. Verstehen ist stets an einer bestimmten Fragestellung orientiert und mithin von einem Vor-

verständnis der Sache geleitet. Oder anders ausgedrückt: Erst die Kenntnis der Intention bzw. der Funktion einer sprachlichen Handlung d. h. der Intention, für die sie relevant ist, macht diese begreifbar. Kognitionswissenschaftliche Modelle veranschaulichen daher, dass die selbe sprachliche Äußerung in verschiedenen Situationen und bei unterschiedlichen Bedürfnissen (Relevanzfaktor!) unterschiedlich verstanden wird (vgl. Risku 1995: 37). Genau dies ist der Fall beim Übersetzen, denn der Translator liest den AT von vorneherein *sub specie translationis.*

Im Gegensatz zum klassischen hermeneutischen Vorgehen, das im Verstehen die textbezogene Kohärenz anstrebt, nimmt Kupsch-Losereit einen Perspektivenwechsel vor insofern, als Verstehen aufgefasst wird als Verstehen von etwas und für jemanden, das der Vermittlung und Überbrückung von historisch-kultureller Distanz und heterokultureller Rezipientensituation dient (vgl. Cercel 2013: 208). Der den Text erstmalig lesende Übersetzer führt eine bestimmte Anzahl von kognitiven Operationen durch, die für seine spätere Strategie eine wichtige Rolle spielen und die beim Nichtübersetzer ausbleiben. Verstehen erscheint weniger als Bemühung um Aneignung, sondern eher als Öffnung gegenüber dem anderen. Der Translator nimmt in seiner verstehensorientierten Analyse die Erwartungen an die kommunikative und soziale Funktion des ZT vorweg, zieht die Bewusstseins- und Handlungsdimensionen seiner Leser in Betracht und antizipiert folglich die Verstehensbedingungen und -möglichkeiten seiner Leser. Er kann in vielen Fällen nicht unterstellen, dass seine ZT-Leser geteiltes, gemeinsames Wissen mit den AT-Lesern haben, muss also Textinhalte nicht nur situativ-funktional und angemessen – den Gebrauchsbedingungen entsprechend –, sondern auch logisch-kohärent thematisieren, also auf Stimmigkeit, Schlüssigkeit, Widerspruchsfreiheit und

Plausibilität achten (d. s. Verstehensvorwegnahmen). Referenz ist keine von vorneherein festgelegte Beziehung zwischen Sprache und Welt, sondern eine aktuell-unmittelbare Verbindung zwischen Sprache und Situation bzw. Handlungszusammenhängen sowie der Zielgruppe der Empfänger und ergibt sich als Konstrukt kognitiver Operationen wie Visualisierung, *Bottom-up-* und *Top-down*-Prozessen, Fokuswechsel. Der kognitionswissenschaftliche Verstehensbegriff orientiert sich an den exakten Wissenschaften gleichermaßen wie an historisch-kulturellen Kontexten und der Kontextualität des Lesers, er hat Geschehenscharakter ohne normativen Geltungsanspruch. Der Sinn eines AT ist nicht zeitlos vorgegeben, er wird ‚differiert' durch die Perspektive und Weite, die sich in einer nie vollendeten Wirkungsgeschichte entfaltet, ergibt sich als Entfaltung eines wirkungsgeschichtlichen unabschließbaren veränderlichen Sinnpotentials eines Textes im Akt des Lesens, der die Integration der textuellen Information in die Wissens- und Handlungsstrukturen des Rezipienten ermöglicht.[23] Textkohärenz ist keine Frage von Wörtern als Bedeutungsträgern und der Verknüpfung zwischen den Sprachelementen (so noch Stolze 2003: 186), sondern das Produkt sinnerstellenden Operationen des Lesers, der auf der Grundlage der Textinformation durch Inferenzen den Zusammenhang herstellt von semantisch-logischen Strukturen, referentiellen Sachverhalten und sozio-kommunikativem Rahmen. Folgendes eigenes Beispiel sei hierzu angebracht:

> Churchill und Adenauer gingen im Garten, dessen Blumenbeete verwahrlost waren, spazieren. Der Rosenliebhaber machte ein betrübtes Gesicht ...

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23 Verwiesen sei auf Derridas Idee einer unendlichen *différance* der Bedeutung, dem Gedanken der ewigen Differenz zwischen Zeichen und Bedeutung. Für ihn verweist Gesagtes in endloser Regression auf anderes Gesagtes, Bedeutungen immer auf andere Bedeutungen.

Dies kann nur verstanden werden, wenn ich weiß, dass Adenauer Rosenliebhaber war und nicht, indem ich die Merkmale zur Bedeutungsfeststellung von Rosenliebhaber aufzähle bzw. im Gehirn präsent habe. Dem Franzosen, dem Kanadier oder dem jungen Deutschen, der Adenauer nicht als Rosenzüchter kennt, muss die Inferenz, also die Schlussfolgerung, die neuronal sprachliches und außersprachliches Wissen verbindet, erst ermöglicht werden, etwa mit: „Der Rosenliebhaber Adenauer …" oder: „Als Rosenliebhaber machte Adenauer …" oder: „Der Rosenliebhaber" entfällt ganz, da die metonymische Bezeichnung weder für den weiteren Kontext noch in der respektiven Kultur eine Rolle spielt.

Der Unterschied zum linguistischen Paradigma besteht in der Dynamisierung/der Prozesshaftigkeit der Relation zwischen AT und ZT. Die kognitive Distanzierung des Translators von einem AT und den Kontexten seiner Verwendung ist Zeichen erweiterter kognitiver Möglichkeiten und Voraussetzung eines integrativ-konstruktiven Verstehensprozesses (vgl. Kupsch 2008: 122–132). Bălăcescu/Stefanink (2006: 53–57) haben, auf dem Hintergrund kognitionswissenschaftlicher Erkenntnisse, die Strategien von Studierenden untersucht, die Grundlage und Voraussetzung für das Textverstehen sind. Die Vorgangsweise ergab, dass Verstehen assoziatives, laterales Denken voraussetzt und gezielt und auf strategische Art Visualisierung, die Aktivierung des Vorwissens sowie den Wechsel zwischen Sichtweisen und Perspektiven vornimmt. Hier das Beispiel von Bălăcescu/Stefanink (ebd.): In einem Text zur wöchentlichen Ministerrunde ironisiert der *Canard Enchaîné,* die bedeutendste satirische Wochenzeitung Frankreichs, die neuen Gepflogenheiten des nach den Wahlen 1983 sich gerade konstituierten sozialistischen Ministerrats und entwirft ein Bild des mangelnden Verantwortungsbewusstseins der sozialistischen

Minister. Diese warten nur auf das Ende der regulären Arbeitszeit:

> Enfin, le Conseil doit être désormais terminé à 12 h 30 pétantes. Plus question de jouer les prolongations. L'heure du casse-croûte, c'est sacré.

Hauptschwierigkeit war das im Deutsche unbekannte „casse-croûte", und annähernde wörtliche Übersetzungen wie 'Sandwich, Butterbrot' oder 'Stulle' (regional norddeutsch) wurden von den Studierenden verworfen. Der nächste Schritt zum Textverstehen war die Visualisierung des Rahmens „casse-croûte", die eine kognitive Szene aufrief und zum Vorschlag führte: „Die Stunde des Mittagessens ist heilig" und der sich beschreiben lässt als Szenenerweiterung von „casse-croûte" zu „Mittagessen", wobei das kontextuelle „Punkt 12:30 Uhr" wohl zur Einführung des Wortes „Mittag" führte, das im AT nicht explizit genannt war. Einige Studierende haben, auf dem Hintergrund des bereits beschriebenen Hintergrundes interesselos-gleichgültigen Verhaltens, eine andere Vorstellung gehabt und einen Szenenwechsel vorgenommen; sie dachten an eine Schulklasse unaufmerksamer Pennäler, die gelangweilt nur auf die Mittagspause wartet. Das führte zu folgender Übersetzung: „Wenn es schellt, wird der Ranzen gepackt" oder „… rennen sie in die Pause". Der Szenenwechsel hat stattgefunden durch den beiden Szenen gemeinsamen Hintergrund (Isotopie) undisziplinierten Verhaltens, der nichtsprachlich materialisiert nur aus Szenenelementen abstrahierbar ist. Bereits die erste kreative Lösung „Die Stunde der Mittagspause ist heilig" wurde verkürzt „Die Mittagspause ist heilig" als zufriedenstellende Lösung übernommen. Der gewählte theoretische Bezugsrahmen und die Übersetzungsvorschläge zeigen mit ihren kreativen Lösungen, wie Intuition und kreative Denkprozesse wissenschaft-

lich erfassbar, erkennbar und somit intersubjektiv nachvoll-ziehbar sind.[24]

Ein Beispiel für eine Szenenerweiterung findet sich in einem Text zu den Mai-Ereignissen von 1968, in dem Sartre von „les matraques de la rue Gay-Lussac" (*Le Nouvel Observateur*, 04.11.1968) spricht, um das brutale Vorgehen der Polizei gegen Demonstranten anzuprangern. Während der französische Leser diese Formulierung im Kontext versteht, muss die Translation für den deutschen Leser die Verstehensvoraussetzungen – die Präsuppositionen – erst herstellen. Die ersten Vorschläge „Die Gummiknüppel" oder auch „die Hiebe/Schläge mit Knüppeln in der Rue Gay-Lussac" schienen den Studierenden zu Recht unverständlich. Im weiteren Übersetzungsprozess kamen sie mittels szenischer Vorstellungen der Situation, in der Polizisten brutal auf Studierende einschlagen, zu einer Neugewichtung und Erweiterung der Szenenelemente. Daraus ergaben sich folgende Zieltextversionen:

> Das Knüppeln auf Demonstranten in der Rue Gay-Lussac.

> Das harte Zuschlagen der kasernierten Polizei/Sondereinheiten der Polizei am 10. Mai 68 im Quartier Latin.

Kognitionslinguistisch betrachtet, verläuft Verstehen und der Weg der Lösungsfindung für kreative zielsprachliche Formulierungen häufig über die beim lateralen, assoziativen Denken ablaufenden Prozesse. Ein Beispiel für Perspektivenwechsel ergibt sich bei einem Zeitungstext zur französischen Geschichte des 19. Jhs. Darin wurde die metonymische Paraphrase im fr. Satz „Le vainqueur d'Iéna est mort en 1821" brav übersetzt: „Der Sieger von Jena starb 1821". Während

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24 Zur Definition und den Typen des kreativen Übersetzens s. Kussmaul (²2007) und Kupsch-Losereit (2021). Beispiele mit kreativen Übersetzungslösungen veranschaulichen die Sinnzuweisung durch den Translator.

aber zunächst kein Studierender den Sieger mit Napoleon identifizierte, nahm eine einzige Studentin eine andere Perspektive bei der Betrachtung des Gegenstandes ein und mittels lateralem Denken übersetzte sie kreativ „Der Verlierer von Waterloo starb 1821"; jetzt konnte die Verlierer-Variante von allen Studierenden in ihr Weltwissen integriert werden, wurde verstanden und als angemessenere Übersetzung erachtet, kam es im Text doch nicht auf den strahlenden Helden Napoleon an. Die beschriebenen kognitiven Strategien wie Aufruf von Szenen, Rahmenwechsel oder -erweiterung, Assoziationsketten und laterales Denken spielen für das Verstehen ebenso wie für die Wahl einer Zieltextentsprechung eine bedeutende Rolle, sie sind zur Stimulation kreativer Übersetzungen lehrbar und lassen sich als Übersetzungstechniken für translatorische Kreativität einüben.[25]

4 Verstehenstheoretische Konzepte: Unterschiede und Übereinstimmungen

TH und CTS kennzeichnen unterschiedliche epistemologische Herangehensweisen in Bezug auf die Darstellung von Verstehensprozessen: zum einen eine mikrotextuelle, eher deduktive Herangehensweise, die auf Allgemeingültigkeit pocht und retrospektiv verfährt, zum anderen ein makrotextuelles, eher induktiv kontextuelles Vorgehen, das die Ergebnisse prospektiv betrachtet. Der in der historisch-hermeneutisch fundierten Rezeption sich konstituierende Sinn des AT

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25 Weitere Beispiele zur unterschiedlichen Konzeptualisierung sprachlicher Äußerungen, die erst mithilfe szenischer Vorstellungen verstanden werden und zu Übersetzungen führen, die über eigenkulturell geprägte Wahrnehmungs- und Deutungsmustern hinausgehen, sind bei Kupsch-Losereit (2008: 130–132) zu finden.

wird durch textuell und sozial determinierte Konventionen und Zeichenrelationen gesteuert. Unter kognitionswissenschaftlicher Betrachtungsperspektive hingegen sind zudem die Situation, kulturelle Gegebenheiten und Konventionen sowie das Wissen darum an der Sinnkonstitution beteiligt. Die Bedeutung von sprachlichen Ausdrücken ist keine starr definierte Zeichenfolge und beim Übersetzen handelt es sich nicht um ein In-Verhältnis-Setzen zweier feststehenden Entitäten, sondern um eine Relation, die durch das In-Beziehung-Setzen erst generiert wird in Situationen und Kontext. Verstehen gelingt oft deshalb nicht, so der Kulturanthropologe Geertz (1987: 19f.), weil wir zwar die Sprache des Fremden verstehen aber nicht die Vorstellungswelt, innerhalb derer seine Handlungen und seine Sprache Zeichen sind.

Hermeneutische und kognitionswissenschaftliche verstehenstheoretische Konzepte unterscheiden sich im Wesentlichen in vier Bereichen: Begrifflichkeit (4.1), Text vs. Diskurs (4.2), passive vs. aktive Sinnverarbeitung (4.3), Intuition und Subjektivität (4.4).

4.1 Begrifflichkeit

Das Modell der klassischen Übersetzungshermeneutik stützt sich vor allem auf sprachliche Repräsentationen von Bedeutung und die vertrauten Kategorien wie Vorverständnis, Vorurteil, Intuition, Subjektivität, Vertrautheit oder Ähnlichkeit der Inhalte von AT und textbezogener Übersetzung. Die Begriffe Original, Treue, Äquivalenz, das normativ aufgeladene Verstehens- und Sinnkonzept, Horizontverschmelzung werden zunehmend angereichert bzw. ersetzt durch kognitionswissenschaftlich-mentale Modelle wie Inferenz, *scene*, *frame*, Visualisierung, Fokuswechsel, Deplatzierung, kulturspezifische Prototypenbildung. Dazu kommen neue Leitkategorien,

wie etwa Anderssein, Alterität, Diversität, kulturelle Differenz, diskursive Regelhaftigkeit als Sinnverstehen, Orientierung am Geschehenscharakter von möglichem Verstehen und Dekonstruktion des normativ aufgeladenem Verstehens- und Sinnkonzepts in der klassischen TH, dialogischer Verstehensvollzug, in dem Fremdes und Eigenes sich in ständiger Interaktion befinden, Objektivierung des Verstehensprozesses.[26]

4.2 Text vs. Diskurs

Statt der Frage nach dem verborgenen Sinn und der Suche nach dem objektiven Sinngehalt eines Textes, ist in der CTS die Analyse von Diskursen, ihrer Regelhaftigkeit und ihrer lebensweltlichen Einordnung der zentrale Antrieb des Verstehens. Jede Diskursart hat einen Verkettungsmodus zwischen Sätzen zur Folge, die in AT und ZT unterschiedlichen Darstellungsmodi und Satz-Regelsystemen unterstehen. Sie weist viele sinntragende Komponenten auf, wie z. B. die Art der Gesprächsführung, der Repliken, der Urteile über den Charakter der handelnden Person etc. All diese komplizierten durch Text und Diskurs vermittelten Relationen werden in das Textverstehen einbezogen und beruhen auf einem breiten Netz aus vorerfassten und im Gedächtnis gespeicherten Einschätzungen, die ohne Inferenzen nicht möglich wären. Die Kraft der Reflexion entfaltet sich im Verstehen als intentionale, kulturelle Praxis, als pragmatisches Aushandeln, als Annäherung an eine echte *cross-cultural* Kommunikation jenseits des Traums der Assimilationisten. Sie hängt ab von der

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26 Vgl. Bachmann-Medick (2017: 299f.) und Grondin (2009: 97–111) zu Hermeneutik und Dekonstruktion. Siever (2010: 88–145) stellt ausführlich die hermeneutischen und dekonstruktivistischen Ansätze des verstehenstheoretischen Paradigmas dar.

Fähigkeit des Nutzers, relevante Bedeutung zu aktivieren, denn je nach Perspektive und Fokus kann eine große Bandbreite von Bedeutungen aus den diskursiven, narrativen, aktantiellen Textstrukturen aktiviert werden.[27] Die Modellierung kognitiver Prozesse ist neuronal, nicht symbolisch-funktional inspiriert und steht diametral symbolischen Modellen gegenüber, die mentale Phänomen rein linear propositional und losgelöst von ihrer neuronalen Verankerung im Gehirn betrachten. Das bedeutet für den Übersetzer, dass auch schon kleinere Texteinheiten wie Anredeformen, Erzählmuster, Symbole nicht isoliert, sondern in kulturspezifische und historische Denkmuster, Bedeutungszusammenhänge und Kommunikationssituationen eingebunden sind. Um Diskurse führen zu können, müssen wir aus Handlungs- und Erfahrungszusammenhängen heraustreten. Auch in einer wirksamen Tradition sind neue Applikationen möglich, die eine kritische Umsetzung mit Rücksicht auf veränderte Situationen gestatten. So fordert Habermas (2009: 119–154) z. B., dass in postsäkularen Gesellschaften religiöse Sprache in eine öffentlich zugängliche säkulare Sprache übersetzt werden müsse. Hier leisten funktionale-kognitive Verstehensansätze eine sensible Rückkopplung an die gesellschaftlichen Problemlagen und Prozesse.

Die Vielfalt der möglichen Deutungen ist v. a. durch theoretische Vorannahmen und Zielsetzungen sowie individuelles Vorwissen gegeben, ohne welches kein Verstehen möglich ist (hermeneutischer Zirkel). Eine vereinnahmende Übersetzung, die das Andere, Fremde, die Meinung des Au-

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27 Sichtbar wird dies z. B. an Übersetzungen von Kollokationen, idiomatischen Wendungen, Sprichwörtern, Metaphern angesichts gegensätzlicher Bildkulturen/Bildtabus, situationsabhängigen Standardformulierungen, sprachspezifischen Konventionen sowie von kulturell und gebrauchsnormativ geprägten AT-Segmenten.

tors, den Autorensinn mit Kategorien des Eigenen erschließt und deutet, kann es gerade nicht erfassen und verstehen. Dieser hermeneutische Dogmatismus bleibt der eigenen Perspektive verhaftet. Es geht aber darum, das Fremde in ständiger Interaktion mit dem Eigenen dialogisch zu analysieren und zu verstehen.

4.3 actio vs. passio

Die TH betont den rezeptiven Umgang mit der Textvorlage als *passio*, der kaum eine interpretatorische Offenheit zulässt. Textaussage und Stilmerkmale des Originaltextes sollen im ZT treu und der Intentionsadäquatheit der Übersetzung entsprechend erhalten bleiben. Mit *passio* ist aber nicht nur der Nachvollzug der Autorenmeinung" (Stolze 1986: 134) gemeint oder eine inhaltliche Identifikation mit der Textaussage, „sondern vielmehr deren deutende Vergegenwärtigung. Beim Übersetzen hat man es vorrangig mit sich selbst" zu tun (Stolze 2017: 272) und diese Selbstwahrnehmung ermöglicht erst die notwendige Empathie, um auf Textebene eine Stimmigkeit von AT und translatorischem Entwurf zu erreichen und Verstandenes inhaltlich präzise und sprachlich angemessen durch Übersetzen zu vermitteln. Die Hermeneutik sieht

> im Verstehen eine Art passiv erfahrener Selbstdarstellung des Sinns, eine innere Anschauung der Wahrheit im Erschließungsgeschehen, die im Text ‚zur Sprache kommt', eine widerfahrene Bewusstseinssteuerung, und das Verstanden-Haben ist dann die subjektive Evidenz von der erfahrenen Mitteilung. Hierfür ist keine Methodik erforderlich, da das Verstehen im hermeneutischen Prinzip von selbst geschieht. (Stolze 2003: 90)

Diametral zu dieser Bestimmung des Verstehens als aktuell-spontaner Beziehung zu einem Text, als impulsiv-ungesteuerter Sinnerfahrung, steht in den CTS der Sinngebungsprozess des Rezipienten als interaktiv Handelndem und das

Verstehen als aktive kognitive Bedeutungskonstruktion gegenüber.[28] Verstehen ist ein dynamischer Prozess, in dem Diskurse und die Regelhaftigkeit von Diskursen mit außersprachlichem Wissen verbunden und analysiert werden, wobei auf Bekanntem und bereits Verstandenem aufgebaut und – falls notwendig – darüber hinausgegangen wird. Im Rahmen eines Diskurses bringen wir Bedeutung und Sinn hervor, denn jedes Textdokument hat etwas Singuläres und ist keine vom Interaktionsprozess losgelöste, feststehende Größe. Der Translator handelt immer wieder erneut das interaktive Verstehen (z. B. von situativ angemessenem Sprachverhalten) in Kommunikationssituationen aus, indem er Inferenzprozesse und integratives Verstehen für den Rezipienten ermöglicht, funktional adäquate Möglichkeiten sichtbar macht, also alternative Lösungsmöglichkeiten in Betracht zieht. Der archimedische Punkt ist die kommunikative Funktionsbestimmung des Textes; sie legt Diskursart und Stil fest, denn auch die Wirkung des AT wird, unter Funktionsaspekten, prospektiv im ZT mit neuen kulturspezifischen Vertextungskonventionen festgelegt. Um den Sinngehalt eines AT zu erschließen, ist es weder hinreichend noch unbedingt notwendig, die Motive, Absichten; Vorstellungen des Autors in Erfahrung zu bringen. Diese Kenntnisse können natürlich den Zugang erleichtern, z. B. wenn die Sinnhorizonte von Autor und Interpret bei historischen Texten oder sehr unterschiedlichen Kulturen deutlich auseinandertreten. Der Vergangenheit wächst aber in der Übersetzung neuer Sinn zu (in Erzählungen, Beschreibungsmöglichkeiten etc), denn sie ist ein autonomer Bedeutungsraum, den die Intention seines Autors nicht mehr belebt (vgl. Ricœur 2005: 109–134). Aus demselben Grund ist die Bedeutung, die ein Übersetzer aus der

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28 Ausführlich zu *actio* vs. *passio* vgl. Cercel (2013: 153–162).

sprachlichen Repräsentation von Bedeutung in einem Ausgangstext konstruiert, immer abhängig vom Leser und dessen Interpretation. Verstehen ist ein aktiver und kreativer semiotischer, sinnbildender Prozess, in dem gilt: „producing and understanding are *tightly interwoven*" (Pickering/Garrod 2013: 329f.). Dieser translatorisch- kreative Verstehensprozess setzt assoziatives, laterales Denken voraus. Visualisierung (*scenes-and-frames*-Semantik) und Prototypensemantik haben sich als geeignete Beschreibungsmodelle erwiesen zur Ermittlung von Strategien des kreativen Übersetzens[29], welche kreative Denkprozesse und Verstehensentwürfe nachvollziehbar und lehrbar machen.

4.4 Subjektivität und intuitive Handlungskompetenz vs. analytische Verstehensverfahren

Der Begriff der Subjektivität von Textverstehen ist in beiden Modellen verankert und ist eine der Begründungen für unterschiedliche Übersetzungen ein und desselben Textes durch verschiedene Übersetzer. Subjektivität wird in der TH verstanden als intuitive Fähigkeit zu raschem, ganzheitlichem Erfassen von Zusammenhängen, sie liegt im Rezeptionsvorgang.[30] Dieser intuitiven unkontrollierbaren Denk- und Handlungsweise, welche übersetzerische Subjektivität und Intuition im Irrationalen verortet, stellt die CTS analytische Verstehensprozeduren gegenüber. So plädiert Stefanink für

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29 Vgl. Kupsch-Losereit (2021) zu Typen des kreativen Übersetzens, das Textbeispiele und deren innovative Übersetzungen ins Deutsche exemplarisch aufzeigen. Der Sammelband Cercel et al. (2017) behandelt das Kreativitätskonzept aus unterschiedlichen Perspektiven.

30 Cercel (2010) bespricht ausführlich die unterschiedlichen Konzepte der übersetzerischen Subjektivität in der neueren Übersetzungshermeneutik.

die Anerkennung der kreativ schöpferischen Subjektivität durch die Analyse der kognitiv-mentalen Abläufe im Übersetzungsprozess. Subjektivität ist nicht in intuitiver/assoziativer Weise in der Individualität des einzelnen Übersetzers verankert, sondern in der neuronal-individuellen, rekonstruierbaren Modellierung kognitiver Prozesse (Interferenzen, semantische, kontextuelle Informationen, Vorwissen des Übersetzers als kontrollierbare Größen), die trainiert werden können; sie wird im Prozess der Reverbalisierung wirksam. Die kognitiven — auch die intuitiven und kreativen — Vorgänge sind subjektiv-individuell, da die Verknüpfungen in neuronalen Netzwerken nicht vorgegeben sind und sich jeweils neu organisieren, aus Erfahrung erlernt worden sind und weiterhin erlernt werden. Die vernetzte Integrationsleistung (von Sprache, Vorverständnis, außersprachlichen Wissensbeständen und Zielsetzungen), die zur Erstellung eines kohärenten und intersubjektiv vermittelbaren Textsinns führt, kann in einen theoretisch fundierten und empirisch eindeutig überprüfbaren übersetzungskreativen Beschreibungs- und Erklärungszusammenhang gestellt werden und zwar auf kognitionswissenschaftlicher Basis; so kann die Lesart eines Textes, die sich dann in einer subjektivkreativen Übersetzungsentscheidung niederschlägt, analysiert, rekonstruiert und wissenschaftlich begründet werden. Auch die neuere Übersetzungshermeneutik (vgl. Cercel 2013: 267–283; Cercel et al. 2017) ist bemüht, den volatilen Begriff der Übersetzungskreativität zu vermeiden und analytische Verfahren zur Begründung subjektiver übersetzerischer Zugriffe heranzuziehen. Es gibt also Konvergenzen in der positiven Beurteilung translatorischer Kreativität, wobei die TH die schöpferische Kraft von übersetzerischer Subjektivität der logischem Denken nicht zugänglichen Intuition zuschreibt, die CTH dagegen subjektkreative Entscheidungen in der Analyse

der kognitiv-mentalen Abläufe erfasst, begründet und sie intersubjektiv nachvollziehbar macht.

5   Fazit

Wir betrachteten das verstehenstheoretische Paradigma mit den beiden Leitmodellen Hermeneutik und Kognitionswissenschaft sowie die Phase des Textverstehens als annähernd autonome Etappe der übersetzerischen Tätigkeit.[31] Gemeinsam ist beiden Disziplinen, dass sie Übersetzen als Text-Rezipient-Interaktion auffassen, die auf einem von Hermeneutikern und Kognitionswissenschaftlern unterschiedlich definierten Verstehen des Textes beruht. Hermeneutische Theorien legen den Fokus auf den Originaltext und bestehen auf dem Sinn-Imperativ, also auf der Forderung, den Text nicht nur so wie vom Autor intendiert, sondern sogar besser zu verstehen, als der Autor es vermochte. Demgegenüber betonen kognitionstranslatologische Ansätze die Freiheit des Übersetzers gegenüber dem Originaltext und lehnen den Sinn-Imperativ ab, weil der Textsinn letztlich nicht einholbar sei und die Funktion des AT aus dem AT nicht zwingend vorgegeben ist. So wird die Frage nach der Individualität des Autors sowie den sprachlichen und textuellen Aspekten des AT verlagert auf die Frage nach der Rolle bzw. Individualität des Übersetzers. In seine interessegeleitete Lektüre gehen ebenfalls angenommenes Vorverständnis und die Erwartungshaltungen des ZT-Empfängers mit ein, nach denen er die Textfunktion seiner Übersetzung ausrichtet. Verstehen und das zu Verstehende sind nur als relationales Ereignis zu

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31   Viele Faktoren, die in der darauffolgenden Phase der Erstellung einer translatorischen Strategie zum Tragen kommen, wie z. B. Auftrag und Auftraggeber, Zielgruppe der Empfänger, Verwendungskontext der Zielsprache, werden nur am Rande betrachtet.

begreifen, als Prozess, denn im Verstandenwerden ändert sich das zu Verstehende fortlaufend. So stellt der Übersetzer den AT zum einen unter Einbeziehung vorhandener sprachlicher wie nichtsprachlicher Wissensbestände von seinem historischen Standpunkt und seinen kulturspezifischen Konventionen und Traditionen aus in ein Überlieferungsgeschehen. Zum anderen liest er ihn mit bestimmten Intentionen, Einstellungen, Dispositionen, normativen Vorstellungen.

Gemeinsam ist beiden Theorien die Vorstellung Schleiermachers von der Hermeneutik als ‚unendliches Gespräch‘ und nach Gadamer der Geschehenscharakter des Verstehens. Für die TH wie für die CTS gilt, dass jede Äußerung im Rahmen eines geschichtlichen wie kulturellen Kontextes stattfindet, und imstande ist, ihren Kontext zu überschreiten, wobei die CTS den Sinn eines Textes als Produkt regelhafter Diskurse innerhalb eines Entstehungskontextes betrachtet. Beide verstehenstheoretischen Ansätze betonen in ihrem praktischen Vollzug die prinzipielle Möglichkeit des Verstehens und die Unmöglichkeit von universeller Geltung eben diesen Verstehens.

Hermeneutik und Kognitionswissenschaften sind verschiedene Denkparadigmen, die auf der Ergebnisebene aber z. T. kompatibel sind. Unterschiedliche Theoriewenden, nicht nur umwälzende ‚Paradigmen‘ können durchaus auch nebeneinander bestehen, gleichsam in einer eklektischen Theoriekonstellation. Wir sprechen daher nicht mehr von einer Unvereinbarkeit dieser beiden unterschiedlichen Theorien, sondern von einem neuen verstehenstheoretischen Paradigma, das sie verbindet und Übereinstimmungen aufweist. Zur konsequenten Durchführung des Programms einer Annäherung zwischen Hermeneutik und Kognitionswissenschaften sei verwiesen auf die Arbeiten des deutsch-rumänischen Forschertandems Bernd Stefanink/Ioana Bălăcescu

(2006 und 2009), welche die aktive Sinnverarbeitung in unterschiedlichen Regelsystemen und Darstellungsmodi überzeugend nachweisen. Zusammenfassend möchten wir eine mögliche Kompatibilität von hermeneutischen mit kognitionswissenschaftichen Konzepten aufzeigen.

5.1 Mit der von der TH propagierten Horizontverschmelzung ist die „Verschmelzung des eigenen Vorwissens und des Vorverständnisses mit dem differenten Horizont der Textmitteilung" (Cercel 2013: 217) gemeint. Das Ideal der Verschmelzung lässt die CTS in dieser Absolutheit nicht gelten und verbindet den Begriff Horizont mit einem erweiterten Gedankeninhalt. Der Übersetzer reflektiert zwar den historisch-gesellschaftlichen Horizont des Textes (Sender, Ort, Zeit, Thematik), tritt in einen Dialog mit dem Text. Dieser Dialog mündet aber nicht in eine Verschmelzung von Textwahrheit und Rezipient, von AT und ZT. Der Übersetzer hebt den Horizont des AT ab von seinem Gegenwartshorizont (vgl. Bălăcescu/Stefanink 2009: 222–230), er geht aus von der Unabschließbarkeit des Sinnhorizonts. Die Wirkungsgeschichte ist keine Reproduktion des Vergangenen, sondern wird durch gegenwartsbezogenes Erkenntnisinteresse ausgelöst. An Stelle des Vorurteils tritt ein kontrolliertes Vorverständnis und unter Gegenwartsperspektive eine Bewegung in die Zukunft. Kognitionswissenschaftlich wird der Begriff der Horizontverschmelzung gedeutet als Interaktion von *Bottom-up-* (Bedeutungsrepräsentationen auf der Grundlage der sprachlichen Ausdrucksmittel) und *Top-down*-Prozessen (Basis von Vor- und Situationswissen). Die naiv-intuitiven hermeneutischen Verstehensvorgänge lassen sich somit, bei aller Gebundenheit des Translators an seine Kultur und den hermeneutischen Gegenwartshorizont, mit einem wissenschaftlichen Instrumentarium begründen als Abfolge von reflektierten Operationen, die zu einem kritischen Verstehen

auf einer reflektiert-metasprachlichen Bewusstseinsebene führen. Das hermeneutische Konzept der Horizontverschmelzung wird geöffnet für Bedeutungshorizonte (offene Horizonte) und die Bedingungen und Entscheidungen in unabgeschlossener Übersetzungsaufgabe beschreibbar und erklärbar.

5.2 Der subjekt-orientierte Verstehensbegriff ist im hermeneutischen wie auch im kognitionswissenschaftlichen Denkmuster eine wichtige Kategorie. Beide betonen die kreativ-subjektive Dimension des Verstehens und heben die Bedeutung des Vorwissens heraus. Jedoch wird der subjektorientierte Verstehensbegriff erweitert und ein wissenschaftlich nachvollziehbarer Begriff von Verstehen tritt an seine Stelle. Dieser stellt ein methodisches Instrumentarium bereit für den Verstehensprozess, nämlich semantisch: die Prototypen und kognitiv: die *senes & frames* für Kontext, Kultur und Geschichte. Das subjektive Verstehen eines Textes, subjektive Entscheidungen und übersetzerische Assoziationskompetenz werden somit durch kognitionswissenschaftlich basierte Konzepte von mentalen Prozessen wissenschaftlich belegt, methodisch abgesichert, begründet, rekonstruierbar und intersubjektiv nachvollziebar (vgl. Bălăcescu/Stefanink 2006: 50–61; Cercel 2010). Durch die Erfassung kognitiv-mentaler Abläufe im Übersetzungsprozess erfährt die übersetzerische Subjektivität im wissenschaftlichen Diskurs eine positive Beurteilung. Der subjektorientierte, auf reiner Selbsterfahrung beruhende Verstehensbegriff wird erweitert und an die Stelle unmittelbar intuitiver Erkenntnis tritt eine andere, diskursive Erkenntnisfähigkeit, die auf methodischer Analyse und wissenschaftlicher Begründung des Textverstehens beruht. So stehen sich zwei Erkenntnismodalitäten im Textverstehen gegenüber, die sich in übersetzungstheoretischer Methoden-

reflexion durch die Integration des kognitionswissenschaftlichen Konzepts ergänzen.

Es gibt viele Arbeiten zur kognitionstranslatologischen Forschung (s. Alves/Jakobsen 2021), jedoch erst wenige Beiträge, welche die Verbindung zwischen kognitionswissenschaftlicher und hermeneutischer Forschung herstellen und sich um eine Annäherung der unterschiedlichen Positionen der beiden Disziplinen bemühen (vgl. Kupsch-Losereit 1997 und 2021; Bălăcescu/Stefanink 2006 und 2009; Bayer-Hohenwarter 2017; Pavlova 2021). Am Beispiel des Verstehenskonzepts kann ein Beitrag zu einer intradisziplinären Übersetzungswissenschaft geleistet werden von Hermeneutik und Kognitionsforschung. Das verstehenstheoretische Paradigma vereint diese beiden unterschiedlichen Theorien und vermag dauerhafte und prägende Dichotomien abzulösen; es führt sprach- und wissensorientierte kognitive Ansätze und einen bedeutungsorientierten semiotischen Ansatz im Verstehensprozess zusammen. Auf der Basis dieser wissenschaftlichen Grundlage für übersetzungsrelevantes Textverstehens kann eine hohe Qualität der Translationsleistung erreicht werden (so Pavlova 2021: 169). Daraus folgt das Desideratum an die Auftraggeber, angemessene Fristen für die Übersetzungsarbeit vorzusehen und mehr Zeit für den Übersetzungsauftrag zu gewähren, die nicht nur Umfang oder Satzlänge des zu übersetzenden Textes berücksichtigen, sondern sich bemessen am Umfang und (Zeit-)Aufwand für die Vorübersetzungsphase. Wie viel Zeit die Vorarbeit für das Verstehen eines zu übersetzenden komplexen Textes benötigt, welcher Mehraufwand auch bei kürzeren Texten erforderlich ist, hängt von vielen ineinandergreifenden Faktoren

ab,[32] denn es handelt sich beim translatorischen Verstehen nicht um einen linearen, sondern um einen retrospektiv-prospektiven mentalen Prozess. Das Fazit dieser Überlegungen: Sprach-, Text-, Sach- und Fachkompetenz sowie kognitiv-strategische Kompetenzen zur Konzept- und Analogiebildung, zur Visualisierung, zum Perspektivenwechsel und zum Inferenzieren sind notwendige Voraussetzung für die translatorische Verstehenskompetenz.

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32   Faktoren, die Textverstehen des AT verzögern, sind: Komplexität syntaktischer Strukturen, Vielzahl von lexematischen Polysemien, die zur Ambiguität der gesamten Satzbedeutung führen könnte, Neologismen, referentielle Bezüge als wesentlicher Bestandteil des Textaufbaus, Recherche und Aneignen zusätzlichen Wissens über Sachverhalte und Kulturspezifika, pragmatische Analyse in Bezug auf Illokutionen und Perlokutionen der Äußerungen, mentale Verarbeitung von Präsuppositionen, mentale Wiederherstellung von nicht explizit Genanntem, Erkennung von Anspielungen und versteckten oder direkten Zitaten aus anderen Texten, von Sprachspielen, von frischen Metaphern.

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Translating Practices: Situated Bodies between Cognition and Expression

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Abstract: Practices correspond to a multitude of performing acts that articulate themselves in interpretation and entail circumstantial and cultural features. Considering that different sets of practices involve bodies with distinct backgrounds and diverse ways of expression, the assimilation or rejection of practices assumes to some extent translation, insofar as it requires intermediation between and among conflicting cultures. Particularly in situations marked by colonization, one is inclined to reproduce not only the hegemonic language but also its corresponding practices, often leading to a concealment of other possibilities of articulation. The capacity of translating practices involves, consequently, finding an adequate way of expression, one that understands hegemonic practices and their meanings, but which nevertheless also conveys a unique voice corresponding to one's situation and marginal practices. It also requires attention to meanings that operate at a pre-predicative level—because practices are based in prejudices that cannot be completely manifested—and to their affective or emotional correlation. The chapter suggests that a complementary discussion of 4EA cognitive science and hermeneutics provides a conceptual base to approach translating practices, insofar as embodiment, affectivity, situatedness, language, and historicity play a key role in these theories. It concludes by exploring the potential of feminist, postcolonial, and decolo-

nial studies, in delivering a political basis to understand how these processes of translation assume a situated body.

1 Introduction

Communication occurs in various levels, for example through verbal language, non-verbal expressions such as gestures, and cultural production. Understanding this variety of expressions and relating to them involves a process of translation, one that distinguishes itself from that which seeks a word-for-word correspondence. This article focuses on a broader conception of translation, one related to expression through practices and the foundation of its interpretation upon one's situation. The accent on everydayness is due to the fact that translation is not taken here as a special situation of technical translation, but as a practical activity in which culture and history are mediated in one's day-to-day affairs.

However, practices are not politically neutral, which means that neither are processes of translation. Translation plays a significant role in everyday practices, particularly in contexts in which hegemonic views are critically discussed; by hegemonic views I mean views that tend to prevail as true without further reflexion. Although sharing some commonality, 4EA cognition and hermeneutic theories shed light in distinct ways on the translational aspects of these practices. Considering that one's situation relates to one's embodied interaction with other beings, 4EA cognition theories stress corporeality and affectivity as necessary components of meaning in one's practices. Conversely, because practices are interpretively oriented, as they are founded on one's facticity and are historically directed toward a horizon of possibilities, they should be taken as hermeneutical phenomena.

In this sense, hermeneutics broadens the sense of embodiment, insofar as it encompasses pre-predicative and non-thematic layers of meaning. Inasmuch as every judgment is supported by several prejudgments, which are relevant to interpretation, although in a non-thematic way, a proposition or a statement is not the unique realm in which meanings are elaborated. In a given situation, what is understood as meaningful is not only a thematic object (the focus of my attention, for example a pen), but also and necessarily the background from which the object stands (for example, a piece of paper, the table, the chair in which I'm sitting, the surrounding sounds, the temperature regulated by the air conditioner, the light coming from the lamp), which remains non-thematic (not thematized by my attention). By the same token, practices present thematic and non-thematic dimensions, although these dimensions exceed the kinds of physical examples given above.

From this hermeneutical and 4EA cognitive perspective, the notion of being situated emerges at the crux of the matter, for it expresses not only an embodied apprehension that co-constitutes the world, that is, the meaningful totality corresponding to one's openness to being (see Heidegger 2001), but also the awareness of pressing matters that correspond to the historical singularity of each interpreter. Hence, in order to understand translational processes in everyday practices one needs to clarify the way affectivity, language, embodiment, historicity, and politics yield meanings.

In order to provide a discussion of translation in everyday affairs, this article presents the following plan. The first section discusses some aspects of 4EA cognition theory with especial focus on the problem of embodiment. It connects the affective side of embodiment with Heidegger's hermeneutics, although making visible important discordances be-

tween 4EA cognition and the Heideggerian approach to situatedness, particularly the latter's radical account of historicity, but also its failure to assign a central role to the body. In the wake of this argument, I explore the notion of prejudice as a distinguishing trait of being situated. Because being situated involves historical issues that require an analysis of the structural propagation of dominion and violence, the third section addresses feminist, postcolonial, and decolonial studies. My essay concludes with an evaluation of the potential of 4EA cognitive science and hermeneutics to illuminate aspects of translation in everyday practices, and suggests that in postcolonial circumstances, embodied interpretations may explore the in-between of cultures and provide unexpected meanings.

2   4EA Cognition and Hermeneutics

One way to find a unity among the many approaches to the 4EA concept of cognition is by taking them as critiques of a brain-centered theory of mind: in rejecting the shortcomings resulting from an intracranially centered and computational process of cognition, proponents of 4EA cognitive science highlight the coupling between brain, body, and environment. Accordingly, they engage with phenomena such as the extension of body cognition, the role of affectivity and being situated, social cognition, the technological shaping of the mind, and the embodiment of language in learning processes.

Conversely, a distinct and older tradition—considering that despite its many predecessors 4EA cognitive science properly arises only at the turn of the millennium—reaches similar outcomes, from Friedrich Schleiermacher's hermeneutical connection between feeling and language to Don Ihde's material hermeneutics (see Robinson 2013, Don Ihde

2001). Although 4EA cognitive science and hermeneutics constitute different branches of knowledge, with their own vocabulary and methodologies, they share a set of interests and mutual influences, including, for example, the phenomenology of Martin Heidegger and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Because Heidegger is influential to 4EA cognition and was himself a hermeneutic philosopher, I present some aspects of his theory in order to lay the basis for a further discussion of the situatedness of translation practices.

4EA theorists often acknowledge Heidegger's being-in-the-world as an alternative to internalist conceptions of mind. However, they almost exclusively pay attention to *Dasein*'s relation to the totality of equipment, which appears in one of the first instances in which the notion of world is discussed in *Being and Time*. Shawn Gallagher, for example, explicitly likens such an account to James J. Gibson's concept of affordance (see Gibson 1979)[1]: "To use Gibson's term, the affordances offered by door, desk, chair, computer, and so on, are implicit in the way that I interact with them—they are ready-to-hand, as Heidegger […] says" (Gallagher 2009: 39). Gallagher's analysis is correct to the extent that in *Being and Time*, cognition—in its traditional sense—is a founded mode of *Dasein*'s existential structure of being-in-the-world.[2] In Heidegger scholarship, this is sometimes called the pragmatic aspect of his philosophy. Nevertheless, it also leads to an oversimplification of *Dasein*'s ontology to simple pragmatic

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1   See Robinson's article "The Affordances of the Translator" in this issue.

2   Heidegger distinguishes the primordial mode of being-in-the-world from activities that depends on it, such as scientific knowledge, which is in turn called a derivative or founded mode (see Heidegger 2001: 66-90). This is sometimes stated as the primordiality of existence over theoretical explanations.

engagements. Gallagher's reading is indebted to this pragmatic interpretation, as he concludes that Heidegger falls short of a circuit of pragmatic relations that encompasses every aspect of being-in-the-world: "That is, others appear as engaged in pragmatic contexts similar to (or different from) our own. This analysis leaves little room for more direct and personal relations such as those based on emotional or even biological attraction" (ibid.: 42).

But such a reading neglects the importance that Heidegger concedes to affective phenomena, which are conceived from an ontological perspective as moods/ attunements and dispositions. In *Being and Time*, one reads that anxiety (*Angst*) is a basic disposition (*Grundbefindlichkeit*) that is not determined by any pragmatic context, in contrast to fear, which is an attunement (*Stimmung*) directed to a detrimentality within a context of involvements (Heidegger 2001: 179). Besides the 1927 *magnum opus*, the central role of attunements is easily found in his other writings, despite the different goals and concepts they entail. Boredom (*Langeweile*) belongs to the context of Dasein's analysis (Heidegger 1995), while joy (*die Freude*) and sorrow (*die Trauer*) appear in his meditation on the history of being (Heidegger 2013: 188), as well as the so-called grounding-attunements (*Grundstimmungen*), such as deep wonder (*Er-staunen*), deep foreboding (*Er-ahnen*), startled dismay (*das Erschrecken*), reservedness (die *Verhaltenheit*), and deep awe (*die Scheu*) (Heidegger 1991).

However, despite the importance of such writings, they do not offer a detailed analysis of Aristotle's notion of *pathē* (usually rendered as emotions), upon which Heidegger develops his theory of dispositions and attunements. The lecture *Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy* conjoins a theory of moods, language, and situatedness, following—but also re-reading—Aristotle's rhetoric in terms of a hermeneutics of

facticity. Because this 1924 lecture course provides a hermeneutic ground on which to understand cognitive processes related to embodiment, language, affectivity, and social interaction, a discussion of some of its passages may be useful.

A characteristic note of 4E cognitive theories is the displacement of an explanation of brain-centered processes to bodily and environmental processes. From the vantage point of language, this means a pragmatic stress on the relevance of speech acts, rather than on descriptions. Rhetoricians are predecessors of this theory, as they conceived language in terms of persuasion. In his discussion of rhetoric, Heidegger addresses the impact that language has in everyday affairs. Heidegger starts his analysis of Aristotle's rhetoric by taking the statement *zoon logon echon*—usually translated as "man is a rational animal"—in another direction, inasmuch as he renders *logos* by language. While discarding the "rational animal" meaning as derivative, Heidegger interprets Aristotle's sentence as not only indicating the human being's capacity to say something, but also the corollary, namely the capacity for that human being to hear itself, and also hear what is said by others—as Heidegger puts it, this is a "letting-something-be-said-by-others" (Heidegger 2009: 76). This dynamical play completely differs from the descriptive language viewpoint, as it focuses on how persuasion works. Heidegger states that "human beings are with one another in the mode of encouraging, of persuading, of exhorting" (ibid.), activities that are possible as long as one hears. In turn, one does not hear merely by taking notice of sheer sounds, but rather, by understanding meanings in situated and engaged contexts. In other words, "he [*Dasein*] does not hear in the sense of learning something, but rather in the sense of having a directive for concrete practical concern" (ibid.). Heidegger and the whole rhetorical tradition conceive language as related to situated

existence, to relevant circumstances in a given occasion. In this regard, language appears originally in specific concerns and expresses one's fore-understanding of a situation. In turn, this fore-understanding is already attuned and anticipated in a pre-theoretical apprehension of a totality of meanings. An attunement is not something that one may add to an understanding, but a basic way of openness, in which beings are understood in a non-thematic and pre-reflective way.

A similar approach is formulated by Klaus Dockhorn in his critique of Gadamer, stressing the connection between hermeneutics and rhetoric, between understanding, affection, and persuasion. He characterizes Hans-Georg Gadamer's interpretation of Schleiermacher, whose hermeneutics is depicted as mainly psychological, as one-sided. In his argument Dockhorn likens hermeneutics to rhetoric, showing how understanding is affectively motivated. In the following passage, Dockhorn disputes Gadamer's depiction of Schleiermacher's hermeneutics as "turning away from the grammatical-rhetorical position to the psychological" (Dockhorn 1980: 168) and, consequently, as disregarding the state of mind of historical consciousness:

> I cannot completely agree with this opinion, because in the process of interpretation, Schleiermacher does appear to recognize the ontological inclusion of the interpreter using considerations from rhetoric. When Schleiermacher speaks about the "holy scriptures and their connection with the given," when he says that these communications are "poetic and oratorical"—"and what could be closer to the latter than dialectic"—and when he declares that piety with its "suffering side" is a "devotion," a "letting one's self be moved by the whole that stands over against one's self," as "the being moved and determined of one's self by the subject-matter," which "forms your existence into a specific moment," then he means precisely that feeling of utter dependency, that pious feeling that accompanies and transcendentally regulates all reflection as a pre-judgment. Are we not facing here something that comes very close to Heidegger's

> "fore-having," "fore-sight," and "fore-conception," at least in its
> content? (Dockhorn 1980: 168-69)

Although Dockhorn accepts that Schleiermacher represents a shift away from the rhetorical roots of hermeneutics, he does not concede that this means a complete dismissal of rhetorical affect, as the shaping of understanding by feelings is clearly stated in the above quotation. A similar connection between hermeneutics and rhetoric is stressed by Heidegger that, unsurprisingly, describes Aristotle's *Rhetoric* as "the first systematic hermeneutic of the everydayness of Being with one another"—in *Being and Time* (Heidegger 2001: 178), just a few years after the lecture on Aristotle's rhetoric. Considering that Heidegger shares with Aristotle common assumptions regarding their conception of language, the distance between contemporary cognitivism and Aristotle also applies to Heidegger: "Aristotle did not narrow down the domain of the emotional *pathē* into the group of object-oriented emotions with a high complexity, that are favoured by the cognitivists" (Pott 2009: 78). Nevertheless, if "Aristotle makes it clear that 'cognitions' (beliefs, thoughts, judgments) initiate the emotional response and are the necessary and in some cases even sufficient conditions of emotion" (ibid.: 72), then the Heideggerian view distinguishes itself not only from the cognitive account, but also from the Aristotelian view of emotions, as long as in Heidegger's ontology dispositions and attunements are not derived from cognitive assumptions. More precisely, the parallel between Heidegger and cognitivism is not so easily framed, because dispositions and attunements work on a pre-reflective level, one which corresponds to a fore-understanding and a pre-predicative discourse. On this level, there are meanings, but they are not those of objective statements. The grounding aspect of dispositions and attunements clearly appears in this passage:

> Insofar as the pathē are not merely an annex of psychical processes, but are rather *the ground out of which speaking arises, and which what is expressed grows back into*, the pathē, for their part, are *the basic possibilities in which being-there itself is primarily oriented toward itself*, finds itself. The primary being-oriented, the illumination of its being-in-the-world is not a *knowing*, but rather a *finding-oneself* that can be determined differently, according to the mode of being-there of a being. (Heidegger 2009: 176; italics in original)

The phenomenological account of meaning acknowledges a predicative level of expression in which language may specifically be used to meet scientific knowledge requirements. However, such a level depends on a pre-predicative layer, a broader horizon out of which the predicative horizon may appear. Prior to any theoretical selection, one's understanding projects meanings from a non-thematic background, according to one's being-historical constitution. This historical project relates to the finite circumstances in which one is situated, that is, to one's having-been. Because of one's facticity, one already has a view of something (Heidegger 2009: 93) that guides one's concern in the world.

Summarizing this preliminary analysis, we may see affinities between 4EA cognitivism and a hermeneutic account such as the Heideggerian one, particularly regarding their mutual critique of the primacy of intracranial processes, their emphasis on a collective and embodied notion of language, and on the relevance of the affective dimension in the constitution of meaning. However, any closer investigation sees irreconcilable issues in their philosophical projects. Particularly, Heidegger's concept of meaning, which stresses the pre-predicative domain—the proper realm of dispositions and attunements—has no parallel in cognitivist theories. Conversely, Heidegger does not provide further analysis of embodiment, although dispositions and attunements do play a key role in his thought (see Aho 2009). In fact, Heidegger makes implicit

use of the rhetorical thesis that says that performances/deliveries in discursive and practical relations are emotionally embodied.[3] Apart from their specific terminology, this is also the core of the proposal of some 4EA scholars.[4] In the next

3   In classical rhetoric, emotions and dispositions are bodily related and connected to the way some content is delivered and apprehended. Aristotle offers a treatise of embodied emotions and dispositions in Chapter II and links them to delivery (hypokrisis) in Chapter III, as in this statement: "It is a matter of how the voice should be used in expressing each emotion" (Aristotle 2007: 1403b; see also Robinson 2016; Gabbe 2016). A development of such issues may be found in Cicero, who speaks of delivery in terms of the "language of the body" (Cicero 2001: 197, III, 222), and in Quintilian, whose account of delivery explicitly encompasses the language of gestures, tones, and looks: "All emotional appeals will inevitably fall flat, unless they are given the fire that voice, look, and the whole carriage of the body can give them (Quintilian 1979: XI, III, 2). Onsberg (2008: 1203) sums up the inceptual link between rhetoric, delivery, and embodiment in the following manner: "As rhetoric originally was closely tied to the oral presentation of a speech, delivery, understood as the best management of voice and body, was naturally of interest to the art. Thus, in the traditional rhetorical system, the so-called rhetorical canon, delivery made up the fifth and last part (Greek hypokrisis, Latin action or pronuntiatio)." Further associations between delivery, emotion, body, and non-verbal persuasion may be found in Austin (1806), Bulwer (1974), and Carruthers (2010).

4   Consider, for instance, Giovanna Colombetti's statement (2018: 574): "It seems correct to say that the mind is not emotional in the sense of always undergoing some emotional episode—if we understand the latter as intense experiences categorizable as 'happiness,' 'fear,' 'surprise,' etc. But if we consider that there is much more to affectivity than episodes of this kind, then the claim that the mind is inherently affective immediately appears more plausible. Non-emotional affective states may include at least moods (feeling cranky, bored, upbeat, up or down, having the blues, etc.), long-term dispositional sentiments (love, hate, etc.), and motivational states (desire,

section, I develop the notion of being situated and explore its outcomes to the notion of historicity.

3   Being Situated and the Pre-Thematic

The idea of being situated proves to be the kernel of Heidegger's hermeneutics of facticity. He develops the notion of hermeneutical situation in one of his earlier writings and explains that every interpretation depends on a previous understanding related to an initial position of, a direction, and a scope of looking (see Heidegger 2002: 111–13). Therefore, being situated is the hermeneutical concept that correlates modifications in the circumstances of our situation in the world with distinct interpretations. However, circumstances do not only refer to the place where I stand, or to particular people who are talking to me, to the weather, to the moment of the day, but also to the places I have lived, people I have met, pressing political and ethical issues, that is, to subject matters that become historically relevant to me. Gadamer describes the facticity of this historical being as "the principle of history of effect" (Gadamer 2006: 298), for being situated entails multiple effects that act on someone's interpretation. Being aware of relevant circumstances does not lead to stringent criteria and knowledge, but rather, to a sense of finitude that understands that every judgment or view is based on prejudices—as the result of a history of effects—that may or not confirm themselves in reality. These prejudices concern every aspect that structures the world, from values to science.

"*The prejudices of the individual, far more than his judgments, constitute the historical reality of his being*", says Gadamer (2006: 278;

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hunger, pleasure, pain, etc.)." See also Chemero (2009), Griffiths/Scarantino (2009), and Colombetti (2014).

emphasis in original). If that statement is right, then the condition of cognition is historically prefigured, insofar as any engagement with a being or an event is from the outset already opened in some perspective by our historical being. A prejudice is not necessarily wrong, as its meaning is projected by our structure of fore-understanding. Because Heidegger and Gadamer both see as dogmatism the attempt to invalidate the agency of our prejudices, their historical accounts embrace the many aspects of being situated.

Because what is historically transmitted is mostly carried out unthematically, prejudices supersede methodical procedures that want to eliminate them. From a hermeneutical standpoint, prejudices are not subjected to elimination, as they are constantly arising according to our historical being. Moreover, hermeneutics does not limit itself in stating the connection between understanding and facticity, but it highlights the productivity of prejudices in our existence. It is by means of prejudices that I recognize a subject matter in its historical dimension, as related to a set of events and beings. In some cases, I may have a distorted perspective about a subject, due to a hasty acceptance of prejudices. In other situations, it is due to the existence of determinate prejudices that I am able to see things in a totally different perspective. Without ignoring the first point, I would like to explore carefully the second one, especially in its political potential.

Meanings are irreducible to theoretical dimensions of our existence, as they are expressed and performed by our bodies. In this regard, embodiment has an inevitable political aspect, one which is prior to what people normally understand as political activities, for it encompasses, according to the above discussion, pre-reflective and pre-predicative realms. In other words, being situated "in the flesh of the world" (Merleau-Ponty 1968: 84) means that one has already

taken into consideration a set of practices, endorsing, refusing, or elaborating it in other forms of significance. To be pervious to this complex of embodied practices in a situated being is to be properly open to historicity. Any expression manifests an embodied situatedness and, therefore, a unique perspective regarding the world. Understanding this uniqueness—not in the psychological sense of empathy with a person, but as establishing a genuine dialogue with him/her—involves interpretation and mediation. A dialogue with the other entails an openness to a different system of practices, which has no complete equivalence in the way I live.

4   Plural Performative Bodies

Feminist, postcolonial, and decolonial studies are among the chief theories that discuss the interdependency between discourse, body, and politics. They do not limit themselves to offering an analysis on how practices are constituted, but rather, they address underlying assumptions of these practices in order to make room for new possible ways of being. In these theories, the body has a central significance, as it bears marks of violence—in many forms of control and domination—which appear as normal because they are grounded in hegemonic discourses that propagate them. Conversely, it is by bodily performances that other possibilities of being are displayed and rendered capable of providing a critique of their normalization.

Embodiment is a historical process. It corresponds to a trajectory of performances, inasmuch as any bodily expression takes place in a social and communal realm.[5] Bodies ex-

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5   Robinson (2003: 82) stresses the performative unity between language and embodiment: "Language, then, is performed in and through and by the body. We make decisions about what word or

press inscriptions of power, but also possibilities that are non-reducible to hegemonic norms. As indissociable from political and cultural contexts, bodies are intrinsically plural, while reflecting distinct performative trajectories in the world. As Donna Haraway states, "Situated knowledges are about communities, not about isolated individuals" (Haraway 1988: 560). Plural bodies communicate in manifold ways. Each expression presents some singularity, although the possibility of one's autonomy and self-understanding over one's own body is not the result of a mere individual decision, but a confrontation to a lesser or a greater extent with hegemonic norms. Embodiment is accordingly one's process of self-understanding in order to acquire a singular voice, a process that, as stressed by cognitive 4EA critiques, is not "intracranial" but corporeally performed in a social world. The difficulty of having a voice that is heard also appears in Donna Haraway proposal of a feminist theory: "We seek those ruled by partial sight and limited voice—not partiality for its own sake but, rather, for the sake of the connections and unexpected openings situated knowledges make possible" (ibid.: 560). Political and cultural restraints are inscribed on the body, and that inscription expresses the affirmation or the denial of certain values. This is true for Haraway's theory, but also for postcolonial and decolonial theories that see people from peripheral countries suffering the drawback of always

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phrase to use with the help of somatic markers. We remember what words and phrases mean, not just their denotations but their connotations and collocations and implications, with the help of somatic markers." In turn, Mona Lilja (2017: 346) underscores the uniqueness of bodily performativity: "By doing so, a number of patterns will be explored that explain how/why bodily performativity exceeds linguistic performativity, and how the gatherings themselves signify something in excess of what is being said."

needing to confront assumptions that represent colonial or hegemonic views in order to express themselves.[6] This may lead to a displacement of meaning, which does not entirely belong to the language that represents the hegemonic view, but which also does not fit the original language of a colonized country. Because embodiment is expressive and linguistically enacted, its understanding necessarily involves translation. Therefore, as stated by Haraway, "Translation is always interpretive, critical, and partial" (ibid.: 589), because it refers to multiple situated bodies instead of one abstract and universal body. Considering that situations never completely coincide, one understands the other's expressions solely by means of an ongoing process of translation—as will be discussed in the next section.

Another gesture that expands the politics of embodiment is provided by Judith Butler. By contrasting "bodies that matter" to "abject bodies," she analyzes the politics that makes some bodies live and leaves other bodies to die. While

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6   Although postcolonialism and decoloniality have much in common, they emerge as autonomous theories, whose scholars often represent distinct geographical locations and work different temporal frameworks (see Bhambra 2014). Among the many aspects of postcolonialism, one may conceive it as a multifaceted critique of metaphysical, ethical, and political issues, such as identity, race, gender; as a literary theory that challenges representations of "colonized or formerly colonized as inferior"; and a theory whose "post-" indicates both discussions after colonialism and a critique of the persistence of colonialism in the present (see McEwan 2019: 24). Conversely, Mignolo (2018: 81) defines decoloniality as follows: "Decoloniality, as I am posing it here, does not imply the absence of coloniality but rather the ongoing serpentine movement toward possibilities of other modes of being, thinking, knowing, sensing, and living; that is, an otherwise in plural. In this sense, decoloniality is not a condition to be achieved in a linear sense, since coloniality as we know it will probably never disappear."

making clear that this critique is not restricted to the violence that is inflicted on women, she takes the abject as a biopolitical notion that refers to "uncountable and unaccounted for" bodies—those who systematically suffer violence and whose lives are permanently at risk (Butler/Athanasiou 2013: 29). According to Butler, "However, to prevent any misunderstanding beforehand: the abject for me is in no way restricted to sex and heteronormativity. It relates to all kinds of bodies whose lives are not considered to be 'lives' and whose materiality is understood not to 'matter'" (Butler et al. 1998: 281). On the other hand, one may confront the political category of the abject by means of performances in which the body appears. "Yes, performativity does take place when the uncounted prove to be reflexive and start to count themselves, not only enumerating who they are, but 'appearing' in some way, exercising in that way a 'right' (extralegal, to be sure) to existence. They start to matter" (Butler/Athanasiou 2013: 101). Embodiment synthesizes, in a way, political and historical concerns, as the body stands for other bodies. For Butler, then, "one is not simply a body, but in some very key sense one does one's body, and indeed, one does one's body differently from one's embodied predecessors and successors as well" (Butler 1997: 404).

The singularity of embodiment is also accentuated in Barbara Sutton's postcolonial approach. In her analysis of Argentinean women during 2002–2003, Sutton discusses the correlation between embodiment and political resistance through the expression *poner el cuerpo.* According to her,

> *Poner el cuerpo* overlaps somewhat with "to put the body on the line" and to "give the body," but it transcends both notions. With respect to political agency, *poner el cuerpo* means not just to talk, think, or desire but to be really present and involved; to put the whole (embodied) being into action, to be committed to a social cause, and to assume the bodily risks, work, and demands of such a commitment.

> *Poner el cuerpo* is part of the vocabulary of resistance in Argentina, and implies the importance of material bodies in the transformation of social relations and history. (Sutton 2007: 130)

Each community develops its own ways of expression by means of which an understanding is elaborated. In this regard, *poner el cuerpo* is not just a reference to the body, but an interpretation of politics from the viewpoint of a situated body, which has already cognitively apprehended relevant circumstances motivationally oriented to action. It entails performance, therefore, as the body is simultaneously a site of resistance and a horizon of possibilities. In the situation analyzed by Sutton, these bodies involve distinct pathways related to the roles they achieve in the communal life.[7] Only by considering these bodies in detail is one able to acknowledge the richness of their expressions and to apprehend the subtleties of their performances. Only then is one capable of putting oneself in conversation with these people and understanding the meanings they ascribe to their embodied expressions, as well as to tortured and disappeared bodies (see Sutton 2007: 134). Although diverse in their performative traits, each woman in Argentina committed to resistance relates to the spectrum of dictatorship and the bodies that were not allowed to survive. The expression *poner el cuerpo* is not solely a dictum, but a dispositional trigger by means of which people share and defend a political view. In this regard, embodiment is not

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7   These women were diverse in age, socioeconomic background, and life experience. About half of them were activists, including feminists, lesbian rights activists, labor organizers, *piqueteras* (picketers), members of *asambleas populares* (popular assemblies), communal kitchen organizers, and members of human rights groups and organizations promoting the rights of AfroArgentines, indigenous peoples, Latin American migrants, women in prostitution, and people with disabilities (see Sutton 2007: 130–31).

a concept restricted to the way a person manifests itself in the world, as it always means an interrelated and communal world, in which bodies affect and are affected by other bodies. This dispositional pre-understanding, which entails different levels of bodily consideration, also includes bodies that are not here anymore.[8] Postcolonial and decolonial accounts of the body enable us to think historical connections that are inscribed on and enacted by bodily performances. Moslund illustrates the singularity of bodies that experience effects of colonization in this fashion:

> Certainly, postcolonial resistance emerges out of an embodied or lived experience of imperial productions of space: the bodily and mental experiences of physical conditions like slavery, racial abuse, divisions of labor, displacement, et cetera, give rise to various forms of opposition to the abstract ideas and suprasensory ideologies behind a particular organization of any place and its interhuman relations. The body is already understood or taken for granted as at the base of it all. (Moslund 2015: 26)

From this perspective, one may state that the Argentinean notion of *poner el cuerpo* is rooted in a communal cognitive pre-understanding about the several violations people have suffered through colonization. It entails a comprehension of a given situation, in which one is aware of these circumstances while putting oneself in risk, as a body that works as an obstacle in order to interrupt a series of violent events.

This is not to say that the concept of performance is restricted to political confrontation. Although sharing some of

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8   Such as the "disappeared bodies" in Argentina and other countries of Latin America. Another relevant aspect of absent bodies is the treatment of the dead. Our relation with past people entails forms of embodiment that manifest our understanding of dead bodies and our attitude toward them, such as rituals of burial and commemoration, and the creation of categories of beings associated to their bodies, such as tombs, relics, and cemeteries. See Ruin (2019).

Butler's views, Saba Mahmood disagrees to a certain extent with the former's view of embodiment, as it seems to present a limited vision of performance. Mahmood argues against her that agency is not reducible to "resistance to relations of domination," but rather there are other acceptable ways of subjectivization.[9] In Mahmood's work with the Egyptian women's mosque movement, she realizes that piety and shyness, virtues cultivated by those women, lead to different ways of self-understanding and expression, forms of embodiment and action based on a certain notion of discipline that differs from Butler's claim to resistance. Instead of simply refusing the importance of resistance, Mahmood is rather arguing that processes based on passivity—as a phenomenological category that embraces "the sedimented and cumulative character of reiterated performances" (Mahmood 2001: 216)—should also count as forms of performance and subjectivization.

5   Performative Practices
in Everyday Translation

Having examined hermeneutical and cognitive aspects of embodiment, namely, the dispositional constitution of meaning, the pre-thematic aspect of the interplay between body, language, and interpretation, and the historical constitution of the body and its performative potential, I now proceed to an investigation of the relevance of being situated to the topic of

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[9]   See Mahmood (2001: 211): "Despite Butler's acknowledgment at times that agency is not to be conceptualized as 'always and only opposed to power' […], her theorization of agency (as much as her demonstrations of it) are almost always derived from, and directed at the articulation of resistance to social norms and the subordinating function of power."

translation. As I am mostly interested in everyday translation, I examine how the politics of body in decolonial contexts is relevant to this process.

Translation is an activity that occurs amidst the "flesh of the world," in the midst of the different ways in which the body expresses itself and is understood. Nevertheless, as I discussed earlier, each expression is rooted in an understanding of one's being-in-the-world, in a practical elaboration of one's concern. In feminist, postcolonial, and decolonial theories, the body is simultaneously conceived as the site of inscriptions of power as well as the *locus* in which resistance and other lifeforms become possible. Since translation is historically embodied, it has to do with a situatedness, with a singular perspective, that expresses meanings and relates to the way one receives these manifestations. Translation mediates cultures and times; it also situates itself among a bodily understanding of the world, the reception of the other's bodily expressions, and an ongoing formation of meaning. Lilja resumes this arrangement of bodily connections as follows:

> With the above in mind, not only are relationships between bodies and bodies, or how bodies move, central issues when discussing emotions, but the relationship between bodies and representations must also be considered important (images, texts, etc.). This is because the repetition of signs is what allows others and objects to be imbued with meaning and emotional value – a process that is dependent on histories of association. (Lilja 2017: 346)

This process of sedimentating meanings is inseparable from the history of its constitution and affective tonalities. In regard to places affected by colonization, the repetition of signs maintains a worldview and its related forms of expressions. This naturally leads to the problem hinted in the previous section, namely, the difficulty experienced by people who have been systematically subjected to domination in finding their

own voice and expression, because the marks of violence are inscribed on their bodies.

Hence, translation cannot be conceived apart from a history of power and subjection. At the beginning of process of colonization, translation was mainly used in processes of domestication. Robinson (2014: 10) describes this moment as enacting a double bind of translation, namely, communication and subjection: "Not only must the imperial conquerors find some effective way of communicating with their new subjects; they must develop new ways of subjecting them, converting them into docile or 'cooperative' subjects." This double direction of translation, which communicates, but also aims at domination throughout the process, shows that this linguistic experience has historically favored colonial interests, as it is not equally determined. People who have suffered the effects of colonization live between a culture that has been imposed as normal, and a repressed one, which is frequently limited to secondary situations. This leads to a predominance of one culture over another, but also over the characteristic forms of language and cognition of the latter, which suffer a process of marginalization.[10] This colonial impact is not the only factor that structures one's cognitive understanding of the world, but it is an important one. In fact, being situated in colonized countries frequently involves a split relation to language, for one needs to master at least one hegemonic language apart from the standard language and local dialects of the country. The intercultural interchanges lead to a revaluation of the role of translation, which becomes a constitutive aspect of our existence rather than a mere technique belonging to communication affairs. Robinson de-

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10   Concerning the topic of power differentials, see Jacquemond (1992) and Robinson (2014).

scribes the shift that researchers of translation have proposed in postcolonial studies:

> Translation in this context is no longer merely a semantic transfer operation performed on verbal texts by a few highly trained professionals with linguistic and cultural skills related to more than one national or regional culture; it is the basis of much ordinary day-to-day communication (Robinson 2014: 29–30).

A translational term more suitable to these circumstances is hybridization, because it acknowledges that one rarely deals with just one language and, consequently, with just one culture in postcolonial contexts. In these situations, one works with hegemonic languages in some circumstances, while in other cases expressing oneself in another language. Bachmann-Medick (2006: 36) states that "This translatedness of cultures, often referred to as 'hybridity', shifts the notion of culture towards a dynamic concept of culture as a practice of negotiating cultural differences, and of cultural overlap, syncretism and creolization." Hybridity is not a special case in places exposed to colonization, but the rule. In a sense, in these situations one is always a mediator, as one realizes the ineffectiveness of both languages in expressing in its entirety contents of meaning that are experienced in everyday life. Assuming that language and perception are intrinsically related, the way one expresses and understands others' performances defines the mode in which one constitutes meanings.

From a decolonial viewpoint, practical affairs involve a tension between languages that cannot be solved by artificial procedures, for it is endemic to the medial character of people that live in a hybrid culture. The way one expresses a matter in another language involves its translation into another corporeality, from gestures and facial expressions to tonalizations and, of course, words. This process is far more complex than just making equivalences between systems of language,

for it unfolds itself articulating affectivity, historicity, and interpretation in a situated body.

Language channels a bodily understanding of the world and, according to postcolonial theories, it also sets boundaries that, in some contexts, may turn out to be "natural" assumptions that are historically constructed. Considering that in postcolonial contexts these assumptions lead to a bodily integration with a prevailing culture that sets the range of normality, other forms of bodily expression constitute a challenge to hegemonic and naturalized views of embodiment.

A body that is not already expressing something in a determinate way is inconceivable, just as it is unthinkable to consider a performance without a particular arrangement of bodies. In this regard, theorists of political performance like Judith Butler reenact in the realm of the politics of body and gender the old rhetorical canon that says that bodily phenomena, such as gestures and one's posture in a certain activity, are events of persuasion.[11] Performances are bodily expressions that manifest one's dispositional understanding of the world, while affirming certain aspects of existence and values that may generate tensions with predominant assumptions and behavior. As attuned expressions, performances do not only reveal the peculiarity of one's position in the world, but also enact a conflict with other perspectives—in particular with hegemonic views. Because performances are always attuned to one's situation, they are bodily forms in which one elaborates language within a historical community and with which they establish a dialogue. This is the basis for considerations of everyday translations, which were already mentioned in the context of postcolonial discussions.

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11   As explained in footnote 2.

In places affected by colonization, one is constantly intermediating between and among cultures that conflict in everyday affairs. In these situations, translation is not so much a special case as it is a common proceeding. It consists of different sets of practices, practices that are diverse because they involve bodies that have another background and that express themselves distinctly. Unlike technical translation, dispositional tones play a key role in rendering meanings in everyday translation. Affective strata co-constitute our engagement with the world in the deepest sense of attuning it with a factical understanding of our communal being. In everyday translation, affectivity connects us to some meanings relative to a given worldview, while simultaneously moving us away from others. In this regard, Lilja (2017: 345) stresses the relevance of affectivity in the formation of communities, particularly when these emotional traits result from a history of colonization: "Just as emotions connect people, they also define who does not belong. Feelings of love and hate are emotions that are crucial for the nation and for determining who 'fits'." Therefore, in such postcolonial contexts the naturalness of using determinate terms to express and translate certain practices is frequently marked by a tacit assimilation and reproduction of hegemonic values. In this sense, translation may reassure holders of current and hegemonic worldviews, but may also give voice to other forms of being and, consequently, to distinct ways of belonging.

The aforementioned expression *poner el cuerpo* is an example of affective cognition. It gathers together people with different backgrounds and constitutions that are affectively directed toward an idea. This sets in motion or puts in play a unique sense of belongingness based on our understanding that distinct bodies and their histories place demands on us. A proper translation of such an expression requires a media-

tion that does not erase its role in contemporary social movements in Argentina, and which is simultaneously intelligible to the reader or audience. As we've seen, Sutton (2007: 130) states that "Poner el cuerpo overlaps somewhat with 'to put the body on the line' and to 'give the body,' but it transcends both notions." While the first meaning stresses the risk of being there, for instance, as in a demonstration, the second one indicates that it involves a willing act. It expresses the aim of interrupting an act of violence as one's body "stands for" others, while putting oneself at risk. Consequently, to reiterate, "poner el cuerpo means not just to talk, think, or desire but to be really present and involved; to put the whole (embodied) being into action, to be committed to a social cause, and to assume the bodily risks, work, and demands of such a commitment," as Sutton explains (2007: 130). A translation of this expression will inevitably miss some of these meanings. From the operational and domesticated literal sense of "put the body" to more careful translations like "to put the body on the line" and "to give the body," it is clear that it is not just a matter of linguistic equivalences, but choices that convey more properly practices that give rise to a certain expression, or rather cover and dismiss them.

Let's consider a situation: if a community in another country influenced by Argentinian social movements and with similar purposes wants to reenact this expression in its own context, it would not be sufficient to render it literally, as it requires encompassing most of the several aspects above mentioned. Moreover, it should also bring up experiences of its own community, and their related forms of expression. The translation should be as powerful to this community as was the original expression to Argentinians, in such a way that it may also connect people affectively, and capable of driving them into action, while evoking the community's own histo-

ry. In this process, a critical awareness of hegemonic terms and schemes of interpretation—as much as it is possible—is advisable, inasmuch as they are insensible to differences.

This account of translation entails a hybridity—irreducible to a mere combination of languages—that arises from a historical engagement with different sets of practices and their hierarchical arrangements of relations. Therefore, it is not just a matter of dealing with disputing systems of practices, but primordially of destabilizing hegemonic structures in order to make room for practices that have their importance denied and have been and are being made invisible. The choice of words, sentences, and other embodied ways of conveying a meaning cannot be restricted to literal correspondences, for this process also manifests hermeneutic tensions between practices that have their own historicity. In everyday translation in decolonial contexts, the capacity for exhibiting these tensions in the way one renders something is fundamental. Contrary to the idea that translation is a smooth passage from one language to another, in which the difference of another language vanishes, I suggest that this process, in postcolonial contexts, generate tensions and displacements that work as indexes of practices that cannot be completely assimilated.

6 Final Remarks

Practices are not phenomenologically intelligible without structures that make their constitutive details visible. Despite their references to distinct philosophical traditions, 4EA cognition and hermeneutical theories are accounts that provide nuanced connections among body, language, historical belonging, and politics, specifically in contexts emerging out of colonization. In these cases, translation is a common activity,

as one has always to mediate among cultures and decide the use of terms and expressions that confirm or deny determinate values. Even in trivial affairs, discourses and other bodily expressions reinforce or undermine structures of domination that convey cultural colonization. This creates a battlefield, in most cases unnoticed, in which meanings propagate hegemonic views at the expense of marginal cultures and forms of life. Unexpected uses of the colonizer's terms in order to displace them and destabilize their original framework, or a straight refusal of the colonizer's terms, while replacing them with terms that emerge from other historically embodied forms of life, are strategies of dismantling colonization. Translational decisions in everyday practices entail a tacit understanding that relates to the way one is attuned to the world by means of an embodied performative communication with others. In these performances, translation exhibits a historical character, as it relates to historical issues connected to one situatedness. One's attunement is not so much that which apprehends meanings differently, according with one's facticity, but primordially the basis upon which other forms of expression are generated. In this sense, the choice of an expression in the target language may not just render an original meaning, but it may also subvert and create other meanings, while exhibiting a gap between languages and practices.

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Translation Consciousness and Translation-Specific Double Intentionality

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Abstract: Translation as a mental operation follows the same fundamental principle as everything mental, namely intentionality. In translation studies as well as in philosophy, especially in those approaches that are interested in translation issues, we rarely come across an approach that has brought to bear the intentionality in connection with the translation phenomenon and examined it from this point of view. However, the phenomenological study of the translation process shows not only a complex intentional structure of this process, which consists of a collaboration of very different intentional acts, but also a complex structure in which the double intentionality of consciousness plays a crucial role. In this article, I deal with how this intentional structure is designed and how the double intentionality specifically comes into play.

Keywords: Phenomenology of language, Phenomenology of translation, Intentionality of translation, Husserl.

1 Introduction

In his *After Babel*, George Steiner makes the following remark:

> It is worth noting that the development of modern phenomenology has accentuated the areas of overlap between translation theory and general investigation of sense and meaning. The conceptual claims, the idiom of Husserl, Merleau-Ponty and Emmanuel Levinas force on anyone concerned with the nature of translation a fuller awareness of, a more responsible discomfort at, notions of identity and otherness, of intentionality and signification. When Levinas writes that 'le langage est le dépassement incessant de la Sinngebung par la signification' (significance constantly transcends designation), he comes near to equating all speech-acts with translation in the way indicated at the outset of this study. Phenomenological ontologies look very much like meditations on the 'transportability' of meanings. (Steiner [3]1998: 292)

In the midst of his criticism of translation theories, especially those that are universalistic, Steiner refers to Husserl and phenomenology in the quoted passage and emphasizes the achievements of the phenomenological tradition for translation thought. George Steiner actually is one of those who are skeptical about any theorizing efforts in the human sciences on the grounds that standards of verifiability, falsifiability and predictability, which follow scientific theories, have no validity in the human sciences (Steiner [3]1998: xv-xvi). Translation theories are no exception in this leveling and harsh criticism of theorisation. Steiner particularly points out that a translation theory in the sense of a mature theory that deals with the conditions of possibility or feasibility of the translation, if it can exist at all, should at least presuppose a systematic theory of language, which, according to him, is not yet given (ibid.: 294).

Regardless of how skeptically the hermeneut Steiner approaches translation theories with his partially legitimate contempt, and how radically he contests any theoretical approach

as "the claims of theory", he does not ignore the achievements of phenomenological philosophy and the specific relevance of the phenomenology of Husserl and its central concept of intentionality for translation thinking. Although with the term "'transportability' of meanings" in the quoted passage he seems to have a critical attitude towards phenomenology as well.

As can be summarized from Steiner's further explanations, a systematic theory of language on the basis of which a possible translation theory can be formulated should accordingly be (1) "An intentionally sharpened, hermeneutically oriented way of designating a working model of *all* meaningful exchanges, of the totality of semantic communication (including Jakobson's intersemiotic translation or 'transmutation')", whereby "the 'totalizing' designation is the more instructive because it argues the fact that all procedures of expressive articulation and interpretative reception are translational, whether intra- or interlingually"; (2) related to a theory of language, because only in this form can it be used with a "systematic adequacy"; and (3) a "mature theory of how translation is possible and how it takes place, of a responsible model of the mental attributes and functions which are involved" (Steiner ³1998: 293–94).

If we go through these three constitutive properties of the ideal theory of translation as prescribed by George Steiner, we find that they can only be achieved by phenomenology as the "theory of theories" (cf. Husserl 1975: 244).[1] And they can be achieved by phenomenology because: (1) phenomenology is an analysis of the being-synthesis, and as such examines this synthetic whole with regard to its constitutive elements including language and linguistic phenomena, inter

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1   All translations from Husserl into English in this article are mine.

alia translation, in the totality horizon of being and does not limit itself to a certain unrelated area. In this respect, phenomenology is the only theory that can develop such a model of all "meaningful exchanges", including intersemiotic ones. (2) Phenomenology examines the whole synthetic being in its intentional relation to consciousness. Consciousness animates being thanks to intentionality and ascribes to being meaning segments or meaning totalities. Linguistic meaning is only possible and understandable as a modality of this general meaning attribution. We therefore have a phenomenological theory of language that is not limited to formal aspects as is the case in linguistics, but is able—and for this it must first be expanded—to explain the translation phenomenon with "systematic adequacy". And (3) the analytics of being goes hand in hand with the analytics of consciousness in its physico-psychic functioning. In this respect, phenomenology is not just a standard philosophy, but a cognitive science that can also study the respective object of investigation from a cognitive point of view and become a bridge between hermeneutics and the cognitive sciences.

One of the most important and urgent tasks of phenomenology as this single omnibus cognitive-hermeneutic science, therefore, consists in identifying the cognitive acts of hermeneutic translation consciousness, which as such is a variant of a general hermeneutic consciousness but nevertheless has its particularities. The nature of this consciousness, like any consciousness in general, is intentional, that is, oriented towards what is to be translated, connecting and absorbing it into consciousness and making consciousness the pole of all translational events. In translation studies as well as in philosophy, especially in those approaches that deal with translation issues, we rarely come across an approach that has made a connection between intentionality and the translation

phenomenon and examined it from this point of view. The study of the translation phenomenon as a mental phenomenon shows, however, a very complex operation of intentional acts. In this process we meet not only a translation-relevant functioning of simple intentionality but also the presence of a translation-specific double intentionality in the sense of a dyadic orientation of consciousness to the main elements of translation.

The aim of this essay is to explain first the intentionality of the complex phenomenon of the translation process based on the translation of a nominal expression—by nominal expression I mean a single expression that names a single object—and second the double intentionality of this process. In order to achieve this, I shall explain what is meant by translation, and I shall especially try to work out an operational concept of translation, i.e. a provisional work definition whose relevance lies in the absence of a universally valid definition for translation. In this regard, I address *translation consciousness* as a translation-specific central topic. To explain how this consciousness works, I shall mostly be referring to Husserl's phenomenology of language insofar as it is relevant to translation issues. I am particularly interested in the ideality of meaning in the sense of its transcendent nature in relation to the factuality of the language and its threefold independence from the physicality of the expression, from the object named by the expression and from all subjective acts that sustain them, and in the problematic relationship between object and nominal expression and the way language works in a life-world reality. I shall then describe the structure of translation consciousness and its intentional acts. This will enable me to demonstrate the double intentionality of translation consciousness. However, since double intentionality as it occurs in the translation process differs radically from the double in-

tentionality that commands objects of perception, i.e. the physical objects, I shall try to clarify the peculiarities of translational double intentionality by analysing the temporality of the translation consciousness.

2 What is translation?

Translation, understood as a primary operation between languages, proves to be a very complex process, determined by numerous factors of different natures, such as linguistic, semiotic, philological, philosophical, cultural, historical, psychological, anthropological and so forth (see Wilss 1977: 60; Steiner [3]1998: 238; Apel/Kopetzki 2003: 12). The complexities of translation can be seen primarily in the variety of the definitions that various authors have long attempted to propose (Koller [8]2011: 76–91). It is beyond the scope of this article to recall these definitions and to study the specificities as well as the inadequacies of each one in order in the end to emphasize the problem of translation as an object of scientific investigation. Therefore, above all we need an operational definition of the translating process, which will temporarily help us in the course of this article and that definition will serve its purpose if it demonstrates the double intentionality of the translation process. Before that, however, it must be clarified that, regardless of how translation has been defined by different authors, what I mean by translation is the operation that takes place between different languages, each one defined as a different genetically constructed system of linguistic representations depending on a specific and delimitable space-temporality. This corresponds to what Roman Jakobson in his famous triadic division of translation calls an "interlingual translation" (Jakobson 1992: 483).

Regardless of all the complications of whatever kind that an interlingual language relationship can entail, translation, so far as it deals with the provisional research objective of this article, i.e. the translation of a nominal expression, means this: a language change in the sense of the relationship between the given expression E in language L and the expression E' in language L'. This relationship can be shown in the first step as follows:

$$E\ (L) \longrightarrow E'\ (L')$$

Figure 1: Basic model of a general translation relationship

The objections that may arise regarding this simple translation relationship alone can be numerous. However, since we are primarily not developing the topic from a purely translation-theoretical point of view and since we are satisfied with an operational conception of the translation process, we do not endeavour to suggest a complete list of all objections that can be raised in this regard. Nor do we intend to provide a detailed answer to all of the objections referred to here.

It can be said that the relationship between E (L) and E' (L') cannot be thought of as a linear one-to-one relationship, however, due to the possible ambiguity in natural languages (e.g. of a lexical, grammatical, syntactic type) (cf. Koller [8]2011: 132–47; Diller/Kornelius 1978: 29f.; Quine 1960: 125ff.). Nor should we take into account the objection that states that the existence of the expression E' (L') is not certain, due to the complications of the different natures just mentioned above (cf. Mounin 1963: 94). A number of further objections may also deal with the problem of different world references, depending on the language in the sense of a different linguistic approach to the world, not to mention the problem of subjectivity as an agent of the translation operation.

As for the first part of the objections regarding the ambiguity question and the non-existence of the E' (L'), we can say: irrespective of how ambiguous an expression is and which relationship-multiplications two potentially ambiguous expressions can assume due to their translation-specific relation, it is certain that a translation-specific relationship-multiplication deriving from the ambiguity is ultimately a set of linear partial relationships between two given expressions. This certainly does not mean that the ambiguity is not important. The ambiguity in the sense of the simultaneous appearance of several possible objects denoted by a single expression or simultaneous appearance of several possible expressions denoted by a single object – the object O simultaneously evokes E1 (L), E2 (L) to En+1 (L), etc. or the expression E evokes O1, O2 and On+1 – and the complications that this situation can cause in a translation process, have their own problems. And since they are also of an intentional nature, they must be explained in a separate phenomenological study. However, we shall only accomplish this after we have discussed and clarified the simple relationship between E (L) and E' (L').

The possible non-existence of E' (L') is also to be understood as the flip side of the question of ambiguity and, as we will see, it does not alter radically the relationship between E (L) and E' (L') or its whole intentional mechanism. Translation is a fundamental subjective or subject-like search for E' (L') once we encounter E (L) for translation purposes, even if E' (L') does not exist. Consciousness of an E' (L')-non-existence, in the sense of searching for an E' (L') on the basis of the evidence of the meaning of the E (L) and realising that the E' (L') does not exist – a special kind of plant, animal, feeling, action, thought, etc. in short: a natural or cultural object for which one language has an expression and another does not – belongs to the intentional consciousness of the

translation process. And it can only be explained in the context of the phenomenological outline of the basic translational mechanism of the translation of E (L) into E' (L'). The only thing that changes is the translation-specific temporality in the sense of a time-related search for E' (L') that may or may not succeed.

As far as the second part of the objections is concerned, we first address the crucial question of the diverse relationship to the world depending on the language. This is discussed in modern philosophy, particularly in Quine's thesis of the indeterminacy of translation. His thesis must be considered as the center of his project, namely to contest language- and theory-independent *a priori* truths and to question the identity and the ideality of meaning. This thesis, as we know, consists in levelling criticism at "the almost universal belief that the objective references of terms in radically different languages can be objectively compared" (Quine 1960: 79). This amounts not only to questioning any ideal language-independent meaning, which is to say to "ontological relativity", but also to the idea of the "inscrutability of reference," the indeterminacy of translation (or rather vice versa), and ultimately to contesting the concept of intentionality (ibid.: 221).

We know that Quine later, especially in his work *Pursuit of Truth*, moderates his position on intentionality to the extent that he recognizes the relevance of "intensional" concepts and admits the irreducibility of the mental possibility of ordering physical states (Quine 1990: 71 and 1991: 143–55; Woodruff Smith 1994: 165). At the same time, the phenomenological investigation of Quine's thesis, as I have explored in an as yet unpublished article, shows that there is an indeterminacy of translation also from a phenomenological point of view. What is clearly at stake here is a reciprocal ap-

proach between the two philosophies despite all the contrasts, and this can be very instructive, because it enables a dialogue between two rival philosophies on the problem of translation. In order for this dialogue to occur at its best, we must first reconstruct the phenomenological view of translation. To do this, we must orient ourselves towards intentionality, the very basis of phenomenology, and explore the translation problematic in relation to our intentional consciousness in its holistic, synthetic and embodied nature.

The intentionality of our consciousness, in particular its function in the translation process in the form of double intentionality, turns the relationship between E (L) and E' (L') into a mediate ontological whole, the center of which we shall soon refer to as translation consciousness: the relationship between E (L) and E' (L') does not come about on its own terms, but solely through a purely subjective or subject-like mediation (simulated by algorithms for example) or through any other mediations endowed with intentionality or simulated intentionality (if possible). The relationship outlined above should then be shown as follows:[2]


Figure 2: Core working model of the translation consciousness

Before we describe the translation consciousness and the corresponding acts involved and hence address ourselves to

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2   Since the existence of E' (L'), as we admitted above, is not evident (although its non-existence is also not decisive for the completion of the translation process), we have shown the arrow with dots.

double intentionality, let us fitst outline some phenomenological elements relevant to the translation which are at the same time indispensable for further analyses.

3   Ideality of Meaning and its Translation-relevant Threefold Independence

In phenomenological language theory, certain "empty intentions" called "meaning intentions" or "significational intentions" are held responsible for the fact that we create a linguistic expression from a "word complex" or "word phenomenon", which apparently differs in no way from all other appearing objects (see Husserl 1984a: 66, 420; Husserl 1984b: 567). These empty intentions of consciousness are ideas or representations (*Vorstellungen*) by nature, but just empty ideas or representations (cf. Husserl 1987: 13), and they are exactly what defines the essence of "significance" or "meaning".

As far as intentions are concerned, they generally differ according to how they are fulfilled, i.e. the way in which they are fulfilled relative to our intuition. In this regard, one can for example point to the radical difference between "desire" and "volitional intentions" on the one hand and "meaning" and "intuitive intentions", which Husserl also calls "objectifying acts", on the other (see Husserl 1984b: 584). Fulfillment itself is a kind of "intuitional illustration" (*Veranschaulichung*) which makes our empty intention objective: we intend something "in a more or less improper or inadequate way", and then our intention possibly is afterwards filled with a certain intuitive "fullness" (Husserl 1984b: 597). The sensible perception, or better, the "originally given intuition" as "legal source of knowledge" and therefore as the ideal of knowledge, plays a decisive role, so that all possible intentions of meaning, including those of pure thoughts and concepts, are

in search of fulfillment in our sensible perception (see Husserl 1976: 51). If, however, one speaks of objectifying acts – acts that objectify and make up the objects – and more precisely of meaning intentions, the fulfillment has the character of "recognition" or "identification", after our meaning intention tries to be fulfilled in a corresponding intuition and what we only thought and intended in the meaning intention is recognized and identified in our intuition (Husserl 1984b: 584).

A meaning intention, as intention, is nothing more than an intentional "act" (cf. Husserl 1984a: 391–92; Husserl 1976: 74 note 2). Therefore our empty intention or idea, when we direct it to an expression, first makes the expression as an expression understandable for consciousness. Then it allows that expression to be grasped for our consciousness as this precise expression and no other, beyond all its possible manifestations and according to certain typological laws, and ultimately it opens up a horizon of possible fulfillment of meaning.[3] The fact that when we read, hear or see an expression like "the table", we first distinguish the expression as an expression at all, then recognize it as an English word, and finally come to the idea of desk and not a chair, means that the whole conception is the work of a cooperation between the meaning intention and the meaning fulfillment, which forms a "homogeneous phenomenological unity" (Husserl 1984a: 44).[4] This unity works on the basis of several linguistic-phenomenological peculiarities.

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3   Regarding the "identity of the word" and its "recognition" according to its "type" (cf. Husserl 2005: 117).

4   Throughout this text, by the word in quotation marks I mean the expression and by the word in italics I mean the object that is conscious or meant either in the mode of perception or in the mode of imagination or phantasy.

The first is the word phenomenon. The word phenomenon as the physical side of an expression is a specific phenomenon insofar as, thanks to its phantom-like existence, it has a specific objective function (Husserl 2005: 170). The word phenomenon is the first thing that our intention meets and it is the one that leads our empty intention to the most appropriate fulfillment. However, it is in its objective fate that it must disappear after our intention has come to its true meaningful objectivity. I see or hear the word "table" and then bring my attention to the real *table* that is in my perception field, or to some idea of a table. Once I grasp what is meant by the word table, what is physically pronounced or expressed is no longer important and I am no longer concerned with it. The act that constitutes this phenomenon in what Husserl calls the "word consciousness" or "signitive consciousness" is accordingly a "qualitatively indefinite act" (Husserl 1987: 12), i.e. the word phenomenon appears in consciousness like all other objects, but its mode of appearance is meanwhile modified without any meaning modification in consciousness.

This ghostly transitional function of the real physical (acoustic-graphic) side of the expression, through which the phenomenological reality of the expression merges into the ideal of meaning, means that on the one hand the physical existence or non-existence of the expression loses importance for our consciousness, and on the other hand the appearance place of the physical side of the expression can theoretically vary in the sense that it can sometimes appear in reality in the perception, sometimes in an unreal and immanent fashion, in one's imagination or phantasy (Husserl 1987: 12; also Husserl 2005: 62). It is therefore completely indifferent to our understanding consciousness whether we read a word on paper or just imagine and picture it in our inner thoughts. In this respect, the word phenomenon merely

serves as a "basis" for triggering acts of consciousness and for terminating the intention through the word or signitive consciousness in "meaning consciousness" or "signification-al consciousness" (Husserl 1987: 15).[5]

The liveliness of the expression and its semantic anima-tion, as I have shown, are not possible without the unity be-tween the intention and the fulfillment of meaning, and ac-cordingly between word and meaning consciousness. We se-mantically animate the word through our meaning intention, and the intention is set on the way to a possible fulfillment in which we gain the meaning. Phenomenologically, as indicat-ed, the "originally given intuition" and especially perception as the ideal of knowledge is the goal of adequate fulfillment (see Husserl 1976: 51). For example, the expression "the table" in the sentence "the table is dirty" only has an adequate meaning if the object we name thereby is intuitively present. The strange thing about this situation, however, is that the intuitively present object in our perception alone cannot be understood by itself as the meaning of the expression, since the expression retains its meaning even without this percep-tion. Here one must strictly differentiate between the mean-ing and the object of an expression. Husserl's claim that phe-nomenologically "mere perception is not a meaningful act" should be understood in relation to this distinction (cf. Hus-serl 2005: 5, Husserl 2002: 74). This can particularly be seen in practical cases where a single expression denotes multiple objects ("bank") or where multiple expressions denote a single object ("drink" and "beverage"), all of which differ from expressions that do not refer to any real object at all ("unicorn") (cf. Husserl 1984a: 52–53, 60).

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5   Husserl also describes the meaning consciousness as "thematic con-sciousness" or "consciousness of fulfillment" (1984b: 564; 2005: 204).

The meaning is an ideally identical unity, which in the *Logical Investigations* Husserl calls "matter" (*Materie*) and later in *Ideas I* "Noema" (on matter cf. Husserl 1984a: 413; on the noema cf. Husserl 1976: 299–302). More precisely, matter, the "generalization of the notion of meaning to the field of all acts", and its intentional essence, or the noema, and in particular the center of the noematic core (which Husserl calls the "determinable X"), are the identical meaning (*Gemeintes*) that occurs in every act of our consciousness (i.e. in every perception, every memory, every imagination, every wish, every question, every command, every judgment, etc.) and are to be understood as the linguistic meaning (Husserl 1986: 91; McIntyre/Woodruff Smith 1975: 116; McIntyre/Woodruff Smith 1984: 88; Føllesdal 1982: 74). This specificity of matter or noema as ideal and identical meaning leads to the radical view that the meaning of an expression, regardless of what kind of expression it is , is every time and everywhere an ideal and identical unity. The meaning of an expression can therefore be distinguished from the word phenomenon, from the real object and from all subjective individual acts (such as the acts of perception) which maintain it in different modes of consciousness. The radicalness of this view goes so far that Husserl emphasizes in *Formal and Transcendental Logic* that language is in its totality and even in its culture-specific inventory something ideal, although its ideality is constantly ignored (Husserl 1974: 24, 163ff.).

Thus, meaning is defined in the sense of a threefold independence from the word phenomenon, from the real object and from all our individual subjective acts. This state has several translation-theoretical consequences and explains that (1) every translation event takes place away from real linguistic relationships in the ideal consciousness realm, (2) consciousness thereby becomes the location for any translation

possibility or impossibility, (3) a suitable translation theory must be able to research and explain this ideality of the translation process, (4) to do this, it must also be an idealistic theory of consciousness, (5) translation theories that approach the translation problem in a purely formal manner (e.g. in linguistics) can neither examine nor describe the fundamental structure of the mental possibility or impossibility of translation, (6) the fundamental possibility of translation is based on a formal linguistic substitutability due to the threefold ideality of meaning, (7) everything intended to be translated can be theoretically freed from all of the linguistic-psychological-ontological relationships to which it belongs, (8) everything needing to be translated can, in the ideal world of consciousness, be theoretically the object of a translational act of interlingual transmission and thus of a process of translation, (9) subjective acts are not decisive in the basic possibility of translation, since the meaning is independent of subjective acts, (10) subjective acts are decisive in the basic possibility of translation because of (1) and (2), (11) this double determination, this dialectic of power and powerlessness, of ability and inability based on the simultaneous decisiveness and indecisiveness of the subjective acts, constitutes the essence of translational, but also presumably of any interpretive action, (12) the translator does not need to have experienced or recognized the topic to be translated and its subject matter, (13) this lack of reliance on the experience of objects points to the fundamental role of the imagination in translation, (14) meaning in its radical ideal being is like a phantom—it is and it is not—and (15) the translator's job is to paint phantoms and to expose the paintings.

In the sentence "They sat around the table and discussed the incident", it is completely irrelevant how the sentence is acoustically, typographically and typologically given. The first

practical step in translation is to have the sentence repeated in my head. We do not know the people involved in the discussion. We do not know what ethnic-anthropological characteristics they have and how many they are. We do not know either the table they are sitting around or the room they are in. Nor do we know the incident they are discussing. The way they argue with each other and the attitude everyone has are unknown to us. The subjective acts of narratological functioning that made it possible to refer to this state of affairs, and the modality of its subjective appearance and possible variations (whether the whole is seen or thought or both)—all this is unknown to us. We do not know either the logical or the psychological in this state of affairs. And yet we are still able to translate this sentence—in German with something like: "Sie saßen um den Tisch herum und diskutierten über den Vorfall", or in French with: "Ils étaient assis autour de la table et ils discutaient de l'incident".

How does this take place? Where does that come from? The description of this cognitive-mental possibility from a phenomenological point of view and the analysis of the intentional structures that are effective here are of considerable difficulty. The main difficulty consists primarily in the difference in the intentional structure of the translation of a noun and that of a sentence. Based on the current state of my research, I will first go into the intentional structure of the translation of a noun. In the example used, I can thus explain through which intentional performances the translation of "table" or "incident" comes about. I am interested first in the problematic relationship between object and expression, then research the intentional tendencies and the functioning of language in a life-world context, in order to finally describe the intentional structures of translation consciousness and its double intentionality.

4 A Problematic Relation between Object and Nominal Expression

If we return to the functioning of meaning fulfillment and consider the way in which our empty meaning intention sets off on the path to a possible fulfillment, regardless of whether the intention comes to a fully adequate meaning in the sensible intuition or not, the whole process depends on a specific act structure that establishes the relationship between consciousness and its object. If we have a purely formal expression, i.e. an expression that in its formalization process has broken off its relation with the absolute matter (the expression "square root", for example), the meaning of the expression and the meaning intention are one and the same. In the case of an expression in which the expression—"the table" for example—denotes an object that is to be found in the field of perception, our meaning intention searches for its meaningful object in the perceptual field (i.e. in the perception or imagination) in order to achieve the most complete and adequate fulfillment possible. Here the relationship between object and expression is a problematic relationship that requires explanation.

Although in some texts Husserl defends the idea that the relationship between an expression and the meant object is the same in both directions (i.e. from expression to object and from object to expression) (Husserl 2005: 412), in *Logical Investigations* he represents the thesis of a double relationship between expression and object, depending on whether we refer to the object from the expression or the other way around. In this context, he distinguishes between a "static" and a "dynamic" relationship, depending on whether the point of departure is the object or the expression:

Static relationship:

Object ———————→ Expression

Dynamic relationship:

Expression ———————→ Object

Figure 3: Static vs. dynamic relationship between expression and object

Overall, if we are dealing with an expression and a sensible object, we have certain sensations on both sides, which on the one hand belong to the "word appearance" and on the other hand to the "object appearance" (Husserl 1984b: 559). Given the ontological differences between the two phenomena, we have an apperceptive act character that objectifies and unifies the two phenomena. In the static relationship, where the point of departure is a sensible object and leads to the appropriate expression, this act is a "cognitional" or "identification act", thanks to which we first recognize the object as this or that object and then as belonging to this or that expression (ibid.: 559). This recognition happens immediately in a static relationship, since the intention, directed at the object, is already fulfilled and no longer strives for fulfillment.

In the dynamic relationship, on the other hand, we first have the symbolic expression, which is only introduced into the process of possible fulfillment through the meaning intention. The meaning intention is an unfulfilled intention of a mere thought, which looks for a "more or less" adequate fulfillment in the intuition and thereby brings about a phenomenological unity that manifests itself in a "consciousness of fulfillment" (Husserl 1984b: 566). Unlike in the static relationship, the objectivity that is merely thought and meant in the expression is visualized in the intuition and the intention

no longer operates directly on the basis of the cognitional act, since we have no object at all and nothing is recognized in symbolic understanding, at least not in the sense of the static relationship. According to these explanations, the difference between the two relationships is a difference between a "process of fulfillment" in the dynamic relationship and a "resting fulfillment" in the static relationship (ibid.: 567–68). We read or hear the word "table" and we have to commit to its fulfillment process until we get to its meaning. That is dynamic. We see the table as an object, we recognize it as a table and immediately as named as a table. This is static.

The unity between expression and object creates a "unity of identity" or a "unity of coincidence" or even, as Husserl later formulates, a "unity of correspondence", whereby the thought and the meant object correspond to the object in the intuition. The cognitional act, which establishes this correspondence and thereby contributes to the constitution of a "consciousness of identity" as a consciousness of identification, rehabilitates as an "act of identity", the "specific intentional correlate" of which is nothing other than the identity between the meant and the real object. But since the intention itself is phenomenologically a "material" or a synthesis of partial intentions, which in turn unite to form the "unity of a total intention", it can also conflict with the intuition. Therefore, instead of a consciousness of identity we have a "consciousness of conflict" based on a "synthesis of conflict" (Husserl 1984b: 571–78). Husserl (2005: 210ff.) later referred to this consciousness in its two variants (consciousness of identity and of conflict) as a "thematic consciousness".

5 Intentional Tendencies and Language Function in Life-World Reality

We still have a long way to go before we begin to see how language works in the *Lebenswelt* "life-world". The question at present is, what changes a life-world reality in this linguistic situation? In a life-world linguistic reality we are not just encountering expressions and objects, and feeling forced for the first time to wait for a cognitional act to be established so that we will know whether this or that object is connected with this or that expression. Also, we do not need to think about whether this or that expression designates this or that object, but everything happens spontaneously, habitually and almost involuntarily. During his period of genetic phenomenology, Husserl deepens his theory of meaning and directs it in a way that allows him to explain this language characteristic as well. In particular, he introduces some fundamental elements, including the term "indicative tendency" (*Hinweistendenz*), which is of absolute importance for answering the abovementioned question.

The indicative tendency is an "intentional trait", which, according to a simplified definition, starts from expression and ends in the "meant thing" (Husserl 2005: 152–53). An even more precise definition states that the indicative tendency is a "transitional tendency" starting with the accomplishment of the word consciousness and ending in the accomplishment of the thematic consciousness (ibid.: 201). The indicative tendency collaborates with our meaning intention so that, firstly, meaning is preferred in the radical difference between word and meaning. Secondly, the entire transition from expression to meaning occurs associatively when our meaning intention changes from the first to the second. The intentionally merged unity of meaning goes hand in hand

with tendencies. However, the fact that the indicative tendency deriving from a certain expression does not end up in any arbitrary consciousness of meaning, but specifically in a corresponding consciousness of meaning, means that it is about a "specific" tendency combined with the specific intentional unity between the expression and its meaning. We hear the word "table" or read it, alone or in the middle of a sentence, but we do not stay long in the perceptual phase of the graphics or the acoustics, as if we were interested in the aesthetics with which they are designed. We may want to do this for whatever reason. It may be a calligraphic or musical phenomenon. The merit of meaning as a work of tendency is that something pushes us away from the mere perception of the word "table" and tries to force us to think of and grasp the meaning of the table. But if we want to continue to turn off meaning because we are interested in appearance for some aesthetic reason, we must resist this tendency.

Despite this connection, we should not conclude that the indicative tendency is identical with the semantic unity between the expression and its meaning. The tendency is based on our meaning consciousness (e.g., in the case of ambiguous expressions), but not on the quality of fulfillment in this consciousness (Husserl 2005: 202) and the way of fulfilling the tendency is different from that of a meaning intention. It is more "satisfied" or "saturated" than fulfilled in the sense of a search for the intuitive and adequate fullness (ibid.: 36, 139). The indicative tendency is to be understood as a "tension" that tries to relax while the meaning intention is to be fulfilled, which ultimately means that the general form of the unity of meaning and the general form of the tendency are to be distinguished. When we perceive the word "table" we automatically think of a table. Automatically thinking of a table means: the tendency has successfully pushed us away from

the perception of the word and led us to the thought of the table. The meaning intention is fulfilled because we think of the right thing. And since we are thinking of the right thing, the tendency is also saturated and does not move us to keep looking. When we accidentally do not think of the right thing, not only do we know that we are not thinking of the right thing, which is the result of the deception of meaning intention, but we are troubled and motivated to keep searching until we think of the right thing, which is the work of the insatiable tendency.

Despite this difference, however, overall fulfillment is the result of fulfilling the meaning intention on the one hand and saturating the indicative tendency on the other (Husserl 2005: 205). The general scheme is as follows:

Figure 4: General modell of fulifilment of meaning intention and indicative tendency

As far as the relationship of the expression and its meaning is concerned, however, we are not dealing with a single tendency, but with at least two types of tendencies, i.e. the "signitive tendency" and the "thematic tendency". Both of them imply the word consciousness and in connection with our interest—whether directed to the expression as word or to its meaning (for example, for a while we are only interested in the writing and not in the meaning), this also leads to a "con-

flict" (Husserl 2005: 209ff.). We perceive the word "table". A signitive tendency directs our attention to graphic or acoustic of the word "table", while at the same time the thematic tendency leads us to its meaning. The following scheme therefore results:

Figure 5: General modell of fulifillment of meaning intention and indicative tendency including the interaction of two types of tendencies

Although the indicative tendency is to be distinguished from the meaning intention, it is a characteristic of all intentions as such and accordingly of all intentional relationships, and very specifically of associative relationships, according to which "one consciousness pushes onto another consciousness, one is reminiscent of the other, one sets up an expectation of the other" (Husserl 2005: 134).[6] Thus, the indicative tendency as a tendency enabling the transition between different components, with all their ontological differences, is not only attributable to expressions or signs, but also to objects or objectivities in the sense of intentionally thought and meant objects. Indeed, thanks to the empirically and genetically constituted intentional tendencies present in all objectivities, it is possible that the world with all its different components gets itself out

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6   "Ein Bewusstes auf ein anderes Bewusstes hindrängt, eins an das andere erinnert, eins das andere erwarten macht" (Husserl 2005: 134).

of a static world and becomes a genetically designed and apperceptive comprehensible whole, the parts of which act like dark matter, which pull us in without making their force structure perceptible. In this respect, it is not only the case that we think of the table due to the tendency structure inherent in the word when perceiving the word "table", but when looking at a table the word "table" comes to mind, which in turn involves the tendency structures inherent in the object, which lead us to the word "table".

It is only through the elaboration and thematisation of tendency structures that we can succeed in going beyond the description of the nature of the language, which Husserl takes to be logical (Husserl 2005: 45), and in describing the language in its functional whole, in its "language habitualness" (*Sprachüblichkeit*) (ibid.: 169ff.) and according to its "concrete unity" of linguistic consciousness (ibid.: 47). What constitutes the concrete unity of linguistic consciousness is exactly what constitutes the essence of language habitualness, namely an "associative unity" through "successive occurrence", after which "the word reminds of the meaning" and "the meaning of the word" (ibid.: 202). The entire functioning of language is accordingly divided between the sometimes logical, sometimes associative function of language, with the possibility of a permanent transition from one to the other. Furthermore, as we will see, this is a crucial step in describing the intentional mechanism of the translation process and its double intentionality.

6 Translation Consciousness and the Intentional Structure of Translation Acts

Translation as a mental activity also follows a possible fluctuation between these two basic language functions. This activ-

ity can also become a language habitualness in the course of successive practice, so that expression E in language L associatively evokes in us its equivalent E' in the language L'. This higher-level linguistic habitualness, which is specifically a translational one, can be considered a variant of a general linguistic habitualness, but cannot be explained by it in the first place, since we can assume that the expression E (L) in its original translational process in the consciousness does not end directly in the E' (L').

We now have the phenomenological conceptual or analytical instruments to venture a phenomenological analysis of an original translation process that takes place in a given consciousness, starting from the simplest case of a nominal expression. The task now is not to speak about a general relationship of equivalence, but rather to elicit the basic functioning of a translation process and its double intentionality. In this context, it is assumed that with the translation operation we try to introduce the nominal expression E (L) into the translation of the expression E' (L').

With the E (L) ("table" for example) we actually have a consciousness, namely a word consciousness, in which our meaning intention pushes us away from the word and leads us to its meaning in the corresponding meaning consciousness. In our meaning consciousness of E (L) occurs a search for the E' (L') ("Tisch"). We have two relations here, which, although they revolve around the meaning of E, of *table*, must not be qualitatively identical, as stated: we have a relationship from expression to meaning in the first part of the whole relationship and a relationship from meaning to expression in the second part. As briefly hinted at earlier, Husserl revises this conception in a text from *Draft Plan for the revision of the 6th Logical Investigation* and tries to neutralize the difference between static and dynamic relationships. In this text, he em-

phasizes the role of a linguistic "recognition", thanks to which the object is not only recognized as a certain object, but recognized in exactly the same way as the corresponding expression designates and means it. According to this revised version, the recognition of the object (*table*) and the meaning of the expression ("table") coincides with the act of recognition or identification, regardless of whether we come to the expression from the object or from the object to the expression, since "apart from the judgment, apart from the existent object that is recognized […] in the expressed knowledge of an object […] everything is one" (Husserl 2005: 412).[7]

Without intending to disagree with this view, we need to proceed in a differentiated manner in relation to the translation process. We have two different qualitative relationships. The specificity of the translation process is that the first relationship dissolves in favor of the second relationship, which does not exist *a priori* in terms of the linguistic standard of a single language. Therefore, the second relationship is temporarily formed to accomplish a new and more comprehensive unity, i.e. a translational unity. The two relationships do not constitute an intentionally merged unity. And, depending on the relationship, we have a separate fulfillment, which can lead to a temporal abnormality and irregularity compared to a linguistic normal case. And by temporal abnormality and irregularity I mean that because of these two separate and not yet intentionally fused relationships and their specific respective fulfillments, translation does not proceed like normal monolingual usage. The possible slowness or stuttering in translation are examples of this temporal abnormality.

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7   "[A]bgesehen von der Beurteilung, abgesehen von dem daseienden Gegenstand, der erkannt wird, ist in der ausdrücklichen Erkenntnis eines Gegenstandes alles eins".

When we go from E (L) ("table") to the corresponding con-sciousness of meaning, where we establish the relationship thanks to the act of recognition, the meant object (*table*) is in the mode of perception (it may well be that the object appears within the field of perception) or imagination. We now know the meaning of the expression. Thanks to the first thematic meaning consciousness, we have the theme (*table*). Also, the meaning intention of E (L) is more or less fulfilled. Conse-quently, we can assume that we have a dynamic relationship in the first part of the relationship and a static relationship in the second. The scheme is as follows:

Figure 6: Dynamic and static relationship in the translation consciousness

Since the first relationship briefly dissolves in the process of translation to establish the second relationship, and all of this while the meant object (*table*), i.e. the meaning, is recognized, it is difficult to accept an *immediate* establishment of a second act of cognition. In other words it is difficult to accept that we establish immediately the relationship between the recog-nized meant object (*table*) and the equivalent expression ("Tisch") without any motivation. In some cases (such as in the case where we forget what a certain recognized object is called: "I see a rambutan. I know the plant from my stay in Southeast Asia. It has been a long time since I was there. I see the plant, for example in a photo of me; I recognize the plant; but I can not remember its name, not even in my language."[8] This knowledge is already with us, but does not lead to a cor-responding expression because the necessary motivation is

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8   I thank Douglas Robinson for this example.

missing or for some reason is not able to give the appropriate corresponding expression.

Due to the translation-specific transition, we can only establish the second act of cognition if the motivation for this transition is present. The motivation to transition from the accomplishment of the first to the second relationship, from *table* to "Tisch", is indeed possible through a collaboration of different tendencies. In a normal language consciousness, an indicative tendency reaches a state of calm and relaxes after our meaning intention has been fulfilled in the meaning consciousness and the corresponding indicative tendency becomes saturated. By definition, the peculiarity of the translation process is that the mere meaning consciousness and the simple establishment of the fulfillment unity in the output of the expression E (L) are not sufficient, since the *telos* of the translation process lies in the search for the E' (L'). Only through the transposition of the *telos* into a far-reaching *search consciousness*, in which the tendency is not completely saturated and translationally follows further search tendencies, does our normal consciousness of fulfillment of E (L) become a *translation consciousness*.

In this regard, a "practical tendency" in the form of a "volitional tendency" is required, which goes beyond our normal meaning consciousness, the consciousness of *table*, and motivates the search for E' (L'), for "Tisch", in this consciousness. Especially since our meaning intention of E (L) is already fulfilled, the meaning is already recognized and our search for E' (L') must be pursued despite the completed fulfilment of the meaning intention of E (L). This tendency is itself an act that does not have a start and a foreseen end point like normal acts, but proves to be an act that extends over a "center point" and follows further acts. Husserl calls it "outward meaning" (*Hinausmeinen*) and names the act a "transient

act" (Husserl 2005: 175, 219). But is this practical volitional tendency in the sense of outward meaning the only tendency that is effective in establishing the second relationship in the translation process? How do we get from an already recognized object, which is also conscious with its corresponding expression in a thematic fulfillment consciousness, to another expression, which calls it something similar in another language?

As already mentioned, Husserl has spoken very often of the sign or the expression from which a tendency derives and tries to lead us to a meaning consciousness. However, this is difficult to accept both in a translation process and in the case where multiple names are assigned to a single object in a single language. Hence, the object is not to be understood as a simple object dealing with a single name, but as an object that can potentially be expressed by several terms. We see or think of a table, the act of cognition and identification recognizes the object as this particular object, but the object can have several names both intralinguistically and interlinguistically. It can be called "la table" (French) as well as "der Tisch" (German), or "miz" (Persian) or "altaawila" (Arabic) or "x", "y", etc. The same can happen in the situation where we recognize the object as a certain one, but the name that denotes it does not occur to us.

This is why we have to accept the need to consider the possibility that our consciousness receives tendencies from both the expression and the object, and to support the idea that the object also directs tendencies to our consciousness that affect our mode of attention to it. In this regard, Husserl particularly distinguishes between two modes of the attention tendency: first, a "factual" or "thematic" tendency, in which a "trait" comes from the object and draws us "for its own sake" (like a "loud whistle" that draws our attention due to its

volume). Second, a tendency that entails "appearing imagination" (*erscheinendes Vorstellen*), whereby we do not turn to the object for its own sake, but "for another sake" and what interests us lies somewhere else (like a loud beep sounding around us that indicates an event, e.g., a danger and the need for a reaction or the return to work, etc.). In this case, the object acts like a sign that indicates something else associatively (Husserl 2005: 210–12).

It seems that the meant object in the second part of the relationship is thematically conscious as such in our translation consciousness and consciousness receives from it an associative tendency intertwined with the practical volitional tendency, whereupon the object works as a medium of orienting our intention to E' (L'). Whether we can follow this associative tendency from the meant conscious object in a practical translation case is now a question. To answer this, we need a linguistic consciousness developed genetically and apperceptively, which will serve as the basis of the association. If we have this consciousness and follow the associative tendency deriving from the meant object and grasped by consciousness, then the equivalent of E (L), namely E' (L'), occurs to us. We then say: "'Table' is 'Tisch' in German". Or, conversely, we say: "I know this object, but was not aware that it is called 'Gewürznelken-Baum' in German". Or a Finn points to a fish in the market and asks me what it's called in English. I say I have no idea. The Finn says "suomeksi se on siika" ("in Finnish it's *siika*"), and I say "Oh, whitefish!"[9] Only after these two tendencies have been completed, a new act of cognition will be used to establish the second relationship. The new scheme can then be represented as follows:

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9   I owe this example to Douglas Robinson.

Figure 7: Universal Model of the translation consciousness

There is not a totally split consciousnesses whose parts lie side by side, but the whole thing takes place in the unity of a single consciousness. Neither do we have a single consciousness in the sense of "everything is one" as Husserl emphasizes in *Draft Plan*. With the completion of the second part of the relationship, the process is formally completed in one direction. However, the fact that the second part of the relationship is completed with the arrival of the E' (L') does not mean that the translation process changes radically at this last stage if E' (L') does not exist. The translation process and its functioning in this phase of the process described so far is a *search process* that takes place with the described intentional structure in the search for E' (L'). If the E' (L') does not exist, the process remains open in the active search mode until our practical volitional tendency, with the arrival of (an) adequate or partially adequate E' (L')(s), is completely or partially satisfied and it thus completes the process, or in case it is not satisfied, we give up the search or we look for other solutions depending on the original translation intent.

7 The Double Intentionality of Translation Consciousness and its Specific Temporality

With the completion of the search process, we now have two originally separate fulfillments, which intentionally become a quasi-consciousness unity through the motivation of the volitional act that takes place in our translational search consciousness. On the one hand, we have the dynamic fulfillment of the E (L)-intention, of the "table"-intention, and on the other hand, the static fulfillment of the *E*-intention, of the *table*-intention, up to the idea of E' (L'), of the "Tisch". In addition to our practical volitional act, which connects the two parts of the translational process in our translation consciousness and creates a quasi-unity, we have a specific retentional and protentional consciousness. The specific retentionality and protentionality of the translation consciousness goes back to certain differences in temporality in relation to a normal retentional and protentional consciousness dealing with time-objects that are physically perceptible objects like a house or a piece of music.

We have in our translation consciousness a specific consciousness of translation which is protentional specifically due to the teleological transient pursuit of the E' (L'), in the sense that we are looking for E' (L') and this search opens a future horizon of linguistic possibilities that are each the subject of a translational determination. We are looking for "Tisch" as the equivalent of "table"—in this search consists the protentionality of translation consciousness. At the same time, as we will see shortly, while not actually a retentional consciousness in the narrow sense, the translation consciousness is retentional in the broad sense that: (1) We do not lose the E (L) entirely from sight, (2) the E (L) remains in a weak retention, (3) we consider E' (L') to be equivalent to E (L),

when it arrives, and (4) we attribute an E (L)-dependency to E' (L'). This state of affairs can be shown as follows:

Figure 8: Retentionality and protentionality of the translation consciousness

So the search for "Tisch" is not a mere search for the sake of "Tisch", but it is the search for "Tisch" as equivalent of "table", where "table", although not active but passive, is present in the form of a weak retention and allows us to immediately recognize "Tisch" as its equivalent once "Tisch" has occurred to us.

The *first* double intentionality of translation consciousness consists in the double intentionality inherent in this search process. We can therefore call it the *unidirectional search-specific double intentionality*. This search-specific double intentionality consists on the one hand of the "transverse intentionality" (*Querintentionalität*) of the search for the E' (L'), for the "Tisch", while the process from E (L) to E' (L'), from "table" to "Tisch", is taking place step by step with the weak retention of the E (L) and the strong protention of the E' (L') that we have at every moment in the course of translation. On the other hand, it consists of the "longitudinal intentionality" (*Längsintentionalität*) of the consciousness of this process as the consciousness of the completion of a translational whole as well as of the connection of E (L) and E' (L'), of the general consciousness of translation, the consciousness of self-involvement in the act of translating from "table" to "Tisch" and in the attempts that enable the establishment of the connection.

Figure 9: Unidirectional search-specific double intentionality

At this stage, such a quasi-unity of translation consciousness could sometimes produce translational evidence in the sense that we can say that E (L) and E' (L') are evidently equivalents. Sometimes, it could not. In the first place, the whole process in its flow from E (L) to E' (L') aims to call for possible E' (L')s in the sense of the location of appropriate equivalent(s) among E'_{1-n+1} (L'), which only provide temporary evidence in regard to the static fulfillment of the second part of the relationship. In other words, the completion of the static fulfillment of the second part of the relationship at most locates the E' (L')s or the alleged E' (L')s. Whether it is or these are evidently (an) appropriate equivalent(s) for E (L) and if so, to which extent it is or they are appropriate, i.e. how appropriate "Tisch" is as an equivalent for "table"—for that we need a higher level of verification act, a transient act of identification and cognition that goes through and beyond every part of the process; which means that a transversal synthesis and thus a new translational identification and conflict consciousness is required that allows us to compare directly the E (L) and E' (L'). This higher-level act of identification gives us translational evidence in the sense of an evident translational congru-

ence. This act is at the same time considered to be the motivation regulator that contributes to the saturation of practical search tendencies, following the establishment of a match and an evident identity between E (L) and incoming E' (L'). On the contrary case, it may lead us to a further search in the event of a mismatch or a non-identity.

The *second* double intentionality of translation consciousness, the *bidirectional verification-specific double intentionality*, occurs through the transversal act of identification. During the verification function wherein this act has to achieve an evident identity, we move back and forth several times between E (L) and E' (L'), between "table" and "Tisch". The direction in which the verification process takes place is therefore indifferent to this act. The bottom line is that all components are conscious this time: we now have two or more symbolic expressions that are supposedly and immanently connected with each other in a translational relationship through our thematic consciousness, in which the meaning or the meant object, *table*, stands as a connecting thematic link. The act can be aimed at E (L), "table", or at E' (L'), "Tisch". Since the first process in the direction from E (L) to E' (L') has taken place, the verification process can now run in the opposite direction, but does not have to.

In order to verify the correctness and the validity of this equivalence relationship, we must renew the identification process of both expressions in our translation consciousness. Due to the awareness of all components, it does not matter whether the intention in the renewal process begins with the dynamic or static relationship, i.e., whether the renewal process is centrifugal (from the meaning or meant object to the expressions, from *table* to "table" and/or "Tisch") or centripetal (from the expressions to the meaning or meant object, from "table" and/or "Tisch" to *table*). In both cases, an

intention is aimed at E' (L') (at "table" for example), while another intention is subliminally aimed at E (L) (at "Tisch") and keeps it fulfilled and close in living memory.

The second double intentionality of our translation consciousness consists in the dyadic aiming of the verifying act of identification at two different linguistic unities. The renewed verification processes of both expressions, which run in different directions despite the completion of the first translation process and the conscious presence of the necessary components, serve to enrich the thematic synthesis and thus to nourish our translation consciousness in order to verify the degree of consistency and identity most closely and to produce a translational evidence, so that we know whether and to what extent "Tisch" as the equivalent of "table" is in fact appropriate. We now have a bidirectional transverse intentionality and a longitudinal intentionality, and both contribute to the consciousness of the synthesis and its improvement up to the evidence. This new state of affairs can be shown as follows:

Figure 10: Bidirectional verification-specific double intentionality

Although the E (L) remains in a weak retention in the original translational search process until the E' (L') has arrived, and although, in the verifying identification process, the E (L) and the E' (L') keep each other retentionally connected to verify the evidence of the equivalence, it does not imply that we are

dealing with an ordinary retentional consciousness in our translation consciousness. It is obvious that our operating consciousness of translation is a translational now-consciousness, which retentionally maintains its quasi-originary impression, namely E (L) or E' (L'), in primary memory in the course of the original search process as well as of the verifying process. We perceive the word "table": we hear or read it. The perception of the word "table" constitutes in our translation consciousness a linguistic "consciousness of what has just happened". In other words, "what has just happened" is the perception not of a physical but of a linguistic object, of *table*. However, the "intensity" of what has just happened in the "continuity" of the translation process does not decrease, as it does in a normal retentional consciousness of physical time objects (cf. Husserl 1985: 31–32). This is because the practical volitional act on the one hand and the verifying act of identification on the other keep the intensity of the retention equal until the arrival of the E' (L') in the search process and until the establishment of the evidence of the equivalence relationship in the verification process. And we do not have any regular modification in the sense of constant substitution of a now-consciousness with another or in the sense of its constant transition in the consciousness of what just happened as is the case, as I said, in a normal retentional consciousness of physical time objects.

The horizon that we first have in the translation process is not an authentically "living" horizon, which, as Husserl describes it (ibid.: 43), is supposed to constitute retention in the perception of a time object. It is inauthentically kept alive through our translational motivation that reflects in the volitional act and in the verification act, in the will to find with evidence the equivalent for "table". This original horizon, which is characterized by weak retention and strong proten-

tion in the search process, becomes a circular or zigzag running horizon in the verification process, which, in its entirety, has in turn its own retentional and protentional horizon not in the conventional sense of an object perception, but in the specific sense of a translational constitution. On the one hand, the specific temporal structure of translation consciousness is due to the specific structure of the translation process, which I described in detail above. On the other hand, it harks back to the fact that the object of our translation consciousness is not a "thing", not a "time object", nor an "objective-time being", but rather a translation specific "affair-complex" (*Sachverhalt*), that ultimately has the form of the judgment *E (L) is E′ (L′)*, *Table is Tisch*.

Judgment, as Husserl claims, is neither presentation nor representation. According to Husserl, judging itself can take more or less time; it has its extension in subjective time and can be presented or represented. What is judged, on the contrary, is not long or short, continuous or less continuous. In other words, the judgment in the sense of judging can be represented, but what is judged cannot, since it is not an "genuine givenness" in the sense of an "individual being" that has a "continuity of appearances" (Husserl 1985: 96-98, 130-134). The translational judgment process ultimately strives for the evidence of the judgment *E (L) is E′ (L′),* for the evidence of *Table is Tisch.* Regardless of how evident and how true it is, the judgment *Table is Tisch* has about it nothing temporal per se. But the process in which the judgment comes about is temporal just like any other judgment process. That the translation-specific judgment process of the judgment *Table is Tisch* is just as temporal as any other judgment process of a monolingual judgment like *E (L) is q* (*The table is practical*) or *E′ (L′) is q′* (*Der Tisch ist praktisch*), does that mean that the three judgments (1) *The table is practical*, (2) *Der Tisch ist praktisch* and (3)

Table is Tisch have the same temporality structures? Especially because the three judgments have the same apophantic structure?

The translation-specific judgment *Table is Tisch* has its own temporal specificities due to the complex structure of the translation consciousness in its two variants, i.e. in search consciousness (weak retention and strong protention) and in verification consciousness (circular or zigzag running horizon with its own retentional and protentional horizon). These specificities are not found in a normal language consciousness with its own genesis and its own apperception structure. The temporal structure of the judgment process of the judgment *Table is Tisch* as the process of a translation-specific judgment formation deviates not only from the temporality of a perceptual object in terms of double intentionality, but also from the temporality of any monolingual judgment about the same perceptual object in the form of *The table is practical* or *Der Tisch ist praktisch*. It is about the *temporality of the translation-specific double intentionality of translation consciousness* in the translation of a nominal expression, the translation of "table".

8   Closing remarks

The way the double intentionality of translation consciousness works, however, shows certain differences in the translation of a sentence compared to the translation of a nominal expression, just as the intentional structure of translation consciousness itself and its act mechanism show certain differences in the transition from a nominal expression to a sentence. The previous explanations have shown the structure of the double intentionality in the translation process of a nominal expression. What complications this structure takes

when translating a synthetic-syntactic form that gives expression to an affair-complex, and how the temporal basis of this structure is organized, has to be analyzed in further investigations.

In memory of my father

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A Cognitivist Risk-Management Approach to Steiner's Hermeneutic Motion

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Abstract: This paper combines Cognitive Translation Studies (CTS) under the specific rubric of Risk-Management (RM), which is closely connected with 4EA cognition, and the magisterial Translational Hermeneutics (TH) of George Steiner's four-stage hermeneutic motion (HM), asking what the risks are that a translator will be cognitively processing (recognising, testing, avoiding, etc.) in regard to each of the motions: trust, aggression, assimilation (appropriation) and restitution. In this spirit, a new reading of Steiner's hermeneutic motion will be offered whereby the model is treated as an idealised model of a single act of translation in order to explore the implicit RM in it. According to Robinson (2015: 45), in the post-Kantian world "Everything we take to be reality is culturally constructed: we have no access to 'objective' reality". This is equally true of risk-management, where the entire process, although culture-driven, emerges in and through and out of personal experiencing and feeling, namely fearing and daring. This paper also explores the RM implied in Steiner's HM as the affective-becoming-conative formation of person-centred norms (a felt pressure to conform) out of perceived repetitions.

1   Introduction

As is apparent from the title, the thematic basis of this essay is rooted in George Steiner's theory of the Hermeneutic Motion (HM), introduced in *After Babel* (1975) (see Agnetta et al. 2021, especially Robinson in that volume), but with a focus not merely on the Translational Hermeneutics (TH) that Steiner explicitly mines but on the convergence between TH and Cognitive Translation Studies (CTS) within the framework of Risk-Management (RM). If we take RM to be an important subdiscipline of CTS, what cognitivist light can it shed on the hermeneutics of Steiner's HM?

Other scholars have of course noted an uncertainty in Steiner's Hermeneutic Motion. It is not clear whether it is a four-stage account of a single idealised act of translation or a series of historical "epochs" of translation, as it was for the German Romantics (Goethe, Novalis). If we read it as the latter, it may just be a convenient way to organise a series of theoretical approaches to translation; for the purpose of using RM to explore the convergences between CTS and TH, I propose to read it in the former way, asking in each of the four stages as it "moves" what the translator's perception or projection of risks might be.

Risk-management as a translator's orientation to a translation task is typically understood cognitively, through the lens of cognitive psychology: how do translators *think and feel* about the risks involved in translating? How do they mobilise various cognitive strategies to manage those risks? Cognitive psychology was also the research methodology I adopted in my PhD research (see Pirouznik 2019). The main question

driving this essay, however, is how those cognitive strategies organise and power the hermeneutics of translation, in the specific context of Steiner's Hermeneutic Motion.

Risk-management can be explained as strategies adopted by translators to solve problems they encounter in the process of translation and/or a method of tolerating cognitive and perceptual ambiguities in the process of translation in their encounter with the unknown, namely unknown information or new knowledge. Therefore, following in the footsteps of Anthony Pym (2015: 1) and bearing on the secondary findings of my own PhD research (see Pirouznik 2019), I see risk-management as translators' response to a problem driven by some type of translation-specific credibility loss. In this spirit, risk-management is the act of mobilising problem-solving efforts by translators to minimise perceived dangers to which their credibility is subject. The notion of risk-management can also be seen as an affective-becoming-conative (pressure emerging out of feeling) means of coping with emotional stress. The question that arises here is: what risks may translators experience and/or construct affectively-becoming-cognitively (feeling moving through conformative pressure to conscious thought) in their process of translation?

RM can, therefore, be defined as a response to the risk(s) of translation the translator experiences in time and space in a body that cannot be in two places or two times at once (i.e., in a single situated body that s/he inhabits, as an individual).

I have borrowed here from Robinson (2020) when describing risk-management as an "affective-becoming-conative-becoming-cognitive" process, where affect refers to feelings and conation is motivation, including the pressure to act in normative ways. If we feel that something is risky, that feeling will motivate our response. Finally, RM can lead to norm-formation in the sense that the repeat experience of risks and

specific management strategies come to feel like professional norms. Norms formed in this manner, however, are less universal and more local than norms as theorised by Toury (1995/2012: 63), which are taken to be "performance instructions" that "specify what is prescribed and forbidden, as well as what is tolerated and permitted in a certain behavioural dimension". This is, as Robinson (2020: 124) puts it, "a theory of the norm-formations of translators as humans".

Having explained all of the above, in order to investigate the question underlying this paper, I will initially ask myself about the risks that the translator is cognitively processing in every stage of Steiner's Hermeneutic Motion: trust, aggression, assimilation (appropriation) and restitution.

The present study could be seen as yet another step forward in the shift from the study of the product of translation to the study of the individual who creates the translation. This would be the study of the translator, or in simple terms: translator studies.

2 What is translatorial risk and how is it formed and managed?

Translatorial risks are perceived threats to a translator's face and credibility. They show themselves as a translator's construct in response to a perceived threat, which may be something unknown or it may be an anticipated challenge from target readers. The translator fears that the translation's purpose will not be fulfilled. As such, looking at risks through the lens of translational hermeneutics (TH) or simply through the eyes of a human translator, *translatorial risk is the translator's counterfactual fear that the translation's purpose will not be fulfilled*. However, the definition thus offered for translatorial risk alludes to Kahneman's "counterfactual affects" as well, where

he and Miller state that orientations to action are guided by counterfactual affect (see Kahneman/Miller 1986). Counterfactual affect can be defined as affect prompted by an imagined future consequence of actions being contemplated in the present. In this sense, much translatorial behaviour is guided by counterfactual affect; the translator's counterfactual affect of fear or anxiety about fulfillment drives him or her to act in proactive ways (conation), that would lead to risk-management in affective-becoming-conative terms. In Robinson's terms (2020: 124), all this represents the "convergence of affect-oriented phenomenology with cognitive science."

Therefore, the modality of translatorial risk-generation or risk-identification in the process of translation may be a "pattern of associated ideas [that] comes to represent the structure of events in [his or her] life," as suggested by Robinson (2020: 125) when reframing translational norm theory through 4EA cognition. The reason I am applying this statement to translatorial-risk-generation and/or -identification is that norms emerge out of the process of risk-management following the translator's re-experiencing and co-experiencing and the repetition of these experience-driven conations, a notion that also draws on Robinson's 2020 article on reframing norms.

When the translator senses a threat to his/her credibility, a counterfactual fear takes shape in the translator's mind about the possibility that a collapse of credibility will undermine or undo his or her reputation for reliability.

In the long run, patterns resulting from attempts at responding to similar perceived risks in the process of translation could help replace the panic and fear experienced by the translator with flexibility in risk-identification and risk-management. Repetition of this type, as mentioned above, will lead to norm formation by the translator, a subject we will

come back to later in this paper with a view to Steiner's Hermeneutic Motion (HM).

It might be useful to explain at this stage that in general, risk-management (RM) is studied in a vast array of disciplines. Additionally, beyond its scientific and academic scope, RM can be seen as a 'life hack' aimed among other things at promoting the quality of life.

In general, approaching RM within the convergence of CTS and TH entails the initial assumption that the risks that translators manage in translating begin as projections of their own fears. With any new translation comes new fears, new risks and new management strategies for and by the translator.

According to a text posted on the Internet by the Lucid Content Team (2021), any risk-management process is a five-stage or a five-phase procedure, comprising "risk identification, risk analysis, risk prioritisation, risk treatment and risk monitoring". In this paper my main concern will be with the way the five stages defined for risk-management can be related to translation within the framework of Steiner's hermeneutic motion, if at all.

In the CTS/TH model promoted in this paper, risk-identification would have to begin with a feeling (what Kahneman calls a counterfactual affect – say, fear or anxiety or concern) that conatively pushes the translator into taking the next steps (analysis, prioritisation, treatment, monitoring, which will typically also involve normativisation). The risk-analysis stage would be the most important stage where the translator makes an effort to analyse the problem type and/or risk(s) s/he believes s/he is facing. Stage three, risk-prioritisation, may be a game of choice for the translator, where s/he decides which risks to tackle and hence prioritise. At this stage the choice a translator makes might be based on what

triggers the greatest fear in the translator or his or her fear, timidity or daring. As such, the prioritisation process would be mainly feeling-based. Stage four, risk-treatment, could deal with the translator's identification of solution type and subsequently affective-becoming-cognitive risk removal and/or risk dismissal. And finally stage five, risk-monitoring, could trigger an inner dialogue in the translator's mind regarding the impact of risk-treatment on the final product of translation from the viewpoint of the end-user: i.e., target reader/receiver and/or receiving culture.

The understanding that risks do not have an objective nature, which is to say they do not exist objectively for translators to identify, is essential to our embrace of the CTS/TH/RM convergence.

3   What is translational hermeneutics?

Translational hermeneutics is a discipline that seeks, among others, to study the influence of the modality of the translator's affective-becoming-conative-becoming-cognitive thoughts, feelings and/or behaviours on translation. In simple words, it can be the feeling-based study of translation that focuses on translator studies to study how translations are formed.

Douglas Robinson has traced the emergence of 4EA cognitive science out of hermeneutics in the Introduction to this volume, with a focus first on the feeling-based hermeneutics of Herder and Schleiermacher and then on the gradual transformation of Dilthey's theory of the *Zusammenhang des Lebens* (nexus of life) into Husserl's *Lebenswelt* (life-world) and ultimately into the situated embeddedness and extended enactivity (mutual constitutivity) of embodiment in 4EA cognitive science. In this essay I accept the broad outlines of that historical emergence but focus specifically on the conver-

gence between CTS/TH/RM and Steiner's Hermeneutic Motion.

Bernd Stefanink and Ioana Bălăcescu (2017) make implicit reference to that link through the explanation that "to understand the text, translators unavoidably project some fore-understanding on the text […] and for the hermeneutic translator the translation is complete when the target text corresponds to the mental representation of the meaning in the translator's brain". This fore-understanding is based on the human translator's experience. As they further put it:

> this hermeneutical conception is supported by cognitivist research as, for instance Fillmore's (1976: 61) description of the process of understanding shows […] "what happens when one comprehends a text is that one mentally creates a kind of world; the properties of this world may depend quite a bit on the individual interpreter's private experiences a reality which should account for part of the fact that different people construct different interpretations of the same text." (Fillmore 1976: 61, quoted in Stefanink/Bălăcescu 2017: 25)

In view of the above, the hermeneutical approach in translation can be seen as one that easily shifts the focus from the product of translation to the person who produces it. In other words, translational hermeneutics is not about transfer at all – of meanings or words. It is about the human act and experience of interpreting and understanding. As such, it is no accident that hermeneutics was the foundation for phenomenology and 4EA cognitive science, both of which are about the experience of being human, of being alive in a human body.

The 4EA (embodied, embedded, enacted, extended and affective) aspects of cognition, an inseparable part of translation, especially of translational hermeneutics, may well be regarded as realms of co-experiencing. This point is quite relevant to my suggestion that TH/RM as 4EA co-experiencing tends to give rise to translational norms. What stands out at

this stage is the convergence of cognitive science with phenomenology, an approach that concentrates on the study of consciousness and the objects of direct experience. With this background information in place, I will move on to the main focus of this paper, Steiner's Hermeneutic Motion.

4   Steiner's Hermeneutic Motion

Steiner (1975: 331) defines his Hermeneutic Motion (HM) as "the act of elicitation and appropriative transfer of meaning" and explains it as being "fourfold". The four stages, moves or motions are: trust, aggression, assimilation (appropriation) and restitution. As Elizabeth Marie Young (1997: 240) notes, George Steiner was "one of the scholars who inaugurated the current interest in the ethics of translation", (quoted in Robinson 2021: 103), especially through his "multi-step interpretive process": the Hermeneutic Motion.

Not for nothing is Steiner's model named the *Hermeneutic Motion*: it is of course steeped in German Romantic hermeneutics. Its grounding in cognitive science—especially 4EA cognitive science, which was still two decades in the future when Steiner wrote—is, however, rather thin and weak, and I propose here to offer risk management as a cognitivist clarification of Steiner's vague model. This will be done by integrating cognitivist risk management into Steiner's model, asking in each of the four stages or motions or moves what a translator's perception or projection of risks might be. In other words, I will be asking in every motion what the risks are that a translator may process (recognise, test, avert, transfer, etc.).

Looking at risk-management from Steiner's perspective or in the framework of his fourfold motion, and bearing on the cognitivist approach to risk-management as simply being

an approach to problem-solving that aids interlinguistic and intercultural dialogue and understanding or even a rhetoric of translatorial reassurance, we can isolate RM as the element that conditions and guides the two acts of "elicitation" and "appropriative" transfer as affective-becoming-conative-becoming-cognitive orientations to those two tasks. Why is this? Because risk-management is a translator's tool for drawing out meaning where the translator is fearful of being derailed from the purpose of the translation and hence risking his/her credibility and reliability. Where meaning is felt to be difficult to grasp or where the translator faces the fear of untranslatability, the translator will choose to resort to "elicitation". And when facing the fear of transferring the unintelligible, the translator ponders among others the choice of localising the drawn-out sense for better grasp in the target culture (i.e., appropriation and restitution).

5   Steiner's hermeneutic motion and RM norms

As I earlier explained, my understanding is that translational norms are in principle self-styled by the translator, through the repetition of risk-management strategies. In other words, an interesting aspect of Steiner's HM from the point of view of risk-management, and also in respect of the cognitive aspect of the cognitive science of norm-formation, is what I would propose as risk-management norms (RM norms). From a human perspective, norms are affective-becoming-conative-becoming-cognitive patterns shaped in response to a translator's personal construction of counterfactual affects like regret and shame as guides to normative risk management. To put that differently, what counts here, and what helps form the norms in stages two (aggression) and three

(appropriation) of Steiner's motion, is the translator's counterfactual affect.

In the next four sections I will be analysing the risks perceived by translators in each stage of the hermeneutic motion. We will read and see that the second and third stages of Steiner's hermeneutic motion are typically taken to be the most risk-prone because translators tend to experience the most cultural and linguistic differences in these two stages. Translators' RM experiences in these two stages give conative impulse to counterfactual affects, leading to norm-formation through repeat experiences of similar affective-becoming-conative situations.

In risk-management, the cognitive tension is between the perceived risk and the self-protective measure(s) a translator takes in response. In this sense, the RM norm represents the relation or relationality between the risk and its avoidance and/or management strategy.

For Kahneman (2014), the experience of a single repetition is enough to set a norm. In risk-management that would suggest that when a translator perceives a risky situation and has to respond in a way that seems to protect her or him against that risk, at first this is just an experience, but when it happens a second time it generates (the imagination and projection of) a norm. However, if the same or a similar relation/tension occurs over and over, eventually that comes to seem not just like a translational norm but like "translation." This becomes the whole proposed landscape of translation, and therefore it can be considered as the whole normative scope or range of (acceptable) translation. These norms can be considered counterfactual orientations to action guided conatively by social expectations. In Robinson's terms (2020: 125), they are based on that "pattern of associated ideas [that] comes to represent the structure of events in [the translator's]

life". Thus, these norms can be seen differently from the self-styled norms coming through immediate experience and problem-solving strategies adopted by the translator in the transition from stage two to stage - three, which Steiner tends to treat as separately embodied in individual translations - In Robinson's terms (ibid.: 127), "this sort of norm-based guidance is *habit-as-instinct* … [the norm] has been habitualized and automated as System-1[1] 'instinct'". In other words, as Robinson puts it (ibid.), "you know how to proceed without thinking about it".

RM norms are closely connected with 4EA (embodied, embedded, enactive, extended, and affective) cognition: "notably they give affective response a key role in marking not only the intensity but the cognitive load of norm-formative decision-making" (Robinson 2020: 122). RM norms are thus experience-driven. From a 4EA perspective, starting from the translator's experiential perspective, norms are not existing laws merely *recognised* by translators but rather idiosyncratic orientations developed in practice by translators based on the strategy/strategies they adopt to manage risks in their process of translation. In this sense, translators develop their own norms based on the strategy/strategies they adopt to manage risks in their process of translation.

It is interesting to note here that as Kahneman explains it, norms are constructed by what Kahneman refers to as *System 1*, the brain module for "thinking fast." (The other is *System 2*, the brain module for "thinking slowly and analytically.")

> The main function of System 1 is to maintain and update a model of your personal world, which represents what is normal to it. The model is constructed by associations that link ideas of circumstances, events, actions and outcomes that co-occur with some regularity, either at the same time or at a relatively short interval. As these links

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1   In Kahneman (2014), fast automated thinking.

are formed and strengthened, the pattern of associated ideas comes to represent the structure of events in your life, and it determines your interpretation of the present as well as your expectations of the future. (Kahneman 2014: 71; quoted in Robinson 2020: 125)

6 Viewing the Hermeneutic Motion through the lens of risk-management

For the purpose of this analysis, each stage of the hermeneutic motion will be considered under a separate sub-heading. The greatest risks are to be sought in stages two and three of the Hermeneutic Motion, namely, aggression and assimilation. This is due to the fact that it is in these two stages that the translator experiences the greatest cultural and linguistic differences.

6.1 First motion: trust

The first stage of the Hermeneutic Motion is trust, which is the basis of any act of translation. The translator initially confides in the text and in the author and tests this trust against the measure of his or her experience. The translator's measure of experience is of a complex nature. It is an affective and at the same time an operational dimension of the translator's mental processing of the text, which as Steiner (1975: 298) puts it "derives from a sequence of phenomenological assumptions about the coherence of the world, about the presence of meaning in very different, perhaps formally antithetical semantic systems, about the validity of analogy and parallel". "All understanding, and the demonstrative statement of understanding which is translation, starts with the act of trust", says Steiner (ibid.).

This untried trust of the "other" by the translator, the belief that something is there that is meaningful and can be

translated and transferred, is yet in itself subject to risk. Instances of concepts and notions that are difficult to transfer or are culturally untranslatable and non-communicative and unable to be grasped by the target receivers are challenges to the translator's initial and unbiased trust. Steiner himself refers to this phenomenon by stating that "trust can never be final. It is betrayed, trivially, by nonsense, by the discovery that there is nothing there to elicit and translate" (Steiner 1975: 298).

In this sense, the first move or stage of the Hermeneutic Motion runs the risk of the translator's confrontation with counteridiomatic or counternormative usage and the untranslatable, or the absence of meaning in the mindset of the target receiver as opposed to the trusted source "other". Here, the mindset of the "target receiver" is the translator's projection and is presented through the translator's perspective. Additionally, "the trusted source 'other'" could be either the source author or the source text, but in either case as experienced by the translator.

The questions the translator might ask himself/herself at this stage could include: What do I risk in trusting this text? How might my trust leave me vulnerable? What mistakes might my trust lead me to make? How might my trust leave me open to attack? How can I transfer this trust to the target reader? How can I manage the risk of a trust backlash (the betrayal of trust)?

Of course, many more questions can be posed by the translator on the matter of trust. The posing of these affective questions by the translator accounts for risk-identification. The next stages to be followed by the translator as a conative response to risk-identification are risk-analysis, -prioritisation, -treatment and -monitoring, among which risk-treatment and/or -management will be explained in the following para-

graphs. Finally, risk-normativisation may also exist as a last and additional stage for some translators, namely those who have experienced repeat RM engagements.

Risk-identification in the first stage of the hermeneutic motion begins with fear of trust. Prioritisation and analysis of the risks perceived are choice- and affectively-oriented. However, to treat the risks a translator perceives at the stage of trust, based on the driving force felt to be triggering this risk—be it the target receiver, the translator himself/herself, or even the translation as a product—the measures adopted by the translator to manage them will differ based on the translator's life experience and mental construct and the possibly multiple responses the translator may project in his/her mind to answer these risky questions. On the issue of mental experience as a measure of managing risks in translation, some translators might be timid and others might be bold. Based on experience, the timid translator will tend to lean toward a risk-avoiding or risk-averting management strategy, whereas the bold translator is more likely to opt for a risk-taking measure.

For example, in response to the question of *what do I risk in trusting this text?* the timid translator may opt for the least face-threatening strategy, which might even lead to sacrificing meaning in the transfer from the ST to the TT. This is a strategy that the translator takes to involve the least possible loss of face. Conversely, the bold translator may gravitate towards transferring the enigmatic instead of choosing to save his/her credibility by producing an easy-to-grasp text. Bold translators dare to transfer ambiguities from the ST to the TT. In other words, the timid translator will choose not to risk the purpose of the transfer to save his/her credibility, whereas the bold translator even risks the purpose of the translation, most likely in response to an initial trust in the author.

Thus, cognitive RM strategies for the counterfactual affec-tive-becoming-conative perception of untranslatability or ST incoherence can include risk-aversion and risk-transfer for instance. In risk-aversion the translator tends to avert or avoid the perceived risk by different strategies such as deletion, elicitation, etc. In risk-transfer the translator transfers the risk to the target receiver as explained above. In this sense, not resolving the risk is a mode of risk-management (see Pirouznik 2019).

6.2 Second motion: aggression

To manage the risk of untranslatability, the translator will need to delve deep into the text. The second move in Steiner's model is therefore "aggression". This stage embodies comprehension in the form of violent penetration into and opening up of the source text. Steiner (1975: 228) thus believes that "comprehension, as its etymology shows, 'comprehends' not only cognitively but by encirclement and ingestion". "Encirclement" and "ingestion" are both obviously metaphors. I assume "encirclement" involves something like circling the wagons, throwing up a barricade around something, so that it remains trapped inside the circle; ingestion is obviously eating. The idea is that you make something alien your own by taking it into yourself. Obviously, by "cognitive" Steiner does not mean everything studied by 4EA cognitive science, which in 1975 was still a quarter of a century in the future. But what else could comprehension be? Comprehension is the ability to understand something. This ability is most importantly based on experiencing. However, when the translator's life experience does not possess those instances of experience that foster cognition and comprehension, that is when the translator resorts to Steiner's "encirclement" and

"ingestion" out of a desire for understanding. Although Steiner talks about "comprehension" as cognition, encirclement and ingestion, "encirclement" and "ingestion" in my view might also be the means of moving beyond the realm of comprehension, where encirclement can serve as the gateway to enslavement in the same manner as Steiner's military metaphor of invading the source culture and taking some part of it home as slave, functions. When the wagons are circled and a barricade is thrown up against the unintelligible there is also the possibility of enslaving it for better understanding when ingestion is not possible. Again, for Steiner (1975: 299), "in the event of interlingual translation this manoeuvre of comprehension is explicitly invasive and exhaustive".

This second stage of Steiner's model is one of the two moves that translators are most likely to experience as risky. Steiner's metaphorical description of the diverse modes of aggression towards the "other" in the second stage of his model opens up new metaphorical possibilities of risk, such as enslavement of the "other" in the process of understanding, resistance of the "other" to violence in understanding it, etc. Sometimes this penetration and violence is such that the target text can become cognitively more accessible and pleasing for its readers than the source text from which it was translated. In Steiner's own words:

> But again, as in the case of the translator's trust, there are genuine borderline cases. Certain texts or genres have been exhausted by translation. Far more interestingly, others have been negated by transfiguration, by an act of appropriative penetration and transfer in excess of the original, more ordered, more aesthetically pleasing. There are originals we no longer turn to because the translation is of a higher magnitude. (Steiner 1975: 299)

In this second stage the translator is thus imagined as an invader who wishes to crush opposition, or inexcusably penetrate the unknown.

Examples of questions translators might ask themselves about possible risks at this stage of the hermeneutic motion could include: what opposition or resistance may I meet? What risks does invasion of the source pose for me, in general? How does this aggression make me vulnerable? At this stage, while invading and seizing, the translator might also begin to anticipate, beforehand, the risks of those activities in the third move as well and ask himself/herself questions that seem to be pointing to the third motion such as: How can I integrate the enslaved notion into the target culture? How will I be treated by the target readers when – they encounter and engage the enslaved concept/notion? Should I tolerate the ambiguity of the source text and transfer this ambiguity into the target text as well or should I compensate for the ambiguity of the source text by avoiding it in the target text?

To manage the risks perceived in this manner, the translator may once again choose based on experience and the degree of counterfactual fear s/he feels: fear of the loss of his/her credibility possibly faced in and through attempts to avert or avoid information that is unknown to him/her; or attempts to transfer the unknown, ambiguous parts of the ST to the target reader in its more or less rough or problematic state; or attempts to dress it up in the manner of the target culture, making it easily accessible for the target reader.

In the second move, therefore, the risk encountered by the translator is triggered by the fear of conveying ambiguities to the target reader/receiver wrongly or badly, because of the presence of an inaccessible element/feature in the source text.

6.3 Third motion: assimilation (appropriation)

To meet the demand of comprehension in the target culture, the translator seeks to reproduce an adapted version of the source text in the target language, and a translator's endeavours and/or experiences in this regard form Steiner's third motion: assimilation or appropriation.

Appropriation follows a stage which Steiner refers to as "aggressive decipherment" (1975: 299). The third stage of the Hermeneutic Motion is incorporative. This incorporation comes from the need to enter and/or include parts of the source culture, semantic and stylistic formulations of the other, into the receiving and/or target culture. The necessity for this blending and/or importation is felt by the translator because the translator has experienced the cultural and linguistic differences and constructs this task as one of overcoming those differences, smoothing them out, smuggling the other into the self, difference into sameness. The import takes on different shapes and formations. In the convergence between cognitive and hermeneutical approaches, the translator reconstructs, appropriates or adapts the foreign text cognitively and affectively as an import that s/he can shape in various ways. If the translator leans more towards the source culture, the result would be "foreignization" or "literalism" and if the translator leans more towards the target culture, the result would be "domestication" or "fluency". The latter approach is characterised by Steiner as "appropriation".

In the process of importation, the translator actually plans and imposes an affective-becoming-cognitive transformation of the source text, which also requires that s/he transform the target language. The risk at this stage, however, is a separate affective-becoming-cognitive construct that brings the following questions to the translator's mind: what if it

does not work? What if the transformation I engineered is not accepted? What if adaptation of the source text is such that the translation reads very differently from the source text? Would the importation of the ambiguities from the source into the target overshadow my creativity? Would the transfer of ambiguities help to enrich the target text? How can I most influentially bridge the gap between the minds of the source author and the target reader? Am I doing the ethical thing? How can I do the ethical thing? Also, returning to Steiner's scenario of bringing meaning home captive, and drawing on Goodwin (2010: 33), other questions that might arise for the translator in the appropriation stage include: "Is the captive going to be dressed in the manner of her new home, or left in her own costume? To what extent is she to be taught the customs of her new home?"

Of the perceived risks and their formulated questions, the question of "what if it does not work?" may be the one that the translator is most fearful of. The translator imagines incorporation of the target text into the target culture, and translates so as to expedite that incorporation--but what if the target readership does not actually incorporate it? The translator is in fact imagining uptake here and has no idea of whether that imagined outcome will come true. So, what could the counterfactual affect of this risk be? What conations will be triggered by this cognition? My view is that the translator may wish to narrow the risk gap by adopting a risk-taking strategy, namely, deleting part of the source text that is key to its understanding and or replacing it with an-easy-to-grasp notion in the target text or localising it in accordance with target experiences, hence domesticating the concept that is beyond his/her but mostly beyond the target reader's experience.

A different kind of risk that relates to the undesirable results of assimilating too much at this stage is what provokes the translator to project a question regarding the degree of assimilation in the process of translation: *What if adaptation of the source text levels up to a source text that reads very differently from the target text?* The counterfactual affect of this could be the translator's fear of producing a target text that is different from its source text, in terms of its comprehensibility, rendering the ST thereby less credible than it originally was—credibility in this case being calibrated to the fluency metric. And this is because in such cases sometimes even the source reader would choose to read the translation of the source text, which reads more fluently and is more comprehensible than its original and is thus more accessible. A second fear is that in such cases, the translator may be considered to have rewritten the source text and not translated it. A question that may well rise at this stage concerns the readers. Readers are not only the target readers but the end-users of the product, who may also include cosmopolitan polyglot intellectuals. Or these readers can come from the same linguistic nationality/origin as the source text -and yet may find the target text so much more comprehensible than the source text that they choose to read it first and then go back to the source text for better understanding. Examples are prevalent among scholars, especially in the olden times, when the language of science or literature differed from people's standard speech.

To manage this risk in favour of the source text, the translator may mainly adopt the strategies of transliteration, foreignisation, and/or literal translation, in which cases s/he would be avoiding risk or transferring it. In the event of adopting transliteration and/or literal translation strategies, the translator would be transferring the piece(s) of unknown information, without clarification (roughly in the same man-

ner as they are for the translaor), to the target reader (cf. Pirouznik 2019).

6.4 Fourth motion: restitution

The aggression in the second and third stages of the hermeneutic motion is likely to violate the harmony of the source text in its transition to the target culture. This is referred to by Steiner (1975: 301) as "imbalance". "The translator has taken too much—he has padded, embroidered, 'read into'—or too little—he has skimped, elided, cut out awkward corners" (ibid.). It is at this stage that Steiner introduces his fourth stage, i.e., Restitution, which above all signifies Steiner's desire for the ethical in translation. In his own words:

> The a-prioristic movement of trust puts us off balance. We "lean towards" the confronting text (every translator has experienced this palpable bending towards and launching at his target). We encircle and invade cognitively. We come home laden, thus again off-balance, having caused disequilibrium throughout the system by taking away from "the other" and by adding, though possibly with ambiguous consequence, to our own. The system is now off-tilt. The hermeneutic act must compensate. If it is to be authentic it must mediate into exchange and restored parity. (Steiner 1975: 300)

In this sense, stage four of Steiner's Hermeneutic Motion, restitution, is a utopian experience and serves to narrow the expanded risk gap introduced in the transition from stage two to stage three. This utopian idealisation of restitution, collectively internalised as normative "translation" through repetition on a massive scale, is partly to blame for the translator's sense of risk in the second and third moves.

Nevertheless, the very imagination of restitution as a narrowing of the risk gap will carry the risk of failure for the translator. Steiner does not really theorise from the translator's perspective at this stage; the imbalance is simply righted;

what was disrupted is restored to normalcy, etc. So, what risks might the attempt to restore balance pose for the translator?

From Steiner's own perspective this risk can be managed by denial and repression, but what would the counterfactual affects of this risk be for the translator? At this stage, similar to the third motion, the translator might ask himself/herself whether s/he has done the ethical thing or would be doing the ethical thing by this restitution. Is doing the ethical thing worth the unfulfillment of the translation's purpose at all? Or in the case of producing a target text that reads quite differently from the source text due to over-assimilation, would the translator need to re-do the action of translation in order to do the ethical thing? Other questions that the translator might ask of himself/herself are: Ideally, I would balance everything out, but what if I fail? What would be my punishment if I failed? Should I sacrifice fluency for the ethical course of action?

This fourth motion is the stage of great emotional interplay for the translator who has now completed the task of translation. At this stage, the translator may experience mixed feelings as a result of the complexity of the perceived risks. The translator fears that the restitution move might fail. Now the bold translator may opt for keeping the imbalance, while the timid translator will most likely aim at restoring normalcy.

Steiner also sees this last stage of restoration as the embodiment of fidelity to the source text, a phenomenon he defines as "not literalism or any technical device for rendering 'spirit'… Fidelity is ethical, but also in a full sense, economic" (Steiner 1975: 301). This last stage is therefore one of a translator's affective-becoming-cognitive responses to the normative requirements not only of the target readers but also of the translation profession.

It is interesting to note that when running the risk-management model through Steiner's Hermeneutic Motion, it is easy to see how the first stage (trust) and the last stage (restitution) obviously follow an idealised normativity, ideal possibly in the sense that all thought of being subject to risk from the side of the receiver is apparently banished. But the second and third stages, aggression and appropriation, are the stages where the translator would have to expand the gap between the risk projected onto the receiver and its amelioration strategy. The gap is extended to the extent that the 'fear' perceived becomes a counterfactual affect—*narrativising* translation in aggressive military terms would tend to make the translator project/pose an intensified risk. Similarly, narrativizing translation in the utopian terms of the first and fourth stages, which supposedly resolve and banish risk, actually intensifies the risk of failure. What translator has ever achieved the mythical goal of perfect restitution?

What is meant by the gap is the relationship between the intensity of the perceived risk and the resulting risk-intensity of the translator's response. If it is a small risk and a small response, the gap is small. The bigger the risk, and the more boldly the translator is willing to engage that risk with an innovative and perhaps even transgressive translation strategy, the wider the gap, and the more capacious the translator's resulting concept of translation.

7   Conclusion and outlines for future projects

RM is more human-centered than text-centered, and running RM through Steiner's model clarifies the human-centeredness of HM. Managing risks is a mode of experience-based and creative norm-formation that may in the long run, through repetition, generate a normative understanding of

"translation itself". A deeper look at the RM norms may trigger and facilitate discourse on what in Robinson's terms is a "human norm theory of translation" (2020: 131). This approach also gives greater prominence to the rhetoric of the translator as a human whose work is driven by his/her individuality and experience, and who is not so much shaped passively by socio-cultural expectations and/or norms but rather gives direction and meaning to these socially, culturally and historically shaped expectations through personal experience and creative self-styling.

For further reflection on the translator's feelings, emotions, mindset and methods of risk-management, preparation of a translatorial analysisstructure (i.e., a project-by-project risk log/register for translation) can prove helpful.

Another interesting subject to pursue in future reflections is the influence of different cultures on decision-making for RM and RM norm formations. The focus in such a study would be on the role of cultures and the diversity of cultures in the shaping of a translator's life-experiences that will impact on translators' decision-making for RM, the basis of RM norm-formation.

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Hermeneutics as a Route to Translating Auditory Aspects of Emotion in Silvina Ocampo's Fictional Worlds: An Analysis of "Okno, el esclavo"

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Abstract: Hermeneutical translation studies is increasingly interested in how interpretation works (Robinson 2020), and interpretation in the context of translation is inextricably linked to issues of understanding. As Hermans (2015) notes, the hermeneutic endeavour springs from a desire to understand, but the practice of gaining that understanding is an art. In fact, he remarks that translation occupies the most challenging end of the hermeneutic spectrum, in part due to the complexity inherent in voicing an understanding across languages. In addition to verbalisation, however, understanding in this context can also refer to hearing, and to having heard a text in its fullest sense. Indeed, Toolan (2016/2018: 250) suggests that written stories are "incompletely appreciated if the sounds and rhythms of their language are not registered, along with any implied meanings those sounds prompt readers to derive." The auditory dimension of written texts thus seems an essential component of literary translation, whereby the

translator must be able to hear, feel, and identify emotional aspects elicited from reading. As Bernofsky (2013: 229) highlights, a translator should hear a text's heartbeat in the cadences of its phrases. Drawing on the affective literature in Translation Studies (e.g. Hubscher-Davidson 2017; Koskinen 2020; Robinson 1991), this chapter will explore the emotion-eliciting auditory aspects in Argentinian writer Silvina Ocampo's haunting short story "Okno, el esclavo" (1988/2014). Combining close reading and computer-aided qualitative data analysis, salient characteristics will be discussed that provoke sound sensations (noise, music, silences) contributing to the story's emotional impact and reader experience. In this way, it becomes possible to understand the translator's daunting cognitive and affective task when (re)interpreting the soundscape of Ocampo's atmospheric worlds.

Keywords: Ocampo, Atmosphere, Soundscapes, Emotion, Translation.

1   Introduction

Silvina Ocampo—referred to as one of Argentina's best-kept secrets (Klingenberg/Zullo Ruiz 2016)—has certainly produced short stories that qualify as personal and original. The writing is multi-faceted and experimental in terms of the narration and draws inspiration from her contemporaries (such as Jorge Luis Borges) as well as her work as a painter. As such, her short stories are known for their unique literary atmosphere and multisensory appeal, essential components that readers need to be able to perceive, engage with, and interpret in order to fully appreciate.

As we perceive the world through our senses, our body is the filter through which we experience, sense, and respond to the world around us. The necessity of being able to 'feel' the source text in order to translate it was discussed by Douglas Robinson as early as 1991: "if you do not feel the body of the source language text, you will have little chance of generating a physically tangible or emotionally alive target language text" (Robinson 1991: 17). This link between sensorial

experiences that arise in the process of reading and the recreation of these experiences in translation has piqued the interest of translation scholars such as Clive Scott (2012/2015), who explored the notion of sensory equivalence and the somato-sensory (audial, visual, haptic, gestural, articulatory kinaesthetic, proprioceptive) modalities of reader response.

Sensory systems, however, remain underexplored in translation studies (TS), perhaps due to their complexity, multifaceted nature, and difficulty to grasp. It could be mooted that the auditory sense in particular is associated with various cognitive and affective processes which can influence the ways that translators perceive and process texts. As Susan Bernofsky (2013: 229) notes, processes of translation and revision entail "listening to a potential text and hearing it amid all the rhythmical detritus of inadequate versions". If experiencing sound in a text is a precondition for translating it, it might be argued that translating sound also affords unique perspectives into the act and experience of perception. While cognitive translation studies (CTS) may provide insights into this delicate mental processing of sensory information, translational hermeneutics (TH) can offer useful information regarding the conditions surrounding our understanding of and immersion in a text's sensory dimension.

Drawing on the relevant literature, this article will explore emotion-eliciting auditory/kinaesthetic aspects in Silvina Ocampo's haunting short story "Okno, el esclavo" (1988/⁴2014). Combining close reading and computer-aided qualitative data analysis, we will discuss salient characteristics that provoke sound sensations (noise, music, silences) contributing to the story's emotional impact and embodied reader experience. In this way, it will become possible to come to a deeper understanding of the translator's daunting cognitive

and affective task when (re)interpreting the soundscape of Ocampo's atmospheric worlds.

2 Translational Hermeneutics and Cognitive Translation Studies

Although translational hermeneutics (TH) has been around for two centuries, the discipline has only come into its own as an increasingly mainstream approach in recent times. Indeed, both translational hermeneutics (TH) and cognitive translation studies (CTS) can be said to have undergone significant development over the last decade or so as relatively new sub-disciplines of translation studies. Both areas have seen a proliferation of publications and dedicated conferences, and while it has been argued that the hermeneutic theory of translation is concerned with the personalization of the translation act (Piecychna 2015), it would not be far-fetched to suggest that the personal and subjective are also increasingly important considerations for cognitive translation scholars. As Risku emphasises (2014: 335), "we will actually also have to study translators in their authentic, personal, historically embedded environments and translation situations if we want to be able to describe the cognitive process." Cognitive and hermeneutic approaches to translation are thought to be convergent in a number of other respects, including "the translators' memory and organization of knowledge, understanding and creation of the translation text, as well as the role of the target reader" (Piecychna 2021: 7).

This second area of convergence (understanding the translation text) is noteworthy as it relates to a specific way of understanding the translation process that is of particular relevance to the present study. As Piecychna (2021) explains, it assumes both that in order to understand the meaning of a

certain part of a text it is necessary to understand how it relates to the entire work, and that in order to understand the message in its entirety, individual parts of the work also need to be taken into account. In TH this process of understanding based on one's evolving knowledge is sometimes called the hermeneutic circle (Cercel et al. 2015: 27), and it aligns with thinking in CTS which also views meaning-construction as dynamic and supported by activated and reactivated mental representations (e.g. Martín de León 2017).

An illustrative example of the hermeneutic circle being activated is provided by Piecychna (2015: 36–37) in her analysis of an extract from *The Ballroom's Café* by Ann O'Loughlin, a novel set in rural Ireland. Piecychna demonstrates that cultural items in the source text ('kitchen garden', 'tarts') activate imaginative constructs in readers' minds, feeding new information into their knowledge base and enabling them to understand the whole message on the basis of its constituent parts, and vice versa. This dynamic and recursive meaning-making and mental engagement process guides reader-translators' understanding of an author's expressive choices, a point to which we will return in section 4.

The other area of convergence discussed by Piecychna (2021) that is worth emphasising for the purposes of the present chapter is that of the target reader's role. Scholars from both traditions are keenly interested in issues relating to how the translator takes account of target readers, their reactions, and their interpretations of the text. For instance, the reader is a key component of Schleiermacher's hermeneutical translation theory: Cercel et al. (2015: 19–20) point out that Schleiermacher's well-known translating methods "take the reader and his reception of a translation as a starting point for the principal organization of a text to be written". Similarly, in a chapter addressing the links between translation and cogni-

tive science, Muñoz Martín/Martín de León (2020: 62) note that translation processes encompass all the interactions among—and the cognitive processes of—all the people involved, including the addressees. This growing interest in issues of reader engagement and reception in both TH and CTS has led to some fruitful reflections on the act of translation as embedded in the relationship between a text and its readers/translators. For example, Piecychna (2015: 31) observes that "The meaning of a text is formed by a reader who, in the consecutive phases of the process of reading, creates the entirety of various senses, in the helical movement of hermeneutical interpretation based on his/her previous knowledge and experience as well as on the expectations which influence the way a text is perceived." In this perspective, the translator (arguably the most engaged type of source reader) "will look at the situational background, the discourse field, the conceptual world of key words and the predicative mode of a text, in order to adequately interpret it" (Stolze 2010: 145). As part of the reading process, the translator will recognise and understand textual aspects that provide meaning, such as specific metaphors, terminology, and other structural elements. The reader's role in meaning-making is expounded in Jean Boase-Beier's (2017) discussion of processes of interpretation and creativity in the translation of Paul Celan's Holocaust poetry. Viewing the reading process as both creative and cognitive, Boase-Beier argues that readers need to understand how linguistic, stylistic, and poetic forms in a text (such as repetitions) reflect the state of mind—or mind-style—that informed it and the author's poetics, as embodied in a poem's style and structure (Boase-Beier 2017: 60–64). Boase-Beier further notes that "Creative reading is always potentially analytical, open to the possibilities of the language of a poem, considering its poetic make-up, reflecting on one's own ways

of thinking and how they might change in response to the poem" (ibid.: 66).

Although the above-mentioned example deals with poetry, hermeneutical analysis can be applied to all text genres (Stolze 2011: 80). Research carried out within CTS has also found that words and structures can achieve cognitive effects in readers, evoke a particular atmosphere, and elicit emotional engagement and response (see various contributions in Schwieter/Ferreira 2017 and in Alves/Jakobsen 2020). However, despite the recognition that translators have to be able to recognise and feel, or sense, various stylistic phenomena (including aspects of sound and speech rhythm) in order to be able to make similar experiences available to a new set of readers, little attention has so far been paid in the hermeneutic and cognitive literatures to forms of literary expression that aim to appeal to and create the auditory sense more specifically (see Scott 2012/2015).[1] Before moving on to a fuller discussion of auditory aspects, however, it seems relevant to briefly review the increasing interest in issues of affect in Translation Studies.

3   The role of affect

The role that affect[2] plays in the practice of translation has been recognised for some time, particularly in the sphere of

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1   Though not specifically rooted in TH or CTS, Clive Scott's 2012/ 2015 monograph dedicates a couple of chapters to voice and rhythm in reading and to translating the acousticity of voice in poetry. This work will be referred to in a subsequent section.

2   In the scientific literature, the words "emotion" and "affect" have often been used interchangeably. Some authors, however, define "affect" as referring to free-floating feelings, whereas "emotion" is more specifically used to refer to feelings in response to a specific

literary translation (e.g., Robinson 1991). Indeed, professional literary translators have regularly written about their practice, reflecting on how translation processes elicit and enable the development of particular feelings, moods, and emotions. Feltrin-Morris (2012: 73) described the translator as "a skilful agent who pulls the strings of the text and the emotional chords of the readers in order to create a connection between the audience and the (invisible) author". Also highlighting the translator's role in recreating emotionally engaging literary texts, Gaddis Rose suggested that a translation may "flatten, intensify, focus or disperse the original" (Rose 2013: 26). She further observed that a loss of intensity from a source text to a target text would not necessarily be problematic for readers who interpret literary texts in unique ways determined by their own psycho-histories. As well as shedding light on issues of reader engagement and on the potential affective impact of linguistic and stylistic choices in translation, literary translators have thus long contributed valuable insights into various aspects of the translator's role and cognitive work when interpreting and (re)creating emotion-eliciting material for target readers.

In the last twenty years or so, scholarly interest in affective issues and their influence on translation has picked up speed, mirroring the growing focus on emotions in the field of psychology (e.g. Sander/Scherer 2009). The recent publication of two substantial monographs in translation studies solely dedicated to this topic (Hubscher-Davidson 2017; Koskinen 2020) attests to this increasing interest, as does the inclusion of emotional skills and competencies in several re-

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triggering event (Quigley et al. 2014). In this chapter, the terms are used interchangeably depending on the preference of quoted authors, and in alignment with scholars who choose not to differentiate so as to highlight the fluidity of conceptual boundaries (e.g. Ahmed 2004).

cent publications on what it takes to become a proficient translator (see for example Lehr 2021; Robinson [4]2020a; Rojo/Ramos-Caro 2018). Recent CTS studies on affective translation processes have expanded our understanding of the profound ways that emotions can influence the translation process and product, and shed light on what Wu calls "hermeneutical situations"—events where readers are expected to feel their way into the writer's intention and writers are expected to feel their way into readers' interpretations (see this volume, p. 118).

For example, in a study exploring the role of individual differences in translatorial decision-making involving affect, Hubscher-Davidson (2009, 2013) analysed the Think Aloud Protocols (TAPs) of postgraduate student translators and found that they experienced somatic and intuitive responses to the literary source text they were working on, for instance by verbalising and justifying so-called gut feelings about authorial intent and target reader interpretations. Parts of their bodies were also involved during the translation process, sometimes unconsciously: they laughed, frowned, or made hand gestures to visualise the flow of the Seine when searching for possible translation solutions. These various feeling-based and bodily responses were found to impact target text syntax and choices (e.g. Hubscher-Davidson 2013: 221).

Interestingly, these findings on affect, embodiment, and use of language can also be extended to other modes of translation. In an empirical study exploring the emotions experienced by subtitlers working on sensitive audiovisual material and the impact of these emotions on their subtitling performance, Perdikaki/Georgiou (2020) found that AV translators can have physical reactions to source material (e.g. crying, feeling nauseated), and that they will adapt their linguistic treatment of the translation in an effort to provide the target

viewer with perceived appropriate affective responses. While some translators were found to experience difficulties engaging with emotion-eliciting content and took longer than usual to essentially feel their way into the source author's intention, others mentally disengaged and rushed through their translations, resisting processes of immersion and interpretation that tend to characterize so-called stable hermeneutical situations.

While this recent work on affect in translation provides empirical evidence of what literary translators have long intuited, that is, that translation can "engage the senses in a physical manner" (Cole 2013: 11), that translators' understanding can be "overwhelmed by visual impressions appealing to their senses" (Stefanink and Bălăcescu 2018: 311) and that "intuition and sensual response are bolstered by [...] precision in reproduction" (Rose 2013: 15), it also revealed that there remains a long way to go in understanding the personal elements linked to translating various aspects of emotion and the complexities involved when translators are required to inhabit different affective realities.

4   Hearing the text's heartbeat

As previously hinted, the process of "feeling" and making sense of a literary text requires readers and translators to become immersed in a fictional world in order to comprehend it, a process made possible by a combination of cognitive and affective work. A reader's initial encounter with that world occurs through the materiality of the text, either through the eyes (seeing the written text during the act of reading), or through the ears (as an auditory rendition). Scott (2012/2015: 31) also highlights this initial dual encounter with the verbal and the visual: "the field of the textually possible is part-gen-

erated by the input of the paralinguistic, both verbal and visual. The verbal paralinguistic includes all elements of vocal input into a text: intonation, tempo, loudness, pausing, tone, degrees of stress. The visual [...] refers to all those visual cues and triggers—typeface, layout, letter shape, margins". In this article our focus is more specifically on the reader's encounter with—and perception of—the oral or auditory elements of Ocampo's text, sometimes called "literatura como pintura" (Klingenberg 2006: 251) or "verbal paintings" (France 2020: n.p.), though the visual and verbal are inextricably linked.

In literary texts, sounds are generally expressed as an imitation of acoustic structures, whether through the use of traditional elements of poetic phonetics and phonology, or through evoking (or having the potential to evoke) auditory responses in the reader, whereby the text relies on the auditory experience of the reader for its detection and interpretation (see Novák 2020). When reading, it has been mooted that auditory experiences can be felt in different parts of the body (Tarvainen 2018)[3] and that these experiences involve physical contact between the perceiver and the sounds which are experienced (Leighton 2018) thus rendering the relationship between the translator, reader, and the text a truly somatic experience (Robinson 1991). In addition, whether or not readers are consciously aware of the sounds heard and experienced when reading, it has been argued that our minds and bodies "are always at the centre of the event" (Breton 2017: 63). These findings further emphasize the links between affect, cognition, embodiment, and language.

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3   Tarvainen 2018 discusses how the neurobiological theory of the mirror neurons supports the concept of listening being a bodily-based intersubjective activity and the concept of proprioceptive listening or "listening with the whole body" in the studies of signing, music, soundscapes, and phenomenology.

Robinson (2020b), addressing the concept of translating for sound in relation to the Bible, cites Buber, who translated text in 'breath units', and Meschonnic, for whom the translation should be 'for the ear and the mouth, not for the eyes.' He concludes that:

> It's not enough just to translate the Bible as a verbal text; we have to redesign the text we find on the page by integrating it into a larger context as embodied/performed religious rhetoric. Performances involve how bodies move both outwardly in the world and inwardly in feelings, how time and space are mobilized for effect and how verbal text is actualized as acoustics (the sounds of phonemes, tonalities pitches, volumes, melodies, timbres, and so on). It matters how we design information in translating it. (Robinson 2020b: 164)

Also interested in the idea of translators designing the acoustics of a text, Bernofsky (2013: 229–30) insists that a translator should be able to "hear a text's heartbeat in the cadences of its phrases", and that the essence of a translation is to be found in its voice and in its rhythm. She explains that in her translation practice she often reads the texts aloud to herself because the eye may overlook problems that are detected by the ear (ibid.: 224). Stefanink/Bălăcescu (2018: 312) suggest that in translating literary texts creative solutions need to be "supported by *rhythm"*, given that some texts may appear first as rhythms, for their meaning to unfold later (see Bellesi 2002). Toolan also suggests that written stories are "incompletely appreciated if the sounds and rhythms of their language are not registered, along with any implied meanings those sounds prompt readers to derive" (Toolan 2016/2018: 250), and Scott (2012/2015: 111) argues that if it were not heard into rhythm, text would remain just a sequence of potential and unconfigured acoustic events. He claims that, as the voice inhabits the text, the succession of acoustic events involved acquires articulations and momentum, causing the rhythm itself to become multi-dimensional, involving intona-

tion, tempo, pausing, phonemic frequency, variation of stress intensities, etc. Furthermore, Scott insists that the acoustic signals emitted when we speak can differ from the perceptual experience of the listener (ibid.: 94–95) and that the type of listening needed to enhance the reader's perception of the literary—a requirement for "listening-to-translate" (ibid.: 92)—is something that can be re-learned, suggesting that reader-translators might teach themselves to listen to sounds (phonemes) as noises, as non-linguistic events capable of expressing emotion (ibid.: 97), a skill he considers essential for literary translators.[4]

The relevance of rhythm in translation has been researched by Bosseaux (2004, 2006) in her corpus study of Woolf's work involving several French translations of *The Waves*. Woolf's novel was constructed around the rhythm of waves breaking on a shore, and written 'to a rhythm, not to a plot' (Woolf 1978: 204). The study enabled the identification of linguistic features affecting point of view that contribute to recreating the waves' rhythmic movement in translation, e.g., deixis, modality, and transitivity. The reader-translator is encouraged to read and write with their ears, feel the text as if 'listening from the inside' (see Caracciolo 2014). Stefanink/ Bălăcescu (2018: 312) suggest that the appeal to the auditory sense of literary texts invites the reader to read it aloud, while Bosseaux notes that Woolf makes her characters speak to themselves formally and self-consciously, each taking up the position of a persona, and that they also appear to speak to the reader directly. To capture and recreate these important verbal components, the reader-translator clearly needs to be

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4   To experience a short rendition of the story read by the first author, visit Translators Aloud channel (https://www.youtube.com/watch? v=N_bIsRYVm3U&t=23s, recorded in May 2020).

actively involved and "oralise the written", as suggested by Scott (2012/2015: 107); also Meschonnic (2011) and addressed in Robinson (2014: 38–52).

Like Woolf, Ocampo experimented with her writing from a sensorial perspective: in her story "Okno, el esclavo" the reader is able to "feel" and "hear" the narrator's fears through the rhythm and tempo created by the representations of a dog's breaths as the plot progresses. In fact, due to the nature of Ocampo's writing, a reader considering the translation of the stories would do well to read aloud the texts, enabling sense making to emerge through both orality and rhythm.

It is thought that, when reading, most people are able to generate mental auditory images of voices or sounds, sometimes resembling a real experience of hearing (see Lima et al. 2015). Auditory imagery can convey the idea of the sound and kinaesthetic aspect of language use, including elements traditionally associated with prosody, such as:

- auditory features (e.g. pitch, intonation, timbre, loudness),
- imagery for nonverbal auditory stimuli (e.g. rhythm, melody, tempo, articulation, environmental sounds),
- imagery for verbal stimuli (e.g. speech, text, in dreams, interior monologue),
- a relationship to perception and memory (e.g. recall),
- individual differences in ability and occurrence (e.g. in vividness, music experience, synaesthesia) (see Hubbard 2010).

In an informative study by Shields (2011) on the importance of auditory images as sites of emotion and as initiators and carriers of meaning in translation, the researcher posits that auditory images provide access to ideas that can lead to, and

even create, logical and rational meaning (Shields 2011: 94). Shields discusses the synergies between auditory imagery and prosody (ibid.: 88–94), and further suggests that the emotional elements of a text are an important part of its meaning (ibid.: 105), implying that activating the auditory imagery embedded in the text becomes an essential tool in the hermeneutic process of understanding some intangible "essence" of the textuality available to the senses (see Stolze 2011: 105). Next, we introduce Ocampo's "Okno, el esclavo," and investigate the auditory imagery and soundscape identified in the text.

5   Analysing "Okno, el esclavo"

5.1 Context

"Okno, el esclavo" (Okno, the slave) is a short story from *Cornelia frente al Espejo*, first published by Tusquets in 1988. This was the last collection written by the author, produced while she was battling dementia, prior to her death in 1993. It is a story of transformation where a female narrator undergoes a metamorphosis into a dog. The narrator loses her human form and becomes an animal—an animal which we all hear at the start of the story, running back and forth in the apartment above, panting and breathing heavily, possibly chained; an animal which will jump into an abyss at the end of the story and become liberated, following its master.

The narrative surrounding the metamorphosis of Okno is particularly tense and dense due to the narrator's continuous existential questioning (Izaguirre Fernandez 2017: 233), thus requiring cognitive effort to understand the text and the numerous sounds elicited. The story was chosen for analysis due to its focus on the auditory and the presence of sound

cues and representations that provide unique insights into the author's auditory palette and cognitions, and because of the unique challenges it poses for the translator.

5.2 Methodology

In order to shed light on the sound sensations and soundscape embedded in the text, sound perceptions were analysed in "Okno, el esclavo" through a combination of close reading (including close listening)[5] and corpus tools analysis. This approach entailed identifying auditory imagery including linguistic and metalinguistic features such as: repetition of phonemes (e.g., Toolan 2016/2018; Gibbons/Whiteley 2018; Scott 2012/2015; for the particle "no" including negation see e.g., Stockwell [2]2020; Gibbons and Whiteley 2018; Nahajec 2012), and of terms representing sounds and sound effects (e.g., Toolan 2016/2018; Caracciolo 2014), etc., all of which contribute to the creation of the rhythm and soundscape of the story. Close reading was complemented by computer-aided qualitative data analysis software (NVIVO and VoyantTools[6]) used to provide textual visualisation of the da-

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5   It should be noted that the close reading and close listening advocated in this study are phenomenologically oriented, in line with Merleau-Ponty's (1961/2014) translation of the phenomenology of reading. Close reading is concerned with the sensorial perceptions of the reader, which it aims to capture. Although Merleau-Ponty does not seem overly concerned with rhythm, or with the relationship between the written and the spoken (see Scott 2012/2015: 2), the role of translators is critical in feeling and sensing the text so that they can enable that experience to be reproduced in translation, in this case, the recreation of the auditory experiences.

6   See <https://www.qsrinternational.com/nvivo-qualitative-data-analysis-software/home> and <https://voyant-tools.org/> respectively for details of the software.

ta, to capture and code auditory perceptions, and to detect stylistic and textual characteristics which might escape close reading only (see Youdale 2020 for the translation of literary style using close and distant reading; also Saldanha 2011 and Bosseaux 2006 for insights into translation and the translator's style using corpus-based analysis). It should be noted, however, that different readers have different experiences, as physical recognition and expressivity are not universal and vary between cultures, histories, conventions, and expectations (Bassnett 1998: 107). As such, these subjective factors inevitably also guided the researcher's experience and interaction with the text and interpretation of data.

Given space limitations, only the most salient or significant auditory features are discussed below. In this context, saliency refers to those elements in the text that can be made more appealing in order to draw the readers' attention, that is, frequency and significance, a criterion adapted from Toolan's parameters of narrative prospection in the short story (see Toolan 2016/2018: 35–36).

Since to to our knowledge no published translation of the ST currently exists, the translations of extracts used in the next section were produced by the first author of the present essay for illustration and comparison purposes.

5.3 Results and discussion

The source text analysed in this study consists of 1758 words, 11 paragraphs (labelled "segments" in VoyantTools) and has 675 unique word forms. The auditory features selected for discussion, as sound cues, include the repeated phonemes "mi", "me" and "no", and the representation of terms associated with breathing, e.g. forms of "respiración" and "jadear", which together serve to give shape to the story's

soundscape. A summary of the data on sound devices is illustrated in Table 1, and a breakdown of these cues by paragraph is featured in Table 2.

Sound cues	Occurrence/terms	Total
Repeated phonemes	"mi"	33
	"no"	32
	"me"	24
Terms expressing breath/breathing sounds	respir* jadea* (forms of breathing)	13
Total		102

Table 1: Sound cues in "Okno, el esclavo"

Paragraph	Mi	No	Me	Breath	Total
1	7	2	1	0	10
2	1	2	0	6	9
3	0	0	1	2	3
4	2	4	2	1	9
5	0	5	0	0	5
6	1	2	0	0	3
7	5	2	2	2	11
8	2	3	4	0	9
9	7	2	5	1	15
10	1	6	5	0	12
11	7	4	4	1	16
Total	33	32	24	13	102

Table 2: Breakdown of occurrences of sound cues by paragraph

From Table 1 it can be gleaned that the most salient sound cues identified in this text include a significant level of repetition: a repetition of phonemes (mi, me, no), and other terms representing the sounds made by an animal's breath repeated in auditorily significant ways, totalling 102 instances across this short text. Table 2 shows that all paragraphs in "Okno, el esclavo" contain auditory representations as sound cues

and that most paragraphs except 5 contain more than one kind. This level of repetition of auditory features in a short story is likely to have a significant impact on the reading experience, as we will explore with some examples in the next sections.

5.3.1 Repeated phonemes: a humming noise

The story begins in the first person and very quickly unveils the precarious psychological state of the narrator. Indeed, the narrator's voice displays fear from the outset, an effect which resonates throughout the story as the repetition of phonemes:

> **Example 1:**
>
> **Mi mi**edo, cuando es **mí**o, **me** inti**mi**da. De noche preparo **mi** terror futuro de la aurora, apago las luces. Estoy en **mi** sala de trabajo. […] Yo alzo la **mi**rada para recobrar **mi** tranquilidad. El **mi**edo perturba los sentidos y la perspectiva. (Ocampo 1988/⁴2014:411)
>
> [**My** fear—**my mi**sery—when it is **m**ine, inti**mi**dates **me**. At night I prepare **my**self for the terrors that will come with the dawn, I turn off the lights. I am in **my** office. […] I raise **my** gaze to recover **my** peace of **mi**nd. Fear perturbs the senses and perspective.]

In this example, the repeated sound effect achieved through alliteration and consonance, is apparent with the repetition of the bilabial [m] and the vowels [i] and [e].[7] The repetition of the phonemes, if read aloud, resonates in the reader's lips and body auditorily and kinaesthetically. The raw frequency of the phonemes[mi] and [me] plotted across all paragraphs of the ST is illustrated in Figure 1.

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7   Other auditory repetitions are also present e.g., per- (-turba/-spective) but these are not highlighted or illustrated as indicated in 4.2.

Figure 1: Frequency of the phonemes [mi] and [me]in the ST

This visualisation reveals that the phoneme [mi] occurs 33 times in the course of eleven paragraphs but it is more prevalent both in paragraph 1 and towards the end, in paragraphs 9–11, as is phoneme [me], occurring 24 times, with their repetition reaching a hectic pitch at the point where the physical transformation into an animal is complete, namely, in paragraph 11. This final paragraph also brings the reader back to the opening statement '*el miedo, cuando es mío, me intimida'*, recursively. The story progresses by means of these repetitions, and the echo and resonance thus created provides an important clue for the reading in one's head or aloud. The density and pace of the occurrences follow the narrative of transformation that takes place: the [mi] and [me] mirror the reflexive and mimetic quality of the first-person narrator undergoing a metamorphosis from human to animal, generating mental auditory imagery which includes verbal and nonverbal stimuli (Lima et al. 2015).

As the reader-translator hears and verbalises the repeated phoneme, they experience somatic and intuitive responses which may impact the choices they subsequently make in their own translations (Hubscher-Davidson 2009 and 2013 discusses this phenomenon in the context of Think Aloud

Protocols). The prosodic properties of language used to enhance a text have been discussed by Gibbons and Whiteley, who recommend that it is key not to interpret sounds or devices as indicative of something specific, but rather as sound patterning that reflects a broader narrative context (see Gibbons/Whiteley 2018: 39). In this instance, the recursive and affective nature of the repeated phonemes contribute to the story's overall meaning and effect, effectively embodying the notion of a hermeneutic circle as explained by Piecychna (2015), whereby new information is continuously fed into readers' knowledge base via specific (auditory) stylistic effects that enable them to understand the whole message on the basis of its constituent parts. As Stolze (2011: 82) notes, "it is a holistic affair, not one of construction out of particles."

5.3.2. Repeated "no": A sign of helplessness

"Okno, el esclavo" contains the particle "no" in every paragraph (as evidenced in Table 2 and Figure 2), and the cumulative effect of the repetition of "no" is amplified as the story progresses.

Example 1:

El ruido cambió de ritmo. Es un ruido femenino, de trapo de piso que pasa sobre la madera; apenas se oye. Un ruido de perro puede compararse a un ruido vegetal? A la planta la conozco. Es una planta lujosa, del primer piso. Por las mañanas la veo porque la colocan sobre las baldosas del patio, pero **no** quiere estar al sol. Su manía es el tiempo. **No** quiere que la rieguen, **no** quiere el sol. Yo, en la semioscuridad del cuarto, adivino las formas que me rodea. Me ha crecido una pata. Respiro como el perro. Preferiría ser planta. (Ocampo 1988/⁴2014: 421)

[The noise changes rhythm. It is a feminine sound, a floor cloth on wood; one can hardly hear it. Can the sound of a dog be compared to the sound of a plant? I recognise that plant. It's a luxurious plant,

from the first floor. In the mornings I see it because they place it on the paving of the patio, but the plant **doesn't want** to be in the sun. It is obsessed by the weather. It **doesn't want** to be watered; it **doesn't want** the sun. In the semi-darkness of the room, I try to guess the shapes that surround me. I have grown a leg. I am breathing like that dog. But I would rather be a plant.]

In this extract, the reader is told about all the things a plant from the first floor does not want to do or be: it does not want to be in the sun, it does not want to be watered. This is a clear illustration of Ocampo's use of repeated negation, exemplified here with the negative particle "no", which is prevalent and through rhythmic repetition and the kinaesthetically embodied effect created can also be said to contribute to the negative tone of the passage. Figure 2 shows the frequency and distribution of no-morphemes across the narration, reaching a climax towards the end.

Figure 2: Frequency of term [no]

The presence of the particle "no" in each paragraph serves to enhance the negativity experienced by the narrator and transmitted to the reader, affecting their cognitive and emotional load. From a cognitive perspective, negation is recognised as a foregrounding device that can make certain aspects of a text more prominent (see Stockwell [2]2020; Gibbons/Whiteley 2018; Nahajec 2012). It could be argued that, in this story, the significant presence of negation in all its manifestations and

the rhythm generated with each occurrence, together contribute to the creation of an atmosphere of helplessness, as they foreground the very things they negate—in this case, life essentials like water and heat.

This finding echoes Boase-Beier's point that linguistic and stylistic forms in a text can reflect the mind-style of the author, whose work has been described as distorted, cruel, and obsessional (Power 2015, King 1986, Balderston 1983). The reader-translator can experience feelings of discomfort and overwhelm upon encountering these effects in the short story, something which is likely to impact the stability of the hermeneutical situation. Indeed, for the reader-translator to be able to feel his or her way into the writer's intention in this case would undoubtedly require the kind of heightened cognitive and hermeneutic effort that Hermans (2019) alluded to.

5.3.3 The rhythm of the breath

A dog, the main non-human character in "Okno, el esclavo", becomes known to the narrator in the second paragraph by the sounds and noises it makes: the dog is restless; it paces up and down; its breath can be heard everywhere:

Example 2:

En el primer piso, un perro grande corre o más bien descansa de sus correrías. Oigo su **respiración** anhelante, apenas interrumpida por segundos. Un perro se repone mejor que un hombre cuando ha corrido. Unos minutos bastan para descansar. Vuelve a repartir su **respiración** por los cuartos, recorre un largo trecho, casi hasta el fondo de la casa, si la casa tiene fondo, y vuelve sobre sus pasos, **jadeante**, y apura el ritmo de su **respiración**. No es un hombre. Yo diría que el perro podría morir si sigue **respirando** en esa forma. (Un hombre también). Sin embargo, sigue devorando el espacio con su **respiración**. Nadie quiere a ese perro. ¿Qué trabajos le hacen hacer? Oigo un ruido de maderas que se entrechocan y luego algo más duro, que se deposita en el suelo. Una caja, tal vez; después otra. De nuevo la

respiración del perro, que vuelve de la plaza, que ha corrido y **respira** sin remisión. (Ocampo 1988/⁴2014: 411)

[On the first floor a big dog runs, or rather rests after his run. I can hear his eager **breath** barely interrupted by the passing of each second. Dogs recover faster than men after running. A few minutes are enough to be rested. He continues to scatter his **breaths** through the rooms. He walks a long way, almost to the end of the house, if the house has an end, and then he retraces his steps, panting, and the rhythm of his **breathing** gets faster. He is not a man. I would say a dog could die if he carries on **breathing** that way. (A man could too.) However, he carries on devouring air with each breath. Nobody loves that dog. What are they making him do? I hear a noise of wood bashing and then something harder, something is dropped on the floor. A box, perhaps; then another. And that dog **breathing** again, getting back from a run in the square and **breathing** without pause.]

The concentration of occurrences of terms representing the kinaesthetic auditory imagery of breath and breathing in Example 3, and exemplified in Figure 3, serves to illustrate what is happening in the text. There is an initial tension, marking the awareness of the presence of the animal by the sounds it makes, as the narrator imagines the tasks and suffering it must be enduring; subsequently, the concentration of occurrences diminishes as the transformation is completed. The story reaches its conclusion when the narrator, now embodied as a dog, is no longer struggling and seems accepting of its fate.

Figure 3: Frequency of terms expressing breaths (respir*, jadea*) in the ST

In terms of breath terms, and the breath sounds made by the animal, the rhythm of breathing and panting reaches its peak in paragraph 2, and then peters out. The changing frequency of instances (and dispersion) of breathing and panting has the effect of calling the readers' attention to their own breath pattern and sounds, activating thereby a mirror-neuron simulation of breathing in the reader (see Tarvainen 2018) as an internal embodied experience serving to heighten the emotional impact of the narrator's tale. There is a kind of somatic self-awareness called forth by the text: in addition to hearing the text's heartbeat in the cadence of its phrases, as Bernofsky (2013) noted, the reader is also made to feel their own rhythmical pulsations and vibrations (see Robinson 2012: 94–95).

Not only does this finding add weight to scholars' observations that rhythm is a key feature in literary texts for immersion and meaning-making (Scott 2012/2015, Stefanink/ Bălăcescu 2018, Toolan 2016/2018), we might also venture that reader-translators are not only made to listen to and feel the character's experience 'from the inside', as Caracciolo (2014) argues, but also to sense—and make sense of—their own bodily responses to this external input (also see Robinson 2012). Rhythm here is a device eliciting the kind of (meta)

cognitive and affective effects in readers that CTS scholars have often discussed (e.g. Angelone 2010), and it serves to highlight the intimate role and involvement of the reader-translator, who is not simply perceiving or recreating sound-scapes for readers of other languages, but also experiencing these on a deeply personal level.

5.4 A holistic view of Ocampo's soundscapes

Figure 4 represents the combinaton of the sound cues we previously discussed. Illustrating these together provides an overview of the aggregated sound representations over the course of the 11 paragraphs forming the short story. This visualisation makes it clear that the earlier and later paragraphs contain the most auditory devices, giving an insight into the story's soundscape as if viewed from a "distance". The visual representations shown in Fig.1–4 can be treated as if they were music scores in the sense of marked scripts (as discussed by Robinson 2012: 79) for the rhythmic, tonal, and kinetic/ kinaesthetic features used to help the translator foreground auditory cues, in readiness for their translation work (see Scott 2012/2015). This means that the frequency of a particle, shown in its paragraph location in the visualizations, hints not only at rhythm but at vocalization and gesturing, both of which are required in the performance of the text; the absence of a feature could be read as a silence or pause, and each occurrence of a specific sound cue is perceived as marking the beat of the story. Overall, the combination of features, reinforced by the lexical choices which we have identified through close reading, contributes to the gradual build-up of a haunting tone which develops with each and every instance of repeated sound effects.

Figure 4: Combination of the sound cues
contributing to the story's soundscape

The close reading and computer-aided analysis performed on the text revealed, as we have seen, the presence of a number of specific acoustic/auditory features in Ocampo's short story, manifested textually as salient characteristics that provoke sound sensations such as the repetition of [mi], [me], [no] and terms associated with breath and breathing sounds. The story is so replete with auditory images that reading it almost seems to require the reader to close their eyes and listen and breathe instead, in order that sensorial and kinaesthetic modalities other than sight may come to the fore. This allows us to rely on orality and aurality (e.g., Bernofsky 2013), including kinaesthesia (e.g. Scott 2012/2015; Robinson 2012) and the mirror-neuron simulation of breathing (e.g., Tarvainen 2018) for clues to understanding.

The graphic and textual visualisations of the auditory imagery and markers (Figures 1, 2, 3 and Examples 1, 2, 3)

served a dual purpose: to showcase the frequency as well as the position of the sound cues in the text. This would tend to predispose a potential future translator, as an engaged reader (Stolze 2010: 145), to identify through distant reading the relative location of the acoustic elements in the text which combine to produce a space for the story sounds (Novák 2020; Youdale 2020). Together, these auditory images and their physical location in the text serve as sites of high emotional involvement (Toolan 2016/2018), carry specific meanings, contribute to the creation of the text's soundscape, and generate useful clues for anyone who may be brave enough to undertake the daunting task of translating Ocampo's work.

6   Conclusion

In this article, we set out to explore the emotion-eliciting auditory aspects in Ocampo's "Okno, el esclavo". Salient characteristics of the text and the reading process that provoke sound sensations were discussed. The aim of the research was to achieve a deeper understanding of the translator's cognitive and affective task when (re)interpreting the soundscape of Ocampo's atmospheric worlds.

When reading the short story, we would argue that the accretion of sound repetitions gives a real impression of the senses being assaulted by the narrator, of literally hearing someone voicing the same thing over and over again, arousing imaginative auditory constructs in readers' minds, and activating a kind of 'reflected subjectivity' in the reader (Stolze 2011: 105) alongside sensory sensitivity. The narrative intensity is increased and meaning established with these devices. Like Scott (2012/2015), we thus feel that voice needs to be properly assimilated into the process of reading and translation. His argument in relation to poetry, that "the real ques-

tion is not how to speak the written, recite the written, but how to introduce the spoken into the written, how to oralise the written" (Scott 2012/2015: 107; see also Meschonnic 2011 and Robinson 2014: 38–52), could easily be extended to Ocampo's short stories, where the vocal potentiality of language is a significant consideration. Repeated patterns help to create literary rhythm, and by linking the breath's interoceptive rhythm to its affective significance, Ocampo's story maximizes the rhythmic nature of our encounters with narrative, bringing that narrative into consciousness. Additional research is therefore necessary regarding what Robinson (2020a) calls the translational implications of sensory channels through which we experience the world, as oralising the written may not come naturally to all would-be literary translators.

An important reason why attention needs to be paid to sensorial representations in literary material, such as those in Ocampo's work, is that the act of reading (and hearing) deeply affects us. In line with the affective turn in CTS, the present analysis provides additional evidence that reader-translators have to process complex feelings and that translation decisions are imbued with affect.[8] The adoption of a hermeneutic lens to analyse auditory aspects in Ocampo's work has led us to conclude that reader-translators need to be able to engage emotionally in order to do this story justice. They need to make the story their own, inhabiting its fully embodied world and in individual ways, so as to understand and design (the acoustics of) a translation that embodies their mindstyle (Boase-Beier 2017) and psycho-histories (Gaddis Rose

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8   Incidentally, these findings point to the possibilities of further investigating affect in multimodal contexts and as a multimodal practice, something which remains under-researched in TS.

2012)—just as the original text reflected the source author's state of mind and affective reality. To create 'verbal art', translators have to embrace the chaos and discomfort and, from it, create a painting that resonates from within.

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The Affordances of the Translator

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Abstract: This article explores affordance-theoretical readings of Walter Benjamin's "Task of the Translator," looking first at Aleksei Procyshyn's mobilization of Anthony Chemero's "radical embodied cognitive science" approach to affordances, in which, as Procyshyn summarizes it, "language use is an enactive process of meaning creation, which affords an appropriately situated and capable agent specific potentials for further action." A closer look shows not only that Procyshyn has not drawn on the full potential of Chemero's theorization, but that Chemero himself has not developed a 4EA-cogsci affordance theory fully—and that the application of affordance theory to Benjamin ultimately doesn't work without a complex reframing of both Benjamin and affordance theory. Specifically, toward the end of Benjamin's essay he moves toward a more personalized understanding of human translators as situated agents—notably Friedrich Hölderlin, but also Martin Luther, Johann Heinrich Voß, A. W. Schlegel, and Stefan George—and another pass through Wilhelm Dilthey's hermeneutical theory of the *Zusammenhang des Lebens* ("nexus/intertwining of life"), which Benjamin invokes by name, helps flesh out both an affordance theory of translation and an extended application to Hölderlin's Sophocles translations. The historical chain from Dilthey through Husserl and Merleau-Ponty to Varela, Thompson, and Rosch's *The Embodied Mind* ties hermeneutics, phenomenology, and 4EA cognitive science together under the rubric of the affordances of the translator.

1 Introduction

The title of this paper reflects Aleksei Procyshyn's 2014 claim that "[Walter] Benjamin's philosophy of language comes astonishingly close to contemporary affordance theories of meaning" (Procyshyn 2014: 368); his interesting reading of several early works by Benjamin culminates in a longish quotation from the 1923 essay "Die Aufgabe des Übersetzers," better known in English as "The Task of the Translator," in which Benjamin does indeed, at least in passing, seem to be adumbrating an affordance theory of *die Übersetzbarkeit* "translatability." There are problems with Procyshyn's reading, but with some tweaks I believe it can provide a springboard for a useful exploration of the convergences between the cognitive study of translation in terms of affordances and Wilhelm Dilthey's hermeneutical theory of the *Zusammenhang des Lebens* ("intertwining of life") which Benjamin also invokes in the "Aufgabe." Let's see how that works.

2 Reading Benjamin's -abilities as Affordances

2.1 Weber on Benjamin's -abilities

In 2008 Samuel Weber published a book cleverly titled *Benjamin's -abilities*, dealing with the many abstract adjectives Walter Benjamin used ending with the suffix *-bar* ("-able") and their noun forms ending in *-barkeit* ("-ability"): *übersetzbar* ("translatable") and *Übersetzbarkeit* ("translatability"), *mitteilbar* ("communicable") or "mediable" and *Mitteilbarkeit* ("communicability" or "mediability"), *kritisierbar* ("criticizable") and *Kritisierbarkeit* ("criticizability"), *reproduzierbar* ("reproducible") and *Repro-*

duzierbarkeit ("reproducibility"), and so on. In his introduction to the book Weber reports that his early interest in these terms in Benjamin was intensified by his experience translating Jacques Derrida's crushing 100-page retort to John Searle's would-be "correction" of Derrida's deconstruction of J.L. Austin's performativity with the notion of *iterability*:

> If one admits that writing (and the mark in general) *must be able* to function in the absence of the sender, the receiver, the context of production etc., this implies that this power, this *being able*, this *possibility* is *always* inscribed, hence *necessarily* inscribed *as possibility* in the functioning or the functional structure of the mark […] It follows that this possibility is a *necessary* part of its structure […] Inasmuch as it is essential and structural, this possibility is always at work marking *all the facts*, all the events, even those that appear to disguise it. *Just as iterability, which is not iteration*, can be recognized even in a mark that *in fact* seems to have occurred only once. I say *seems*, because this one time is in itself divided or multiplied in advance by its structure of repeatability. (Weber 1988: 48; quoted in Weber 2008: 5–6; Weber 2008's emphasis)

That "power or potentiality to repeat or be repeated," Weber observes, which (*pace* Searle) "is not the same as repetition" (2008: 6), is very similar to what Benjamin means by his "-abilities." Derrida's iterability, like the Benjaminian -abilities that Weber isolates for study, maps out "a structural possibility that is potentially 'at work' even there where it seems factually not to have occurred" (ibid.: 6). In affordance-theoretical terms, as we'll see, this effectively defines iterability as the "power or potentiality to repeat or be repeated" *in the (performative) environment alone*, even if no "animal" (human actant) ever repeats anything: an environmental affordance that need never afford actual performative iterations to actual humans. As we'll also see, this Derridean proto-affordance theory anticipates Procychyn's affordance-theoretical reading of Benjamin as well.

The other point to note vis-à-vis Procychyn's reading is that Weber's Derrida-influenced take on Benjamin is grounded not only in morphology but in the philosophy of mind/cognitive science, in terms of both *mental repetition and comparison* ("A 'mark' can be identified, which is to say, apprehended as such, only by virtue of its being repeated, at least mentally, and compared to its earlier occurrence," Weber 2008: 6) and *identity* ("Memory and repetition are thus constitutive elements of identity, which depends on iterability—that is to say, on the ability of any event to be iterated, repeated," ibid.).

Weber's exploration of Benjamin's -abilities tracks nearly the entire quarter century during which Benjamin was writing and publishing: from "Über Sprache überhaupt und über die Sprache des Menschen" (Benjamin 1916/1991) ("On Language as Such and on the Language of Man," transl. Jephcott 1978/1986) through his doctoral dissertation, defended in 1919 and published in 1920(/1980), *Der Begriff der Kunstkritik in der deutschen Romantik* ("The Concept of Art Criticism in German Romanticism," transl. Lachterman 1996), and the essay on translation that he wrote in 1921 and published as a preface to his translation of Baudelaire in 1923, "Die Aufgabe des Übersetzers" ("The Task of the Translator"), to his 1935 (/1980) essay "Das Kunstwerk im Zeitalter seiner technischen Reproduzierbarkeit" ("The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction," transl. Zohn 1968/2007), but also in the notes for the Arcades Project. I will focus here, however, solely on "Die Aufgabe des Übersetzers"/"The Task of the Translator," with reference in English to the paraphrases in my commentary (Robinson 2023c).

2.2 Theorizing Benjamin's -abilities as Affordances

In "Walter Benjamin's Philosophy of Language" Aleksei Procyshyn (2014) notes Weber's monograph, but takes distance from it: "Samuel Weber dedicated a whole book to *Benjamin's -abilities* (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2008), but failed to notice their affordance character. He overlooked the dispositional nature of Benjamin's argument, relying instead on Derrida's discussion of 'iterability.' Although illuminating, Weber's account remained unfortunately at the grammatical level of Benjamin's text" (381n19). While I find that negative assessment a bit extreme—as we've just seen, even in the introduction Weber engages the philosophical complexities of Benjamin's thought at a level far deeper than the grammatical—it's true both that Weber never expands his reading into the productive realm of affordances and that Procyshyn pushes Benjamin's -abilities to a whole new level of philosophical complexity, using Anthony Chemero's (2009) radical rethinking and reframing of the pioneering ecological psychological work Gibson (1979) did on affordances and the rich literature that has engaged Gibson's work since. As Procyshyn puts it,

> Benjamin's philosophy of language comes astonishingly close to contemporary affordance theories of meaning, with which it shares a view of meaning as a relational and agent-relative feature of an environment that can be apprehended directly—i.e. without discursive mediation. On this view, language use is an enactive process of meaning creation, which affords an appropriately situated and capable agent specific potentials for further action. (Procyshyn 2014: 368)

This is an extraordinarily fruitful addition to Benjamin studies, and Procyshyn is a philosopher whose nuanced engagement with Benjamin's early thought does bear abundant fruit. My brief in this section, however, is that Procyshyn's take on Benjamin's affordances has an Achilles' heel: that the "appropriately situated and capable agent" that is supposedly afford-

ed "specific potentials for further action" never quite puts in an appearance in his reading. This absence—which, as we saw in the previous section, haunts Derrida's deconstruction of Austin as well—is especially evident when Procyshyn (2014: 377) quotes the passage from the third paragraph of Benjamin's "Aufgabe" that most clearly spells out the affordance-theoretical resonances of what Benjamin calls *die Übersetzbarkeit* "translatability":

> Die Frage nach der Übersetzbarkeit eines Werkes ist doppelsinnig. Sie kann bedeuten: ob es unter der Gesamtheit seiner Leser je seinen zulänglichen Übersetzer finden werde? oder, und eigentlicher: ob es seinem Wesen nach Übersetzung zulasse und demnach — der Bedeutung dieser Form gemäß — auch verlange. [*Procyshyn's first ellipsis*] Nur das oberflächliche Denken wird, indem es den selbständigen Sinn der letzten leugnet, beide für gleichbedeutend erklären. Ihm gegenüber ist darauf hinzuweisen, daß gewisse Relationsbegriffe ihren guten, ja vielleicht besten Sinn behalten, wenn sie nicht von vorne herein ausschließlich auf den Menschen bezogen werden. So dürfte von einem unvergeßlichen Leben oder Augenblick gesprochen werden, auch wenn alle Menschen sie vergessen hätten. [*Procyshyn's second ellipsis*] Denn es gilt der Satz: Wenn Übersetzung eine Form ist, so muß Übersetzbarkeit gewissen Werken wesentlich sein. (Benjamin 1923/1972: 10)

> A work can be translatable in either of two senses: whether among all of its readers a translator able to translate it is ever found, or, more authentically, whether its essence allows it to be translated and its form demands that it be translated. [*Procyshyn's first ellipsis*] Only the superficial thinker will deny the independence of the latter and claim that both come to the same thing. Certain relational concepts are best served by pulling back from an exclusive focus on human beings. Even if a life or a moment had been forgotten by every living human, it could still be considered forgettable if its Essence demanded that it be remembered. [*Procyshyn's second ellipsis*] For the dictum applies: If translation is a Form, it follows that the translatability of certain works must be part of their essence. (Transl. Robinson 2023c: 25–26, 28, 30, 32)

The first thing to note there is that Procyshyn has quoted se-
lectively: his two ellipses leap strategically over critical points
that would have problematized his claims. But let's come
back to those two elisions in a moment, and begin with a look
at his summary of that passage:

> Benjamin's characterization of "translatability" (*Übersetzbarkeit*) is,
> with one word, dispositional: it is relational, context-dependent, and
> involves some kind of stimulus or interaction that makes a distinct
> phenomenon manifest. Some texts thus *afford* translation, and the
> normative or practical attitudes we hold with respect to these envi-
> ronmentally situated affordances allow us to better specify what
> Benjamin has in mind when he invokes "mimesis." (Procyshyn
> 2014: 377; his emphasis)

The problem there is "Some texts thus *afford* translation." Af-
ford it *to whom*? Or rather, in terms of the "relationality" that
Procyshyn follows Anthony Chemero in claiming for the real
existence of any affordance, "Some texts thus afford transla-
tion" *in relation to their reading by whom*? For Procyshyn the texts
are the "environments" or "niches" in relation to which "ap-
propriately situated and capable agent[s]" are afforded "spe-
cific potentials for further action"—but in his reading of Ben-
jamin, the agents have vanished, or else never existed in the
first place. As he adds on the next page, "a translatable text
bears within itself a transformative potential (as yet un-
schematized) that can be made manifest" (Procyshyn 2014:
378). That "translatable text" is again the environment and
that "transformative potential (as yet unschematized) that can
be made manifest" is the affordance; but if there are agents
"appropriately situated and capable" of responding to it, they
are shadowy beings not only obscured by Procyshyn's non-
specific passive voice ("made manifest" *to whom*?) but, to the
extent that they ever do come to exist, "selected" and shaped
by the "potential." (As we'll see in the next section, this would
seem to make the affordance-theoretical model Procyshyn

adopts not the disposition model, as he claims, but the re-source model.)

True, in that passage from Benjamin we do have one agent, or the potential existence of one: "whether among all of its readers a translator able to translate it is ever found." But Procyshyn doesn't seem interested in that agent; nor, for that matter, does Benjamin himself. For Benjamin it is "more authentic" to care "whether its essence allows it to be trans-lated and its form demands that it be translated"—and the passive voice in "be translated" is even less forthcoming in regard to possible translating agents than the possibility that "a translator able to translate it" might some day be found.

And this is where Procyshyn's ellipses matter. The sen-tence elided in the first is: *Grundsätzlich ist die erste Frage nur problematisch, die zweite apodiktisch zu entscheiden* (Benjamin 1923/ 1972: 10) ("Answering the first question is problematic; an-swering the second is apodictic," transl. Robinson 2023c: 26). This obviously consigns the agentizing search for a human translator to the scrap-heap of "an exclusive focus on human beings" and elevates the passivizing embrace of transcenden-tal forms and essences to the realm of absolute theological certainty. In the sentence elided in the second ellipsis, the "apodictic" follow-up to "pulling back" from that focus on humans becomes an explicit shift to the divine:

> Wenn nämlich deren Wesen es forderte, nicht vergessen zu werden, so würde jenes Prädikat nichts Falsches, sondern nur eine Forde-rung, der Menschen nicht entsprechen, und zugleich auch wohl den Verweis auf einen Bereich enthalten, in dem ihr entsprochen wäre: auf ein Gedenken Gottes. (Benjamin 1923/1972: 10)

> If its essence required that it not be forgotten, the predicate would not be false, but only a demand to which humans had been unable to respond, and also a reference to a realm in which it would be ful-filled, namely God's memory. (Transl. Robinson 2023c: 30)

There's the other potential agent: God. Just as God's memory could interact relationally with the "essential" unforgettability of the person whom all humans had forgotten, so too could God's translation skills interact relationally with the "essential" translatability of the literary classic which no human had proved able to translate. So in Benjamin the answer to the question I posed above—if "Some texts thus *afford* translation," to whom do they afford it?—is double: either the human translator (but that's problematic) or, apodictally, which is to say with absolute unquestioning certainty, and therefore *eigentlicher* "more authentically," the divine translator.

Read this way, Benjamin's "Aufgabe" seems an unlikely candidate for an affordance-theoretical application. The idea that the universalized God of Israel might be an "appropriately situated and capable agent" afforded "specific potentials for further action" in relation to a specific environmental niche seems a stretch. A Greek or Roman god, maybe (Hermes/Mercury?); an animistic spirit, more feasibly (the dryads?); but not a universal Creator God who "remembers" and "translates" infallibly because he (emphatically not she) stands outside the limitations of human social action. The Kabbalists' Ein Sof or "The Infinite," which many Benjamin scholars have seen him invoking in referring to the reassembly of the broken vessel (Benjamin 1923/1972: 18; transl. Robinson 2023c: 136–40), would not only be definitively beyond the affordance pale; it would be incapable of an anthropomorphic act like remembering or translating. In the Kabbala such acts might be performed by one or another of the ten divine emanations, among whom there is indeed one female (the tenth)—but as deities they still seem unlikely candidates for environmental affordances.

This shifting of focus from the human to the divine, and more generally to the transcendental, which does seem to

eviscerate an affordance-theoretical reading, is widely recognized as the truest thrust of Benjamin's essay. Antoine Berman (2008/2018: 40) in fact argues that the title of Benjamin's essay is a misnomer: it's not really about the task of the *translator*. "This is a text," he writes, "that is more preoccupied with translation than with the translator. We could perfectly well replace each occurrence of the word 'translator' with the word 'translation'." The word *Übersetzer* "translator" appears 20 times in the essay—one of those in the title—and according to Berman in not one of those cases does Benjamin specify what the translator must do to carry out his or her responsibility adequately. The ostensible task of the translator in every case is reportedly to achieve a mystical transformation of the source and target languages that no human translator could ever possibly *set out* to achieve. Hans Vermeer (1996), noting the same tendency in the essay, calls it "utopian" thinking. In Berman's and Vermeer's readings it is *translation* that achieves the mystical transformation to "pure language," whether the translator wills it or not, and whether the translator is aware of participating in it or not. But actually the transformation is not exactly achieved by translation either, as if that transformation were the *task* of translation; it is simply (or complexly) a kind of inevitable byproduct of translation. It is just sort of what happens when translation takes place. According to Berman there is no task, really. And according to Paul de Man (1986), the title doesn't even promise a "task": he argues that by *die Aufgabe* Benjamin actually meant "giving up." That is, after all, what the word means morphologically, and how it is used in certain contexts. Drawing our attention to Benjamin's self-admitted failure as a practical translator himself, of Baudelaire and Proust, de Man notes that in the normative understanding of the work the translator fails *by definition*: "The translator can never do

what the original text did. Any translation is always second in relation to the original, and the translator as such is lost from the very beginning" (de Man 1986: 20). The translator's ostensible "task" is to give up.

In this reading, what the human translator is "afforded" is a recipe for abject humiliation and failure. Perhaps, therefore, Samuel Weber's deconstructive approach to Benjamin's -abilities was really the more trenchant one? Perhaps it is more useful to track (un)translatability and (im)mediability without consideration of affordances provided for situated, embodied, personalized agents?

Perhaps. I want to argue, however, that Berman, Vermeer, and de Man are partly wrong about Benjamin. He does move, toward the end of the essay, toward a more personalized understanding of human translators as situated agents—notably Friedrich Hölderlin, but also Martin Luther, Johann Heinrich Voß, A. W. Schlegel, and Stefan George—and a closer reading of the passages dealing with them will, I argue, yield interesting possibilities for an application of affordance theory. Wilhelm Dilthey's hermeneutical theory of the *Zusammenhang des Lebens* ("nexus/intertwining of life"), which Benjamin invokes by name (the *Zusammenhang des Lebens* name, not Dilthey's) on p. 10 (33–35), will also help us flesh out an affordance theory of translation. As I showed in the Introduction to this volume (pp. 34ff), Dilthey's 1910/1927 hermeneutical theory was the primary influence on Edmund Husserl's 1936 concept of the *Lebenswelt* ("life-world") in his last and most brilliant book; Husserl's *Lebenswelt* was a strong influence on Maurice Merleau-Ponty's 1961/1964 "Eye and Mind" (transl. Dallery 1964); Merleau-Ponty's last published essay was a strong influence on the development of 4EA (embodied, embedded, extended, enactive, and affective) cognitive science, which shaped Anthony Chemero's "radical

embodied cognitive science" retheorization of affordances. This historical chain ties hermeneutics, phenomenology, and 4EA cognitive science together under the rubric of the affordances of the translator.

First, then, let's familiarize ourselves with affordance theory, by tracking Anthony Chemero's (2009) seventh chapter (section 2); then take a closer look at Dilthey's hermeneutic theory of the *Zusammenhang des Lebens* ("nexus/intertwining of life") as it influenced both Benjamin and the 4EA cognitive science that Anthony Chemero mobilizes (section 3); then turn back to translation, with a brief outline of the affordances that made possible Hölderlin's translations of Pindar (section 4). I conclude (section 5) with a look at some possible affordances that Hölderlin's Pindar translations might yield us as translators and translation scholars.

3   Understanding Affordances

3.1 Idealisms

Let us begin, then, with the case of environmentally situated embodied agents—or what Anthony Chemero (2009) follows the ecological psychologists in calling "animals." Benjamin's apparently exclusive focus on transcendental vitalisms without situated, embodied agents would make his philosophy of language an idealism; and as Chemero notes, "For all the noise ecological psychologists make about being realists, it is not obvious at the outset that ecological psychology is not a form of idealism, in which perceivables exist only when they are perceived. It is a small step from this to a global idealism, in which the world disappears whenever I close my eyes" (Chemero 2009: 149). He is referring specifically to the tendency in ecological psychology to reify affordances not as

experienced by embodied animals in an environment but as part of the structure of the environment—intrinsic features that may be used by animals wandering into the environment but that are understood as existing in the environment whether any animals wander in or not.

By the same token, the effacement of agents in summaries like Procyshyn's "Some texts thus *afford* translation" and "a translatable text bears within itself a transformative potential (as yet unschematized) that can be made manifest" also seems to embrace that kind of idealism; and as I began to suggest in the previous section, Procyshyn seems to be invoking not a disposition model of affordances (on which more in a moment) but the Darwinian resource model advanced by Edward Reed: "Reed's (1996) conception of affordances as resources that exert selection pressure avoids this issue by making it the case that affordances exist unproblematically, even without animals capable of perceiving them" (Chemero 2009: 149). As Reed (1996: 18) himself puts it, "The fundamental hypothesis of ecological psychology […] is that affordances and only the relative availability (or nonavailability) of affordances create selection pressure on animals; hence behavior is regulated with respect to the affordances of the environment for a given animal." Note: "behavior is *regulated.*" The affordances are properties of the environment that regulate the behavior of animals. In a translation application, "some texts thus *afford* translation" not in relation to translators but in the abstract, structurally; any human (or possibly even divine) translator that comes into the vicinity of such texts would be *regulatorily* afforded translation, which is to say forced to translate within normative confines imposed by the source-textual environment.

Chemero notes that other researchers, notably champions of the "disposition model" like Turvey et al. (1981), War-

ren (1984), Turvey (1992), and Michaels (2000), insist that "affordances must be complemented by the effectivities of animals" (Chemero 2009: 149), but it's never clear in their work whether "affordances *depend* in some sense on animals" (ibid.; emphasis added). The criterial question for Chemero is: "Do affordances exist without animals?" (ibid.).

Surprisingly, given his expostulations against idealism in affordance theory, he says yes—and to illustrate that answer borrows a thought-experiment from Daniel Dennett (1998), who draws a distinction between things that are lovely and things that are suspect. Things that are suspect must actually be under suspicion; but things that are lovely could be lovely even if no one is around to view them and pronounce them lovely. Affordances, Chemero argues, are "lovely":

> Affordances do not disappear when there is no local animal to perceive and take advantage of them. They are perfectly real entities that can be objectively studied and are in no way figments of the imagination of the animal that perceives them. So radical embodied cognitive science is not a form of idealism. But affordances do depend on the existence of some animal that could perceive them, if the right conditions were met. Because affordances, the primary perceivables according to ecological psychology, depend in this way on animals, the ontology of ecological psychology is not a simple form of realism. It is a form of realism about the world as it is perceived and experienced—affordances, which are inherently meaningful, are in the world, and not merely projected onto it by animals. (Chemero 2009: 150)

But this is problematic (not apodictic). Affordances that "are perfectly real entities that can be objectively studied and are in no way figments of the imagination of the animal that perceives them" are "perfectly real entities" *for* "the animal that perceives them." As Chemero himself insists, affordances are not features of the environment but relationalities experienced *in situ* by animals in their environment; and as he also makes clear, drawing on the "radical empiricism" of William

James (1912/1976), relationalities are empirically real, because they are *experienced* as real. But a *potential* relationality that *might* be experienced by an animal in a specific environment is not real, because it is not being experienced by that animal. It is certainly true that properties of the environment are real even in the absence of animals that experience them; but those properties only become *affordances* in experiential relationality with the animals that experience them. An affordance is indeed "a form of realism about the world *as it is perceived and experienced*"—not an idealism that shapes possible worlds that might some day be experienced by an animal. Chemero's point is that "affordances, which are inherently meaningful, are in the world, and not merely projected onto it by animals," and I agree completely: affordances are real situated embodied relationalities *and not* mere projections. But without that situated embodied relationality between environment and animal an affordance is precisely an ideal structure reified and projected onto the environment in and by a god's-eye view from above—an artifact of bad theory obtained by *subtracting* the experiencing animal from the experienced relation.

I noted in section 1 that Procyshyn's effacement of the "animals" or agents of translation seems to link him more strongly to Edward Reed's "resource model" than to Michael Turvey's "disposition model"; but in fact the two models aren't all that different, and Chemero, an eloquent advocate of "radical embodied" (4EA) cognitive science, recommends persuasively that we move past both. In Chemero's analysis, the difference between the two models is that "unlike Reed's view of affordances as resources, Turvey's account of affordances as dispositions is nonselectionist" (Chemero 2009: 138), which is to say that in the disposition model "affordances per se cannot exert selection pressure on animals.

Properties of the environment are not affordances in the absence of complementary properties of animals" (ibid.). In Turvey's approach those "complementary properties of animals" are *effectivities*, which are effectively *dispositions*; in Chemero's summary they are "defined as the organismal complement to affordances qua dispositional properties of the environment (Turvey et al. 1981; Shaw, Turvey, and Mace 1982; Warren 1984; Turvey 1992)" (ibid.: 145). But as Chemero notes, if "affordances are not properties of the environment … there is no need for the complementing property in the organism" (ibid.); and, he adds, "the problem with seeing abilities as dispositions is that when coupled with the right enabling conditions, dispositions are guaranteed to become manifest" (ibid.). Not only does this disparaging summary align well with Procyshyn's affordance-theoretical reading of Benjamin's "Aufgabe"; it anticipates (and perhaps conditions) his specific phrasing in "a translatable text bears within itself a transformative potential (as yet unschematized) that can be *made manifest*." "Individuals with abilities are supposed to behave in particular ways, and they may fail to do so," Chemero adds. "Dispositions, on the other hand, never fail; they simply are or are not in the appropriate circumstances to become manifest" (ibid.). Translators experiencing a specific text in a specific professional "environment"—hired to translate that text for a specific purpose for a specific audience, as skopos theory would put it—may come to the task with a generalized "ability to translate," but in "relation" (engagement) with that text in that environment may find their skill inadequate to the task. More on that in section 4, below; the point to note here is that Procyshyn's "some texts *afford* translation" shimmers between the resource model (where the text selects and regulates the translator) and the disposition model (where the task activates the translator's disposition) without

enabling further determination, because it effaces the translator entirely. For Procyshyn the translational affordance is a stable property of the source text.

Chemero's own insistence on moving past both Reed's resource model and Turvey's disposition model mobilizes two 4EA transgressions of the static: first, *relationality* as a reciprocal constitutivity in which the engagement of animals with their environments generates affordances as a sharing or exchanging of enabling powers (as opposed to the static resource and disposition models in which stable properties of environments afford action-potentials to the stable properties of animals); and second, *dynamism* as change across time (as opposed to Chemero's own earlier view [2001a, 2001b, 2003] that the affordance as an environment-animal relationality too is a stable thing).

3.2 (In)direct Perception

As I noted at the end of section 1, Chemero's 4EA reframing of affordances as embedded/extended relationalities between an environment and the animal that experiences it points us back to a century-long intellectual history beginning in 1910 with the hermeneutic theory of Wilhelm Dilthey and proceeding through the *Lebenswelt* ("life-world") concept that Edmund Husserl based on Dilthey's *Zusammenhang des Lebens* and Merleau-Ponty's "Eye and Mind" to the enactivism of Varela et al. (1991). In anticipation of that discussion in section 4, let's track some problems in this early formulation Chemero offers:

> For radical embodied cognitive science to eschew mental representations, it must take perception to be direct, to be the pickup of information from the environment. Furthermore, animals must be able to use that information to guide action without complex processing, without mental gymnastics. This requires that perception be

of affordances, or opportunities for behavior. Animals, that is, must be able to perceive what they can do directly. (Chemero 2009: 135)

By perceiving "directly" he means the ability "to use that information to guide action without complex processing, without mental gymnastics"—which he glosses as without "mental representations." But obviously "complex processing" is a scalar concept: how complex does the processing have to be before it crosses the line from "direct" into "indirect" perception? The middle ground between direct and indirect perception is obviously not a wide DMZ but a heap, a fuzzy-logic sorites series: perception in different contexts may *seem more or less* direct without allowing the imposition of a stable binary logic. Yes, in one binary logic "The animal (or rather its brain) performs inferences on the sensation, yielding a meaningful perception" (Chemero 2009: 135): that would be the idealization of "indirect perception," as mediated by mental representations. But Chemero is on shaky ground, I would argue, in simply flipping our understanding of the situation to the opposite binary logic, the idealization of "direct perception":

> In direct theories of perception, on the other hand, meaning is in the environment, and perception does not depend on meaning-conferring inferences. Instead the animal simply gathers information from a meaning-laden environment. The environment is meaning laden in that it contains affordances, and affordances are meaningful to animals. But if the environment contains meanings, then it cannot be merely physical. This places a heavy theoretical burden on radical embodied cognitive science, a burden so severe that it may outweigh all the advantages to conceiving perception as direct. (Chemero 2009: 135)

This early in his chapter, Chemero might be read as tracking the thinking of early affordance theories, and *not* affirming this "direct perception" binary logic as the foundation of his

own approach; but he does explicitly associate that logic with the "radical embodied cognitive science" of his title.

The tension between the crypto-idealism of "direct perception" and Chemero's "radical embodied cognitive science" emerges most uncomfortably when he gets around to redefining his earlier relationalizing definition of affordances in *dynamic* terms—which is to say, affordances as they develop over time, and in "developing" actually change both the environment and the animal's relationship with the environment. Surely one defining aspect of that dynamic relationship is *learning*: the animal enters a familiar environment with past experience of it "under its belt," as it were. If "the animal simply gathers information from a *meaning-laden* environment," surely the environment has previously been *laden* with meaning dynamically, which is to say imbued with meaning in and through the animal's own evolving relationship with it. "The environment is meaning laden in that it *contains* affordances," Chemero says, but "contains" is a static verb that oversimplifies the dynamic processes by which the environment *comes* to contain affordances through the animal's enactive engagement with it, and by which the learning processes based on repeating and remembering past engagements phenomenologically "freezes" or reifies mutable experience as objective external fact: relationally experienced and relied-on affordances as "contained."

The next step past this static "containment" might of course be to the -abilities of poststructuralist thought: Derrida's iterability is not just *always* but *always already* "inscribed as possibility in the functioning or the functional structure of the mark." Elided in Derrida's transphenomenological deconstruction of Austin and Searle is the relational and temporal phenomenology of *co-experiencing* that iterability as a possibility, and indeed of *iterably* co-experiencing it, co-experiencing it

so often that it comes to seem first like an individual experience and then, ultimately, like an "inscri[ption] in the functioning or the functional structure of the mark."

A similar elision is arguably at work also in Benjamin's transcendental metaphysics, according to which *Wenn Übersetzung eine Form ist, so muß Übersetzbarkeit gewissen Werken wesentlich sein* (Benjamin 1923/1972: 10) ("If translation is a [Platonic] Form, the translatability of certain works must be part of their [transcendental] Essence," transl. Robinson 2023c: 33): the temporal trajectory of the phenomenological co-experiencing of the relational affordances that make a text first seem to be translatable, then to possess a stable abstract quality called "translatability," and finally to possess that quality even after the destruction of all human life on earth, is again elided.

For a fuller account of the phenomenological organization of that co-experience, let us next turn back the clock to Wilhelm Dilthey's 1910 hermeneutical theorization of the *Zusammenhang des Lebens* (3a) and Edmund Husserl's 1936 phenomenological theorization of *die Lebenswelt* (3b).

4 Understanding Affordances Hermeneutically

4.1 *Der Zusammenhang des Lebens* in Benjamin

One of Walter Benjamin's keywords in the "Aufgabe" has somewhat surprisingly gone unnoticed in the extensive scholarly literature on the essay, namely *Zusammenhang*.[1] Variously

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1   Of all the commentators on Benjamin's "Aufgabe," Anthony Phelan (2002) comes closest to stumbling on the connection with Dilthey, in an article titled "*Fortgang* and *Zusammenhang*: Walter Benjamin and the Romantic Novel"—but without once mentioning either "Die Aufgabe des Übersetzers" or Dilthey, let alone Dilthey's (and Benjamin's) keyword *der Zusammenhang des Lebens*.

rendered in the four full English translations as "context," "connection," and "structure," and in Chantal Wright's 2018 translation of Berman (2008) as "interrelation," Benjamin's eleven mentions of that term are most specifically localized in the concept of *der Zusammenhang des Lebens*:

> Dennoch steht sie mit diesem Kraft seiner Übersetzbarkeit im nächsten Zusammenhang. Ja, dieser Zusammenhang ist um so inniger, als er für das Original selbst nichts mehr bedeutet. Er darf ein natürlicher genannt werden und zwar genauer *ein Zusammenhang des Lebens*. So wie die Äußerungen des Lebens innigst mit dem Lebendigen zusammenhängen, ohne ihm etwas zu bedeuten, geht die Übersetzung aus dem Original hervor. Zwar nicht aus seinem Leben so sehr denn aus seinem ›Überleben‹. (Benjamin 1923/1972: 10; emphasis added)

> Still, the translation is closely intertwined with this power of the source text's translatability. Indeed the two are the more closely intertwined precisely because that intertwining means nothing for the source text. That intertwining can be called natural; more precisely it is *an intertwining of life*. For in the same way as expressions of life are intimately intertwined with living beings, without having any significance for those beings, so does a translation emanate from the original—not from its life so much as from its "superlife." (Robinson 2023c: 35–36; emphasis added)

It is of course fairly easy to guess at what it might mean for a translation to be intertwined with its source text; more difficult, perhaps, to guess at what it would mean for a translation to be intertwined with "this power of the source text's translatability"; but in what sense exactly is that intertwining "natural," and what, finally, is it a *Zusammenhang des Lebens* or an "intertwining of life"?

4.2 *Der Zusammenhang des Lebens* in Dilthey

Finding that *der Zusammenhang des Lebens* is a keyword in Wilhelm Dilthey's late work *Der Aufbau der geschichtlichen Welt in*

den Geisteswissenschaften (1910/1927; in English *The Formation of the Historical World in the Human Sciences*, transl. Makkreel and Rodi 2002), one that was picked up by Martin Heidegger as well in *Sein und Zeit/Being and Time* (§77), helps orient us to what Benjamin was doing with the term several years before it appeared in Heidegger's magnum opus. Dilthey begins his monograph ("First Study") with a discussion of *Der psychische Strukturzusammenhang* ("The Psychic Structural Nexus"), then moves on in the Second Study to a discussion of *Der Strukturzusammenhang des Wissens* ("The Structural Nexus of Knowledge"). In the first he is concerned with "psychic structure," but specifically the nexus of psychic structure, how the psyche "hangs together" structurally—which is to say how each person's lived experience of their own psyche hangs together, what holds the inner relations of our lived experience of the psyche together in a coherent structure. In the second he backs up one step, from the *Zusammenhang* ("hanging together", nexus or intertwining) of what is known to the nexus or intertwining of knowing. Following Schleiermacher, who was following Herder, he begins the Second Study with an epistemological look at *Gefühl* ("feeling"), which I traced in the Introduction (pp. 14–21). The Third Study, which becomes Part II, deals with "The System of the Humanities" and "The World of Spirit as a Productive Nexus."

It's not until Part III, then, "The Plan for the Continuation of the Formation of the Historical World in the Humanities," that he comes to *der Zusammenhang des Lebens* ("the nexus of life"). In one passing aphorism, for example, *das Leben* ("life") is shorthand for *der Zusammenhang des Lebens* ("the nexus of life"): "Das Leben ist wie eine Melodie, in der nicht Töne als Ausdruck der realen dem Leben einwohnenden Realitäten auftreten. In diesem selbst liegt die Melodie" (Dilthey

1910/1927: 234) ("Life is like a melody in which the notes do not express realities embedded in life. The melody lies in life itself," transl. Makkreel/Rodi 2002: 254). Life, in other words, is not an empirical reality, but a phenomenological one, a lived experience, like the lived experience of music. "Life," in other words, is not an object but a sociocultural nexus. As for the pithy statement that "The melody lies in life itself," which is to say in the nexus of life, this is an interesting shift from his talk of "parts and wholes" throughout; in many of his formulations the tones would have been the parts that constitute the melody as the whole, as an analogue of the "realities embedded in life" as the parts that constitute the nexus of life. Here, analogically, the nexus lies in life, or *is* life.

In the six numbered paragraphs that follow, however, the first three seemingly restore the mechanistic relationship of parts to wholes, through the analogy of language, as understood through the building-block theory:

> 1. Der einfachste Fall, in welchem Bedeutung auftritt, ist das Verstehen eines Satzes. Die einzelnen Worte haben jedes eine Bedeutung und aus der Verbindung derselben wird der Sinn des Satzes abgeleitet. Das Verfahren ist also, daß aus der Bedeutung der einzelnen Worte das Verständnis des Satzes sich ergibt. Und zwar besteht eine derer die Unbestimmtheit des Sinnes, nämlich die Möglichkeiten eines solchen und die einzelnen Worte, <bestimmt wird>. (Dilthey 1910/1927: 234)

> 1. The simplest case in which meaning arises is the understanding of a sentence. Each individual word has a meaning, and we derive the sense of the sentence by combining them. We proceed so that the intelligibility of the sentence comes from the meaning of individual words. To be sure, there is a reciprocity between whole and parts by virtue of which the indeterminacy of sense, namely, the possibilities of sense, (are established) in relation to individual words. (Transl. Makkreel/Rodi 2002: 254–55)

Letters are the building blocks of words, and words are the building blocks of sentences. It is only by combining the

word-block-meanings in sentences that sentential "meaning" or "sense" arises. Dilthey goes on:

> 2. Dasselbe Verhältnis besteht zwischen den Teilen und dem Ganzen eines Lebensverlaufes, und auch hier wird das Verständnis des Ganzen, der Sinn des Lebens aus der Bedeutung […]. (Dilthey 1910/1927: 235)

> 2. The same relationship exists between the parts and the whole of a life-course, and here also the understanding of the whole, the sense of life [arises] from the meaning […]. (Transl. Makkreel/Rodi 2002: 255)

That leap at the end, where "the understanding of the whole" is added to the mechanistic part-whole combinatory logic as a kind of holistic supplement to the mechanism, and "the sense of life [arises] from the meaning [of sentences and of life-courses]," seems to belie the part-whole misstep. Just as "The melody lies in life itself," surely the understanding of the whole meaning of life lies in life itself as well. But the combinatory part-whole building-block theory of sentences stands, stuck in Dilthey's craw.

Significantly, too, Benjamin sought to break the isomorphism between 1 and 2: for him it is precisely by smashing the sentential sense-nexus in 1 that one becomes able to contribute to the transcendental Neoplatonist life-nexus in 2.

Dilthey next sums up 1 and 2 in 3:

> 3. Dieses Verhältnis von Bedeutung und Sinn ist also in bezug auf den Lebensverlauf: die einzelnen Ereignisse, welche ihn bilden, wie sie in der Sinnenwelt auftreten, haben wie die Worte eines Satzes ein Verhältnis zu etwas, das sie bedeuten. Durch dieses ist jedes einzelne Erlebnis von einem Ganzen aus bedeutungsvoll zusammengenommen. Und wie die Worte im Satz zu dessen Verständnis verbunden sind, so ergibt der Zusammenhang dieser Erlebnisse die Bedeutung des Lebenslaufes. Ebenso verhält es sich mit der Geschichte. (Dilthey 1910/1927: 235)

> 3. With reference to a life-course, this relationship of meaning and sense is as follows: The particular events that constitute the life-course as it unfolds in the sensible world have a relationship to something that they mean, like the words in a sentence. Through this relationship, each particular lived experience is gathered together for its meaning on the basis of some whole. As the word in a sentence are connected into its intelligibility, so the togetherness of these lived experiences produces the meaning of a life-course. It is the same with history. (Transl. Makkreel/Rodi 2002: 255)

What makes Benjamin's "Aufgabe" so difficult to understand, of course, is that he deliberately and apparently perversely overturns this humanistic understanding of meaning. Not only does he say in effect that "as the words in a sentence are *dis*connected into *un*intelligibility, so the clashes of these lived experiences produce the meaning of sacred history"; he also doesn't even try to persuade us that his counterintuitive (which is to say, anti-humanist) formulation is true, by mobilizing the kinds of evidential and argumentative support that we humanists accept as persuasive.

Dilthey's next paragraph begins to move on to larger concerns:

> 4. So ist also dieser Begriff der Bedeutung nur in bezug auf das Verfahren des Verständnisses zunächst gediehen. Er enthält nur einen Beziehung eines Äußeren, Sinnfälligen zu dem Inneren, dessen Ausdruck es ist. Die Beziehung ist aber von der grammatikalischen wesentlich verschieden. Der Ausdruck des Inneren in den Teilen des Lebens ist etwas anderes als das Wortzeichen usw. (Dilthey 1910/1927: 235)

> 4. This concept of meaning [associated with a life-course or a history] has emerged only with reference to the procedure of understanding. It involves merely a relation of something outer, given in sense, to something inner of which it is the expression. But it is essentially different from a grammatical relation. When the parts of life express something inner, this is not just a mode of verbal signification, etc. (Transl. Makkreel/Rodi 2002: 255)

This is closer to what Benjamin outlines, except that in Benjamin the relation is not of "something outer, given in sense, to something inner of which it is the expression"—it is rather of something outer, involved in rubbing and abrasion, to something inner that is living and hidden in what is abraded. What is outer is translation, the clash of languages that translation brings about; what is inner and living and hidden is pure language. We will later see Dilthey imagining the discovery and presentation of things (affordances?) hidden in the life-environment as the task of the poet—a notion that Benjamin borrows for the poet-translator from Friedrich Hölderlin.

In 5, Dilthey begins to worm his way around to a subtler understanding of understanding:

> 5. Sonach sagen uns die Worte Bedeutung, Verständnis, Sinn des Lebensverlaufes oder der Geschichte nichts als solches Hindeuten, nichts als diese in Verstehen enthaltene Beziehung der Geschehnisse auf einen inneren Zusammenhang, durch den verstanden werden. (Dilthey 1910/1927: 235)

> 5. Accordingly, the words "meaning," "intelligibility," "sense of a life-course," or "history" do nothing more than indicate the relation inherent in understanding between events and the inner nexus by which they are understood. (Transl. Makkreel/Rodi 2002: 255)

The two questions that this passage begs are "what is that 'relation inherent in understanding'?" and "what is that 'inner nexus by which they are understood'?" Paragraph 6 finally brings us to *der Zusammenhang des Lebens* ("the nexus/intertwining of life"):

> 6. Was wir suchen, ist die Art des Zusammenhanges, die dem Leben selber eigen ist; und wir suchen sie von den einzelnen Geschehnissen desselben <aus>. In jedem derselben, das für den Zusammenhang benutzbar sein soll, muß etwas von der Bedeutung des Lebens enthalten sein; sonst könnte sie aus dem Zusammenhang derselben nicht entstehen. Wie die Naturwissenschaft gleichsam ihren allge-

meinen Schematismus an den Begriffen hat, in denen die in der physischen Welt herrschende Kausalität dargestellt wird und ihre eigene Methodenlehre in dem Verfahren, diese zu erkennen, so öffnet sich uns hier der Eingang in die Kategorien des Lebens, ihre Beziehungen zu einander, ihren Schematismus und in die Methoden, sie zu erfassen. Dort aber haben wir es mit einem abstrakten Zusammenhang zu tun, der nach seiner logischen Natur ganz durchsichtig ist. Hier sollen wir den Zusammenhang des Lebens selber verstehen, der dem Erkennen niemals ganz zugänglich werden kann. (Dilthey 1910/1927: 235–36)

6. What we are seeking is the type of *connectedness or nexus or intertwining* that is proper to life itself—*a connectedness/nexus/intertwining* rooted in particular life-events. For any event to contribute to this *connectedness, this nexus, this intertwining*, it must possess something of the meaning of life; otherwise, this meaning could not arise from the nexus of events. Just as the natural sciences have their universal schematism in concepts that explicate the causality prevailing in the physical world, and a distinctive methodology for attaining conceptual cognition of it, so the categories of life disclose to us their relations to one another, their schematism, and the methods to grasp them. With the former, however, we are dealing with an abstract system whose logical nature is completely transparent. With the latter, we expect to understand the *nexus or intertwining* of life itself although it can never be entirely accessible to conceptual cognition. (Transl. Makkreel/ Rodi 2002: 255; translation modified)

4.3 Affordances in Dilthey and Benjamin

Transparency in the natural sciences, achieved through abstraction; inaccessibility in the humanities. Dilthey's word for transparent is *durchsichtig*; a synonym would be *durchschaubar*, morphologically "through-viewable." Transparency is specifically *afforded* natural scientists and their readers and students through abstraction; complete accessibility to the nexus of life, though expected, is *not* afforded humanists. Why not? One possible explanation might be generated out of a closer reading of the passage I discussed in the Introduction, while

presenting Dilthey's *Zusammenhang des Lebens*, to which I promised to return here in the context of affordances: "Unter den phänomenal gegebenen Körpern findet sich der menschliche, und mit ihm ist hier in einer nicht weiter angebbaren Weise das Erleben verbunden" (196). I'll translate that myself this time, more literally: "Among the phenomenally given bodies finds itself the human one, and it is here bound up with lived experience in a not further specifiable way." Obviously, as I mentioned in passing in the Introduction, *die Unangebbarkeit* ("the unspecifiability") of that way is an -ability akin to Walter Benjamin's *Unübersetzbarkeit* ("untranslatability") and *Unmitteilbarkeit* ("immediability"). What is specifiable in thinking about that pronouncement is that on this passing point Dilthey is methodologically—though of course all unawares—aligned with Edward Reed's resource model of affordances: for him that specifiability is simply a missing resource in the environment. As Reed puts it, "only the relative availability (or nonavailability) of affordances create selection pressure on animals" (Reed 1996: 18), and for Dilthey the ability to specify further the way the human body is bound up with lived experience in the environment of human life is simply unavailable. The connection between the human body and lived experience is the environmental reality in which he as a philosopher lives, and he would like to be afforded the ability to specify it further, but that affordance simply is not available. To paraphrase Aleksei Procyshyn, the specifiability-affordance is a "theoretically transformative potential (as yet unschematized)" that not only has not been made manifest for Dilthey in 1910 but never will be made manifest for any of the philosopher-animals that may hypothetically need it in the future.

But of course we know that the phenomenologists just a few decades after 1910—Husserl in 1936 and Merleau-Ponty in

1961—were afforded that (specifi)ability. How did the environment change in the interim? As Chemero's model would predict, it changed through the dynamically changing relationship between the philosopher-animals and their environment. And tellingly, Dilthey himself, despite declaring the environment irredeemably closed to such affordances, helped change the environment. At the end of his life Edmund Husserl was able to expand the affordances somewhat, thanks to Dilthey's theorization of *der Zusammenhang des Lebens*; at the end of his, Merleau-Ponty was able to rip it wide open, thanks to the transformative contribution of Husserl's posthumous book. By the 1990s, thanks to Merleau-Ponty, the environment was primed for philosopher-animals to specify the bond between the human body and lived experience not only "further" but brilliantly, with long and heated debates over numerous specifications.

Another passage in Dilthey that seems to point ahead to the theory of affordances, and this time to something closer to the relational and dynamic model advanced by Anthony Chemero, is this (I will again retranslate the passage more literally than Makkreel and Oman did, to highlight the affordances):

> Der Zusammenhang des Erlebens in seiner konkreten Wirklichkeit liegt in der Kategorie der Bedeutung. Diese ist die Einheit, welche den Verlauf des Erlebten oder Nacherlebten in der Erinnerung zusammennimmt, und zwar besteht die Bedeutung desselben nicht in einem Einheitspunkte, der jenseits des Erlebnisses läge, sondern diese Bedeutung ist in diesen Erlebnissen als deren Zusammenhang konstituierend enthalten.

> Dieser Zusammenhang ist sonach eine in der Natur *alles Erlebbaren* enthaltene, ihm eigene Beziehungsweise oder Kategorie.

> Worin die Bedeutung des Lebens liege, das ein Individuum, ich oder ein anderer oder eine Nation, durchlebt hat, ist nicht eindeutig dadurch bestimmt, daß eine solche Bedeutung besteht. Daß sie statt-

findet, ist dem Erinnernden als Beziehung *des Erlebbaren* immer gewiß. Erst im letzten Augenblick eines Lebens kann der Überschlag über seine Bedeutung gemacht werden, und so kann derselbe nur eigentlich momentan am Ende des Lebens auftreten oder in einem, der dies Leben nacherlebt. (Dilthey 1910/1927: 237)

The *nexus/intertwining* of lived experience in its concrete reality lies in the category of meaning. This is the unity that brings together the run of the experienced or the re-experienced into memory, and indeed stands the meaning thereof not in a unity point that lies beyond lived experience, but this meaning is contained in these lived experiences constituted as their *nexus*.

This *nexus* is therefore a way of relating or category contained in the nature of all that is experienceable and typical of it.

Wherein lies the meaning of life that an individual, I or another or a nation, has lived through is not manifestly therethrough determined, that there stands such a meaning. That it occurs is to the rememberer ever certain as a relation of the experienceable. First in the last eyeblink of a life can the somersault over its meaning be made, and so can the same only truly at the moment of the end of life step forth— or else in one who re-experiences this life. (Transl. Makkreel/Oman 2002: 256–57; translation modified by Robinson; emphasis added)

Here the affordance of experienceability is not a stable property or resource of the environment—not *ein Einheitspunkt, der jenseits des Erlebnisses läge* ("a unity point that lies beyond lived experience"), and it's not *daß eine solche Bedeutung besteht* ("that such a meaning exists") either. It is rather *eine Beziehung des Erlebbaren* ("a relation of the experienceable") that is so dynamic, so constantly growing and emerging out of that relationality, that it cannot step forth as a stabilized affordance until the last moment of the rememberer's life—or in someone else's re-experience of that life after the rememberer's death.

Benjamin's version of this in the passage where he calls translatability a *Zusammenhang des Lebens* ("a nexus/intertwining of

life") seems subtly to shift from the resource model to the dynamic relationality model and then back again. When he first broaches the subject it seems that translatability is a permanent and stable affordance of the source-textual environment:

> Übersetzbarkeit eignet gewissen Werken wesentlich — das heißt nicht, ihre Übersetzung ist wesentlich für sie selbst, sondern will besagen, daß eine bestimmte Bedeutung, die den Originalen innewohnt, sich in ihrer Übersetzbarkeit äußere. Daß eine Übersetzung niemals, so gut sie auch sei, etwas für das Original zu bedeuten vermag, leuchtet ein. Dennoch steht sie mit diesem kraft seiner Übersetzbarkeit im nächsten Zusammenhang. Ja, dieser Zusammenhang ist um so inniger, als er für das Original selbst nichts mehr bedeutet. Er darf ein natürlicher genannt werden und zwar genauer ein Zusammenhang des Lebens. (Benjamin 1923/1972: 10)

> Translatability is built into the Essence of certain works. This does not mean that it is essential for the source text that it be translated; rather, it means that a certain significance resident in source texts expresses itself in translatability. Obviously no translation, no matter how good it is, can have the slightest significance for the source text. Still, the translation is closely intertwined with this power of the source text's translatability. Indeed the two are the more closely intertwined precisely because that intertwining no longer means anything for the source text. That intertwining can be called natural; more precisely it is an intertwining [nexus] of life. (Transl. Robinson 2023c: 33–35)

Übersetzbarkeit eignet gewissen Werken wesentlich ("Translatability is built into the Essence of certain works"): as an affordance it is not only a stable but a transcendental resource. But as Benjamin begins to work out just how the translatability affordance is made manifest, he introduces the temporal sequentiality of historicity:

> So wie die Äußerungen des Lebens innigst mit dem Lebendigen zusammenhängen, ohne ihm etwas zu bedeuten, geht die Übersetzung aus dem Original hervor. Zwar nicht aus seinem Leben so sehr denn aus seinem ›Überleben‹. Ist doch die Übersetzung später als das Ori-

ginal und bezeichnet sich doch bei den bedeutenden Werken, die da ihre erwählten Übersetzer niemals im Zeitalter ihrer Entstehung finden, das Stadium ihres Fortlebens. (Benjamin 1923/1972: 10–11)

For in the same way as expressions of life are intimately intertwined with living beings, without having any significance for those beings, so does a translation emanate from the original—not from its life so much as from its "superlife." After all, the translation comes later than its source text, and when one arises out of a truly significant work—the kind that never finds its chosen translator in the era of its genesis—that indicates that the work has reached the stage of its ongoing life. (Transl. Robinson 2023c: 33–35)

As in Dilthey on experienceability, the affordance of translatability is made manifest dynamically in time, so that it is only at a specific point in time that the translatability of a certain source text becomes experienceable—not at the moment of death, as in Dilthey (and in the "afterlife" translations of *das Überleben* in Zohn and Rendall), but at the moment of fame-based supercharging, the inception of *das Stadium ihres Fortlebens* ("the stage of its ongoing life"). The other divergence from Dilthey, of course, is that even in the dynamic relationality of time the translatability affordance for Benjamin is never made manifest to translator-animals, or editor-animals, or necessarily to living beings ("experiencers") of any sort. Translatability for Benjamin here in the opening paragraphs of the essay is not actually an experienceability. For Dilthey, on the other hand, as a post-Kantian and post-Romantic humanist, the dynamic relationality is between the environment and *der Erinnernde* ("the rememberer-animal"), or else *der Nacherlebende* ("the re-experiencer-animal"). In this case Dilthey is clearly in line to participate in and shape the dynamic relationality between *der Zusammenhang des Erlebnisses* ("the nexus/intertwining of lived experience") and the philosopher-experiencers to which it affords transformative thinking and feeling; Benjamin not only reverts to the re-

source model but seemingly (at least early in the essay) banishes all past, present, and future experiencer-animals from the transcendentalized environment.

Another Dilthey-based reflection on affordances points us ahead to section 5f, in which Friedrich Hölderlin (the poet-translator-animal) works with Pindar (the source author/text as his poetic environment) to develop new poetic affordances in dynamic interrelationality:

> Die Bedeutsamkeit, die so die Tatsache empfängt als die Bestimmtheit des Bedeutungsgliedes aus dem Ganzen, ist ein Lebensbezug und kein intellektuelles Verhältnis, kein Hineinlegen von Vernunft, von Gedanke in den Teil des Geschehnisses. Die Bedeutsamkeit ist aus dem Leben selbst herausgeholt. Bezeichnet man als Sinn einen Lebensganzen den Zusammenhang, wie er sich aus der Bedeutung der Teile ergibt, dann spricht das dichterische Werk vermittels des freien Schaffens des Bedeutungszusammenhanges den Sinn des Lebens aus. Das Geschehnis wird zum Symbol des Lebens.

> Von der anthropologischen Reflexion ab ist alles Aufklärung, Explikation des Lebens selbst, so auch die Poesie. Was in den Tiefen des Lebens enthalten ist, welche der Beobachtung und dem Räsonnement unzugänglich sind, wird aus ihnen herausgeholt. So entsteht im Dichtenden der Eindruck der Inspiration. (Dilthey 1910/1927: 240)

> Significance, which appropriates a fact as a meaning-constituent determined by a whole, manifests a life-concern and not an intellectual relationship, and does not project reason or thought into this part of the overall event. Significance is derived from life itself. If we designate as the sense of a life-whole the connectedness resulting from the meaning of the parts, then the poetic work expresses the sense of life by means of freely creating a meaning context. The event becomes a symbol of life.

> Starting with anthropological reflection, everything involves the illumination and explication of life itself; it is the same with poetry. What is hidden in the depths of life and is not accessible to observation and reasoning, poetry is able to mine. Thus poets and writers

create the impression of being inspired. (Transl. Makkreel/Oman 2002: 260)

We observe first that this passage provides a further explanation of the "facticity" that Dilthey posits as what he calls *das gegenständliche Auffassen* ("objective grasp")[2] of the nexus of

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2   Dilthey has a whole section on "Das Gegenständliche Auffassen" ("Objective Apprehension"), which he defines like this:

Das gegenständliche Auffassen bildet ein System von Beziehungen, in dem Wahrnehmungen und Erlebnisse, erinnerte Vorstellungen, Urteile, Begriffe, Schlüsse und deren Zusammensetzungen enthalten sind. Allen diesen Leistungen im System des gegenständlichen Auffassens ist gemeinsam, daß in ihnen nur Beziehungen von Tatsächlichem gegenwärtig sind. (Dilthey 1910/1927: 121)

Objective apprehension forms a system of relations in which perceptions and lived experiences, remembered representations, judgments, concepts, inferences, and their combinations are contained. All these functions in the system of objective apprehension are alike in that only relations within the factical are present. (Transl. Makkreel/Oman 2002: 143)

What exactly is a *Tatsache* ("fact") in a system composed entirely of "perceptions and lived experiences, remembered representations, judgments, concepts, inferences, and their combinations"? The passage to which this note is attached offers one explanation. Makkreel/Rodi (2002: 2–3) explain that Dilthey borrowed Hegel's term *der objective Geist* ("objective spirit") for the objectified "elementary understanding" that we inherit from the past: "We are already historical because we grow up amidst the ways in which the spirit of the past has been objectified and preserved in our present context. Objective spirit is the medium through which we participate in our socio-historical situation, understand our place in it, communicate with each other, and interact." In Hegel objective spirit was ideal and universal; in Dilthey it assumes a pragmatic, empirical, realistic character (see Dilthey 1910/1927: 148-52; Makkreel and Oman 2002: 170-74). The role of the humanities is to raise that low-level local empiricism to a higher transregional and transnational (and ideally "universal") level and thus to "transform[] the real knowledge of ordinary life into the conceptual cognition of disciplinary discourse."

life: facts are *appropriated* by *die Bedeutsamkeit*, which is not, *pace* Makkreel and Oman, exactly "significance." The *-sam* suffix can be used in two ways, to indicate a quality (compare *-haft*, *-voll*) or an ability (compare *-bar, -abel*[3]). For example, *biegen* is "to bend" and *biegsam* is "flexible, bendable." Facts, we might venture, are appropriated by *signifiability* as what more literally might be translated "the determinedness of the meaning-link/-joint out of the whole." And just as signifiability is not a meaning but an ability either to mean or to find or assign a meaning, and as a *Bedeutungsglied* is not a meaning, or even a mechanical meaning-link or meaning-joint in an articulated machine, but an affordance provided to living experiencers attempting to link the meanings of individual events into the meaning of a nexus of life, so too is a fact not an extrahuman object but another affordance mustered by those human life-experiencers in their construction of a meaning-nexus.

The moment in that passage that is signifiable for Hölderlin's poetic affordances comes in the second paragraph. "Everything involves the illumination and explication of life itself," and the poet is engaged in that same effort; but some properties of the life-environment seem to be unavailable to the animals that live and function in it, and the poet has the ability to "mine"—expose not just as facts but as affordances—those hidden or obscured things. "So entsteht im Dichtenden der Eindruck der Inspiration," Dilthey writes: "So arises in the poet the impression of inspiration." As we'll see Charlie Louth noting in section 5f, "Hölderlin wanted the same immanence in his own time, he wanted his poetry to be able to provoke the passage of the Spirit, to be inspired, as he

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3 *-abel* is a Latinate suffix, like English -able: acceptable is *akzeptabel*, disputable is *disputabel*, incommensurable is *inkommensurabel*, and so on.

saw Pindar's to have been. Pindar provided the traces of the Spirit, one of its best and most expressive forms" (Louth 1998: 125).

Another way to put it: the "inspired" Hölderlin stands to ordinary life-experiencers as the "inspired" Maurice Merleau-Ponty stands to Wilhelm Dilthey. As Hölderlin was able to mine "the passage of the Spirit" as poetic affordances that for lesser poets (not to mention non-poets) were simply missing resources, so too was Merleau-Ponty able to mine and specify as affordances the facts of the way the human body is bound up with lived experience in the environment of human life, which for Dilthey were simply "not further specifiable."

4.4 The Narrativization of Mental Representations

Elsewhere Dilthey writes:

> Im Erleben war uns das eigene Selbst weder in der Form seines Abflusses, noch in der Tiefe dessen, was es einschließt, erfaßbar. Denn wie eine Insel erhebt sich aus unzugänglichen Tiefen der kleine Umkreis des bewußten Lebens. Aber der Ausdruck hebt aus diesen Tiefen heraus. Er ist schaffend. Und so wird uns um Verstehen das Leben selber zugänglich, zugänglich als ein Nachbilden des Schaffens. (Dilthey 1910/1927: 220)

> In lived experience we grasp the self neither in the form of its full course nor in the depths of what it encompasses. For the scope of conscious life rises like a small island from inaccessible depths. But an expression can tap those depths. It is creative. Thus in understanding, life itself can become accessible through the re-creation of creation. (Transl. Makkreel/Oman 2002: 241)

What makes *das Leben* ("life") *zugänglich* ("accessible") to *das Verstehen* ("the understanding")? What, to put it in affordance-theoretical terms, *affords* life to the animal's ability to act? Not necessarily (in)direct perception—though arguably Dilthey's formulation is another way of framing what Che-

mero calls direct perception. For Dilthey, it is *ein Ausdruck* ("an expression"). To us word-oriented humanists that immediately suggests a verbal utterance, but of course an *Ausdruck*/expression can also be a nonverbal response of some sort, a facial expression or other kinesthetic expression of feelings or other body states, in humans or other animals; and, as we'll see, Dilthey also explored music as an *Ausdruck eines Erlebnisses* ("expression of lived experience"). Dilthey's paraphrase of that *Ausdruck*/expression at the end of the quotation just above is specifically *so wird uns um Verstehen das Leben selber zugänglich, zugänglich als ein Nachbilden des Schaffens* ("in understanding, life itself can become accessible through the re-creation of creation"). The (here nominalized) verb *nachbilden* implies the creation of an accurate after-image: creating an after-image of life makes life accessible to humanity, and thus for the humanities.

Would that be a "mental representation," then? To the extent that the brain (not just in humans) is in the business of converting sense data into coherent representations of the world, yes, of course. Chemero explains that "the role of mental representations in explanations of adaptive behavior is as causally potent, information-carrying vehicles," and that "the representation plays a role in the causal economy of the agent, and, because it carries information about the environment, allows the behavior it causes to be appropriate for the environment" (Chemero 2009: 50). In his campaign for radical embodied cognitive science Chemero champions "direct perception" as an *exclusion* of such representations; but the unsuspecting reader of that advocacy is left wondering not only how any animal could survive in any environment without cerebrally mediated information about it, but how any living creature with a brain could possibly *exist* without receiving such information.

It turns out that what Chemero wants to exclude is not mental representations as such but the inferential *processing* of such representations:

> To claim that perception is direct is to claim that perception is not the result of mental gymnastics, of inferences performed on sensory representations. The direct perception view is anti-representationalism about perception, so it is just the right kind of theory of perception for radical embodied cognitive science. When an animal perceives something directly, the animal is in nonmediated contact with that thing. This implies, of course, that the perceiving isn't inside the animal, but rather is part of a system that includes both the animal and the perceived object. (Chemero 2009: 98)

The problem, in other words, is not mental *representations* but mental *gymnastics*: logical inferences, which is to say conscious propositional thought. Presumably Chemero wants to imagine environmental affordances for say single-celled organisms that move toward food sources and away from extremes of hot or cold—or at the very least for animals without language, and thus without the access to logical operations that language makes possible. It's difficult to imagine what sort of information single-celled organisms receive about their environment, but in order to explain their ability to move in directions that seem purposive to us we do have to theorize their access to such information; and certainly it has long been an accepted scientific fact that wolves, birds, and bees receive and act on extensive information about their environments.

It disturbs me, however, that Chemero wants to call that "*nonmediated* contact." The systemic perspective in which perception (and thus "mind") is *extended* as well as embodied, embedded, and enactive is an important corrective to older individualized models of perception; but in what sense exactly is extended perception "nonmediated"? Surely (see Robinson 2013) extended perception, whether visual, haptic, or

kinesthetic, *is* mediation? Surely what Chemero means is that the animal is in embodied, embedded, extended, enactive, and affective (4EA) *mediated* contact with the thing—and indeed that that mediated animal-thing contact of engagement is itself the systemic basis for the dynamic relationality of affordances?

One might be inclined to argue that Dilthey's take on all this remains individuated, perhaps because he theorized the *Zusammenhang des Lebens* nearly a century before Varela et al. (1991: enactivism) and Clark/Chalmers (1998: extended mind) and the beginning of 4EA cognitive science: for him the hermeneutical intertwining of life is the "autobiographical" phenomenology of the individual's entire life as experienced historically, not just one moment at a time but one hermeneutical interpretation of life at a time, intertwined directionally. He uses the analogue of music:

> aber was so fixiert ist, ist eine Idealdarstellung eines Verlaufes, eines musikalischen oder dichterischen Erlebniszusammenhanges; und was gewahren wir da? Teile eines Ganzes, die in der Zeit vorwärts sich entwickeln. Aber in jedem Teil ist wirksam, was wir eine Tendenz nennen. Ton folgt auf Ton und tritt neben ihn nach den Gesetzen unseres Tonsystemes; aber innerhalb desselben liegen unendliche Möglichkeiten, und in der Richtung von einer derselben gehen die Töne so vorwärts, daß die frühere bedingt sind durch die späteren. (Dilthey 1910/1927: 220–21)

> What is fixed in this way is an ideal bodying forth of a process, of a musical or poetic nexus[4] of lived experience. And what do we ob-

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4 A "nexus" of course is a connectedness or a connected group, like a network or a web, from the Latin for binding, tying, or fastening together; Makkreel/Oman (2002), who mostly use "nexus," also often translate *der Zusammenhang* as "connectedness" or "context," whenever they believe Dilthey is using it descriptively rather than as a technical term. Carr (1986: 76) translates Dilthey's *Zusammenhang* as "coherence," from the Latin for "clinging together." All four are accurate and useful translations of the German sense of "hanging to-

serve here? Parts of a whole that develop and move forward in time. In each part there is operative what we call a tendency. Tone follows upon tone and aligns itself with it according to the laws of our tonal system. This system leaves open infinite possibilities, but in the direction of one of these possibilities, tones proceed in such a way that earlier ones are conditioned by subsequent ones. (Transl. Makkreel/Oman 2002: 241; translation modified slightly)

Each *moment* is directionalized—*wirksam* ("operative") with *was wir eine Tendenz nennen* ("what we call a tendency")—because it's not an ontological moment but a hermeneutical one, a phenomenological one, an active part of *ein Erlebniszusammenhang* ("an intertwining of experience") that organizes experience in meaningful ways.

But the apparent individuation of that *Zusammenhang* is only notional, based on the default assumption—another traditional and therefore collective *Zusammenhang*—in the early twentieth century that all experience is individual. In fact, of course, Dilthey's invocation of *die historische Kontinuität der Tradition* ("the historical continuity of tradition") makes the *Erlebniszusammenhang* ("nexus/intertwining of lived experience") or *Lebenszusammenhang* ("nexus/intertwining of life") not individual but collective:

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gether." In translating Benjamin's use of the phrase, however, I have retranslated *Zusammenhang* as "intertwining," for two reasons: one, Benjamin also uses the verb *zusammenhängen*, and there is no verb form of "nexus," and two, in those four Latinate terms the semantics of clinging/binding/tying/connecting together is buried in the Latin roots, and the kinesthetic intensity of Benjamin's rhetoric in the essay seems to demand a more robust embodiment of the clinging. This is especially true, it seems to me, because the entities that cling together in Benjamin's essay are not prehermeneutic life and hermeneutic expressions of life but languages and texts imagined as large animate creatures that tussle and clash.

> In einem weiteren Sinne ist auch Musik Ausdruck eines Erlebnisses. Erlebnis bezeichnet hier jede Art von Verbindung einzelner Erlebnisse in Gegenwart und in Erinnerung, Ausdruck einen Phantasievorgang, in welchem das Erlebnis hineinscheint in die historisch fortentwickelte Welt der Töne, in der alle Mittel, Ausdruck zu sein, sich in der historischen Kontinuität der Tradition verbunden ist. (Dilthey 1910/1927: 221)

> But there is a wider sense in which music too is the expression of lived experience. Here "lived experience" designates every kind of linking of specific experiences in the present and in memory; analogously, "expression" designates an imaginative process in which lived experience illuminates the historically evolved world of tones, in which all the ways of being expressive have been connected in the historical continuity of the tradition. (Transl. Makkreel/Oman 2002: 242)

Here the musical analogy makes it clear that *der Zusammenhang des Lebens/Erlebnisses* ("the nexus/intertwining of life/lived experience") is *eine Verbindung* ("a linking") *einzelner Erlebnisse in Gegenwart und in Erinnerung* ("of specific experiences in the present and in memory") not just of the individual but of the collective that has afforded the individual the ability to engage the environment productively, which is to say constitutively.

Lest we leap to the conclusion that this constitutivity is an origin myth, an event that happened once some time in the past and is simply "encountered" by individual animals, we should remember the dynamism of Chemero's radical embodied cognitive science: the relationality of animals and environment is constantly being *(re)constituted* as affordances, as the operative arm of *der Zusammenhang des Lebens/Erlebnisses* ("the nexus/intertwining of life/lived experience"). I noted earlier that the affordances generated in and by and through the engagement of animals with their environment are *learned*, so that an animal entering (or waking up to) a familiar environment is not participating in a *new* extended perception of a "meaning-laden environment," as if the lading of that envi-

ronment with meaning had happened long before the animal engaged it and now must be generated from scratch; rather, the animal is *reactivating* the learned meanings with which that same extended-perception system (i.e., including the animal) had previously laden it. What Dilthey's hermeneutic adds to that formulation is the *directionality* or *historicity* of what has been learned: there is a possibly *unconscious narrativity* to the *Zusammenhang.*

Unconscious? I take it that is what Dilthey means by *wie eine Insel erhebt sich aus unzugänglichen Tiefen der kleine Umkreis des bewußten Lebens* ("the tiny ambit of conscious life rises like a small island from inaccessible depths"): *conscious* life rises from the depths of the *unconscious.* And if those depths are not so much the Freudian unconscious of the repressed but simply whatever we're not consciously aware of, they can also be the depths of habit, of actions and abilities that have been automated through habitualized repetition. I also take it that something like habitualization is a large part of what Chemero means by "direct perception": we are typically not aware of what we're perceiving, or of the extent to which our perception is extended out to co-experience with our environments. Any sudden change in our environment—a loud noise, a large shadow suddenly falling on us from above, etc.—may drive our co-experiential perception a few steps "up" into "more" conscious awareness; but even for humans, and *a fortiori* for non-human animals, there is no clear demarcation between "full" unconsciousness and "full" consciousness.

Narrativity? I take it that is what Dilthey means by *in der Richtung von einer derselben [Möglichkeiten] gehen die Töne so vorwärts, daß die frühere bedingt sind durch die späteren* ("in the direction of one of these possibilities, tones proceed in such a way that earlier ones are conditioned by subsequent ones"). It is difficult to fathom just how subsequent "tones" (or remembered

"events") might condition earlier ones, except insofar as what we are co-experiencing is what Derrida calls an iterability that is built into the recursive structuring of the hermeneutical *Zusammenhang*. Not a first time, in other words, but an nth time: always in the middle of a sequence that is constantly doubling back on itself, finding its laters in its earliers, and using those laters to impose *die Mitteilbarkeit* ("communicability" or "mediability") on those earliers.

5   Understanding the Affordances of the Translator

5.1 Benjamin on the Source Text as Unmetaphorically Alive

And now, finally, let us return to translation. I mentioned before that Benjamin early in the essay forecloses on translationality as an affordance for human life-experiencers, and thus on experienceability; for Dilthey too *die Äußerungen des Lebens innigst mit dem Lebendigen zusammenhängen* ("expressions of life are intimately intertwined with living beings"), but as Benjamin rereads him they are so intertwined *ohne ihm etwas zu bedeuten* ("without having any significance for those beings"). In Benjamin's Diltheyan analogy, the source text is the "living being," and the translation is the "expression of life" that has no significance for the source text.

But what does it mean for the source text to be alive? Benjamin tells us that we are to understand the "life" or aliveness of a text *in völlig unmetaphorischer Sachlichkeit* (Benjamin 1923/1972: 10) ("in fully unmetaphorical objectivity," transl. Robinson 2023c: 36); but in what way can a *text* be objectively and unmetaphorically alive? The mystical symbolism that Benjamin takes from the thirteenth-century Lurianic Kabba-

lah would suggest that texts are low-level emanations of the divine, or at least of ideal Forms from Plato's Realm of Ideas/ Forms, as mobilized by the demiurgic Logos of Philo Judaeus (ibid.: 142); they are given fully unmetaphorical life by the spark of the divine, but because they come in contact with human beings, that spark is concealed by a shell that Kabbalists call Kelipot. In Benjamin's mystical hermeneutic the task of the translator is to translate literally, finding the point of maximum friction between the source and target languages, so as to rub the shells up against each other until ultimately, some time in the utopian future, they crumble away and reveal the divine light of pure language.

5.2 Finding Hölderlinian Affordances in Benjamin

But let us now attempt to read that scene with higher granularity, informed by the imagistic path we have been pursuing through affordance theory in sections 2–4. As I mentioned in section 2.2, Benjamin's brief but supercharged engagement with the affordances of the translator comes toward the end of his essay, when he comes to the translations of Pindar and Sophocles by Friedrich Hölderlin:

> Gar die Wörtlichkeit hinsichtlich der Syntax wirft jede Sinneswiedergabe vollends über den Haufen und droht geradenwegs ins Unverständliche zu führen. Dem neunzehnten Jahrhundert standen Hölderlins Sophokles-Übersetzungen als monströse Beispiele solcher Wörtlichkeit vor Augen. … Hierfür wie in jeder andern wesentlichen Hinsicht stellen sich Hölderlins Übertragungen, besonders die der beiden Sophokleischen Tragödien, bestätigend dar. In ihnen ist die Harmonie der Sprachen so tief, daß der Sinn nur noch wie eine Äolsharfe vom Winde von der Sprache berührt wird. Hölderlins Übersetzungen sind Urbilder ihrer Form; sie verhalten sich auch zu den vollkommensten Übertragungen ihrer Texte als das Urbild zum Vorbild, wie es der Vergleich der Hölderlinschen und Borchardtschen Übersetzung der dritten pythischen Ode von Pindar zeigt.

Eben darum wohnt in ihnen vor andern die ungeheure und ursprüngliche Gefahr aller Übersetzung: daß die Tore einer so erweiterten und durchwalteten Sprache zufallen und den Übersetzer ins Schweigen schließen. Die Sophokles-Übersetzungen waren Hölderlins letztes Werk. In ihnen stürzt der Sinn von Abgrund zu Abgrund, bis er droht in bodenlosen Sprachtiefen sich zu verlieren. (Benjamin 1923/1972: 17, 20–21)

In fact a literal rendering of the syntax totally flips the reproduction of meaning on its head and threatens to lead straight into the incomprehensible. To the nineteenth century Hölderlin's translations of Sophocles stood as monstrous examples of such literalism. … Hölderlin's translations are prototypes of their Form. … They stand in relation to even the most perfect transpositions of their source texts as "primordial image" (*Urbild* = prototype, archetype) to "pre-image" (*Vorbild* = model, exemplar, paragon). Any comparison of Hölderlin's translations of Pindar's third Pythian Ode with Borchardt's will show that clearly. And because of that, in them lurks the most appalling primal peril of all translation: that when the gates of language have been so savagely sprung they may slam shut and enclose the translator in silence. The translations of *Antigone* and *Oedipus Rex* were Hölderlin's last work. In them sense plunges from abyss to abyss until it risks losing itself in the bottomless pit of language. (Transl. Robinson 2023c: 131, 179)

What stands out there in affordance-theoretical terms is the clashing convergence of the imageries of superhuman success ("prototypes of their Form") and all-too-human failure ("enclose the translator in silence"). What affords Hölderlin the ability to surpass every other translator who has ever lived also encloses him in silence. The cognitive and perhaps affective dissonance between those two outcomes—and arguably even two divergent affordances, one for success and one for failure, each inside the other—has proved insurmountable for some readers, and they have sought to collapse the dissonance into simple failure. Paul de Man (1986: 62), for example, first turns the dark Romanticism of Hölderlin plunging from abyss to abyss into a fairly mundane technical literary

reference—those "abysses" were nothing but "a *mise en abyme* structure, the kind of structure by means of which it is clear that the text itself becomes an example of what it exemplifies"—and then into another example of the inevitable failure of the translator to translate.[5] And Peter Fenves (2011: 150) argues that Benjamin *does not* celebrate Hölderlin's achievement, indeed disapproves of it, so that Benjamin's horror at silence becomes a horror at a translator's failure to translate properly: "The translations of Sophocles have no regular interval Δ, hence no direction, and therefore verge on senselessness." These readings, of course, ignore Benjamin's insistence that Hölderlin's translations were prototypes of their Form. For Benjamin, near-perfection; for de Man and Fenves, failure.

Another way of resolving the apparent clash of affordances might be to lodge a factual correction: "The translations of *Antigone* and *Oedipus Rex* were [*not*] Hölderlin's last work." He finished them in 1803–4, just before their 1804 publication, and continued to write poetry for the rest of his long life, living in Zimmer's tower till he died in 1843 at the age of 73; his later work included the famous 1812 lyric "Die Linien des Lebens" ("The Lines of Life"). Sometimes after playing the piano for the tourists that showed up at the tower to see him and ask for his autograph he would write an impromptu poem for them. And if the implication is that trans-

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5   See Bannet (1993: 583) for a persuasive deflation of de Man's offhand attempt to deflate Benjamin's mysticism by making everything in the "Task" about either death—for de Man translations "'kill the original' (C 84) by using language 'destructively' and 'nihilistically' to plunge the original 'from abyss to abyss until it threatens to become lost in the bottomless depths of language' (C 84)"—or mere technicalities "in the service of linguistic fundamentalism and an ultimate and ironic political nihilism" (Pence 1996: 85; see also Porter 1989).

lating Pindar and Sophocles drove him crazy, he was diagnosed with schizophrenia in the late 1790s, *before* he set his hand to translating Pindar (1800), and well before he tackled Sophocles. The prognosis that gave him no more than three years to live came after the 1804 publication of the Sophocles, in 1806; but there is no reason to assume that he was any "crazier" then than he was at his first diagnosis seven or eight years earlier.

In the light of this historical correction Hölderlin's apparent "failure" might be revealed as nothing more than Benjamin's desire to punch up the actual life-intertwining affordances of Hölderlin's experimental translations from ancient Greek into a more dramatic story. It may in fact be that Benjamin simply didn't have reliable access to Hölderlin's biography, and that the lurid imagery of "the gates of language had slammed shut and enclosed Hölderlin in silence" and "sense plunges from abyss to abyss until it risks losing itself in the bottomless pit of language" were therefore simply productions of his own dark Romantic imagination.

5.3 Pindarian Affordances in the Classical Study of Ancient Greek

Rather than taking sides on Benjamin's failure/success cluster, I propose in subsections 5.3–5.6 to make a brief pass through Charlie Louth's (1998: 103–49) chapter on Hölderlin's translation of Pindar.

Our starting point for that story, however, has to come before the moment at which Louth starts the account, namely the classicist *normativization* of (the nexus of) literary translation from the ancient Greeks. Hölderlin, after all, knew not only how Pindar had been translated into German before him, but the obvious facts that we tend to take for granted:

the differences between ancient Greek and modern Greek; the differences between Greek and German; the fact that Pindar was a poet; the fact that since antiquity he has been considered both the greatest and the most difficult of the nine lyric poets of ancient Greece; what poetry is, what lyric poetry is, what verse form is, and in what verse forms Pindar wrote; and so on. These are all affordances provided Hölderlin by "the tradition," the historical life-nexus of translating from ancient Greek into German. They are relational objects "thematized" in and by and as his life-world, and they are specifically normative ones—affordances considered "correct" by the tradition. As such they would have been learned—dynamically—by Hölderlin in the course of learning ancient Greek; but presumably he would not have read or been told that these are *norms* of modern Pindar translation. As I argue in Robinson (2020), a dynamic (temporal) phenomenology of normativity tends to construct norms participatorily, through the experience of repetition: "the norms of translation" as studied by Gideon Toury (1995) and Andrew Chesterman (1993) and others as stable laws are the products not only of learning but of forgetting that one has learned.[6] What a normatively stabilized environment affords the translator is not

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6   For a reading of translational norm theory from Chesterman (1993) and Toury (1995) to Robinson (2020), see Halverson/Kotze (2021). They note that Toury's (2012: 284-89) revised edition of Toury (1995) makes the shift from the earlier notion both he and Chesterman promoted of a conscious propositional "legislation" or at least "negotiation" of norms to a model in which translators unconsciously imagine audiences and audience responses, and that by not taking Toury's 2012 revision into account, I end up caricaturing his norm theory based on the earlier formulations alone (Toury 1995: 58–59). What remains new and important in my account, however, they say, is that I am the first to couch norm theory explicitly in the context of 4EA cognitive science.

only the safety of conformity—of knowing how to conform—but the reassuring illusion of a stable hierarchy between law-givers and law-obeyers.

Pushing a little harder on that initial formulation, we can begin to explore how a specific translator like Hölderlin is afforded the desire and the ability to translate a difficult poet like Pindar. Remember, from p. 248 above, that Benjamin outlined the *less* authentic definition of translatability as *ob es unter der Gesamtheit seiner Leser je seinen zulänglichen Übersetzer finden werde?* ("whether among all of its readers a translator able to translate it is ever found"). In my commentary on that passage in Robinson (2023c: 26) I noted that this "has to do with the relative difficulty of the source text and the relative translation skill of the human translator, and the impossibility of being 100% certain of either. How difficult does a text have to be to translate for that to count as a problem? How good does a translator have to be at translating that specific text for the translation that results to count as a translation?" While these questions are impossible to answer in the abstract, and very difficult to answer for either any individual translator considering whether to undertake a specific translation or any editor seeking to hire a translator in a specific translational environment, "this is," I added, "the commonsensical level on which we typically think about translatability."

It is also, of course, the realm in which the *task* of the translator is typically normativized, and thus in which both the translator and the editor must decide whether the translator has what it takes—the affordance(s)—to complete the task. As Jacques Derrida puts it,

> Le titre dit aussi, dès son premier mot, la tâche (*Aufgabe*), la mission à laquelle on est (toujours par l'autre) destiné, l'engagement, le devoir, la dette, la responsabilité. Il y va déjà d'une loi, d'une injonction dont le traducteur doit répondre. (Derrida 1985: 219)

> The title [of Benjamin's essay] also says, from its first word, the task (*Aufgabe*), the mission to which one is destined (always by the other), the commitment, the duty, the debt, the responsibility. Already at stake is a law, an injunction for which the translator has to be responsible. (Transl. Graham 1985: 175)

Like the "laws" that Toury (1995) and Chesterman (1993) call translation "norms," of course, those injunctions or expectations are not laws at all but affordances organized and mobilized collectively by that *Lebenszusammenhang* or *Lebenswelt* that we call the translation marketplace, and learned dynamically, and often unconsciously, by translators as they become increasingly competent in the "community of practice" (Wenger 1999) of that marketplace.

5.4 Romantic Literalist Affordances

Now one could argue that Walter Benjamin's theory of translation was an idiosyncratic view shaped as an affordance not by the marketplace but by the Jewish mysticism in which he had been dabbling for nearly a decade with his friend Gershom Scholem. But in fact there was a larger esoteric *Zusammenhang des Lebens* ("nexus/intertwining of life") that had been shaping his orientation not only to Jewish mysticism but to his transcendental metaphysics of translation, namely, German Romanticism. Antoine Berman (2008, Wright 2018 in English) and other Benjamin scholars have wanted to claim that German Romanticism was the *total* environment shaping Benjamin's translation-theoretical affordances; and while that is manifestly not true—his pre-Kantian transcendental essentialism may be difficult for some of his admirers to swallow, but it really is undeniable—it did nevertheless wield enormous influence. It was a major affordance in Benjamin's early philosophy of language. And given his assertion that Friedrich Hölderlin was the greatest translator who ever lived—

that his translations of *Oedipus the King* and *Antigone* were "prototypes of their Form," more perfect than even the most perfect human translations ever—it is worth noting that the German Romantic *Zusammenhang des Übersetzens* or translational life-nexus yielded both Hölderlin and Benjamin (and of course many others) a literalist affordance of translation. For German Romantics and post-Romantics, and arguably for anachronistic pre-Romantics like Benjamin as well, literal translation was a "marketplace" norm. Hence Louth (1998) devotes his first chapter to the emergence of that marketplace norm through the work of the German translators who Benjamin says *[haben] morsche Schranken der eigenen Sprache [gebrochen]: Luther, Voß, Hölderlin, George haben die Grenzen des Deutschen erweitert* (Benjamin 1923/1972: 19) ("[have] smashe[d] through the target language's rotten barricades: Luther, Voß, Hölderlin, and George all pushed back the boundaries of the German language," transl. Robinson 2023c: 164)—specifically by translating literally. Luther is famous as a staunch opponent of literal translation, of course—he insisted that you have to go into the houses, the streets, the markets and watch Germans' mouths move as they speak, and translate that way (Robinson 1997/³2014: 87)—but as Louth (1998: 9) points out, he did also admit that in certain passages he translated literally, because, as Jerome had put it long before, in those places the word order contained a mystery.

Voß was perhaps the prime mover of this Romantic affordance of translation:

> Voss's method was to adopt a very close equivalent to Homer's hexameters (essentially identical, allowing for the different nature of metrics in German and Greek) and to retain too, as far as possible, the syntax, the word-order and the forms of individual words. Doing this, he found that German was capable of a reflection of the Greek not previously imagined possible, and the whole idea of the shape of German was changed. Voss found for it a flexibility and plasticity it

> had not hitherto possessed, or which had been deadened by the normalization and rationalization the *Aufklärung* [Enlightenment] had subjected it to. […] The new resources of expression Voss opened or retrieved were not solely due to the direct influence of Greek: he also revived old and dialect words in the manner of Luther, who was a model in this respect. (Louth 1998: 26–27)

Note there the resonances with our discussion in the Introduction (p. 38–39): "the whole idea of the shape of German was changed" is obviously what Husserl calls *ein Wandel der Thematik* ("a change/transformation of the theme"), and possibly, as that new literalist "theme" took hold—"Voss did effect a kind of revolution in taste, in that what was at first almost universally misunderstood came to be accepted as a classic" (Louth 1998: 28)—what Dilthey called the *Richtung* or directionality in which *gehen die Töne so vorwärts, daß die frühere bedingt sind durch die späteren* ("tones proceed in such a way that earlier ones are conditioned by subsequent ones") The new "flexibility and plasticity" that Voß found for German was a new affordance, one "it had not hitherto possessed, or which had been deadened by the normalization and rationalization the *Aufklärung* had subjected it to." "The new resources of expression Voss opened or retrieved" were also affordances of translation that later Romantic translators, notably A. W. Schlegel in his brilliant Shakespeare (1797–1810)—still today, two centuries later, the standard go-to German translation—put to good use.

But what about those two centuries? Louth makes clear that the Romantic literalist affordances of translation took hold in German in a deeply transformative way. Those Romantic and post-Romantic affordances do not extend down into the professional translation marketplace, but for high-level German translators of classic literature they are still in force. Not necessarily as norms—certainly not as laws—but as affordances, *Zusammenhänge* that make literal translation

not only doable but attractive. (Another way of saying "not only doable but attractive" would be that they are affordances for translators and target readers alike.)

As for the long century from Schlegel's Shakespeare to Benjamin's "Aufgabe," the key name in Benjamin's list of German-expanders for his own time was Stefan George (1868–1933), whose *Umdichtungen* of Baudelaire, Mallarmé, Dante, Shakespeare, and many other poets were saturated in the German Romantic literalist affordances. The relations between Benjamin (and other Jewish literati) and the George circle in the 1920s and early 1930s, before Hitler came to power and George fled Germany to neutral Switzerland (and died there the year after, in 1933), were complex. George was himself not anti-Semitic, and there were a few Jewish members of his circle, but George was wary of letting Jews become a majority. Also, his nostalgic aristocratic ethos and the emphasis he placed in his poetry on self-sacrifice, heroism, and power were appealing to the Nazis, who claimed him as one of their own—though George secretly opposed Hitler, and two members of his circle were later ringleaders of the July 20 (1944) plot to assassinate Hitler. One of the major affordances of German Romanticism beginning early on, during the occupation of the German principalities by Napoleon from 1806 to 1814, was a nationalistic nostalgia for the medieval greatness of Germany—the Hohenstaufen emperors of the Holy Roman Empire, the *Nibelungenlied,* and later Wagner's *Ring* cycle—and that whole life-nexus did tend to afford Nazi proclivities and hatred of the Jews as rootless "internationals." After the destruction of Nazi Germany in the war, too, George's work was banned due to suspicion of Nazism. But his 1928 book *Das neue Reich* ("the new realm"), which contained a poem titled "Geheimes Deutschland" ("secret Germany"), was a paean to an aristocratic Germany, not *das*

dritte Reich ("the Third Reich"). Benjamin's early attraction to ancient mysticisms tended to link him in many people's mind to this same nationalistic Romanticism; indeed in addition to Benjamin, the most prominent admirers of Hölderlin's radical translations of Pindar and Sophocles in the 1920s were Martin Heidegger and the George circle.

When Benjamin wrote the "Aufgabe" in 1921, then, the life-nexus that afforded him the fervent commitment to literalism that supercharges the essay was not ancient history. It was very much the cultural environment in which he lived and wrote. For whatever reason, however, it was not the cultural environment in which he translated, and above all published his translations; hence the gulf, on which many Benjamin scholars have commented, between "Die Aufgabe des Übersetzers" and the stiff, musty translation of Baudelaire to which that essay was attached as *Vorwort* ("foreword"). One is tempted to blame "the marketplace" and its sense-for-sense norms for this, but Stefan George was publishing his brilliantly Romantic transcreations in that same marketplace, and presumably Benjamin could have done the same; perhaps it is enough to say that the German Romantic literalist affordance enabled him to write *about* translation in ecstatic ways that he was unable to mobilize when he *made* translations, without speculating on the reasons for the split.

So now let us turn to Hölderlin's Pindar translations, as tracked by Charlie Louth (1998). What, let us ask, were the affordances of that translation, and how did the reciprocity of his engagement with his cultural environment generate those affordances, and how did he act on them? And then, in the Conclusion (section 6): what affordances do they generate for us? How can and do we use them?

5.5 The Affordances of Influence

First, consider what literary historians discuss under the rubric of "influence." An influence is manifestly a literary affordance, but an affectively-becoming-cognitively fraught one: since the transformative work on influence by Harold Bloom (1973, 1975) we have known both its enabling and its disabling power, and the convoluted lengths to which poets can go to manage and mobilize the resulting anxiety. Louth too invokes Bloom's *Anxiety of Influence* in discussing Hölderlin's career as a poet and translator (Louth 1998: 133–35); he notes that the first major influence on the young Hölderlin, in his mid-twenties, was Friedrich Schiller, who took to Hölderlin immediately and was busy launching him on an illustrious career when the young ephebe suddenly left Jena, without warning. Schiller apparently was furious and would not answer Hölderlin's letters for a year and a half; and Hölderlin scholars to this day do not know what precipitated the departure. One line of speculation, which Louth too raises (ibid.: 132), is that the anxiety of influence was too overwhelming: Hölderlin had to cut and run to avoid being subsumed into the orbit of Schiller's precursor-power. He was already writing exclusively Schiller-influenced poetry.

From a very early age, Hölderlin had known that he wanted to look for guidance from F. G. Klopstock (1724–1803) and Pindar; "of these," Louth notes, "Pindar affected Hölderlin's poetry most directly and radically, though Klopstock probably provided the means for that to be possible, a language into which Pindar could come" (Louth 1998: 132). (Elsewhere Louth notes that "probably none of the versions [of Pindar by Hölderlin] would have turned out thus without the revolution in poetic diction performed by Klopstock" [ibid.: 52–53].) Pindar of course had the advantage of being

long dead, giving Hölderlin the distance and freedom to manipulate his influence, especially by translating him; but "coming under Pindar's influence, though spared the tensions of personal contact, he was also subject to the total historical pressure of antiquity" (ibid.: 132), and Hölderlin was "aware that even the desire for originality was only a reaction against an attitude of subordination to antiquity which had become the norm, and that there could be no simple evasion of its prerogative" (ibid.). By the time Hölderlin came to translate Pindar, in 1800, numerous notable attempts had already been made to render him into German, by the Swiss Johann Jacob Steinbrüchel (1729-1796) in 1759, by Voß "in the style of Klopstock" (Louth 1998: 47) in 1777, by Friedrich Gedike (1754–1803) also in 1777 (this one Hölderlin owned), and by several of the other usual Romantic suspects, such as Wilhelm von Humboldt and A. W. Schlegel. By the time Hölderlin began translating Pindar in 1800, in other words, the leading literati in the German-speaking principalities had been at work generating affordances for the literal translation of Pindar for nearly a half century.

5.6 The Affordances of Romanticized Ancient Greece

In addition, of course, there was the German Enlightenment/Romantic veneration of ancient Greece, which had been emerging over roughly that same half century. As Louth puts it, "ancient Greece was principally important to Hölderlin as a time and place of divine immanence" (Louth 1998: 125), but that conception of ancient Greece was another early-Romantic affordance. When Louth adds that "Pindar's poetry had both recorded and itself been a manifestation of the immanent Spirit" (ibid.), he means not the printed Greek words of Pindar's poems but the Pindar affordance emerging

out of the engagement of dozens of late-Enlightenment/early-Romantic translator-"animals" with the textual-becoming-cultural environment they called "Pindar." And Louth's summation of that affordance shows Hölderlin mobilizing it not just *for* translation but *through* translation for his own poetry: "Hölderlin wanted the same immanence in his own time, he wanted his poetry to be able to provoke the passage of the Spirit, to be inspired, as he saw Pindar's to have been. Pindar provided the traces of the Spirit, one of its best and most expressive forms" (ibid.).

Hölderlin did not translate Pindar for publication. It was a private school for him, an exercise, a training ground for his own poetry. He translated Pindar in an attempt to transform the way he wrote poetry. As Louth notes, "in the main, and sometimes for long stretches of text, Hölderlin proceeds 'mechanically,' letting himself be guided by each Greek word as it comes, in a remarkable attitude of submission" (Louth 1998: 111). He was like the diligent student spending long hours practicing a difficult translation task in order to shine in the foreign language classroom—and perhaps, later, in the foreign country (though Hölderlin had precious little experience of foreign countries). But as the preceding paragraphs should make clear, he did not choose Pindar at random. In a very real sense the "extended mind" or life-nexus of the Romantic intellectuals and artists in the German-speaking world of his day, including of course Hölderlin himself, chose Pindar for (and by and as) him. Literalism was an affordance for translating Pindar, not necessarily because Voß and Schlegel and the others had afforded literalism for Romantic literati as the most brilliant way to showcase an author in German (as Benjamin would later claim), but because Hölderlin wanted to *get inside* Pindar, to feel what it was like to write poetry like

Pindar. But also for him Pindar was an affordance for writing a new kind of poetry:

> In Hölderlin's poetics a poem works to bring the Spirit into its dynamics, but the poems themselves inevitably fail to do so and what they voice is its absence, a sense of what it would be like through the almost unbearable desire for it to be there. Now in a sense with translation it is the same: the Greek poem can never be fully reconstituted in the German, a lack of discrepancy is always implied. But whereas in the poetry the absence, however strongly the need and the longing be realized, must always remain an absence and as such only definable in negative terms, in the translations what cannot be fully conveyed is quite specific and actual: the Greek text. By making the analogical transposition from poetic Spirit to Pindar's Greek, the poetics, at their most extreme, can be turned into a form of practice. (Louth 1998: 126)

6   Conclusion: Hölderlinian Affordances for Us

6.1 Affordances of Reading Hölderlin's Pindar

In addition to this pragmatic instrumentalization of both Pindar and literalism for the transformation of his own poetry, however, Hölderlin also developed new Pindars and new literalisms—each by working on the other. In a sense the very patient and diligent and almost "mechanical" mobilization of the Pindar-and-literalism affordances for the purpose of transforming his own poetry itself became a new environment in which Hölderlin participatorily, by engaging with it in embedded and extended ways, enacted new affordances for translation. It's not just, as Louth puts it, that "Pindar's Greek was also an established, transmitted form, and Hölderlin seems to have approached it with the intention to break it, guided by the belief in the transience of all forms, in the necessity of their yielding to new ones" (Louth 1998: 120). Nor is it just that "Hölderlin's extreme, disturbing method of

translating thus has the extra purpose of contriving a personal Pindar, of displacing him" (ibid.: 134). It's also, as Louth too insists throughout his chapter, that Hölderlin does violence to both the Greek and the German in order to make them meet in the middle. He's pushing on Pindar to make him German, and pushing on German to make it Pindar, and the result, as Louth doesn't mention, is a radically new kind of literalism that can be used by other translators—a new affordance for translators.

Louth does note that "translation is entirely a matter of relation: the nature of the relation between original and version determines the type of translation in question" (Louth 1998: 127), and that if that relation is always a change, a transformation, even a mutilation, there are countless, perhaps unlimited ways of transforming a source text in the direction of a target language. "The question for the translator," he adds, "is how that change should be managed, and whether it should be elided (concealed), or accented" (ibid.: 128). Because of the way he grappled with Pindar, Hölderlin ended up accenting the change, drawing attention to the process—indeed apparently leaving Pindar half-translated, leaving the translation process suspended in early draft form. The private purpose of the translation job allowed this, of course: in translating the two Sophocles plays for publication a few years later he polished and edited obsessively, but he was translating Pindar for himself, not for a public. As Louth expresses this, "It is a translation in which the crossing over, the intermediary stage which a conventional translator will skip over or repress, becomes uncomfortably apparent. The gap is translated. If we think of a translation as a modulation (as in music) out of the original, then the Pindar translation is an unresolved chord, with the modulation in progress. But the unresolvedness is exactly its rich potential" (Louth 1998:

119–20), and thus also its enabling affordance for later translators. But it's complicated:

> to read [the Pindar translation] is to be set in a region which is almost pre- or non-lingual or before the ordering of consciousness, because it is an unresolved mixture of different systems where the very articulation of sense seems to be both impeded and enacted. The Greek is dismantled into German words, and its structure cannot signify in them; German is given a foreign structure in which its words cannot properly operate. But this region is also extremely fertile—the translations are rich in exciting juxtapositions and sequences of syntax that startle into a new awareness of the possibilities of language. There is the sense of a resource not quite tapped. (Louth 1998: 121)

A resource, of course, is an affordance, and *not quite tapping* that resource is another kind of affordance. The latter can frustrate the target reader who expects of a translation "normal" (normative) accessibility: for the target-cultural ignorances of the source-cultural environment to be accommodated; for the prose sense of the source text's strangeness to be simplified and stylized; for the reader to be made to feel at home in a new text. The "extreme fertility" of "this region" is easy to miss, because it requires of the reader a special kind of imagination—indeed a special kind of imaginative and critical *work*. The "exciting juxtapositions and sequences of syntax that startle into a new awareness of the possibilities of language" have to be *read* that way—and reading that way is extraordinarily difficult, and therefore often frustrating.

6.2 Reifying Relational Affordances as Dispositions

In fact there is a strong affiliation between the assumption that avant-garde translations are *intrinsically* too difficult for target readers and the disposition model of affordance theory that Aleksei Procyshyn champions. If the translation-nexus in culture "universally" constructs target readers as disposi-

tionally unable to read anything difficult, the tens or hundreds of thousands of people whose lived experience enactively maintains that nexus will tend to shape translation norms around easy accessibility. Their participation in that nexus will tend to impose regulatory limits on the act of translating, so as to define and delimit translatorial effectivities as intrinsically aimed at creating a translational environment (the target text) that will in turn regulatorily afford target readers' understanding *at that low dispositional level* of critical understanding. Hence such supposed "universals" of translation as the lexical simplification of the source text, with the notorious result that "the language [of translations] is usually flatter [than that of original writing], less structured, less ambiguous, less specific to a given text, more habitual, and so on" (Pym 2010: 79, summarizing Toury 1995: 268–73).

And of course by the very principle of dynamic relationality for which Anthony Chemero advocates, the normative pressure to dumb the target-textual "environment" down to suit the static affordance-theoretical conception of the hypothetical target-lectorial "animal" as dispositionally incapable of understanding a difficult translation tends in turn to dumb actual target readers down as well. As Chemero (2009: 149) puts it, in Turvey's disposition model "affordances must be complemented by the effectivities of animals": a static regulatory environment imposes normative limitations on the animals that can function in it, and in so doing shapes and consolidates ("perfects") their "effectivities."

But that is too simple. A more nuanced formulation would have it that the normative dumb-down pressure has had the effect of transforming the target readership into two camps, a "normal" booboisie that has thoroughly and comfortably adapted to the "normal" dumbed-down target-textual environment and an "abnormal" and therefore peripher-

al and profoundly suspect elite that despises "normal" trans-
lations and either reads only in original source languages or
seeks out innovative and even experimental translations (see
Robinson 2023b).

But now note the tensions between the dynamism of
"transform the target readership" and the static binary of
"into two camps": clearly the binary in the previous para-
graph is still too simple. If we allow the transformative dy-
namism to leach over into and ultimately overrun the static
binary, we may find that the relationship between the target-
textual environment and the target-lectorial "animals" that
function in that environment to be in *constant* transformation.
Even the readers whom we might be inclined to despise as
the "normal booboisie," in other words—the ones who sup-
posedly have to read at a fourth-grade level and must never
be intellectually or affectively challenged—are subject to
change. They too can learn. And to the extent that they don't
learn, that they show no signs of changing, that fact should
itself be understood not as an indication of some static
"ideal" disposition that defines and determines "universals of
translation" but as the ever-active (re)shaping of the affor-
dances of their relational participation in specific textual en-
vironments.[7] Nor does the mere fact of being willing and
even eager to participate in a more challenging relationship
with a target-textual environment guarantee membership in
some reified elite. Even to poetically and translationally so-
phisticated readers, for example, Hölderlin's Pindar transla-

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7   The three sentences preceding this note are obviously reframings of
    the theory of foreignization from Schleiermacher through Berman
    to Venuti, with the greater narrative/explanatory detail afforded by
    the intellectual trajectory from Diltheyan hermeneutics through
    Husserlian and Merleau-Pontyan phenomenology to 4EA cognitive
    science.

tions offer poetic and translational affordances that may seem more daunting and discouraging than enabling—until they find that they *need* that affordance, even perhaps weren't looking for it but turned out to need it after all.

It's like our MA students in translation programs who don't like theory and don't want to take our theory classes because all they need is practical translation and/or interpreting skills in various domains thank you very much—and then, somehow, almost against their will, they get excited by this or that theoretical approach, and realize just how enabling that approach is *for their practical translation work*. They realize that translation is not just a mechanical and submissive reproduction of turgid source texts but can be creative and transformative—which ultimately means that their own future careers don't need to be boring and mechanical and submissive but can be creative and transformative as well. When they least expect it, the "useless" but required environment of the theory class affords them a potential for career excitement.

6.3 Hölderlinian Affordances for Experimental Translation

In closing I would say that, Walter Benjamin to the contrary, Friedrich Hölderlin is not intrinsically an exemplary or "prototypical" case. Benjamin thinks he is because Hölderlin is the most brilliant exemplar of the translation strategy for which he is arguing—and also because he has foreclosed on the target reader from the very start, and indeed in some sense on human "animals" from the very start, including the translator, and therefore is not ideally positioned to think about translation in terms of affordances for the translator or the reader. The fact is, though, that Hölderlin's translational affordances

are very much a niche affair, useful (if at all) to a very small minority.

But for some of us—some very few of us, perhaps, who translate experimental works that defy conventional translation strategies—Hölderlin's affordances can indeed be transformative. This does not necessarily mean imitating Hölderlin's precise translation strategies—indeed it would be fair to say that Hölderlin himself didn't imitate his own precise translation strategies. (He developed them, and kept developing them as he translated.) I have, for example, experimented with a radical literal translation of Benjamin's "Aufgabe" that not only seeks out German-English cognates as a (West-)Germanic version of Hölderlin's tendency to translate the etymological back-stories of Greek words into German, but also plays with line-breaks to help readers parse the strange English that results:

> Nirgends erweist sich einem Kunstwerk oder einer Kunstform gegenüber die Rücksicht auf den Aufnehmenden für deren Erkenntnis fruchtbar. (Benjamin 1923/1972: 9)

> N'wher'any erwits self to one couldwork
> or to one couldform
> againsto'er the ridgesight
> up the upnimmers
> for her erkenn'dness
> fruitbear.

> (Robinson 2023b)

The inciting question behind that experiment, obviously, is why an essay that despises sense-for-sense translation should be translated sense for sense; the follow-up question concerns what affordances the textual environment of Benjamin's "Aufgabe" might provide the translator of that essay

who feels impelled to act on the pressures arising from the inciting question. Mining Hölderlin's Pindar translations for those affordances, even if the result does not perfectly align with Benjamin's theory of translation, is one—not the only possible—response arising out of a dynamic environmental affordance relation with the essay.

But the affordances we derive from Hölderlin's Pindar might be deployed more broadly as well, to enable other kinds of experimentation. How does one translate nonsense poetry—say, заум/*zaum* ("beyonsense", see Robinson 2017b: 156–60)—or translate a homophonic translation like the Zukovskys' Catullus into another language? How does one translate lipogrammatic writing, where the source text never uses a specific letter, or, more radically, excludes all vowels but one?[8] How does one translate a collage novel, or

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8   See e.g. the first stanza of Ernst Jandl's German lipogrammatic poem "ottos mops," probably written in 1963, published in 1970:

ottos mops trotzt
otto: fort mops fort
ottos mops hopst fort
otto: soso

Elizabeth MacKiernan (Jandl 2000) has translated that like this:

Lulu's pooch droops
Lulu: Scoot, pooch, scoot!
Lulu's pooch soon scoots.
Lulu brooms room.

That's an innovative shift, from excluding every vowel-letter but "o" to excluding every vowel-phoneme but [u:]. In traditional semantic-equivalence terms, of course, "droops" is somewhat problematic for "trotzt," which involves some sort of defiant resistance, possibly including snarling and growling and the baring of teeth. How about "hoots," or "loots"? How about "croons," or "tunes"? How about "pukes," or "spooks"? (Does the "u" in "tunes" or "pukes" disqualify it? There are two "u's" in Lulu … How about the silent "e" in those words? A lipogrammatic poem takes letters [γράμματα/*gram-*

mata], not phonemes, as the criterial elements to be included or excluded; would MacKiernan's translation actually be lipophonetic?) "Brooms room" is apparently necessitated by the fact that "so so" is not a way of talking to a dog in English; MacKiernan apparently imagined an alternative scenario in which the pooch is shedding ("drooping"?) and Lulu has to sweep up the fur.

It's not difficult, though, to stick to the lipogrammatic exclusion of "a," "e," "i," "u," and "y," leaving only "o":

otto's dog won't go
otto: off dog off
otto's dog lollops off
otto: so so

"ottos mops" is online at <https://www.lyrikline.org/en/poems/o ttos-mops-1232>, where there are also links to full translations into MacKiernan's English as well as French, Russian, Turkish, and Czech (accessed January 18, 2022).

In English, of course, "so so" or "so-so" is an adjective meaning "not bad," not an adverbial interjection; and while one could read that as Otto's judgment on the way the *Mops* "pug" leaves the room, in German Otto is actually chiding/comforting/praising the *Mops* mildly, along the lines of "you poor dog, having to leave, but you were bad for refusing and are now good for obeying." But then one of the affordances generated by experimental translations like Hölderlin's Pindar and Hölderlin-celebratory essays like Benjamin's "Aufgabe" is that slavishly reproducing the source-textual sense is not the only possible goal of translation.

If one wanted to push harder on that along Hölderlinian lines, one could try something like this:

otto's dox mox
otto: forth dox forth
otto's dox hops forth
otto: zo-zo

"Dox" there is one possible Old English etymological source for "dog"—the etymological lineage is not known for sure. It may come from something like *doc-* plus the pet-form diminutive *-ga*, like *frocga*

for frog and *picga* for pig; but then an alternative source for *frocga* is *frox*, and *dox* in Old English means "dark" or "swarthy."

Trotzen is a Germanic verb with no English cognates. Rather than taking the easy colloquial way out with "won't go," as I did above, I decided to jump to another Germanic cognate that in some contexts works as a translation of *trotzen*: "to mock." It's unlikely that Otto's *Mops* is *mocking* him, of course, but "to mock" derives from Middle Low German *mucken* ("to talk with the mouth half-open, to grumble") and Middle Dutch *mocken* ("to mumble"); Modern German *mucksen* is "to mumble, to grumble, to utter a word," and Modern Dutch *mokken* is "to mope, to sulk, to pout," but also "to grumble"—and dogs do mope, sulk, pout, mumble, and grumble. *Trotzt* "mox" as what Dilthey called *ein Ausdruck eines Erlebnisses* "an expression of lived experience."

"Dox" and "mox" also open up all kinds of other interesting associations. These days, more than a half century after Jandl wrote the poem in 1963, "dox" is a slangy respelling (like pix, hax, vax) of "docs," meaning either doctors or (especially) documents; to dox someone is to publish their documents on the Internet. "Dox" also suggests doxie (sweetheart, but also dachshund) and the "mox" respelling of "mocks" suggests moxie (the gumption to refuse your master's order). And if a doxie doxes those dox with moxie and does it *soon* (Latin *mox*), then, well, anything is possible.

"Forth" is a no-brainer: it is the obvious English cognate of German *fort* "away."

"Hop" is not only the most obvious translation of *hopsen* but its cognate.

And "zo-zo" is not only the way German (or Yiddish) *soso* would be pronounced, but the actual Dutch equivalent.

I was introduced to Jandl's "ottos mops" in 1987, in my first semester as Acting Associate Professor of Finnish-English Translation Theory and Practice in the newly formed Department of Translation Studies at the University of Tampere, Finland. As part of my teaching load I was asked to offer a lecture series to one entire intake cohort of the department each year, with roughly one hundred students from the English, German, and Russian divisions—and to teach it in Finnish, since many of the students from the other two

mobilize heteronyms to transform a translation or a translation history into a parable of heterotopia (Robinson 2023b)? Earlier, too, I had occasion to mention the stratagem of repurposing obsolete words and phrases in the target language, as used by Luther and Voß (and urged by Leibniz [Robinson 1997/2014: 184–86], and used also in Robinson 2017a, 2020): this would be a less radical strategy that is arguably also enabled by Hölderlin's Pindar affordance.

The primary affordance emerging out of these ruminations, however, might be not for translators but for translation scholars. All too often hermeneutically minded and cognitively minded translation scholars thematize their research in opposed ways, as "humanistic" and "scientific," respectively, with a huge gap in between. What the convergences among Diltheyan hermeneutics, Husserlian phenomenology, and the radical embodied cognitive science of Anthony Chemero would appear to offer is an affordance that reshapes the research environment of translation studies in ways that find science inside the humanities and human culture inside cognitive science. That, surely, should help all of us research "animals" develop the affordances of what Wilhelm Dilthey calls a more effective and far-reaching *Wirkungszusammenhang* (Dil-

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divisions didn't have enough English to follow the class. I decided to give a lecture one week and then lead a workshop the next, with the texts for the workshop sessions brought in by students, each week from a different division.

One week the Finnish-German students brought in "ottos mops," and the rousing practice session it inspired—the Finnish-Russian and Finnish-English students working in language-pair-specific groups to translate it, the Finnish-German students serving in each group as source-text experts—etched the first stanza of that poem into my memory. This is my long-belated thanks to those students from so long ago, for one of the high points in that class.

they 1910/1927: 152–88) ("productive nexus," transl. Makkreel/Oman 2002: 174–209).

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Hermenéutique. Pour une logique du discours individuel comprises French renderings of Friedrich Schleiermacher's writings devoted to hermeneutics and textual criticism. Dating from 1805 to 1830, some of these writings are relatively well-elaborated texts, whereas others are more disparate lecture notes and transcriptions. Translated by the distinguished scholar of Schleiermacher, Christian Berner (author of the important work *La philosophie de Schleiermacher*, 1995), this volume gives Francophone readers valuable insights into Schleiermacher's account of the art of interpretation.

Schleiermacher is esteemed as one of the founding fathers of modern hermeneutics, especially insofar as what would be modern, in this case, involves the effort to subsume the age-old specialized domains of Biblical and juridical hermeneutics into a general hermeneutics, one supplied with a robust philosophy and accompanied by a rigorous reflection on the nature of language as such. To be sure, Schleiermacher's hermeneutical concerns are rarely far removed from his preoccupation with New Testament theology in particular, but the general applicability of his hermeneutical approach remains salient nonetheless. And while one can observe that hermeneutics was of relatively secondary importance compared to his work on theology and religion on the one hand, and both dialectical and aesthetic philosophy on the other, it remains the case that what Schleiermacher enjoins us to think is how hermeneutics is of valuable assistance in gaining a fuller comprehension of the topic at hand—a philosophical topic, a theological topic, a literary-critical topic, etc. Hermeneutics, in that sense, is applicable across many domains—it supplies itself as an auxiliary for thought, as an aid to the attainment of a more evolved mode of considered self-reflection.

Readers of *Hermenéutique. Pour une logique du discours individuel* will find much food for thought, and because this is so, it will not be remiss, I take it, to devote portions of the present review to discussing what Schleiermacher says in these texts. (I'll be quoting from Berner's French translations of Schleiermacher's German.) Consider Schleiermacher's question: "Comment apprend-on originellement à comprendre? C'est là l'opération la plus difficile et le fondement de toutes les autres, et nous l'accomplissons dans l'enfance" (p. 89). How to understand understanding? We ought to begin by looking at children, and contemplate their remarkably quick—almost spontaneous—progress as learners. That learning is part and

parcel of an inculcation into language, and hence children are already performing a hermeneutic operation insofar as they grasp at the meaning of discrete words, sift their vocabulary for nuances of signification, and assess matters of context, register and tone. As Schleiermacher writes, "Tout enfant n'accède à la signification des mots que par l'herméneutique" (p. 67). Schleiermacher therefore asserts a self-evident truth: from infancy onwards, all human beings are creatures of language. The business of hermeneutics is accordingly the business of language. Thus, "Le langage est la seule chose qu'il faille présupposer dans l'herméneutique" (p. 65). But the further business of hermeneutics is to gain insight into persons —be it children, or adults—who express themselves in language, and so Schleiermacher observes that "On doit déjà connaître l'homme pour comprendre le discours, et pourtant on ne doit faire sa connaissance qu'à partir du discours" (p. 72).

Already we discern the hermeneutic desire to gain insight into human beings—to access their individual subjectivities and their thoughts by means of their use of language. Nonetheless, the writings collected in Berner's volume also concern the access interpreters might gain not into spoken discourse, but into texts. At issue, in this respect, is textual criticism and textual interpretation. Here, Schleiermacher describes two operations which ought to be combined in the effort to understand texts. The first operation is characterized as grammatical hermeneutics. This concerns understanding the objective, or concrete laws and structures of a given language, as well as comprehending the expressive availabilities afforded by that language to speakers and writers at a given period in time. In this case, "L'homme disparaît avec son activité et n'apparaît que comme organe du langage" (p. 101). The second hermeneutic operation—described as "psycho-

logical" and "technical"—is subjective. Here, "la langue disparaît avec sa puissance déterminante et n'apparaît que comme organe de l'homme au service de son individualité" (p. 101). A novel by Balzac, for instance, is hardly a grammar book—rather, the expressive components of French are assembled by him and wedded to a singular linguistic enterprise, namely the writing of *Illusions perdues*, say, or *Le Père Goriot*. If one wishes to know that Balzac, and those novels, then psychological interpretation would involve the effort to gain insight into the textual products of that author's individual creativity. Ideally, what would accordingly be "subjective," is a meeting of minds—the author's, and the interpreter's. Schleiermacher, in that regard, is not shy of the idea that interpreters, some of the time, work by intuition or even have the capacity to divine matters relating to authors and the texts at hand. Only some of the time, however. For at other times, the interpretive task, subjective though it may be, is appreciably technical, concerned with the *making* of that particular text—its imaginative craft, its expressive fabrication.

Schleiermacher's hermeneutics thus acknowledges the particularity, individuality, or singularity of a given work. But that work is hardly so idiosyncratic or idiomatic that it divorces itself from all generalities. To continue with my example, Balzac's French is generally recognizable as French and partakes thereby of the "universals" which are singular to that language and which allow for such recognition in the first place: Balzac's grammar and syntax resemble that of other users of French, general linguistic laws governing French are respected by him, and one can find his words defined in a French dictionary.

Schleiermacher probably wouldn't deny that interpretation can be arduously technical, and there are further technicalities to be confronted in respect of the painstaking editorial

work of textual criticism. But there is much to be appreciated in Schleiermacher's characterization of interpretation as an *art*. If this be so, then interpretation mustn't be a monotonous, mechanical, or sterile exercise—a schoolroom chore rather than an enjoyable practice of hermeneutic dexterity. "Comprendre est un art" (p. 122), he writes. The ultimate goal of hermeneutics isn't to produce a work of art, but interpretation is an art insofar as interpretive practice resembles artistic practice. Here, one has to insist that the process of making art isn't solely a matter of the robotic application of whatever norms, conventions or outright rules are in force and which prescribe to artists how they ought undertake their own artistry. If artists assert their right to a latitude, *vis-à-vis* such prescriptions, so do interpreters. Assuredly, Schleiermacher proposes certain guidelines—though one hesitates to call them *rules* for the hermeneutic method. But since each work one undertakes to interpret is different and singular, then one's interpretive approach must flex to that particular "case," and it's that flexion which characterizes the hermeneutic art. Hermeneutics could not otherwise earn that term "art" if it were the opposite of any art, namely the mechanical implementation of a rote method.

It will eventually prove necessary for Schleiermacher to describe moments where that art isn't required, however, and moreover characterize what artless discourses look like. I will return to this matter below. But, at this juncture, we might offer a provisional summary of Schleiermacher's account by availing ourselves of Berner's introductory "Aperçu analytique." Two points are to be retained. Firstly, Schleiermacher views hermeneutics as an undertaking that can be called, with certain precautions, a technical discipline, one which serves the interest of correct comprehension. Yet, and to insist on the point, while hermeneutics can be characterized as a

method (it can therefore be followed, and indeed taught), it can also be deemed an art. "Method" and "art" aren't opposed to each other, but find their commonality once it's grasped that hermeneutics advocates for flexibility *vis-à-vis* "rules"—that flexibility should be as proper to "method" as to "art."

Secondly, Schleiermacher doesn't think that the role of hermeneutics should be limited to moments when interpretive difficulties become apparent: in the context of interpreting texts, for instance, this might simply be occasions when readers encounter something perplexing or something that looks wrong, like a patent error. One might imagine that readers, faced with such difficulties, then avail themselves of hermeneutics to solve the problems, and then carry on. Not so: hermeneutics, as Berner stresses on Schleiermacher's behalf, is necessary if one wants to understand anything, even in circumstances where one isn't confronted by an apparent difficulty. If one finds the meaning of a given passage in a text to be completely limpid, one has still performed an operation of interpretation to deem it so. Hermeneutics—in a higher sense—cannot be reduced to a "how-to" manual for solving discrete problems of textual difficulty. For what hermeneutics really is, or should be, is what affords us the illumination we seek when we are motivated to understand. Hermeneutics accompanies our will-to-understand. That *volonté* may well be oriented towards a knowledge that is scientific or epistemological, but the flexible process of interpretation which conducts and conduces to that knowledge-goal remains appreciably "artistic" in nature. Thus, as Berner puts it: "L'interprétation (qui connaît une forme laxiste lorsqu'elle n'est engendrée que par une difficulté et une forme rigoureuse lorsqu'elle relève d'une volonté constante de comprendre) est artistique" (p. 42).

Given the richness of Schleiermacher's hermeneutical reflection, the difficulty confronted by anyone who presents these texts to an audience—in Berner's case a presentation to Francophone readers—concerns the variety of readers who will find Schleiermacher of interest. Specialists of theology will find interest in his discussion of New Testament interpretation, and philosophers will find much food for thought in these texts as well. But one constituency also concerned with Schleiermacher is constituted by specialists of literature. Let me address that constituency in particular.

Schleiermacher envisages interpretation as an interplay between analytical work on details and an apprehension of the meaning of the whole. This is a version of the hermeneutic circle, of course: "Toute compréhension du détail est conditionnée par une compréhension du tout" (p. 75), writes Schleiermacher. But the difficulty concerns how many "wholes" interpreters have to take into account. To return to my Balzac example, is the "whole" in question the total meaning of *Illusions perdues*? Or is the "whole" something one grasps only if one compares that novel to other works by Balzac, perhaps indeed to his *œuvres complètes*? Or ought interpreters enter into their hermeneutic compass the generic "set" of such works, namely the genre of the Novel as such? Eventually, and inevitably, the circular logic of interpretation risks devolving its manageable circles to a potentially uncontrollable, and indeed spiraling inclusion of yet wider "wholes"— the last "whole" being nothing less than the generic set describable as the entirety of Literature as such. Berner is right to observe, therefore, that "En fait, le cercle de la compréhension est multiple et s'élève en spirale vers la généralité" (p. 47). Thus while the interpreter might be concerned solely with the singularity of just one work by Balzac, the apprehension of "generality" might well encompass the relation of that

work to what Berner calls the "domaine de la littérature dont elle fait partie" (p. 48).

Revealingly, therefore, Schleiermacher relies on the apprehension of *genre* to stabilize what otherwise threatens to become a logic of hermeneutic circularity (or spirality) that asks too much of interpreters. Thus if Schleiermacher can declare that "toute compréhension du détail est conditionnée par une compréhension du tout," he subsequently adds that "Originellement le tout est compris comme genre" (p. 76). He also says that "La totalité doit provisoirement être comprise comme individu d'un genre, et l'intuition du genre, c'est-à-dire la compréhension formelle de la totalité, doit précéder la compréhension matérielle du détail" (p. 124). To be noted, moreover, is the rider: "Des productions arbitraires ne deviennent jamais des genres" (p. 124). As interpreters begin their analysis of the details of *Illusions perdues*, for example, it seems that they must first identify that novel as the token of a more general type—as a novel belonging to the genre Novel. Perhaps such interpreters will not deem that operation to be a philosophical operation, but nonetheless, once "totalities" enter into the equation, as counterparts to discrete "details," then perhaps—via the notion of "genre"—we can guardedly assert that such interpreters are willy-nilly treading upon the domain philosophy considers its own – the domain of the total, of the categorical, and arguably the generic. Each text is different from all other texts, but genericity supplies a relatively perceptible notion of Sameness. For the sake of what can be called the dialectical logic of hermeneutical interpretation (and once one speaks of "dialectics" and "logic" one is surely doing philosophy), a logic which requires both Difference and Sameness, what cannot be tolerated are texts that refuse to confirm their generic belonging: these would be "arbitrary productions."

No doubt, scholars of a different stripe might be inclined to query whether literary genres are sufficiently stable for this hermeneutic or dialectical work to achieve itself—especially so in respect of the novel, which is somewhat generically unstable (according to Jacques Rancière, indeed, "Le roman est le genre de ce qui est sans genre" (p. 29). Investments in the stability of genre can often prove risky investments, at least if the risk is assessed in terms of philosophy's desiderata, namely stable categories and discrete sets or identifiable classes of something or another. But speaking of genre, in any event, one notes that Schleiermacher is moved to say that "un seul écrivain doit être considéré comme plusieurs s'il a écrit dans plusieurs genres [littéraires]" (p. 97). Much to be preferred is the logic of one writer for one genre. The number one enables us to decisively identify one thing from another—one writer from another, one genre from another. It gives us an idea of the individual—that which is undivided, and hence particular and singular. Reliable identification is built into Schleiermacher's hermeneutic system, and that reliability is afforded only if comparing and contrasting can elicit stable individualities—this author not that author, this genre not that genre. But if interpreters confront instances of the *several*, then difficulties multiply. It would be preferable if Balzac had only written novels, so that a singular Balzac corresponds to a singular genre. Yet he also wrote for the theater (some plays being adaptations of his novels, like the 1839 work *Vautrin*), a work of tragic verse, and numerous short stories or *contes*. So we perhaps need to split Balzac into a number of variants of the same authorial persona—one "Balzac" for one genre, another "Balzac" for another genre and so on. (And, in respect of the putative stability of the genre called "Novel," the indistinct borderline between Balzac's long novels and his

shorter novels—novels and novellas, so to speak—poses additional problems.)

Like all dialectical thinkers, Schleiermacher is concerned with the categorical stability of Sameness and Difference, and hence with the stability of particularities, individualities, and specificities. The hermeneutic gesture to identify anything at all depends on the reliability of the act of comparison (and accordingly the possibility of contrast without which there is no comparison). Hence Schleiermacher's remark concerning arbitrary productions, and also the move to cope with the ambiguities of a single writer who writes in several genres. Hence also Schleiermacher's desire to wed one author to just one singular property, which is his or her individual *style*. We must, therefore, also countenance the (philosophical) category of the "proper." A style must be proper to each singular author, and that signature style must be perceivable at all times. Thus Schleiermacher asserts: "Chaque écrivain a son propre style" (p. 105). Furthermore, "Le style d'un individu doit rester le même dans tous les genres, modifié par le caractère de ces derniers" (p. 149). One would want to be able to identify Balzac by registering his style as the same style across all genres he adopted—the novel, the *conte*, the theater etc. "Modification" is accordingly all that can be tolerated. But Schleiermacher puts it more strongly: the style of an individual—let's say, of an individual writer—*must* remain the same. Philosophy's neat categorizations dictate that "must," one suspects, rather than the contingent imperatives of literary criticism's assessment of stylistics. Whether it be the matter of genre or that of style, in any case, Schleiermacher persistently asserts the possibility of a reliable dialectical mediation between particularity and/as individuality, and generality. But if we are still attempting to apprehend the "whole" of *Illusions perdues*, even as we work on the details of that text, how do

we identify that "whole"? Would it be a unifying meaning of that novel? Or a central theme, a core Idea which emerges from our reading, enabling us to thereby declare that this is what Balzac's novel is verily *about*?

Here, Schleiermacher is rather interesting. Assuredly, we might look to the title, and hence confidently declare that if the title is *Illusions perdues*, then the novel is presumably about lost illusions. Yet Schleiermacher has his doubts about titles, those doubts being motivated by the fact that, for ancient texts, titles were often missing, or only belatedly imposed on a given text. So if titles aren't always reliable indicators of a given work's unifying theme, if they don't always give us purchase on the compositional or thematic unity of the work, then what will? Sometimes a literary work, Schleiermacher observes, announces its central theme at the beginning (consider the first page of Proust's *À la Recherche du Temps perdu* or at the end, where "Le Temps perdu," the last tome of Proust's novel, effectively resumes the entire project of the novel). The sense of an ending, to allude to Frank Kermode, surely can give interpreters a reliable sense of the book's central idea. But not always, which is why Schleiermacher suggests that we might have to look for episodes in a given work that are more salient than others—he characterizes them as "passages accentués" (p. 108)—and assume that such an accentuation is an indication of the author signaling a core theme or idea. The problem, however, is that some texts don't accentuate this or that passage: Schleiermacher references the epic, remarking that in epics every passage or episode is treated with equal emphasis (i.e. no emphasis at all). He also mentions irony, which can indeed be a challenge for readers: if they don't grasp the irony, then they don't get the point. Think, moreover, of ironic tone: Flaubert's deadpan irony is almost toneless, and so doesn't give us that "accentu-

ation" readers might desire in order to specify the core theme of *Madame Bovary*.

The difficulties accumulate, and indeed Schleiermacher remarks that "De nombreux écrits prétendent avoir pour sujet quelque chose qui est tout à fait subordonné par rapport au thème véritable" (p. 107). To change literary contexts away from the French, one might suggest Joyce's *Ulysses* as an example: it purports to have Homer's *Odyssey* as its subject matter, but that ancient text is in a very complex relation of subordination to the "thème véritable" which emerges out of Joyce's account of the Dublin-based activities of Leopold Bloom, his interactions with Stephen Dedalus, and indeed (since she gets the last word, and thereby offers her sense of an ending in more than one way) the sensations and experiences of Molly Bloom. Still, interpretation must be capable of apprehending some kind of meaningful whole otherwise the logic of the hermeneutic circle—that work on parts and wholes—simply breaks down. What, then, can we say concerning the particular wholeness of a given literary composition? Again, the gesture to specify that particularity, and that wholeness, will have to involve comparison and contrast. In a limited context, one might establish that work's singularity by comparing it to other works. Perhaps it's possible to forgo acts of comparison and simply intimate or intuit that singularity. But in a more expansive context (and here is where Berner's "spiral" reemerges) one would be working with another whole, namely the whole historical, cultural and linguistic horizons in and against which that work is situated—assessing, therefore, all that was creatively possible at that particular period in time. It is hence a matter of

> la totalité de ce qui était à la disposition de cet auteur. On doit donc s'en tenir aux limites de la nation et de l'époque […]. L'individualité nationale et séculaire est la base de l'individualité personnelle. Par

> exemple, pour les auteurs dramatiques anciens, il ne faut pas dire qu'ils disposaient de notre composition caractérisante ou que les poètes anciens disposaient de notre sentimentalité. (P. 109)

There is much to say here. It's the sort of thing Madame de Staël, in *De la littérature* and in *De l'Allemagne*, could have written: she reflects on literature by way of a historical account that works back to the writers of antiquity, but which also looks across to England and Germany in order to consider the linguistic, cultural, and indeed political contexts which individualize the literature of one nation compared to another. She also registers the question of "individuality" at different levels of specificity (and, not incidentally, does so by means of translation), and the matter of "sentimentality" is addressed by her as well, in light of an assertion that Christianity divorced modern literature from the literature of antiquity, and that Christianity provided the context for our modern approach to the expression of feelings—for her, sentimentality is a matter of a romantic melancholy informed by a specifically Christian intimation of the fallenness of Man.

De Staël would have agreed with Schleiermacher that "l'écrivain ne peut donc être compris qu'à partir de son époque" (p. 109), and that "On découvre cette totalité a. par la comparaison de ce qui est contemporain et semblable ; b. en recourant à l'analogie de ce qui est étranger et de ce qui appartient à une autre époque quant aux lois générales de la combinaison" (p. 109). But whether an interpreter, in view of that "totalité," has to effectively embed the analysis in a larger historical reflection is perhaps the key question. It's asking a lot. The more manageable way concerns, once more, fixing oneself on the reliable identification of genre: it gives us a sense of what was possible at that time, that spread of creative possibility being a matter of what constitutes a genre in the first place, namely the putative laws it abides by, or transgress-

es. We can therefore contemplate, for instance, the genre of the *Bildungsroman*, and assess Balzac's *Illusions perdues* or Flaubert's *L'Education sentimentale* against the background of that genre—look across to Goethe's *Bildungsromane*, for instance, and back again to Balzac and Flaubert. Still, if the basic gestures remain those of comparison and contrast, it's notable that Schleiermacher admits that some writers seem to exist in a genre of one (and hence can hardly be considered generic at all): "Difficile chez ceux qui ne se rencontrent qu'une seule fois, comme Pindare et, à certains égards, Platon" (p. 111). One admires that rhetorical precaution, "à certains égards," in connection with none other than Plato …

Give or take Pindar and Plato, and those genre-less productions Schleiermacher calls "arbitrary," the relative stability of generic affiliation provides a basis for the circular apprehension of details in light of a certain "whole," and vice versa. Schleiermacher puts it this way: "Pour reconnaître tout genre de particularité, on doit conjuguer deux méthodes, l'immédiate et la comparative" (p. 155). He adds: "La méthode immédiate consiste à chercher à connaître physiognomoniquement le principe subjectif par la confrontation entre l'ouvrage et l'idée pure de son genre" (p. 155). Moreover, "des ouvrages intuitionnés physiognomoniquement dans le détail doivent être comparés entre eux dans la perspective de l'idée commune du genre" (p. 155). So to perceive genre, one either compares works deemed to belong to the same genre, or performs an immediate act Schleiermacher intriguingly characterizes as an act of *physiognomonique* intuition. But notice how one must must keep in mind the "idée pure de son genre." Can there be such a thing? One suspects that Friedrich Schlegel would have been interested in this idea (or Idea) of a pure genre. Perhaps Schleiermacher's hermeneutics, and Schlegel's notions of Critique and Theory, converge here: at issue is the

intimation of such a purity as the ideal horizon of a given work, even if that horizon remains only ideal given the practical circumstances of writing literary works. Imagine the complete fulfillment of genericity in one single *ouvrage*, the end of all sundry examples of this or that genre, and the realization of an *exemplar* or paradigm that can be profiled as a (or *the*) Literary Absolute: the pure poem, the pure novel, the pure genre.

Obviously, comparing and contrasting are likely to be the more usual ways interpreters will go about matters, and so we can attend to Schleiermacher's remark that "Ce n'est que dans la mesure où on compare plusieurs ouvrages du même genre que la connaissance de l'individu peut être complétée" (p. 156). But one wonders whether the stabilities Schleiermacher wants for genre are not constantly threatened by the caveats and qualifications he himself so intriguingly enters. And though Schleiermacher doesn't make the question of the novel salient in his discussion, one senses that the generic and compositional unruliness of the novel is what concerns him. For on the topic of composition—which Schleiermacher would wish to be organic, cohesive and hence amenable to the hermeneutic detection of the work's unity, theme, idea and generic affiliation—he has this to say of a work that isn't properly composed. In this case,

> l'écrivain fait montre d'une grande imperfection et son ouvrage n'est qu'un amas, un composé d'imitations hétérogènes, ou bien le lecteur a pris pour un point principal ce qui n'en était pas un. Un tel danger est principalement engendré pas de grandes masses subjectives morcelées, des épisodes, des digressions, etc. (P. 155)

To my mind (and to Rancière's mind as well), the novel is particularly susceptible to such digressions and to the incorporation of heterogeneous matter. Notwithstanding what use is made of Aristotle's *Poetics* to delineate the right rules for

novelistic composition (it ought to have a beginning, a middle, and an end), the novel has a bad habit of becoming a baggy monster, to allude to Henry James: it incorporates material which—if one is inclined to insist on generic specificities—would be putatively "heterogeneous" to it, it loses the thread of its own plot quite frequently, and can go off on proliferating digressions. One thinks of *Tristram Shandy* and of the novels of Jean Paul—possibly the writer Schleiermacher had in mind here. No wonder readers might mistake the "point principal" if they are always being invited to enter the novel at multiple points and find themselves always-already *in medias res*.

I have dwelt on these aspects of Schleiermacher's discussion because, to me, a key interest of these texts lies in the implications one can tease out in connection with literary studies. I will return later to Berner's presentation of the philosophical interest of these texts shortly, but the point to make for now is that Schleiermacher is hardly a thinker solely concerned with the mysterious rapport interpreters might effect with authors by means of a certain empathy, intuition, or even divination. And, when one inspects what he says about the figure of the author and the figure of the reader (or interpreter), there are rich subtleties to be apprehended. Schleiermacher can indeed write that "L'une des choses essentielles lorsqu'on interprète est d'être capable de faire abstraction de sa propre conviction pour épouser celle de l'écrivain" (p. 57). But this "espousal" does not necessarily imply a Romantic resuscitation of the author, a sort of critical naivety that Barthes's "La mort de l'auteur" essay dispelled for us in 1967.

For Schleiermacher also writes this: "L'idée de l'auteur ne garantit que sa dignité, et non son individualité qui, elle, est garantie par la façon dont il l'expose" (p. 106). Barthes, since I have just mentioned him, probably wouldn't disagree with

that. Barthes did not wish away the "dignity" of the author (and in any case, the law acknowledges authors' rights to dignity by bestowing the right of copyright), but the appreciation of an author's individuality can only be a matter of that authorial exposure or exposition which is made manifest by the writings we readers are given to read. Barthes would approve, I think, of Schleiermacher's remark that grammatical interpretation involves an analysis that works "comme si on ne savait rien de celui qui discourt ou qu'on ne devait faire sa connaissance qu'à partir de là" (p. 122/3). Barthes might not have portrayed that kind of interpretation as "grammatical," however—that's not how a structuralist would put it—but that activity of "comme si" is surely what is entailed if the analysis is to bracket out the "author." One pretends as if the author never existed, even if one knows well enough that Shakespeare did exist, in flesh and blood, and authored *Hamlet*. If one wishes to know authors, then the principal way to do so is to pass via their writings. Assuredly, one might facilitate that knowledge by reading not just *Hamlet* but a biography of Shakespeare, but, as Schleiermacher observes, "la connaissance de l'écrivain, qui doit venir en aide à l'interprétation grammaticale, doit venir d'ailleurs" (p. 123). Here, however, might be the divergence with Barthes: it depends on whether the second hermeneutic operation is still oriented towards insight or access into the author's creative subjectivity. If it is, then we have to ask where one gets that information. From "ailleurs," to be sure, but presumably from the elsewhere domain occupied by biographies and autobiographies—precisely those texts Barthes, in his critique of the Sorbonne dogmas of the scholarly exercise to provide dissertations on *l'homme et l'œuvre*, sought to ward off and quarantine to an *ailleurs* that wouldn't intrude on the analysis of a writer's text.

But it's only a very strong structuralist position that asserts the desirability of ignoring the author altogether, and, contrariwise, only strong intentionalist positions claim that the task of interpretation is to grasp the original intentions of the author. Most positions acknowledge the heuristic utility of the notion of an implied author (differentiating, therefore, the implied author from the flesh and blood author). Schleiermacher is appreciably more balanced, less extreme in his positions, and such intellectual balance, we might agree, is an admirable hallmark of hermeneutics. Thus it's important to be clear about the following remark: "On doit comprendre aussi bien et comprendre mieux que l'écrivain" (p. 83). This isn't necessarily an arrogant exercise in hermeneutic superiority, nor is it a Freudianism *avant la lettre* that understands the author better than himself insofar as the interpreter/analyst claims to understand the writer's *unconscious*. Instead, Schleiermacher simply means that interpreters take more factors into account, when contemplating works of literary creativity, than writers did themselves. This is obvious: when Balzac or Flaubert sat down to write their works, they didn't precede their writing process by a full-scale contemplation of the entire history of Western literature. It wasn't necessary for them to contemplate the title of de Staël's *De la littérature* and then pose it as a question, namely "What is Literature?" before they wrote *Illusions perdues* or *Madame Bovary*.

But the interpreter, in Schleiermacher's eyes, is enjoined to such tasks, and assuming such tasks are performed competently, it's possible to declare that one knows writers better than they know themselves. The hermeneutic task accordingly remains this: "Reconstruire le discours donné de façon à la fois historique et divinatoire, objective et subjective" (p. 173). Yet, as Schleiermacher explains, there are many aspects to this interpretive practice. If one thinks about matters in terms

of literary texts, one firstly has to consider how the text is embedded in whatever constituted the horizons of linguistic possibility at a given epoch—these are objectively historical considerations. One also has to grasp how language, which is a material reality or "fact," was transposed into the writer's mind and deployed in the service of that writer's subjective and individual creativity—this entails subjectively historical considerations. Then there are matters concerning "objectively prophetic" (p. 173) issues. One could understand this as sensing how the text itself will become a point from which language will develop into the future (Joyce's *Ulysses* points towards the future of the English language, showing what expressive resources the English language already harbored within itself). Finally, there are "subjectively prophetic" (p. 173) questions to take into account, which we might envisage in terms of how writers contend with pressing expressive matters at one occasion of writing but develop such matters across the span of their careers: consider the early Joyce of *Portrait of the Artist,* then the Joyce of *Ulysses* and then the Joyce of *Finnegans Wake.*

In terms of such prophesies—presentiments of future developments both in terms of writerly creativity and in terms of the potential of language as well—interpreters have more horizons to consider than any given writer. Because this is so, it's not an arrogance or a hermeneutic presumption of special insight to declare that the interpreter has to initially understand things as well as, and then better than the author did. Hopefully, it's therefore clear what Schleiermacher means (and doesn't mean) when he says "Avant d'appliquer l'art, il faut qu'on se soit mis au même niveau que l'auteur, tant du côté objectif que du côté subjectif" (p. 174). This isn't just an expression of Romantic hermeneutics too easily caricatured as a matter of intuitive or empathetic identification with the

thoughts and feelings of the author of a text, as if that "level" implies interpreters standing shoulder to shoulder with authors at the very time and place of their creativity. And indeed, because this is a caricature, then there is no impediment to the deeming of Schleiermacher more compatible with approaches to language and meaning that we see in structuralism and post-structuralism than appears at first glance.

Yet if Schleiermacher retains the term "art" in order to describe interpretation, then we must nonetheless mark the difference between hermeneutics and structuralist "decoding." Let's therefore retrieve, at this juncture, what it means to declare that interpretation is an art. In doing so, I now want to begin reviewing Berner's edition and translation of Schleiermacher by taking the liberty of comparing it with Andrew Bowie's English edition, *Hermeneutics and Criticism.* The comparisons are instructive, I think. The section that matters, for our present purposes, is section 9 of the 1819 text on hermeneutics. Berner's heading for that section is "Interpréter est un art" (p. 166). Bowie has "Explication [*das Auslegen*] is an art" (p. 11). Perhaps the difference between "interpretation" and "explication" doesn't matter, but then again, perhaps that difference does matter, since Bowie feels it necessary to interpolate the original German and, in a translator's note, explains that he prefers "explication" as a translation of *Auslegen* and *Auslegung* "as its links to 'unfolding' bring it closer to the German sense of 'laying out' the meaning of a text" (p. 3). In any case, the key remark by Schleiermacher, revisiting the difference between grammatical, and psychological or technical interpretation, is this:

> Si l'aspect grammatical devait être achevé pour lui-même isolément, il faudrait une connaissance parfaite de la langue et, si c'est l'autre [aspect qui devait être achevé isolément pour lui-même], alors il faudrait, une connaissance exhaustive de l'homme. Puisqu'aucune des deux ne peut jamais être donnée, on est contraint de passer d'un as-

pect à l'autre, et on ne peut formuler aucune règle sur la façon dont devrait s'effectuer ce passage. (Pp. 166–7)

One cannot formulate a rule to establish how one passes from one aspect to the other. This is important, because the lack of rules takes us to the heart of Schleiermacher's invocation of "art" in respect of his hermeneutics. We might now contemplate an interpolation that Bowie adduces to section 9, but which Berner's edition doesn't. It reads: "The complete task of hermeneutics is to be regarded as a work of art, but not as if carrying it out resulted in a work of art, but in such a way that the activity only bears the *character* of art in itself, because the application is not also given with the rules, i.e. cannot be mechanized" (p. 11). What makes interpretation an art is not the end result (an artwork) but that "art" confronts the fact that there is no rule for the application of rules. *Kunst* throws off the tethers of mechanically heedless rule-obedience, and edges into a flexible balancing-act between free play and a recognition that art isn't so heedless of rules that it resembles spontaneous improvisation. So it is for art, so it is for the art of interpretation.

Here, then, is the ambiguity of the word "art." Two of Bowie's translator's notes clarify the matter: "Schleiermacher's use of words based on *Kunst* involves both the sense of 'method' or 'technique,' which entails the application of rules, and of 'art' as that which cannot be bound by rules" (p. xx). And,

> For Schleiermacher, "art" is any activity that relies on rules, for which there can be no rules for the applying of those rules. Schleiermacher uses "art" (*Kunst*) both in the sense of the Greek *techne*, meaning ability, capacity, and in a sense related to the new aesthetic notion, primarily associated with Kant, that something cannot be understood as *art* merely via the rules of the particular form of articulation. The differing senses of the word are decisive for the whole of his hermeneutics. (P. 3)

Perhaps Schleiermacher can be accused of having it all ways at once: there are methodological rules, but then again the character of art seems to go beyond such rules. But it's obviously the robotic aspect of rule-obedience he rejects; what isn't envisaged is the outright abandonment of methodological protocols, nor the severing of any association between hermeneutic method and Greek *techne*. For if this were so, it's hard to see how one could gain any rigorous, or indeed philosophical purchase on interpretative praxis, and—although Kant is less concerned with *techne*—it would have been similarly impossible for Kant to devote a philosophical treatise—*The Critique of Judgment*—to the nature of art.

No doubt, Schleiermacher is characteristic of his age, whether one describes that age as Kantian and post-Kantian, or Romantic. It's not that art entered into the era of complete liberty, as if one summarily declared "There are no rules for art," nor is it that the rule-books, like Aristotle's *Poetics*, were suddenly rendered defunct—one thinks of the presence of Aristotle in Lessing, and in Dilthey's essays on poetics and literary creativity (published in English translation under the title *Poetry and Experience*). Yet if one recalls Dilthey's texts, one still appreciates that the nature of artistic creativity, in his view, now has to be treated in new ways—not so much by an inspection of whether an artist did, or didn't adhere to the rules established by the Greeks (or, as in France, in light of the codifications of *Belles Lettres* and the treatises of Boileau, Batteux, Marmontel, and others), but as a sometimes mysterious activity, unamenable to the pedestrian insights of hidebound critics. Hence the Romantic concern with the mysteries of genius. Hence Kant's claim that the genius gives the rule to art but no one, except maybe Nature, gives the rule to a genius. Hence de Staël, moreover, and her preoccupation with Shakespeare's genius, and (more guardedly) of Goethe's.

If Schleiermacher's use of the term "art" is not without its strategic ambiguities, what is significant is that there is a moment where he refers to occasions when interpretive art isn't required. Firstly, he says that "là où le discours est sans art, il n'est pas non plus besoin d'art pour comprendre" (p. 164). Secondly, he clarifies that artless discourse as follows: "Mais ce qui ne fait que répéter quelque chose qui a déjà été donné n'est au fond rien: propos sur la pluie et le beau temps. Cette valeur nulle n'est cependant pas le néant absolu, mais seulement le minimum. Car c'est à partir d'elle que se développe ce qui est signifiant" (pp. 167–8). It's interesting that, following that remark, Bowie's edition inserts the following whereas Berner's edition does not: "The minimum is common discourse in business matters and in habitual conversation in everyday life" (p. 13). Talking about the weather and the banalities of bureaucratic parlance: *le degr*é *zéro du discours*, you might say, as far as hermeneutics is concerned. But no hermeneutic thinker will accept such a zero degree, as if hermeneutics reaches its limit and finds itself wholly redundant. So "minimum" is a carefully chosen term which takes us out of these dangerously non-hermeneutic null or zero-degree scenarios and back into the context where hermeneutics still has applicability. (Schleiermacher will not have been able to have anticipate, when he spoke of the almost non-hermeneutical impertinence of talking about the weather, Jacques Derrida's text, entitled *Spurs: Nietzsche's Styles/Éperons: Les Styles de Nietzsche,* on Nietzsche's reference to having forgotten his umbrella …).

In any case, talk of the weather is the minimum pole on the spectrum of what constitutes hermeneutic interest. The Flaubert of *Un Cœur simple* knew this too, incidentally, which is why Barthes devoted portions of his essay, "L'effet de réel," to a barometer one finds in that Flaubertian text. But

what about the maximum pole? The maximum is "ce qui est le plus productif et le moins répétitif ; *classique*. Du côté psychologique, [le maximum] est ce qui est le plus particulier et le moins commun : *original*. N'est absolue que l'identité des deux, le *génial*" (p. 168). Despite the differences, what matters for the hermeneutic thinker is an admiration for linguistic productivity: in terms of literary production, a classic work will stimulate further literary production, albeit in terms, perhaps, of derivative acts of imitation and translation. An original work will do likewise, as will, to a supreme degree, the genial artwork, simultaneously baptized as a (perhaps instant) classic and as unprecedentedly original.

My discussion of Schleiermacher's texts has, up to now, underscored the interest they will have for specialists of literature, and in that regard modestly complemented Berner's discussion in his introduction. But there is much more to be considered, in respect of that introduction, and so one might begin, again, with the matter of the paradox that while Schleiermacher is credited as a founding father of modern hermeneutics, hermeneutics was not necessarily in the forefront of his concerns. But if the bestowal of that founding-father status was an outcome of first Dilthey's and then Gadamer's profiling of Schleiermacher's hermeneutical work, then Berner rightly enters the requisite caveats in respect especially of Gadamer's objections to what the author of *Truth and Method* takes to be Schleiermacher's desire to reduce the gap between the author and the contemporary reader by means of psychological intuition. But if one reads the texts collected in this volume, as Berner observes, then one can gauge the extent to which Gadamer's engagement with Schleiermacher is somewhat misleading. Berner also invokes the important work on Schleiermacher undertaken by Peter Szondi and Manfred Frank (and one hastens to acknowledge the important work

of Berner himself, particularly in the contexts of the French reception of Schleiermacher).

Berner briefly refers to what could crudely be called the "post-modern" contention that sometimes differing perspectives on a given topic cannot be reconciled by hermeneutic arbitration. For Jean-François Lyotard, this would be the matter of "le différend." The rebuttal of Lyotard can be mounted by a number of hermeneutic thinkers of the more diplomatic persuasion, be it Schleiermacher, Gadamer, or Ricœur. Consider the hermeneutic motif of dialogue, where the interlocutors aren't utter strangers to each other, nor deaf to each other's viewpoint. For it can be assumed that the interlocutors have at least agreed on the topic for that conversation. Only on the basis of that agreement can one intelligibly converse upon the matter at hand (although it might be that the conversational outcome is that each partner agrees to disagree). For Berner, Schleiermacher accordingly "prend pour point de départ les présupposés mêmes du dialogue ainsi que la volonté de l'entente" (p. 18). Indeed so: it's hard to imagine any hermeneutic approach that isn't inspired by the will to achieve common accord, understanding, or "entente." *Pace* Lyotard, hermeneutics insists that "un différend ou un conflit entre des discours n'a de sens qu'à présupposer une intention d'accord et une volonté d'entente" (p. 18). Nonetheless, I think one has to acknowledge Lyotard's distinction between a *litige* (where there is a possibility of arbitration between contending viewpoints) and a *différend* (where there isn't). Moreover, since there is a French word—"différend"—which designates that irreconcilable position, then such a situation is at least thinkable.

At issue, in any case, is that "intention d'accord," and here we might ask whether it's too easy to simply *presuppose* that intention. Could we imagine a situation where that inten-

tion is not presupposed, in advance of any subsequent debate, conflictual or otherwise, on a given topic? The famous Derrida/Gadamer debate (if that's what it was) is a case in point: Derrida didn't abide by that presupposition, and, by a performance of what one might call intellectual irrelevance, he refused to enter onto the common ground that had been priorly (or always-already) established for that debate between himself and Gadamer. It's not the brief of the present review to litigate the contention between hermeneutics and deconstruction, between diplomatic hermeneutics and radical hermeneutics, or between hermeneutics and post-modernism. But one notes Berner's tellingly predictable invocation of Jürgen Habermas, in whom we find, as with Schleiermacher, "le *télos* du dialogue comme entente établie rationnellement qui se manifeste dès l'herméneutique dans la volonté de comprendre l'autre" (p. 19). Andrew Bowie, incidentally, gestures in the same vein to Donald Davidson's *Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation*, citing him as declaring that "The method is not designed to eliminate disagreement, nor can it; its purpose is to make meaningful disagreement possible, and this depends on a foundation—*some* foundation—in agreement" (p. xxvii).

Nonetheless, hermeneutics apparently remains on the side of anti-foundationalist thinking insofar as hermeneutics embraces the relativism of differing viewpoints, and thus—at the level of philosophy—appears to disbelieve in the possibility of definitive Truths or Absolute Knowledge. (Though once one enters caveats for Gadamer—author of *Truth and Method*, after all—and Ricœur, then the contention involves the problem of what philosophy means by Truth in the last instance.) But, as with Habermas as well, Schleiermacher is still sufficiently Kantian that he believes one can conduct the operations of interpretation in a rational way, and moreover posits that rational knowledge, or knowledge achieved by ra-

tional interpretive procedures, characterizes the kind of knowledge that can indeed be held in common. Yet if what is at stake is "la volonté de comprendre l'autre," as Berner puts it, then ethical considerations must be taken into account. The ethical quandaries, however, are these: if the ultimate goal of the hermeneutic engagement with the Other is to transpose or indeed translate the knowledge gained of the Other into a commonly shared knowledge, then the category of the Same presides. From the perspective one can attribute (though not without precaution) to Emmanuel Levinas, however, the category of Difference, or rather Alterity, must preside, for fear that the otherness of the Other is compromised by that effort to gain a measure of common knowledge. But hermeneutics is less categorical in its engagement with the Other, compared to Levinas, even as hermeneutics respects what would be individual, singular, or particular to the Other. Hermeneutics seeks to place that respect at the heart of what still remains a bid to overcome what would otherwise be the unknowable difference of the Other. Berner's quotation from Schleiermacher here is important:

> Ce qui importe, c'est donc un art d'utiliser la langue comme action, et la possibilité d'une approximation d'une identité du savoir de tous dépend entièrement de l'art de reconstruire le discours d'autrui comme acte. – Ce sont donc l'art d'interprétation et l'art de la traduction qui permettent de maîtriser cette relativité de la pensée, qui la rendent concordante avec la pensée générale et qui réalisent l'idée du savoir, dans chaque cas particulier, nonobstant cette différence. (Pp. 25–6)

This merits more commentary than I can provide here, but let's note the interaction between the vocabulary of sameness ("identité du savoir," "tous," "pensée générale") and the vocabulary of difference (implied by "relativité de la pensée" and "chaque cas particulier"). Compare another remark of Schleiermacher's, moreover: "Si nous envisageons alors la pensée dans l'acte de communication, alors la tendance de la

pensée, comme ce qui est communicable, est de rendre le sa-
voir commun à tous" (p. 26). The "tendency" of thought, as
and when it implies acts of communication, entails a bid to
render knowledge common to all. But if the matter concerns
the hermeneutic reconstruction of someone else's commu-
nicative act—the discourse of the Other, or the writing of the
Other—then this reconstruction must not operate a "maîtri-
se" that becomes overweening, or indeed hermeneutically
violent—this would be unethical, especially in Levinas's view,
because the reduction of what otherwise should be the irre-
ducible otherness of the Other is a failure of ethical respon-
sibility. Hermeneutics, it might be objected (particularly of
Gadamer), has no real sense of hermeneutical violence—or
of violence as such—whatever it says about certain conflicts
of interpretation. Hence it has a faulty notion of ethics by the
same token. Then again, hermeneutics offers a middle way,
as long as it's implemented by interpretive tact (as Gadamer
stresses), and is sensitive to the particularity of a given "case"
(as both Schleiermacher and Gadamer emphasize). That par-
ticularity notwithstanding, there is still an effort to achieve
common ground, or a generally apprehensible knowledge. If
that were impossible, then hermeneutic dialogue would sim-
ply ruin itself into the futile opposite of dialogue, namely a
stand-off between two Others where the gulf of mutual dif-
ference is so wide and deep as to be effectively unbridgeable.

Here, finally, is where we can stress Schleiermacher's
valuable invocation of the *art de la traduction* (in Berner's trans-
lation). For isn't it precisely the aim and activity of *translatio* to
bridge differences, to span the two sides of what translation
prefers to regard as riverbanks rather than as the two sides of
an infinitely distant gulf? We know that Schleiermacher was
keenly invested in the art of translation—the essay "On the
different Methods of Translating" is much-discussed, of

course (and Francophones owe to Antoine Berman and Berner himself the French translation of that essay), and it's worth pointing out that Schleiermacher undertook translations of Plato—he took over the task from Friedrich Schlegel, with whom Schleiermacher was originally collaborating on the project.

Rightly, however, Berner does not make the topic of translation particularly salient in his presentation of Schleiermacher's texts—rightly, because the topic doesn't emerge as an explicit issue in these hermeneutic texts. Berner's introduction does not profile his own translation strategies, moreover, which is a perfectly legitimate decision, of course, but nonetheless, one is struck by the relative scarcity of translator's notes in this volume. I do think there could have been more assistance provided to French readers in respect of the more challenging terms Schleiermacher uses, however. I have already cited Bowie's helpful gloss on the German term for "art," namely *Kunst*. Moreover, as regards a term Berner translates as "discours," Bowie alerts the Anglophone to the difficulties of rendering *Rede:* "I shall often use the rather artificial terms 'discourse,' or 'utterance,' for *Rede*, rather than referring to 'speech,' because Schleiermacher often uses the term *Rede* for both spoken and written language, and there is no obvious English equivalent which keeps this ambiguity" (p. 3). It would have been desirable for the French translation to offer more assistance with the term *Gegenstand*. Take two examples: one line of Schleiermacher's reads: "Car l'agencement selon lequel l'objet [*Gegenstand*] se décompose est une chose" (p. 134). Then we read the following: "Ce qui, dans un discours, est importé d'un domaine étranger peut être expliqué à partir de tous les discours dont il est le sujet [*Gegenstand*] principal" (p. 135). Berner's interpolation of the German word is presumably intended to alert readers to some-

thing important, but given the fact that in the first instance *Gegenstand* is translated as "objet" and in the second translated as "sujet," one can well imagine readers being considerably unsettled by that ambiguity—subject and object are surely very different terms, although Berner's translatory decision in each case is the correct one, as far as I am competent to judge. Still, a translator's note would have been useful, I think, especially since *Gegenstand* emerges—with similar ambiguity—at many moments in the translation.

Berner's edition is a little less user-friendly compared to Bowie's, and it's unfortunate, moreover, that *Hermenéutique. Pour une logique du discours individuel* doesn't provide an index, as Bowie's edition does (it's a regrettable feature of French academic publishing in general that they don't often bother to provide a thematic index or an index of names). And one would have liked more direct explanation of the decision to title the volume *Hermenéutique. Pour une logique du discours individuel*. One could have followed Bowie—he is content with *Hermeneutics and Criticism* (Bowie justifies the term "criticism" rather than "critique," moreover, on the grounds that these texts largely concern textual criticism). And the French term "discours" seems to orient us to oral utterance (caveats duly entered for the problematic translation of Schleiermacher's use of the term *Rede*), whereas—as my review tried to show earlier—Schleiermacher's writings are rather more geared to textual discussions where what "individuates" a text is weighed against what nonetheless establishes its belonging to the more general class of texts assembled under the rubric of a given genre (thus I hope it isn't captious to wonder if another title could be *Herméneutique. Pour une logique du discours général*).

It remains to be said that *Hermenéutique. Pour une logique du discours individuel* offers a satisfying example of the art (or

Kunst) of translation. No scholar immersed as deeply in hermeneutical thought as Berner is would accept the compliment that his translation of Schleiermacher is definitive, but he will, I hope, accept the compliment that his translation is as approximate (to use a Schleiermacherian term) to that definitive translation as one might wish. French readers are hence fortunate to have the riches of Schleiermacher's thought available to them in a volume that blends the dexterity of Berner's translations with the expert rigor of Berner's reflection on the central features of Schleiermacher's hermeneutical approach.

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Translation, Gadamer, and the Hermeneutical Perspective

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"It is a truism," writes Beata Piecychna in *The Hermeneutics of Translation*, "to say that in order to translate a text, the translator must understand and interpret it" (p. 43). It's indeed a truism, and therefore she is surely right to wonder, in this thoughtful and sophisticated book, why hermeneutics has been relatively neglected by translation studies. After all, the objective of hermeneutics is to elucidate the act of interpretation itself, and moreover to enhance our conceptual purchase on how we understand something at all. So why not explore that truism concerning the translator by adopting the analytical framework of hermeneutics?

It seems, in Piecychna's view, that the cognitive approach which "dominates over this discipline" (p. 31) has occluded hermeneutic lines of enquiry to a certain degree. This is probably true of the European context, though one might add that it's not really true of the North American context, largely because the profile of whatever might be called the "discipline" of translation studies is still delineated by the academic protocols of comparative literature studies. Leaving aside the North American context, in any case, we might indeed wonder at the occlusion of the hermeneutic approach. Perhaps there are a few more reasons explaining this relative neglect of hermeneutics. One is that hermeneutics has its roots in a philosophical tradition, and philosophy—let's admit it—can be intimidating. It's not that one has to do philosophy every time one studies translations and translators, of course, nor is it the case that adopting the hermeneutic approach to translation entails abandoning the field of *practical* enquiry into translation to empiricists of various stripes either. One of the tasks of Translational Hermeneutics has been to show that there can be a passage from hermeneutical philosophy to practice—see, for example, the 2018 volume, published by Zetabooks, entitled *Philosophy and Practice in Translational Hermeneutics* (see Stanley et al.).

It's good that we have a book like Piecychna's therefore, since there are clearly some intellectual conversations still to be had within translation studies in and around that truism —the common ground surely all researchers in translation studies can share. Invoking Radegundis Stolze, moreover, Piecychna refers to "the basic and obvious assumption that translation is a hermeneutic act in which the human factor plays a decisive role" (p. 24). Assuming we all agree with these truisms and statements of the obvious, then we're well set for the hermeneutic engagement Piecychna offers in this book:

an engagement with the hermeneutic philosophy of Hans-Georg Gadamer that seeks to use Gadamer's thought in order to bring into better profile the notion of the translator as a hermeneutic practitioner. Such a portrait depicts a person possessed of critical self-awareness in respect of the interpretive activities of translation. At issue, in this regard, is taking what Piecychna calls a "holistic" (p. 30) look at the translation process and the translator involved in this process.

The central difficulty, when one deploys Gadamer in order to study translation and translators, however, is that his own remarks on the subject are markedly ambivalent: on the one hand, Gadamer views translation as almost paradigmatic for hermeneutics. On the other hand, Gadamer is frequently negative when assessing translations—that negativity is expressed in the usual ways (mostly in connection with translations of poetry), namely that translations don't ring true, that something gets lost in translation, and so forth. Negotiating Gadamer's ambivalence requires a considerable amount of dexterity on Piecychna's part, particularly insofar as the central focus of her book remains the provision of a hermeneutic portrait of the competent translator. It is this dexterity I want to register in the remainder of this review.

After a foreword to the English edition (her book was first published in Polish) and an introduction, the first chapter is devoted to Gadamer's concept of language. In this chapter, Piecychna quite rightly suspends reflection on the translator specifically in order to position the human being as such against the background of Gadamer's history of linguistic thought in the West. It begins, conventionally enough, with Plato and Aristotle. In respect of Aristotle, though, one might note that important moment where he invokes the famous man/animal divide: Aristotle philosophizes via yet another truism, which establishes that animals aren't capable of intel-

ligible speech whereas human beings (or human animals) are. Only we are possessed of the *logos*. There is much to be said, therefore, about the important fact that this argument (if it is one) is found in *The Politics*, and hence really concerns the *zoon logon ekhon*. The man/animal divide, elaborated in terms of capacities for *political* speech, problematically structures Aristotle's hierarchical vision of the roles of men, women and slaves. In terms of Gadamer's way with Plato, in any case, Piecychna discusses Gadamer's remarks on *The Cratylus*, but, to my mind, it's how Gadamer handles *The Phaedrus* in *Truth and Method* that really counts. I'll come back to that shortly. Then Piecychna assesses how Gadamer proceeds to the Christian contexts—at issue is God's Word, and whatever we might understand by the Word Made Flesh. The following remark is worth pondering in this respect: "Gadamer says that the Christian idea of incarnation saved the essence of language from oblivion" (p. 53). Piecychna clarifies the subsequent episodes Gadamer provides us as he relates his historical account of Western thinking upon the nature of language: the contribution of Nicholas of Cusa, the eighteenth-century Enlightenment, and then the significance of Humboldt in particular.

Consider, however, the moment in *Truth and Method* when Gadamer adverts to that capital moment in *The Phaedrus* (section 275) where Socrates—or Plato—expresses his anxieties concerning the invention of writing. "We need only recall," Gadamer writes, "what Plato said, namely that the specific weakness of writing was that no one could come to the aid of the written word if it falls victim to misunderstanding, intentional or unintentional" (p. 392–3). One is inclined to remind Gadamer that it's Socrates who *says* this, but it's Plato who *writes* it—the distinction isn't one I make out of sheer pedantry. One paragraph later, Gadamer then remarks that

"All writing is a kind of alienated speech, and its signs need to be transformed back into speech and meaning. Because the meaning has undergone a kind of self-alienation through being written down, this transformation back is the real hermeneutical task" (p. 393). Note "speech *and* meaning," as if the two terms mutually presuppose each other. The task of hermeneutics is one given to it, you might say, by Plato (or Socrates). But now let's note that this passage from *The Phaedrus* is the same one that Jacques Derrida examines so intensely at the beginning of his *Of Grammatology* (1967). Recall that what Derrida means by "grammatology" is an attention to the *written* side of language. Derrida hence deploys grammatology in order to explore the consequences of philosophy's (in this instance, Plato's) fear of writing, and hence the massive preference for speech over writing. That preference or privileging began with Plato, Derrida argues, and continues on at least as far as the Enlightenment. Moreover, it's on the basis of an extremely close reading of Rousseau's "Essay on the Origin of Languages" that Derrida then offers an account of "The Age of Rousseau" (it's the title of the second section of *Of Grammatology*), an age which perhaps still hasn't come to a close even as I write this review essay in 2022.

With Derrida in mind, consider a line from Piecychna's excerpt of Gadamer's text "Von Lehrenden und Lernenden": "The real task for hermeneutics here is to interpret—so to speak—the living word and breathe a new life into the word, which has been petrified in writing. But no translation is really alive" (p. 35). Yet, as Piecychna remarks in a later portion of her book, "the translator's task is to translate the text back into living speech" (p. 82). In the first quotation we see writing demeaned as petrified—it's dead. And that death contrasts with the living word which we may presume is the living word of speech. But if this is the veritable task of hermeneu-

tics itself—to breathe new life into language, to rescue the word from its deathly petrifaction in mere writing—the key question is whether Gadamer thinks a *translator* can give the word the kiss of life, so to speak. It would seem not, if Gadamer can write "But no translation is really alive." So if "the translator's task is to translate the text back into living speech," we might wonder if this is an impossible task (*Aufgabe*) that a translator perforce has to give up on (*aufgeben*).

My emphasis should resonate with Piecychna's remark that "a writing becomes a repeatedly postulated living speech when it becomes 'revived.' Of course, we may understand this postulate in various ways, but the specific 'revival' of the message may also result from the translation of a given text into another language" (p. 37). I agree: I think translators revivify texts—they give them a new lease of life. Walter Benjamin thought so too, but the question is whether Gadamer does. It's clear, whether one chooses to juxtapose Derrida or not, that Gadamer distinctly privileges speech. Piecychna is therefore right to claim, in a footnote, that "Gadamer's *logos* stands for 'language' or 'speech'" (p. 49). We might even say "language *as* speech," and hence expediently get rid of, or at least pretend to ignore the question of *writing* in the logocentric philosophical system. Piecychna also puts it like this: "Language is truly realized only in living speech" (p. 49).

The objection that specialists of Gadamer will make at this juncture is that Gadamer explicitly declares that the true object of hermeneutics is writing. In *Truth and Method*, only one page after his allusions to *The Phaedrus,* Gadamer writes that "Everything written is, in fact, the paradigmatic object of hermeneutics" (p. 394). Indeed so, and Piecychna acknowledges this as well, but if Gadamer can *also* say "The real task for hermeneutics is to interpret—so to speak—the living word and breathe a new life into the word, which has been

petrified in writing" (already cited above), then one can none-theless ask whether the reason why hermeneutics attends to the "fallen," dead, or otherwise petrified dimension of writing is because it has a deep desire to redeem writing of its fallen-ness. It's a matter of the hermeneutic aspiration to turn a stone body of writing into the living body of speech—a body enfleshed, like God's Word, suffused and infused with breath and Spirit.

Piecychna spots some of the problems lurking in Gada-mer's account of language very well. Take Gadamer's keen preoccupation with a notion that emerges in St. Augustine—the "inner word." Once a word gets inside the body, then it partakes of our own breath and it can even be heard in our "inner ear." Once inside, it relinquishes its exteriority, which I imagine to be the exterior dimension of *writing*. Yet, Piecych-na rightly remarks upon the fact that "We observe a turn in Gadamer's deliberations as he asks a number of questions about what an inner word is and whether it exists at all, since it is not subject to 'physical sound articulation'" (p. 54). Quite so. It's risky to try to save "the essence of language from oblivion" (cited earlier) by investing in *theo*-logy, because one exits the domain of enquiry where we can safely speak of the sounds a human body can make and hear (including silence, of course) and entering onto a terrain where the matter con-cerns mystical notions of the *parole* of the soul, the spirit, and so forth.

In Piecychna's first chapter, then, there is rich food for thought. There is an opportunity to inscribe Gadamer into the contexts of Derridean grammatology if one is minded to do so—though, of course, there is no obligation to do so. I cannot agree with the following statement, however: "Gada-mer created his concept of language in the 1960s. As Jean Grondin rightly emphasizes, this theme belonged to the

philosophical terra incognita at that time" (p. 47). It may be true that Gadamer created his concept in the 60s, and perhaps Grondin means that the topic of language was philosophical *terra incognita* solely in Germany, but if Grondin means that such *terra incognita* was more widespread than that, then I would mildly point out to Grondin that Derrida published both *De la grammatologie* and *L'Écriture et la différence* in 1967. Philosophical reflection on language was hardly *terra incognita* to him, nor to many thinkers working in Paris during the 60s. And it's hardly true to say that "Neither Husserl nor even Sartre engaged in linguistic peregrinations" (p. 47). I'm not sure "peregrinations" is the right word, but in any case I cannot see how it would have been possible for Derrida to write his text on Husserl, namely *La Voix et le Phénomène*, if Husserl had nothing to say about linguistic issues. And, as for Sartre, we might recall those moments in *Nausea* when Roquentin experiences a situation where the name for a thing no longer "sticks"—this is the term he uses—to the thing itself.

It will doubtless seem paradoxical to invoke Sartre's Roquentin in order to stage a return to Piecychna's main claims for Gadamer. But, in fact, what one sees in *Nausea*, as also in literary modernism a few decades before, is the staging of linguistic *crisis*: the breakdown (to use Saussurean terminology) of the relation between signifier and signified, the collapse of referentiality, and so on. One thinks of Rilke's *The Notebooks of Malte Laurids Brigge*, for instance, as an example in the high modernist context. But Gadamer, for his part, is deeply affirmative of the possibilities of language and its ability to make sense. It's why he appreciates Wittgenstein, he who inspects "language games" without indulging in the sort of linguistic catastrophism one sees in the various radicalizations of Saussure and Benveniste. It's also the same affirmative stance adopted by Ricœur as well, of course.

In light of Gadamer's highly positive view of language and the human activities of sense making, we can now begin to focus upon the translator. For when Piecychna describes the translator's attitudes to a text, and then the work a translator does with that text, the spirit of her description is informed by Gadamer's encouraging promotion of language's vital meaningfulness. Piecychna is both lucid and deft with the nuances of what now has to be described on the translator's behalf. It all begins with the translator's approach to the text at hand. She writes, "Understanding of the text is determined by the so-called anticipation of meaning" (p. 111). Agreed: translators would hardly undertake translations if they anticipated that the task would involve translating sheer nonsense. Thus, "Anticipation is the key prejudice characterizing a translator's work" (p. 117). This is a good prejudice to have —translators pre-judge the text, possibly even before they begin the work of translation, and the verdict is that texts want to mean, wish their meaning to be transposed into the foreign language. It remains a prejudice, however, up until translators actually begin translating, and then they will find out whether that prejudice was justified or not. Only then will translators find out that the text is not nonsense, or—since we cannot exclude the possibility—that the text *is* nonsense. Prejudices, since they belong to the time of the "pre," the "fore," and the "beforehand," always have to await the posterior time of their eventual verification or rebuttal.

So once that preamble-time of "anticipation" has ended, and the work of translation has properly begun, Piecychna can now deploy the full resources of the hermeneutic circle in order to describe the subsequent interpretive stages of the translatory operation. Chapter Two, entitled "Translation as the Realization of a Circular Structure of Understanding," offers a stimulating account of those circular operations as

the translator steadily works on parts of the text in light of an apprehension of the textual whole, slowly culminating the text, phase by phase, until completion. A very good remark Piecychna makes, concerning the contending "geometries" of translation, namely a circle versus a flat line, is this:

> For linearity would indicate the impossible ideal of conducting certain stages in the translation process and definitely ending the process of interpretation. But we also know that once the translation "slips out" of the translator's hands, it continues to live its own life, is subjected to successive interpretations, and sometimes gives impulse to creating a retranslation of the same source text. (P. 130)

If one adheres to the linear model, we would envisage something resembling a well-constructed "Aristotelian" play or novel: there would be a beginning, a middle, and an end—the end marked by a full stop or period in order to halt the "line" of translation, so to speak. But it's preferable to invoke the geometry of the circle because, while circles do indeed describe a closure (a seamless circle), each translator, upon finishing his or her text, nonetheless acknowledges that such a translation, achieved though it may be, is never so closed around the text that a putatively definitive translation has been accomplished. Not so: a translator who acknowledges the infinite possibility of texts to offer themselves to other translators and interpreters therefore admits that other circles can begin and succeed each other. To make this acknowledgement is simply what it means to be a hermeneutic translator in the first place. Texts, then, are always open to interpretive and translatory possibility. That openness doesn't exactly resist each translator's desire to finish his or her own translation and hence achieve for that particular translation the gratifying sense of an ending (to invoke Frank Kermode). It's rather that the text finds its translatory freedom in the necessary exposure of that finalized translation to whatever

contingencies enable a translation to slip out of the translator's hands, just as it also slipped out of the author's hands as well, and found itself in the hands of a translator. Having slipped the bonds of authorship and the translator's authorship as well, the text—the translation—can circulate further, and find itself being read and contemplated at other times and places. The condition of being read and contemplated like this is the hermeneutic condition that necessarily conditions any account of the ontology of texts. For a text finds it own *being* at those moments of being read, contemplated, interpreted and translated.

Consider, in view of that "slipping out" of the translator's hands, however, how the Plato of *The Phaedrus* might view matters, given his fear of writing wandering about, getting into the hands of people who have no business with it. In any case, as Piecychna describes it for us, hermeneutics and its sense of interpretive circularity gives us way to think about the provisional end of translation and the beginning (or even the beginning-before-the-beginning) of translation as well. Let's keep on beginning, in fact, since Piecychna has further insights to offer in this regard. The nub of the matter concerns the battery of terms Gadamer uses to describe the interpretive moments of the "beforehand," so to speak. An important aspect of the hermeneutic circle involves what Gadamer calls "pre-comprehension." At issue, here, is what the translator will have had to have understood in advance of the proper work of translation. For Piecychna, this will have been the sort of background information all translators need to have at their disposal: a sense of the tradition in which the text is situated, be it generic or otherwise, a sense of what was at stake, intellectually or creatively, at the historical moment when it was written, and so forth.

That pre-comprehension—effectively a prior sense of the manifold horizon in which the text was situated—must be matched, as Piecychna rightly claims, by the translator's own sense of horizontal self-situatedness: "The translator starts from one's own familiar world knowledge, and any phenomenon appears subjectively against the backdrop of this given individual fore-knowledge" (p. 121). So here are more starting points and preliminary beginnings to consider. And once the translatory work actually commences and proceeds towards its final (but never definitively finalizable) end, hermeneutic translators conduct themselves with a sort of self-interrogating lucidity *vis-à-vis* their various understandings and misunderstandings of the text at hand. Piecychna puts it very nicely: "In a way, it is an inner act of speaking to oneself, translating to oneself, explaining to oneself, because everyone understands the text in his own way" (p. 107).

Now, one question that arises here is whether what is part of that silent soliloquy is an engagement (or even a dialogue) with the various doctrines concerning translation: those methodological premises one decides to adhere to or to resist, like the dogma or edict of "equivalence," for instance. We know that mention of "equivalence" can often trigger heatedly polemical debate, but I think Piecychna's hermeneutic approach allows us to express a bit of mild common sense: hermeneutics acknowledges that the interpretative strategies of a translator will be informed by many factors, and one factor could well be the doctrine of equivalence (it could even be the determining factor). Some translators adopt that doctrine as a sort of regulative ideal, in the Kantian sense, some do not. Some feel, moreover, the burden of a certain ethics governing the translator's work—Piecychna refers, in this regard, to the somewhat risky bid to invoke an ethics of hospitality and hosting. One thinks of George Stei-

ner, of Antoine Berman, and of Richard Kearney, whose work is clearly influenced by Levinas's ethics of alterity.

Hermeneutics simply proposes that the translator's understanding is informed by many things. This is yet another truism, of course. But the commonsensical and neutrally proffered insights of Gadamerian hermeneutics, for all that they risk platitude, are a refreshing change from what sometimes passes for translation "theory" (or even "philosophy"): the simplifying reduction of the translator's subtle praxis to invidiously either/or options. One thinks of Schleiermacher: either the translator ushers the reader to the text or the translator escorts the text to the reader. One thinks of Venuti's opposition between domestication and foreignization. One thinks of Richard Kearney's Levinasian account of translation as a hosting of the other, a vexingly tendentious account, in my view, since it licenses Kearney's problematically confident assessment of what constitutes a good translation or a bad one.

I find Piecychna's approach much more intellectually inviting, therefore, insofar as there is no *parti pris* that the reader, or the reviewer, is forced to confront in this book. Yes, there is advocacy for hermeneutics, but for all the philosophical elaborateness of Gadamer's account, it still seems commonsensical and hardly partisan. Moreover, if truisms are somehow at the heart of the discussion, it would seem rather philosophically nugatory to take up a strident position—a *parti pris*—in defense of something so true as to be a truism. If there are moments in her book one might find "problematic" (to use that somewhat disingenuous term), then they concern problems with the philosophical account Gadamer gives of the hermeneutic circle. Piecychna's account of Gadamer's account is extremely philosophically competent and I have no qualms on her account. The qualms I do have,

however, concern what Gadamer himself has to say about the hermeneutic circle. Let's get back to those terms Gadamer uses, therefore, all of which purport to describe the interpreter's fore-knowledge.

Now, one thing Gadamer invites us to contend with is what Piecychna characterizes as "an initial grasp of the fullness" (p. 114) of a text—in Gadamer's German, a *Vorgriff der Vollkommenheit*. So what would an interpreter, or a translator, initially grasp, or even fore-grasp, and apprehend as a fullness? Of what is a text "full"? Piecychna cites P. Feliga in order to clarify: "Well, for us, only that which has full unity of meaning is understandable. We always assume the full unity, when we read a text. It is only when the text becomes incomprehensible to us that we start to have doubts about the message and try to heal it" (p. 115). So like the prejudice that anticipates texts wanting to mean, we can now add the prejudice that texts mean their meaning to be meaning-*full*—and indeed that texts represent themselves to we readers, translators and interpreters as a "unity" that can never be less than full of meaning.

It goes without saying that Gadamer could never have written Friedrich Schlegel's "On Incomprehensibility" (which is why I hesitate to call Gadamer a thinker who unproblematically stands in the Romantic tradition——Gadamer, revealingly, to my mind, has no sense of Schlegelian "theory" or "critique," and I think it's also why Gadamer cannot seem to engage with Benjamin either). But, as Piecychna rightly observes, "it would be interesting to analyze the phenomenon of translation against the background of the metaphor of healing" (p. 115). Let's do so. We are wearily familiar with the many descriptions of translation as a violent activity. If we agree that it is violent, then perhaps it's high time to think about healing those putative "wounds" translation

makes upon the body of the original text. I'm thinking, in this regard, of George Steiner's hermeneutic motions of translation, and the much-discussed violence he describes. On the other hand, one wonders whether there are any cases where one would not seek to "heal" a certain breakdown in meaning. Is it not conceivable that a text might wish to remain—in the translation as much as in the original—incomprehensible? Góngora, Mallarmé, or Beckett might reject the presumptuousness of a translator declaring something to be incomprehensible and then "healing" that incomprehensibility. Beware calling something incomprehensible when it may be that what is really going on is a deliberate poetic strategy of *hermetic* meaning-making. And that strategy should be preserved as much as possible, rather than "healed."

It's true, of course, that any working translator cannot risk leaving portions of the text incomprehensible for the target audience. So I willingly admit that it's an indulgence to imagine a translator leaving spots of garbled nonsense in a given translation. Nonetheless, it's no accident that when one bristles at the translator's presumptuousness faced with so-called incomprehensibility, one does so the name of literature, precisely. So what about literature in Gadamer's account? Compare and contrast Gadamer and George Steiner. The latter invests all his hermeneutic energies in literature, and places his trust in literature's *Vollkommenheit* of meaning—indeed, as Steiner argues in *Real Presences*, this meaning is so full in literary texts that such texts resemble, or perhaps even *are* sacred texts, similarly capable of wielding the Word of God convoked by the Bible. Gadamer, for his part, also venerates literature, particularly in view of the literary texts of "tradition" and the texts he describes as "classics." Yet he doesn't veer into Steiner's risky blend of literary criticism and theology. Nonetheless, let's read the following quotation

from Gadamer's text "Vom Zirkel des Verstehens" and let's note the vocabulary that emerges here:

> We presuppose not only an immanent unity of meaning, which gives the reader guidance, but the reader's comprehension is also constantly guided by transcendent expectations of meaning which arise from the relationship to the truth of what is meant. Just as the addressee of a letter understands the news he receives and, to begin with, sees things with the eyes of the letter-writer, i.e., takes what the writer says to be true – instead of, say, trying to understand the writer's opinion as such – so we too understand the texts which are handed down on the basis of expectations of meaning drawn from our own relation to the issues under discussion. (Gadamer 1959: 62, quoted on p. 115)

Piecychna deploys this quote very skillfully in the course of her own assessment of what Gadamer might mean by the *Vorgriff der Volkommenheit*. For my part, I would just note that Steiner could have written those first three lines. Notice how "immanent" works in alliance with "transcendent" expectations of meaning. Note "the truth of what is meant": for a philosopher like Gadamer (and like Plato as well), we must mean what we say. And what we mean must imply—and successfully convey—the *truth* of what we mean. Any other scenario is inconceivable for Gadamer. Irony, lies, the sort of infelicitous or misfiring speech acts described by J. L. Austin (or Derrida) are off the table, otherwise Gadamer loses that wonderful word—so wonderful and so cherished by philosophy (for philosophy, and *as* philosophy)—, namely *truth*. Notice the analogy enabled by the swift convenience of the "just as" rhetorical move: Gadamer envisages the truth of a text in terms of being both addressed by a letter, and receiving it. Gadamer premises the truth of whatever that letter communicates upon the unarguable fact that the letter was meant for the addressee—for the recipient. So if a text, likewise, enters into the domain of truth itself then it's because it can re-

liably send itself via the post to whomever is destined to receive that letter. Postal hermeneutics: letters, in Gadamer, never get lost in the mail, always get read by the persons they're intended for. And indeed (to twist what Gadamer really means here, admittedly), these letters get read with the *same* eyes as the eyes of the letter-writer. These letters never end up—as Plato feared—being read by those who have no business with them. The letter Plato fears has an uncertain addressee; Gadamer's letter does not. Unlike Poe's purloined letter—read or un-read with so much intensity by Lacan and indeed Derrida—that purloining never happens in Gadamer. It suffices to put a stamp on the envelope, inscribe the addressee, and *truth* would then be a matter less of what the specific content of that letter is (upon opening, a matter of the contestable "opinions" of the letter-writer) but more the incontestable fact that meaning is always a matter of meaning *meant* for the right person.

The entire issue now comes into focus: Gadamer isn't necessarily characterizing the recipient here as a "translator" because the recipient who is supposed to be capable of presuming upon this truth, upon this plentitude of meaning, is whomever is addressed by *tradition*. So what is at stake is this "handing down," and hence what is necessarily at stake is the identity of those for whom, or to whom a traditionary text is meant and sent. Will Gadamer risk the scenario where a traditionary text is received by a translator and therefore sent to other languages and therefore to other audiences and readerships that "tradition" hadn't intended? Or is it that traditionary texts hand themselves down only to those who share the same language as the traditionary text itself and therefore risk no such voyages and vicissitudes of translation?

Let me suspend answering such questions, and turn briefly to Piecychna's account, given in Chapter Three, enti-

tled "Translation as a Concretization of Historically Effected Consciousness." For Piecychna is right: it's almost impossible to adequately assess Gadamer's figure of the translator without assessing matters concerning tradition. As Piecychna says, "Tradition is also a fundamental concept in Gadamer. It is an inalienable component of the process of reaching agreement" (p. 147). Moreover, "The process of transmitting tradition—a kind of a keystone of intersubjective understanding—is another way in which he reveals the specificity of the translation act and the role of the translator who becomes an intermediary between past and present" (p. 137). Presently, I will return once more to Gadamer's addressed envelope or letter in order to wonder a little more about that "transmitting," but for now we can appreciate that the scenario here is that of a text (but let's insist, a *traditionary* text) "sent" from the past towards the present of the translator. Now what, in that case, would be the mediation with which the translator is tasked? Nothing less, it seems, than the mediation between past and present—which is as much to say history itself.

But the translator's mediation between past and present is apparently restricted to the rather bland scenarios of what Gadamer calls "dialogue." So when Piecychna adverts to Andrzej Bronk, in connection with Gadamer's notion of hermeneutical experience, and says that "Bronk suggests that it has the character of a conversation, because it refers to a dialogue with the historical message, thus enabling the interpreter to understand things" (p. 140), Bronk's suggestion, while accurate, is too understated (and a little banal). Gadamer himself is far too neutral as well. Piecychna quotes him from *Truth and Method*: "For tradition is a genuine partner in dialogue, and we belong to it, as does the I with a Thou" (p. 140). But there is no sense of the fractious relationship some have with "tradition," no sense of the resistance one might wish to muster

vis-à-vis that "belonging"—for colonial subjects, to take an example, if not *the* example, that so-called belonging will have been foisted upon them. Some will feel that Gadamer's concept of dialogue is calamitously ill-equipped to deal with that kind of traditionary situation. Moreover, there are other, rather different ways of construing the I–Thou relation in this respect as well. Althusser's notion of interpellation, for instance, registers a more minatory scenario where "tradition" is replaced by a term Gadamer hesitates to use, namely "ideology." And when ideology addresses a person, it's an address couched in the form of a command rather than in the form of a benign invitation to dialogue. Theorists weaned on different intellectual fare (postcolonial theory, Marxian theory, specialists of Gramsci, followers of Bakhtin, and so forth) will accordingly have little time for what will seem, to them, to be Gadamer's rather strategically *trite* notion of conversation with the past and with tradition.

Nonetheless, Gadamer, Piecychna and Bronk are right to insist that all interpreters—including translators—are situated in history (they are right because it's a truism, of course), and hence negotiate between the *past* which constitutes history as such and the *present* (which also constitutes history as such, I suppose) of their own interpretive or translatory circumstance. In her section on "Translation and Tradition," Piecychna remarks that

> In the translation process, tradition performs a very important function. It shows interpreters what is past, while making them aware of their place in the present. It is a bridge that enables the interpreter to melt the horizons of the past and the present. It is a process of mediation between present and past and between the alien and the known and learned. (P. 156).

If the question is whether the translator is only a passive bridge-builder or can in fact operate in a more active (perhaps

even activist) way, Piecychna valuably remarks, in that regard, that "On the one hand, translators should not uncritically give in to tradition, but on the other hand, they should take it into account, be aware of it, and identify themselves with it, but not dogmatically" (p. 157).

The problem that Piecychna is skillfully negotiating here, is what is sometimes objected of Gadamer, namely his "conservative" position *vis-à-vis* tradition. *Mutatis mutandis*, the question is whether Gadamer's preferred translator will also be conservative—the preserver of tradition's "message" or "missive" at all costs. Yet when Piecychna writes that, "[f]or Gadamer, transgressing tradition is a way to verify one's own beliefs and obtain partial self-knowledge, since when the interpreter comes into contact with something unknown, the transmission of tradition leads to a deeper reflection on historical existence" (p. 157), one wonders whether Gadamer actually uses the term "transgression," or really shows us what such a transgression looks like. One also wonders whether Gadamer would be comfortable if one replaced the word "interpreter" in that sentence by the word "translator." I suspect he wouldn't be or at least he would probably advert to his essay "Lesen ist wie Übersetzen" (1989) and enter the same caveats one sees in that text concerning the different kinds of "translations" operated by readers and by translators in the conventional sense. Moreover, when Piecychna writes that "tradition allows creative freedom to the interpreter" (p. 157), one wonders how much freedom is allowable in Gadamer's scenario. Does it matter who the interpreter is here, in view of that freedom and that balance between transgression and conservation?

Let's put it this way: if it's true that Gadamer has a conservative attitude to tradition, will he risk entrusting the message handed down by tradition to a translator? That is: if we

assume that the language of tradition itself is perforce a native language, and therefore imagine that if one stands in the lineage of the German tradition, for instance, Gadamer's traditionary texts will be written in German as well, is it legitimate to assume, on Gadamer's behalf, that those texts are therefore primarily, perhaps even *exclusively* meant for German readers? To return the Gadamer's letter analogy: is it that the "letter" of that German tradition will always have been addressed to a fellow German? Or will Gadamer venture the riskier scenarios where tradition—and the very message that it hands down—is received by non-native German speakers for one thing, and for another by translators who send that message toward foreign shores and foreign languages?

Consider, in view of these questions, a quote I find particularly revealing from Gadamer's essay "Heidegger's Later Philosophy": "The poet is so dependent on the language he inherits and uses that the language of his poetic work of art can *only* reach those who command the same language" (Gadamer 1960/2008: 228; the italics are mine). I'm not going to quibble with Gadamer here, although I cannot refrain from raising a quizzical eyebrow in the name of Samuel Beckett. The point I want to make concerns why Gadamer, so often in his writing, feels it necessary to say things like this. I suspect it's because he feels the specter of the translator hovering dangerously over the cherished products of tradition, and especially of poetic tradition. So if Gadamer is right to claim that the language of the poetic work of art can *only* reach those who speak the same language, then the task of the Gadamerian translator becomes acutely difficult and perhaps doomed to failure. How could a poem of Rilke ever reach an Anglophone audience if Rilke's poetic language is *only* meant, addressed, sent, and transmitted for and to a German audience?

Happily, we can redeem this somewhat invidious situation for the translator by re-quoting Piecychna's valuable remark that "we also know that once the translation 'slips out' of the translator's hands, it continues to live its own life, is subjected to successive interpretations, and sometimes gives impulse to creating a retranslation of the same source text" (cited above). I think we could also paraphrase this a bit and say that once the source text, notwithstanding its desire to be read by those who share the same language it is written in, "slips out" of the authors hands, it can find other audiences, other translatory vistas, and indeed other prospects for life. Let's paraphrase even more pointedly: once the traditionary text, notwithstanding its desire to be read by those who share the same language it is written in, "slips out" of the hands tasked with the act of *transdare*, even such texts that are otherwise hampered by the leaden label of "traditionary" can still find other audiences, other translatory vistas, and indeed other prospects for a life beyond the conservative half-lives reserved for the fetish texts of unchanging canonicity. Tradition—and surely Gadamer would agree, despite what some have condemned as his hermeneutic conservatism—cannot and should not protect the texts of that tradition from the contingencies of translation, interpretation and forms of re-writing. Otherwise they ossify into archaism, and die off like the dinosaurs. So translators remain vital protagonists for Gadamer, and for Piecychna. And what is vital about texts—what keeps them alive, in a sense—is that they offer themselves to an infinity of interpretations, readings and translations. Piecychna remarks, therefore: "As Gadamer emphasizes, there is no single sense of a text and there is no way we can ever work out such a sense" (p. 165). I heartily endorse that remark even though I'm not entirely sure if Gadamer, any more than Ricœur, would actually put it like that.

Now, Piecychna's book is not intended to be a full-scale engagement with the contentions in literary theory concerning the limits or limitlessness of interpretation. Nor is her book intended to be a work of literary theory either. Still, there are literary-critical angles that Piecychna develops, and so let's attend to these. Piecychna cites E. D. Hirsch: "Textual meaning is not a naked given like a physical object. The text is first of all a conventional representation like a musical score, and what the score represents may be construed correctly or incorrectly" (p. 188). Hirsch, author of the 1967 book *Validity in Interpretation*, is keen to establish interpretive criteria for such validity (correctness and incorrectness, in this case), and he has been vigorously criticized for that reason. But one wonders why Hirsch—nowadays rarely cited in literary-theoretical circles—is still invoked in the context of hermeneutical thinking. Ricœur, in *Time and Narrative,* approvingly cites Hirsch as well. In any case, whatever dubieties one might have concerning Hirsch's criteria for interpretive "validity" (I have many) and whatever one feels about Hirsch's analogy between a musical "score" and a "text," there is no doubt about it: there needs to be an assessment of the way Gadamer characterizes the name and nature of "text." What is a text?

Piecychna's assessment spreads out along two axes. The first axis lays out the types of text to be translated, but more importantly the sort of things a translator feels to be the salient features of the text to be translated. Piecychna thus writes: "Since each text creates problems of a different nature, a competent translator can prioritize by focusing on what constitutes the essence of the source text. Identifying priorities in the text is a skill which reveals the high competence of the translator" (p. 166). She invokes Stolze in this regard as well: "each text has features distinguishing it from others, hence, we may describe it as an autonomous or individualized

entity" (p. 166). Finally, and intriguingly, Piecychna writes that "In each case, a translator must decide what constitutes the so-called translation dominant in a given text" (p. 166). A literary theorist might have some qualms about "the essence of the source text," however, and there is perhaps more to be said about the text as an autonomous or individualized entity, since a lurking problem—in literary studies at any rate—might be the issue of intertextuality which de-autonomizes or de-individualizes any given text to a certain extent. But what is a "translation dominant"? It would have been desirable, given that very interesting term, to provide a few examples (not necessarily exclusively drawn from literature, to be sure) in order to clarify how a translator decides on that "translation dominant," and then what he or she does next. Nabokov, I suggest, would have been an interesting example: faced with the poetic aspect of Pushkin's *Eugene Onegin*, that poeticity being the "translation dominant" of that text, perhaps, Nabokov took his famous decision to render Pushkin's text in prose. "If we consider that the text itself reveals its truth to the reader," Piecychna writes moreover, "then we should state that the text provides the reader with information about what its most important aspect is" (p. 167). This is a very interesting remark, particularly in view of the word "truth"—again, an example would have perhaps been helpful to show how texts provide the reader with that information in light of the revelation, no less, of their truth.

The second axis offers a spread of more literary-theoretical reflections on the notion of text, and in this case, there is a significant invocation of Roland Barthes. The quotation is from *Sollers écrivain*: "The text is full of white spots, cracks to fill, and whoever sent it predicted that they would be filled, and left them blank for two reasons. First of all because the text is a lazy (or economical) mechanism that lives at the ex-

pense of the added value of the sense that the recipient intro-
duces into it" (p. 176). Piecychna follows up on Barthes's re-
marks adding, "Therefore, texts 'live' also through transla-
tions, which embody reading, understanding, and interpreta-
tion. Translations show the truth contained in texts, indicat-
ing an ontological moment in the hermeneutic conversation"
(p. 176). And then Piecychna cites E. Tabakowska: "Reading
a translation—understood as a process—is a special case in
which the reader's consciousness combined with rationality
creates, reproduces, and processes images (re)created and
recorded in the word of the Other—the translator" (p. 176).

One of the things I admire about Piecychna's book is its
willingness to push hermeneutics beyond its comfort zone.
In specific regard to Gadamer, I cannot imagine him finding
Barthes particularly congenial, and especially not Philippe
Sollers. Gadamer might have preferred to displace Barthes's
reflections concerning those white spots (or blank spots) to-
wards the phenomenological contexts of Ingarden and Iser
—they both theorize the reader's activity as an "actualization"
of textual cues given by the text. But there is a great deal of
merit in remaining, as Piecychna does, with Barthes here,
since it allows her—once more—to envisage the *life* of texts,
and hence appreciate the "value-added" (whether in an eco-
nomical sense or not) provided by translators—by those who
fill (or perhaps widen) those cracks and textual lacunae with
new meaning. But I doubt that Barthes would have been keen
on the description of those putatively translatory exercises in
filling-in-the-blanks as a "conversation," and I'm not sure he
would have regarded the interaction between translator and
text as an instance of hermeneutics either. For Barthes, as we
know, one key distinction is between *lisible* and *scriptible* texts
—Sollers, for Barthes, instantiates the "writerly" text, and it
is writerly texts which afford exuberant opportunities for re-

writing—be it by a reader still reading Soller's French, or (though Barthes never countenances this) by a translator transposing that French into another language. For Barthes, such exuberance gives us not a hermeneutics of translation and/as reading so much as an *erotics* – the distinction here concerns the difference between *plaisir* and *jouissance* worked out in *The Pleasure of the Text*. And since this is so for Barthes, I wonder about putting Tabakoska's observations concerning "the reader's consciousness combined with rationality" in any vicinity with Barthes. For in Barthes's account of reading, "rationality" is not a guiding term.

What emerges from Piecychna's engagement with Barthes, in any case, is a sharply consequential remark: "The concept of text poses a particular challenge to Gadamer" (p. 180). That is indeed true—and Piecychna has the intellectual integrity to profile what is indeed challenging for Gadamer in respect of the notion of "text." Let's follow her here. "For Gadamer," she writes, "a text can mean a musical work, a film, an opera spectacle, a theater performance, a painting or a sculpture, and thus anything that is subject to understanding and related interpretation" (p. 178). Yet a gap seems to open up between the "texts" of music, film, painting, and sculpture, and then the texts supplied by *writing* when Piecychna says that "In Gadamer's hermeneutical philosophy, we may also describe a text as representing a written manifestation of language" (p. 179). On the one hand, Gadamer affords himself an expansive notion of "text" since it extends to non-written artworks like sculpture and painting and musical performance, but on the other, if one insists on a notion of text that only implies (or *also* implies) a "written manifestation of language," then we have a quandary: which is it? Is the definition of "text" as inclusive as Gadamer seemingly wants it to be or is "text" actually something which excludes

painting and (unless one wishes to argue matters concerning librettos and musical scores) a Beethoven symphony, because the basic definition of a "text" presupposes the written manifestation of language? Moreover, Piecycna writes, "texts are all manifestations of life" (p. 178). But then again, Piecychna can cite Gadamer in *Truth and Method* saying that "A text is not to be understood as an expression of life but with respect to what it says" (p. 179).

These confusions are not of Piecychna's making. They are Gadamer's confusions. It would take many books, besides Piecychna's own, to sort out why Gadamer is so contradictory here. Partly, one supposes, it's because Gadamer never really engaged with structuralism and the Saussurean linguistics it drew upon. Ricœur did, of course, which is why there is considerable interest to be found in his essay "What is a Text?" (and indeed, in Barthes's piece, "From Work to Text"). Perhaps Gadamer, despite using the term "text," really meant "work." And, of course, if one were to be flagrantly blunt about it, the strongest way of explaining Gadamer's challenges with respect to "text" would involve us, once more, risking the formidable complexities of Derrida on *écriture, texte, œuvre*, and so on. That would return us, in the end, I think, to the different way Gadamer and Derrida read that moment in *The Phaedrus* I mentioned earlier.

Let's continue by looking at Piecychna's survey of Gadamer's way with texts and, to do that, one has to also discuss paratexts. Her discussion, in this regard, is very interesting. It's apparently possible to speak of "the authentic quality of a text" (p. 180), and this is apparently achieved by distinguishing that integral text from antitexts, pseudotexts and pretexts (or fore-texts). She writes, adverting to Gadamer, of types of paratexts that are "linguistic expressions impossible to frame within a text" (p. 181). Let's retain that notion of expressions

"impossible to *frame* within a text" (my italics). Piecychna proceeds further with Gadamer's typology. Texts "that do not conform to the essence of Gadamer's textuality per se are pseudotexts—or text-opposed texts—which contain elements that do not engage at all in the process of transmitting meaning and do not submit to interpretation procedures. Very often, these are rhetorical elements which play a strictly functional—or even decorative—role" (p. 181).

Any literary theorist worth her salt would find easy to deconstruct Gadamer here. Gadamer, it seems to me, is on very treacherous ground, for all that he seems confident in the capacity of *frames* to delimit texts from whatever textual material is supposed to lie outside that frame, and indeed serve merely functional or decorative purposes. Frames, paregons, borders, and even "text-opposed texts": I don't think this is the sort of theoretical terrain Gadamer traverses particularly well, and indeed if one has Derrida in mind here (*The Post Card*, *Living On: Borderlines*, and so on), Gadamer will appear as nothing short of naïve. But it all comes out in the open when Piecychna offers her central insight: "According to Gadamer, such (fore-)texts contradict the true essence of textuality. In fact, proper, true, authentic texts are literary texts which, with every reading, speak anew and, importantly, "live" after we decipher the meaning they carry, which is not the case with the other types" (p. 181).

Here it is at last: only literary texts are authentic, and they earn their authenticity because reading can turn the petrified matter of writing into *speech*—and thus do they veritably *live*. The true essence of textuality is precisely not the fact of a text being written down, but the availability of a text to the redemption of its "dead letter" (to sound like Plato), a redemption that is achieved by means of its availability to be spoken, re-spoken or recited. Unacceptable to Gadamer would ac-

cordingly be the statement that the true essence of textuality is that textuality *has no essence*. Equally unacceptable would be the assertion that textuality is *not* to be thought of in reference to organic life either. Derrida, and in an important sense the Benjamin of "The Task of the Translator," confront such truths, whereas Gadamer does not. And that is why, to return to Piecychna's first chapter on Gadamer's history of philosophical thinking on the concept of language, he is so attracted to *The Cratylus*, and to the Christian theo-logical reflection on the living, incarnate Word.

Gadamer's reflection on textuality converges, then, on the opposition between speech and writing, which in turn is patterned on the opposition between life and death. If foretexts "contradict" the very essence of textuality, it's because fore- or para-texual materials are dead, petrified or ossified —un-living because they are merely the functional or decorative marks of a *Book*, rather than part and parcel of a *living* work or text. And that is why Piecychna excellently cites a passage from Gadamer's essay "Text and Interpretation" where two lines jump out with alacrity. First line: "Literary texts are such texts that in reading them aloud one must also listen to them" (p. 181). Second line: "As if written in the soul, they are on their way to *Schriftlichkeit* (scripturality)" (p. 181). Once one reads a piece of writing aloud, that recitation enables the oral performance of a text, and now it can be heard in the one hermeneutic organ Gadamer so consistently privileges, namely the ear. And how Rousseauean is that "as if written in the soul." Is it any wonder, to briefly return to Derrida, that the central portion of *Of Grammatology* concerns precisely Rousseau and his fantasy of a writing—an ideal script or scripturality—that is "ideal" because it is *as if* written on the transparently expressive "page" of the heart or soul itself? How fascinating, in any case, that Gadamer, when he inves-

tigates the etymological usage of "text," offers two strategic examples: firstly, the text of the Bible, and secondly "the text of a song" (p. 180). Gadamer, as I tried to show in my essay "Theological Hermeneutics and Translation: Ernst Fuchs's 'Translation and Proclamation'" (cf. O'Keeffe 2021), is rather keen on releasing the message of the Bible from the bonds of writing, and it's why he dwells on the performative aspects of preaching from the pulpit: once a preacher reads from the Bible, he reads it aloud. And while a song might have a script, that script yields to the performative exercise of singing aloud (or in silence to oneself).

Gadamer is highly consistent in his preference for speech over writing, and that preference informs a great deal, I think, of what he has to say about notions of "text." It also informs what he has to say about the various figures he selects as candidates for hermeneutic interpreters—readers, and translators. At issue, at the end of the day, is whether translators, in Gadamer's mind, can operate that transformation back (in his German, the *Rückverwandlung*) from writing to speech – from dead writing, that is, to living speech. I've had my own things to say about that, in connection with Gadamer's "Lesen ist wie Übersetzen" (I permit myself to refer to my essay entitled "Reading, Writing, and Translation in Gadamer's Hermeneutic Philosophy", O'Keeffe 2018), and I won't rehearse all of my argument here, but my point, in a nutshell, is that reading is *like* translation only up to the point at which reading is *not* like translation. And the point at which the likeness breaks down is precisely at the point where Gadamer regards translators as being incapable of operating the *Rückverwandlung* whereby petrified or otherwise "dead" writing is transformed into living speech. Gadamer thinks the reader can do such a thing, but that a translator cannot. Hence Gadamer's pervasively negative view of translations.

Besides wishing to record Piecychna's kind engagement with my own work in this respect, let me say that Gadamer's symptomatically negative appraisal of translations clinches my positive appraisal of Piecychna's book, in fact. For, as I suggested at the outset of this review essay, the challenge Piecychna faces is to negotiate Gadamer's own ambivalent relationship to translation and translators while making the case for a hermeneutic approach to translation. What this means is that Piecychna has had to write a multi-layered book that can be read in equally multiple ways. It is, therefore, a book written in the very spirit of Gadamerian hermeneutics: available to more than one dialogue, available to more than one kind of reader—a specialist of European translation studies, literary theorists, or even, dare I say, a Derridean. What is admirable about *The Hermeneutics of Translation* is the polyvocality of the text—there are Polish scholarly voices to be heard, other scholars like Barthes to be hearkened to, and conversations to be had between disciplines as well as within whatever currently constitutes the specific discipline of translation studies. I'm not sure what kind of reader—or reviewer—I have been of her book, but I can attest to the fact that dialoguing with her text has been thoroughly stimulating and an invitation to further reflection. Let me end by citing her one last time, referring to Gadamer: "Gadamer states that every time we return to a text in order to better understand its content, we take into consideration its so-called primary message (*Kundgabe*), i.e. the primary information that must be understood" (p. 186). The primary message or announcement—the *Kundgabe*—of Piecychna's book is that the hermeneutic approach to translation gives (this is the giving of "*geben*") rich resources for reflection, and this message is very effectively transmitted to whomever will read Piecychna's book. Moreover, as she argues in the "Coda," entitled "Hermeneutics of Translation,

Where Are You Heading?" Piecychna announces a healthy future for the hermeneutic approach to translation. At least one reason why that future looks healthy is because the profile of that future might well resemble what we are fortunate to be able to read in the present, namely such a good book as *The Hermeneutics of Translation*.

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Reviews | Rezensionen

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Rezension zu: GIL, Alberto / GILI, Guido (2022): *La differenza che arricchisce. Comunicazione e transculturalità.* Roma: Edizioni Santa Croce s.r.l. 212 S. ISBN: 979-12-5482-040-7.

Bei dieser soeben erschienenen Arbeit handelt es sich um eine sehr interessante disziplinenübergreifende Studie, die neue Blicke auf die Kommunikation zwischen Menschen unterschiedlicher Kulturen oder, präziser gesagt, zwischen Menschen in ihrer individuellen kulturellen Prägung eröffnet. Das Buch richtet sich nicht nur an Kommunikationsexperten und Studierende in diesem und verwandten Bereichen, sondern auch an Laien, die sich einen tieferen Einblick in das Phänomen der „Transkulturalität" als Begegnung zwischen Kulturen in einer Welt immer komplexerer Vernetzung wünschen (vgl. S. 8). Transkulturalität wird dabei als Chance und Möglichkeit der Bereicherung in zwischenmenschlichem Austausch gesehen. Zentrales Anliegen der beiden Autoren, die sich mit Blick auf die Studie in ihren fachlichen Profilen ideal ergänzen (vgl. auch S. 182), ist eine Zusammenführung unterschiedlicher theoretischer Perspektiven auf Transkulturalität mit dem Ziel, einen Ansatz darzubieten, der die Würde

des Menschen in seiner kulturellen Identität in den Mittelpunkt stellt (vgl. S. 8). Dieses Projekt wird in der stringent aufgebauten Studie in fünf aufeinander aufbauenden Kapiteln unter Rückgriff auf eine Vielzahl wissenschaftlicher Ansätze, die hier nicht alle genannt werden können, gut verständlich und nachvollziehbar in die Tat umgesetzt:

Mit Kapitel 1, „La sfida della comunicazione e della comprensione", werden die (definitorischen) Grundlagen gelegt. Der Mensch wird als eine auf unterschiedliche Weise in Kultur(en) eingebettete Persönlichkeit beschrieben, für die der Austausch mit anderen Menschen potentiell durchaus auch Risiken bergen kann; Kommunikation bedeutet „Übersetzung" (Hannerz) in die Welt des anderen (vgl. S. 17). Das Kapitel veranschaulicht konstitutive Elemente von Kulturen, Dimensionen materieller Kultur, Aspekte intra- und interkultureller Kommunikation sowie Medienkultur und Kulturindustrie als Kultur *sui generis* und zieht dabei Ansätze u. a. von Hall, Hofstede, Kluckhohn, Parsons, Schwartz oder Triandis zu Rate.

In Kapitel 2, „Le condizioni della comunicazione intra e interculturale", wird in drei Unterkapiteln detailliert auf die Bedingungen kommunikativen Erfolgs eingegangen: Zunächst stehen strukturelle und kontextabhängige Voraussetzungen der Kommunikation im Fokus. Dazu zählen Facetten des kommunikativen Codes (geschriebene und gesprochene Sprache, Gestik, Mimik, Schweigen, Proxemik usw.), das Weltwissen der Beteiligten (*schemes*, *scripts* und *frames*) sowie die Kenntnis essentieller Regeln der Kooperation (Grice, Lakoff, Brown/Levinson, Leech u. a.), die in Kommunikation zwischen Kulturen differenzierter zu betrachten sind (vgl. S. 58). Daran anschließend wird den personenbezogenen Faktoren der Kommunikation besondere Aufmerksamkeit geschenkt, worunter vor allem die Intention des Kommunizierenden,

das Interesse am Gesprächsobjekt oder an der Person des anderen, das Bemühen um Kommunikation sowie das gegenseitige Vertrauen gefasst werden. Drittens schließlich rückt die konkrete interaktive Situation in den Fokus und damit Fragen wie z. B. diejenigen, ob es sich um einen dauerhaften oder einen okkasionellen Kontakt, eine gleichwertige oder asymmetrische Beziehung, eine friedliche oder aber eine konfliktträchtige Situation handelt, in der kommuniziert wird.

Auf diesen Kapiteln aufbauend, steht in 3 („La transculturalità come fenomeno socio-culturale") das Phänomen der Transkulturalität selbst nunmehr im Fokus der Betrachtung. Mit der soziokulturellen Perspektive wird dabei den fraktalen Strukturen, der Hybridität und der Heterogenität von Kulturen (vgl. S. 85) Rechnung getragen. Auch in diesem Kapitel wird in drei Schritten gearbeitet: Auf einen Blick in die Geschichte (Pieper, Poppe, Espagne/Werner u. a.) folgt die Beschreibung der Herausbildung des Konzepts „Transkulturalität", welches, beginnend mit Ortiz 1940 und immer stärker seit der letzten Dekade des 20. Jahrhunderts (Appadurai, Welsch, Berg, Zebadúa u. a.), die Begrifflichkeit der Multi- und der Interkulturalität aufgrund ihres von homogenen bzw. geschlossenen Kulturen ausgehenden Konzepts verdrängt hat (vgl. S. 89f.). Besonders in den Blick genommen werden in diesem Kontext auch die Arbeiten von Robertson („glocalizzazione", vgl. S. 98), Liebes/Katz (Untersuchung zur Rezeption der Fernsehserie „Dallas" in unterschiedlichen Kulturen, vgl. S. 98f.) sowie Hannerz, der die Vorherrschaft der USA bzw. Europas in der Medienproduktion und die damit verbundene Beeinflussung anderer Kulturen festhält. Im letzten Abschnitt mündet das Kapitel zunächst in einem Blick auf das Modell der Transkulturalität von Welsch, das auf der „transversalen Vernunft" als zwischen verschiedenen Bereichen verbindendem Konzept basiert (vgl. S. 101). In der wei-

teren ausführlichen Diskussion (z. B. Buber, Guardini, Rosa, Donati), die hier nicht im Einzelnen wiedergegeben werden kann, wird dann aber überzeugend für das Konzept der „ragione relazionale" optiert, in der das Ich sich im Du durch die Beziehung spiegelt und verwirklicht (vgl. S. 112). Als Konsequenz dieses Konzepts gilt es, kulturelle Unterschiede herauszuarbeiten, diese jedoch nicht als Hindernis oder als zu überwindende Elemente zu betrachten, sondern als solche, die für den Dialog geradezu notwendig sind (vgl. S. 112f.).

Nicht minder überzeugend wird den Leserinnen und Lesern im vierten Kapitel („Transculturalità come dialogo translinguistico: la traduzione") ein tiefer Einblick in die Translation als Instrument des transkulturellen Dialogs geboten. Vier Schritte erscheinen dabei als Unterkapitel: Im ersten Schritt wird anhand unterschiedlicher Beispiele in diesen besonderen Bereich transkultureller Kommunikation eingeführt: Die politische Seite und die Frage, wer ein Gedicht eigentlich übersetzen darf oder sollte, wird am Beispiel von Amanda Gormans Gedicht anlässlich der Amtseinführung von Biden, „The hill we climb" (vgl. S. 120f.), aufgeworfen. Ausführlich wird anschließend Borges epochaler Aufsatz „Pierre Menard, autor del *Quijote*", besprochen, der Anlass zu Gedanken über die Aktualisierung von Texten durch Leserinnen und Leser durch die Zeit hinweg bietet (vgl. z. B. S. 122), mit dem aber auch die Suche in der Übersetzung nach dem Wesen des Originals verdeutlicht wird (vgl. S. 126). Übersetzer und Übersetzerinnen erscheinen dabei in einem schönen Bild als „Restauratoren" („restauratori di opere d'arte", S. 127), die die Identität eines Kunstwerks wiederherzustellen versuchen. Dieser Aspekt leitet über zum zweiten Punkt, nämlich den Fragen der Beziehung zwischen Hermeneutik als Prozess des Verstehens einerseits und der Kreativität der Wiedergabe des Verstandenen andererseits; Überlegungen hierzu hatten vor

einiger Zeit insbesondere auch zur Gründung des Forschungszentrums „Hermeneutik und Kreativität" geführt,
das derzeit an der Universität Leipzig angesiedelt ist (hermeneutik-und-kreativitaet.de). Auch dieses Thema wird in seinen theoretischen Facetten, z. B. der näheren Beleuchtung
des Kreativitätsbegriffs, und an Beispielen, wie an Übersetzungen von Textpassagen aus Goethes „Faust" oder der
„Odysee", eindrucksvoll diskutiert. Ebenso wird das darauffolgende Unterkapitel zu Übersetzung und Performanz, in
dem, kurz gesagt, Übersetzen als Handlung und als Mimesis,
der Übersetzer als Handelnder betrachtet wird, anhand bemerkenswerter Beispiele (Meerbaum-Eisinger, Rilke) illustriert, die verdeutlichen, dass mit der Übersetzung „tiefere
Schichten" des Originals freigelegt werden können (vgl.
S. 152). Abgeschlossen wird dieses Unterkapitel mit einem
Blick auf eine Bibelstelle in zwei zeitlich versetzten italienischen Übersetzungen, die weitere Fragen der „fidélité créatrice" hinsichtlich Lexik oder Informationsstruktur in sensiblen
Kommunikationskontexten aufwerfen (vgl. S. 152ff.). Der
vierte und letzte Abschnitt schließlich nimmt sich die ethische Dimension der Übersetzung und die Glaubwürdigkeit
des übersetzerisch Handelnden vor; auch hier wird man
durch ausführliche Argumentation bereichert. Bescheidenheit einerseits und Mut andererseits kristallisieren sich in dieser Darstellung als Faktoren heraus, die in derartigen translatorischen Kontexten wesentlich erscheinen.

Mit Kapitel 5 schließlich liegt ein im Vergleich zu den
anderen Kapiteln kürzerer Textabschnitt vor, in dem die Fäden der Darstellung zusammenlaufen. Das Christentum wird
hierin als ein Kulturen verbindendes, gewissermaßen „überdachendes" Element dargestellt, als eine Botschaft, die allen
Kulturen als Angebot vorliegt und die – unter Berücksichtigung der jeweiligen Eigenheiten – darin aufgenommen wer

den kann (vgl. S. 174). Untermauert wird diese Perspektive durch Hinweise auf einige sich auf die Kulturvermittlung beziehenden Textstellen offizieller Schriften der katholischen Kirche. In einem kurzen Fazit ab S. 179 nehmen die Autoren zusammenfassend Bezug auf den Titel ihres Buches, mit dem sie (kulturelle) Unterschiede als Bereicherung ausweisen, und geben zugleich eine kurze Zusammenfassung ihrer Positionen.

Wie schon eingangs betont, handelt sich bei diesem Werk um eine äußerst lesenswerte Studie, die ein großes Panorama wissenschaftlicher Ansätze mit neuen Ideen fundiert zusammenführt, auf diese Weise viele Perspektiven eröffnet und die Leserschaft neu über Kommunikation in Kulturen nachdenken lässt.

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Review of: LEAL, Alice (2021): *English and Translation in the European Union. Unity and Multiplicity in the Wake of Brexit*. Abingdon-on-Thames: Taylor & Francis. 228 pp. ISBN: 9780367244910.

The European Union speaks many languages. But sometimes only one: the language of Shakespeare, which is also the idiom of 400 other million people. 70 million of them live in the European Union. That is what makes the whole affair so complicated. The EU is in a quite uncomfortable position when it comes to language policy. If it tries to become more anglicised, it will be accused of disregarding its own founding

myth. If it gives in to the demands for more linguistic diversity, it will be blamed for becoming entangled. In a word: Europe should come to a decision once and for all. Or should it not? Could it be that the current status quo is not so wrong? Perhaps Europe should decide not to decide. For once, not deciding would be the best option. Or maybe not?

Created in the aftermath of the Second World War, the "Union" as it is called stands on the one hand for the principle of "integrated multilingualism", which is to be understood in the sense that linguistic diversity is supposed to have a unifying effect and pave the way for more solidarity and mutual understanding.[1] Simultaneously, however, this same Union is torn between the desire to comply with the principle of multilingualism and the de facto use of English. Alice Leal wanted to get to the bottom of this contradiction at a time in her life when she had also other important issues to deal with. Her book *English and translation in the European Union* was, as she explains in the preface, "gestated and born" (p. IX) with her second child. By German standards, this is remarkable, especially when one considers that in Germany only a quarter of full-time professorial positions are held by women and that only a handful of books are completed by pregnant women. Leal has embarked on this adventure, shuttling back and forth between the standing desk and the pregnancy ball, always with the firm intention of finishing the manuscript before the deadlines set by her publisher or by the sometimes quite arbitrary laws of nature. Anyone who completes a book under these conditions has one thing over others: the knowing that the perfect moment does not exist, or rather that the

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1   It is an attitude that finds its echo in two articles of the Charter of Fundamental Rights: Article 21 lists language as one of the prohibited grounds for discrimination and Article 22 states that the EU shall respect linguistic diversity.

perfect moment is the present moment, with all its imponderables and inconsistencies.

Leal's work, which has a very topical subtitle (*Unity and multiplicity in the European Union*), deals with language policy in the EU, whose originality lies, as just pointed out, in the principle of "integrated multilingualism" and hence in the confluence between "integral" and "institutional" multilingualism, a position which symbolically expresses respect for the multilingualism of the European populations. However, this principle quickly reaches its limits in practice, and there is often a contradiction between the idea of diversity and pragmatic everyday considerations. Leal notes on this: "As a unique and multifaceted community of communication emerges in the EU, the spillover effects particularly of the EU's language regime—itself a spillover of market forces—become evident" (p. 4–5). Considering these effects, Leal advocates that after the British vote to leave the EU, the English language should be elevated as the so-called "lingua franca". It is a demand that is not without explosive force, as voices have recently been raised in favour of more linguistic diversity. The book *Europa denkt mehrsprachig* (2015) edited by Fritz Nies for example resolutely called for a new language policy in the EU that would break away from the dominance of the English language. It is these voices that are working to ensure that German and French are no longer discriminated against as working languages.[2] With the UK's withdrawal, so the argument, a clear signal has been sent that prohibits English from being established as a single official language.

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2   In fact, the German language occupies a comparatively subordinate position in the European institutions. This is the result of a whole bundle of reasons, most of which have to do with the history of the German-speaking countries in the first half of the 20th century and the policies of the Federal Republic of Germany since 1949.

As unlikely as this may seem at first glance, English could lose its status as an official language, and this although the idiom of the author born in the small town of Stratford-upon-Avon has been the most used for institutional communication and is the one that most of the European citizens speak as a second language. Leal grew up in Brazil and learned English not as a mother, but as a second language, a situation familiar to many EU citizens. Anyone who acquires a second language besides the mother tongue, develops a specific relationship to the "overlapping" language which is shaped and influenced by numerous different aspects, conditions, and expectations. The question that Leals wishes to raise is to know whether this relationship is describable, and how the difference to the mother tongue can be grasped conceptually. Let us take a closer look at how she formulates her intention:

> Although I started learning English as a child growing up in Brazil, I have never lived in an English-speaking country or been socialised in it by inner-circle speakers. What is my English then? Should it be associated with standard British English because of my choice of spelling? Should it rather be classified as international English? Or global English? Or English as a lingua franca? (P. 2)

The questions asked here are important hermeneutic questions, precisely because the focus of attention is not the mother tongue but the second language. If one takes seriously the assumption that human beings produce language and are shaped by language, it is of course fascinating to find out to what extent living-bodily beings are shaped by a *second* language. Research literature on the subject is flourishing, although it is noticeable that even recent publications have not arrived at a new definition of the notion "second language". As far as the "mother tongue" is concerned, there seems to be a consensus, at least since the publication of Claus Ahlzweig (2013: 15), that the word is not only an expression of

colloquial language, but equally an expression of language consciousness, a designation of a property of language, of reflection on language. Even though Leal does not refer directly to Ahlzweig's definition, it is interesting to note that her concept of second language hardly differs from his notion of "mother tongue"; she too is convinced that the second language implies "language consciousness", a historically not necessarily fixed property of language.

Leal's view even goes a bit further when she says that English as a second language benefits from the multiple interferences to which it is exposed due to the constant influences of other languages. Whereas the comparative stylistics has so far endeavoured to regard interference as an evil to be eradicated in order to achieve a language free of linguistic impurities, Leals concludes that language contact phenomena represent an immeasurable opportunity for English in particular. The term "interference" comes from physics, or more precisely from wave theory, and refers to phenomena of wave trains that meet and overlap at a common location. In the relevant secondary literature, the concept is defined via different ways of approaches. The classic view is that of Brigitte Lüllwitz (1972), according to which "interference" is the result of a mixture of languages, because it is the product of the mutual influence of two languages. Leal is in the tradition of Behaviourisms, which states that the acquisition of the second language is primarily conceived as a *projection* of the patterns of the first language.[3] Identity or similarity between patterns would thus lead to positive transfer in second language acquisition, as opposed to negative transfer or interference.

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3   Leal's style, by the way, is the best proof that the English language actually benefits from the projections of other languages. Despite the complexity of the content, she takes the reader by the hand and gently introduces him or her to her trains of thought.

In her opinion, a purely correct language does not exist; rather, following Jacques Derrida, she assumes a decentration, a discontinuous restructuring of language in the infinite game of signifying. In the horizon of the famous "différance" concept Leal undertakes an attempt to redefine the relationship between linguistic diversity and linguistic unity. Based on the conviction of the French philosopher, she concludes that the struggle against extremism leads again to new extremism; therefore, new patterns of thinking are required, which will be moving from destruction to deconstruction. Only in this way the logic of pure negation comes to a standstill and the old dualism between unity and diversity merges into a higher unity, into an intermediate realm where the old opposites are not felt as opposites. It is no longer a question of asking oneself whether one or the other should be striven for, it is rather a question of realising both at the same time: Unity *and* diversity, diversity *and* unity as two mutually dependent entities. The search for the higher compromise results in Lead's case to a "transcultural turn"; by this notion she understands an EU "more capable of intercomprehension", a body of states that allows us to "keep our individuality while taking a step towards others, who, in turn, get to keep their otherness" (p. 128).

A further justification for Leal's view is given in the founding treaties of the EU, and it is indeed true that from the very beginning, with the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community, both principles, unity and diversity, were present. Since the European Union began to exist, the balance between these two principles has had to be constantly redefined, and those who attempted to move the pendulum one-sidedly in one direction endangered the state of agreement that has been reached. For only in this balancing lies the prospect of deriving benefit and advantages from the com-

munity for each member state. If the pendulum swings too far in one direction or the other, then all countries are thrown back on their national interests, and the community falls apart again into a disjointed entity of nations. This would set Europe back decades and endanger its political future. The dilemma between unity and diversity can therefore—as Leal rightly points out—only be resolved by strengthening both principles. Unity must be strengthened through targeted reinforcement of the English language, and the principle of diversity must be supported through concrete actions. These concrete actions would include the creation of an EU Agency for Linguistic Diversity.

Leal's book has given me, who grew up with two languages (German and French), surprising insights into my own bilingualism. Bilingualism needs to be cultivated, otherwise there is a danger that one language will dominate the other. I have always seen English as a foreign language, as a tool to get in touch with others who do not speak French or German, and as a language of science, as many articles in the linguistic field are nowadays written in English. Nevertheless, it has often frustrated me not to have in English the same possibilities of expression as in German or French. I learned through Leal that there is a different perspective to be taken: in fact, using English is not about the one language spoken and reinvented by Shakespeare, but about a fascinating projection surface into which certain patterns of the mother tongues can be extrapolated. In this respect, even languages that are perceived as foreign languages contribute to identity formation. The so-called second language, which in my case is the third language, is more than a communication tool; as projection surface of the mother tongue(s) it has a subject-creating function. If I had not read Leal's book, I would never have had the idea of writing a journal contribution in English.

On the bottom line, it looks like I owe quite a lot not only to Shakespeare but also and above all to Leal.

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Review of: MALMKJÆR, Kirsten (2019): *Translation and Creativity*. London / New York: Routledge. 130 pp. ISBN: 9781138123274.

A book authored by Kirsten Malmkjær is a reason to celebrate. That this should be so is obvious to anyone who has familiarised himself or herself with Malmkjær's work in translation over the last three decades or more, and is aware of her contribution to the discipline—a contribution which has often involved showcasing other scholars' work and limiting writing and public speaking to those instances where she felt there was something she absolutely had to say. And this strikes me as the ethical thing to do. Clearly, for Malmkjær, writing is never a contrived exercise signalling conformity to external demands and temptations, but the natural outcome of a process of inquiry which started, in each case, because

the researcher needed to work out for herself the answer to a question, or to a set of questions.

Malmkjær does not belong to a school or 'turn'; she is a philosopher of language who stands out in Translation Studies for having brought to the endeavour to conceptualise translation and describe translations her understanding of language philosophy, especially analytical (in the tradition of Quine and Davidson). She has written about translation stylistics, research methodology, the role of translation in language teaching, and about translations of Danish literature (especially Hans Christian Andersen). Malmkjær's readers have learned to expect detailed linguistic analysis as part of the way in which the author thinks translation, with a focus on the question of meaning and on stylistic considerations. At all times, they can count on Malmkjær's integrity and feel safe in the knowledge that this is one academic who knows exactly what she is talking about when she manipulates sophisticated ideas, and who will not resort to wooden language. In fact, she cannot, because she needs utterances to mean something, rather than nothing or very little.

Translation and Creativity has a thesis. Its author sets out to "argue not only that translating is a valuable art form and that valuable art can be the result of the activity of translating", but also to "maintain that translating per se is always creative" (p. 3). The monograph includes an Introduction, four chapters, and a very brief Afterword in lieu of conclusions. This reader, at least, felt it is unfinished work, for reasons I will outline in what follows.

Chapter 1 is entitled "Definitions of creativity" and contains a review of literature on creativity and the latter's association with originality, danger, and with … translation. Malmkjær begins with Kant's discussion of artistic creativity in the *Critique of Pure Reason* and in the *Critique of Judgement* and

compares Kant's position with later views in terms of what creativity is considered to refer to, who can be said to be creative, as well as the question of whether creativity can be taught or not.

In Chapter 2, "Translation in the context of definitions of creativity", the researcher contends with one overarching issue: "Does translating qualify as creative given current theorists' views of creativity?" Many section titles in both Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 are phrased as questions. Malmkjær explains that, just like creativity, translation is many things, and that creativity and translating abilities appear to be omnipresent in humans and that a case can be made for the role of nurturing and training such abilities with a view to developing them. In my opinion, one of the most valuable insights here is that translations are original *and* imitation and copying are part of the way in which they are produced, which is in fact the case with all creative works, according to Rehn (2011). This should go some way towards providing a common-sense answer when confronted with remarks that translations are mere copies of an original. Malmkjær states in no uncertain terms that such views collapse on both philosophical and linguistic grounds.

The third chapter of *Translation and Creativity* gives Malmkjær the opportunity of a brief excursion into the theory of meaning, which then leads her to outline a number of aspects of the translating process (the title of this chapter is "Accounts of the translating process") and to propose a view of translation based on philosophical aesthetics and, more exactly, on the observer's attitude to the object which he or she observes. One can only wish the section in which Malmkjær does this, which she entitles "How to be a translator", should have been longer than the two pages it contains. Having referred to the 'aesthetic attitude' as defined by Roger Scruton

(1974/1988), characterised by the appreciation and enjoyment of an object for its own sake, and having established that this attitude can apply not only to works of art such as, for instance, paintings, but also to texts, it would have been important and, perhaps, necessary, to tell the reader more. The idea of translation as description of an object towards which the observer, in this case a translator, may have an aesthetic attitude is certainly interesting, but it almost seems like the author was not sure what to do with it, once she mentioned it. And if the aesthetic attitude involves affording an object attention for its own sake while relinquishing all concern with, say, objectives and purposes, what are we to make of the fact that a (professional) translator is likely to have translating in mind while contemplating the text as an artwork?

Aesthetic attention to a text to be translated does not by and of itself guarantee creative translating, according to Malmkjær (p. 68). However, as she reminds the reader (p. 79) by quoting Boase-Beier, "translation which is stylistically aware can make a more reasonable case for its interpretation of the source text than any other sort of translation can" (2006: 110), and is more likely to predispose the reader to adopt, in turn, an aesthetic attitude towards the target text (p. 93).

Would anything be lost, in terms of meaning, if 'aesthetic' were deleted from 'aesthetic attention' and only 'attention' were conserved, or if 'aesthetic' were replaced with 'stylistically aware'? The answer, I think, is yes, of course. But I am left wanting to know why exactly.

In the fourth chapter, "Creativity in translating and translations", Malmkjær discusses several translators' accounts of their translation processes which demonstrate keen attention to detail in the source texts, and examines excerpts

from these texts and their translations. She also offers a case study of her own experience of producing a translation into English of Andersen's "The Princess on the Pea" (usually known under the title "The Princess and the Pea"). Towards the end of the chapter, the author illustrates what she considers non-creative, an-aesthetic translating. While not disagreeing with Malmkjær's assessment that the translation choices she decided to present in this section are less than felicitous, a question sprang to mind: could it be that some of them were, in fact, motivated by the translator's particular type of (aesthetic) attitude?

The Afterword sums up the book and does not offer further elaboration, leaving this reader in two minds about whether this is a bad thing or a good one. As I realised I was finishing reading *Translation and Creativity*, I saw two options to choose from: a sense of frustration that there isn't one more fully-fledged chapter to wrap up the discussion, and appreciation for Malmkjær's ability to stop writing exactly where she has to, which means once she has shared what she had to say, at a given moment in time. I walk away with a number of insights, among which: originality and imitation simultaneously characterise processes and outcomes; it is not possible to conceptualise translation "as a form of creative writing influenced by a pre-existing text" (p. 69) because translation is not reading and then writing, or writing interwoven with reading, but its own process, which is creative in nature; "[a]esthetic attention to a text does not require a further theory, but nor does it preclude it" (p. 79).

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Review of: OKULSKA, Inez (2018): *Wer hat's geschrieben, wer übersetzt? Autor- und Übersetzerschaft als kontingente Rollen*. Wissenschaftliche Reihe des Collegium Polonicum. Berlin: Logos Verlag. 139 S. ISBN: 978-3-8325-4524-6.

Ein schmales, aber provokatives Buch hat die polnische Forscherin Inez Okulska mit ihrer Doktorarbeit vorgelegt. Glaubte man bislang zuverlässig oder zumindest intuitiv zu wissen, wer der Autor und wer der Übersetzer eines Werks ist („Der Autor ist doch derjenige, der den Text geschrieben hat, und der Übersetzer ist der, der ihn übersetzt hat", S. 15), gerät man nach der Lektüre von Okulskas Untersuchung dann doch in Unsicherheit über diese landläufige Annahme bzw. Funktionszuweisung. Hinterfragt wird sie mithilfe von zwei Hauptthesen: (1) Die Autor-Übersetzer-Relation sei wesentlich unstabil. Okulska argumentiert und präsentiert aussagekräftige Exempel gegen die für fest gehaltene und hierarchisch strukturierte Beziehung von Autoren und Übersetzern in mehrfacher Hinsicht: temporal (erst verfasst der Autor den Originaltext, dann wird er übersetzt), auf der Achse der Macht (der Übersetzer ist schon immer dem Autor unterworfen) und in der Rollenzuweisung (man hält die Kategorien

des Autors und Übersetzers als Vollzieher des Akts des Schreibens bzw. Übersetzens für eindeutig, „als resultierten sie immer aus unstrittigen Tatsachen", S. 16). Okulska zufolge sei dem jedoch keineswegs so, denn: (2) Autor- bzw. Übersetzerschaft seien im Grunde genommen lediglich Rollen, die den jeweiligen Personen hauptsächlich durch Konvention in einem gegebenen historisch-sozialen Kontext zugewiesen wurden. Sie seien „keine *intrinsischen* oder *immanenten* Attribute ihrer jeweiligen Träger", sondern „Eigenschaften, die übernommen, errungen und abgegeben werden können" (S. 7). Es sei im Endeffekt keineswegs klar, wer den Originaltext und wer die Übersetzung verfasst habe.

Dreh- und Angelpunkt der Argumentation Okulskas für diese immerhin überraschende These ist das Phänomen bzw. der Begriff der Kontingenz, den die Autorin von Richard Rorty (2002) übernimmt. Dieser besagt, dass es „keine immanente Natur der Wirklichkeit gebe", „keine einzige Wahrheit sei daher vorbestimmt oder vorgegeben", sondern im Gegenteil, sie werde „vielmehr konstruiert, und zwar durch die Sprache" (S. 45). Dies gelte auch für die translatologischen Hauptkategorien Original und Übersetzung, die somit wesentlich instabil weil nicht selten willentlich konstruiert seien. Bestätigt sieht Okulska diesen Gedanken in der bewegten Geschichte von Autor- und Übersetzerschaft, die sie in einem weiten Bogen von der Antike bis zum heutigen Tag (S. 46–62) skizziert. Als besonders wichtig für die Fragestellung des Buches wird der Moment der Abweisung der romantischen Idee der Originalität als Attribut des schöpferischen Genies im 20. Jahrhundert und der zeitgleichen Einführung der Kategorie der Intertextualität hervorgehoben, die den Begriff der Autorschaft mächtig ins Schwanken brachten. Diese für die Geisteswissenschaften gänzlich prägende, dekonstruktivistische Entwicklung habe laut Okulska

zur Folge: „Das einzige Merkmal, das die Identifizierung des Autors noch ermöglichte, blieb die Signatur in Form von Paratexten wie einer Unterschrift oder auch in Gestalt von Hinweisen auf den Verfasser, die von außen (von Werbern, Verlegern, Ausstellern etc.) dem Empfänger zugetragen wurden. Die Autorschaft bestand so schließlich nur noch aus einer *Information*, nämlich der darüber, wer als Autor betrachtet werde" (S. 57, Hervorh. im Original). Dies geschehe ebenso im Falle des Übersetzers, der nach den Paratexten (Beispiele hierfür werden genannt, S. 63–66) als solcher klassifiziert werde. Okulska schlussfolgert, dass auch die Übersetzerschaft „*keine immanente Eigenschaft des Übersetzers*" (S. 66, Hervorh. im Original), sondern eine zugeschriebene Rolle sei. Was üblicherweise als Übersetzung gilt, sei „lediglich durch Paratexte (also Kombinationen aus Peritexten wie ‚übersetzt von', der Angabe des oder der Übersetzernamen, und Epitexten wie etwa Ankündigungen des Textes als Übersetzung) der Leserschaft als solche angezeigt und von ihr entsprechend rezipiert" (S. 67) werde. So beruhe die fundamentale Instabilität der Zuweisung der Autor- bzw. Übersetzerrolle (weil „lediglich" extern, und folglich manipulabel) „auf einer Art Kommunikationsvertrag zwischen Sender und Empfänger" (S. 67), der aber (weil unzulänglich abgesichert) zahlreichen Fälschungen – Okulska nennt sie „Mystifikationen" (S. 67) – auf beiden Seiten freien Raum lässt bzw. gelassen hat.

Die indiskutable Stärke des Buches besteht eben in der Präsentation zahlreicher Fallbeispiele für solche Mystifikationen. Beachtenswerte Belege für die provokativen Thesen des Buches, die tradiertes Originalitätsdenken, übliche Funktionszuweisungen und überhaupt ein nicht zu unterschätzendes terminologisches Debakel in Bezug auf die Begriffe Original und Übersetzung resp. die Kategorien Autor und Über-

setzer zu entlarven bemüht sind, werden gebracht. Hier seien – für den Genuss des Lesers – nur einige genannt: Reichlich sind die Beispiele für originäre Werke, die dem Publikum als Übersetzungen aus einer anderen Sprachen präsentiert wurden, ohne es tatsächlich zu sein. Sir Horace Walpole, Earl of Orford, veröffentlichte 1764 die „Übersetzung" von Onuphrio Muraltos Roman *Die Burg von Otranto*. Ein Jahr später, nachdem das Buch zu einem Bestseller wurde, bekannte Walpole seine Urheberschaft. Editorisch lässt sich ein Originaltext auch nicht immer eindeutig definieren. Nicht selten – vor allem in Bezug auf vormoderne Texte wie *Tausendundeine Nacht*, aber auch beispielsweise auf Franz Kafkas Werk, das wegen der Multiplizität der existierenden Entwürfe ein durchaus abenteuerliches editorisches Leben kennt – „erschaffen" sich Übersetzer selber „ihr" zu übersetzendes Original, wie übrigens auch Karen Emmerichs Studie *Literary Translation and the Making of Originals* (2017) zeigt und die (Mit-)Autorschaft von Übersetzern buchstäblich untermauert. Zudem kann der Übersetzer selber zu auktorialer Macht in Paratexten wie Anmerkungen, Vor- und Nachworten, Interviews greifen, indem er die Autorität des Autors massiv untergraben kann. Jan Gondowicz, der polnische Übersetzer von Boris Akunins *Diamantene Kutsche* und selbst ein großer Gelehrter, greift zu „paratextuellen Waffen" (S. 43) und entlarvt etliche Schilderungen im Original als unglaubwürdig resp. historisch falsch in der Öffentlichkeit: „Der Autor irrt sich oder lügt einfach", so Gondowiczs Behauptung in einem Interview (zitiert in Okulska, S. 41). Durch solche schweren Anklagen gegen den Verfasser wird der Übersetzer quasi zum zweiten, besser informierten Autor des Originaltextes. Sein Zugriff wird als „Machtübernahme" über das Original gedeutet (S. 35–43). Dass Autorität ein Schlüsselwort bei der An- bzw. Zuerkennung von Autorschaft und Originalität dar-

stellt, zeigt auch das Beispiel Karl Dedecius', der prominente Übersetzer und Vermittler polnischer Literatur in deutscher Sprache, der seine eigene Position zu einer mächtigen Institution aufbaute. Diese verlieh ihm eine unbestrittene Autorität im Bereich von Übersetzungen aus slawischen Sprachen. Interessanterweise besorgten ihm seine beachtenswerten Leistungen als literarischer Übersetzer und Herausgeber den „autonomen Status eines Autors" (S. 124): Dedecius wird nicht selten als „Dichter" oder „Übersetzer-Poet" bezeichnet, obwohl er kaum eigene Dichtung verfasst hat (S. 124). Solche und andere „translatorischen Mystifikationen" – und Okulskas Buch ist eine echte Fundgrube hierzu – würden schließlich zeigen, dass sowohl die Autor- als auch die Übersetzerschaft über einen Text gegebenenfalls auf manipulierbaren Informationen beruhen. Konventionen lassen, so die Autorin, „viel Spielraum für Täuschung und irreführende Gesten" (S. 37), die die Autor-Übersetzer-Relation viel unschärfer gestalten als gewöhnlich angenommen und nicht immer durchschaubare Identitätsspiele in Gang bringen können.

Eine Rückfrage an die Autorin dieser hoch lesenswerten Studie sei am Ende dann doch gestattet: Sind Autor- und Übersetzerschaft tatsächlich „lediglich Rollen" (S. 126), die „immer äußerlich an- bzw. vorgegeben werden" (ebd.)? Ist Auktorialität – von Original bzw. Translat – ohne jeden Zweifel „eine *äußerliche* textuelle Autorität" (S. 128, Hervorh. im Original)? Solche starken, endgültigen Statements („lediglich", „immer") bedürfen m. E. einer nicht unwesentlichen Nuancierung: Texte verfügen durchaus über immanente Eigenschaften, die üblicherweise unter dem Begriff Stil zusammengefasst werden und ihre unverwechselbare Zugehörigkeit zu einem Autor bzw. Übersetzer ermöglichen und ebenfalls relativ prompt erkennen lassen. Nicht unbegründet gilt

der Stil eines Textes als der individuelle Fingerabdruck seines Verfassers – des Originals sowie des Translats –, der mittlerweile sogar von Softwares zuverlässig identifiziert wird, wie beispielsweise Roy Youdale (2020) überzeugend nachweist. Die *translational stylistics* legt bereits seit Mitte der 1990er Jahre Modelle für die Analyse stilistischer Merkmale der Übersetzung resp. Methodologien zur Erfassung des Übersetzerstils vor, wie bspw. von Mona Baker (2000) beschrieben wurde. Diese andere Perspektive und diese Forschungen hätten zumindest erwähnt werden müssen, um das Spektrum „aller möglichen Konstellationen innerhalb der Autor-Übersetzer-Relation" (S. 128) in seiner Vielfalt und Komplexität präsent zu halten.

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Rezension zu: SANMANN, Angela (2021): *Die andere Kreativität. Übersetzerinnen im 18. Jahrhundert und die Problematik weiblicher Autorschaft* **(= Beihefte zum Euphorion. Zeitschrift für Literaturgeschichte, Bd. 113). Heidelberg: Winter. 330 S. ISBN: 978-3-8253-4738-3.**

Vielen Schrifstellerinnen galt sie als Vorbild. Anna Maria von Schurmann (1607–1678), die als Tochter reformierter Eltern eine umfassende humanistische Bildung genossen hatte, erwarb sich nicht nur als Historikerin, Linguistin und Philosophin einen Namen, auch in der Kupferstecherei, der Dichtkunst und der Musik brachte sie es zu höchster Perfektion. Ihr Vater, der an das Ideal humanistischer Erziehung glaubte, nahm ihr auf seinem Totenbett das Versprechen ab, niemals zu heiraten und sich ausschließlich der eigenen Vervollkommnung zu widmen. Ausdruck ihrer gelungenen wissenschaftlichen Vernetzung waren ihre Korrespondenz mit bedeutenden Gelehrten, vor allem aber ihre Mitwirkung in der *Republica Litteraria*, einer Art Wissenschaftsgemeinde, in der bis ins 18. Jahrhundert hinein die Gelehrten aller Disziplinen einen breit angelegten gesellschaftlichen Diskussionsprozess förderten.[1]

 Die Schrifstellerinnen und Übersetzerinnen, die Angela Sanmann in ihrer als Buch erschienenen Habilitationsschrift

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1 Dieser Diskussionsprozess ist umso beachtlicher, als auch die Geschlechterfrage nicht ausgeklammert wurde. Was jedoch als Gemeinschaftsinitiative begonnen hatte, sollte im Laufe des 18. Jahrhunderts zunehmend abebben und schließlich – sehr zum Nachteil gebildeter Frauen – zum völligen Erliegen kommen.

vorstellt, konnten sich einer solchen breit angelegten familiären und öffentlichen Unterstützung kaum rühmen. Luise Gottsched, Marianne Wilhelmine de Stevens, Marie-Élisabeth de La Fite und Sophie von La Roche, „vier Schlüsselfiguren weiblichen Übersetzens im deutsch-französischen Sprachraum des 18. Jahrhunderts" (S. 279), verfügten nicht über jene weit verzweigte Korrespondenz, die – wie bei Schurmann der Fall – als Forum wissenschaftlicher Diskussion hätte dienen können. Obwohl alle vier Literatinnen herausragende schriftstellerische Fähigkeiten vorweisen konnten, waren sie darauf angewiesen, ihre Kreativität in Nischen und gesellschaftlich unauffälligen Domänen zu entfalten. Eine solche – parallel zur männlich dominierten Öffentlichkeit existierende – Domäne stellte die Übersetzung dar, „eine intellektuelle Tätigkeit im Verborgenen" (S. 20), die literarisch ambitionierten Frauen ungenutzte Freiräume eröffnete. Hier konnten sie ihre eigene Kreativität entfalten, ohne im Schatten von schriftstellernden Kollegen zu stehen. Die „gesellschaftlich sanktionierte Subalternität des Übersetzens" stellte einen abgeschirmten Zufluchtsort dar, „den das Schreiben unter eigenem Namen nicht biete[n]" konnte (S. 21).

Sanmann, die an der Universität Lausanne forschend und übersetzend tätig ist, hat ein eindringliches Buch über weibliche Autorschaft im 18. Jahrhundert geschrieben, deren entscheidendes Merkmal darin besteht, in der *Übersetzung* einen reichen, ihr gemäßen Entfaltungsraum zu finden. Für alle vier „Schlüsselfiguren" ist die übersetzerische Tätigkeit ein Horizont der Hoffnung – Hoffnung auf Anerkennung, worin in umfassender und letztgültiger Bedeutung die Aufwertung der Übersetzung als eine Spielart der schriftstellerischen Tätigkeit miteingeschlossen ist. Anders als ihre männlichen Kollegen nahmen übersetzende Schrifstellerinnen keine exzessive Ehrfucht vor dem Original ein, bot ihnen doch der

im Übersetzungsprozess entstehende intertextuelle Freiraum die Möglichkeit, eigene Anliegen einzubringen. Das Übersetzen galt ihnen als Garant, nicht völlig in der Bedeutungslosigkeit zu verschwinden – weshalb wohl auch keine von ihnen sich mit dem Titel des bekannten Aufsatzes von Johanna Borek *Der Übersetzer ist weiblich und damit unsichtbar* (1996) hätte identifizieren können.[2]

Der Titel des Buches, *Die andere Kreativität*, darf – wenn auch Sanmann den Bezug nicht explizit herstellt – getrost als Anspielung auf Simone de Beauvoirs feministischen Grundlagentext *Das andere Geschlecht* (⁵2000) verstanden werden, der die Konstruiertheit von Geschlechterrollen auf systematische Weise hinterfragt. So wie bei de Beauvoir vorgeführt wird, wie sich das Patriarchat Handlungs- und Entwicklungsmöglichkeiten von Frauen in den Weg stellt, beschreibt Sanmann den eingeschränkten Aktions- und Entscheidungsradius von Schriftstellerinnen, die sich auf einem von männlichen Kollegen, Verlegern und Redakteuren dominierten Markt zu etablieren suchen. Für den von ihr analysierten Zeitraum macht sie deutlich, dass die Vorstellung einer ursprünglich weiblichen Essenz die vier Übersetzerinnen unter erheblichen Rechtfertigungsdruck stellte (S. 32). Dabei gaben die intertextuellen Spielräume zwischen Ausgangs- und Zieltext ihnen die Möglichkeit, über Mechanismen und Faktoren nachzudenken, die dem männerspezifischen Selbstverständnis von Literatur zugrunde lagen. Das Selbstverständnis der Literatinnen war demnach

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[2]   Mit einem etwas anderen Wortlaut wäre die Identifizierung möglich gewesen: *Der Übersetzer ist weiblich und gerade deshalb nicht völlig unsichtbar* beschreibt eine Lebenseinstellung, die – wie bei den „Schlüsselfiguren" der Fall – das Übersetzen als eigenständige kreative Schreibleistung erachtet.

in einem stetigen Wandel begriffen, je nach Übersetzungsprojekt und publizistischem Kontext, aber auch in Abhängigkeit von den ideologischen Implikationen des Originaltexts sowie den ästhetischen und ggf. ökonomischen Zielen der jeweiligen Produktion: Versteht die Übersetzerin ihr Tun als eine eher dienende oder aber als eine künstlerisch eigenständige Tätigkeit? Sucht sie die schützende Unsichtbarkeit der Anonymität oder exponiert sie sich als künstlerisch ambitionierte Literaturvermittlerin? Äußert sie sich zu den herrschenden Vorurteilen gegenüber weiblicher Gelehrsamkeit, sei es in offensiver oder defensiver Weise, oder verzichtet sie darauf? (S. 34)

Auf all diese Fragen geben die vier „Schlüsselfiguren" je unterschiedliche Antworten, die Sanmann anhand von bis dahin noch unerschlossenen Quellen einer gründlichen Analyse unterzieht. Ihr Buch tritt somit nicht für eine essenziell andere Kreativität ein, sondern versteht sich als Plädoyer für die Anerkennung der *individuellen* schriftstellerischen Leistung von Übersetzerinnen, die bisher keinen Eingang in den Literatur- und Übersetzerkanon fanden.

Nun ist ja das Selbstdenken nicht nur ein zentrales Thema der Aufklärung, sondern auch der Hermeneutik. Alle vier Übersetzerinnen haben mit ihren Antworten auf die mit ihrer Übersetzungspraxis verbundenen Fragen die Entwicklung der übersetzerischen Hermeneutik in verschiedene Richtungen vorangetrieben, allen voran Luise Gottsched (geb. Kulmus, 1713–1762), die mit ihren beiden voneinander abweichenden Adaptationen der *Épitre chagrine à Mademoiselle de la Charge*, einer von Antoinette Deshoulières verfassten satirischen Briefpoesie, der Debatte um das Wörtlichkeitspostulat neuen Zündstoff verlieh. In der Druckfassung von 1744 nimmt Gottsched eine im Original nicht enthaltene Bedeutungsverschiebung vor, deren Fokus sich auf die Bedingungen weiblichen Schreibens richtet. Ging es Deshoulières noch um die mit dem Gelehrtentum verbundenen Lebens- und Arbeitsbedingungen, so pointiert Gottsched die spezifi-

sche Situation von schriftstellernden Frauen. Aus dem „bel esprit" („Schöngeist") wird die mit „Verstand" beschlagene *Frau*, die „nach Art der Dichter singt" und „nicht die geringste Gunst des Glücks" (S. 71) für sich beanspruchen kann. In der postum erschienenen Druckfassung von 1763 distanziert sich Gottsched vollends von der Salongesellschaft und ihrem breiten Lesepublikum, indem sie das Geschehen in der Stadt Leipzig verortet. Die „Lindenstadt" degradiert hier zum „Raub der Dummheit" (S. 75), und den dort lebenden Frauen attestiert sie so wenig Bildung, dass selbst die besten unter ihnen kaum den Anspruch erheben könnten, „auch Schülerinnen nur der Schurmannin zu seyn!" (S. 76). Dabei wird mit dem Verweis auf Anna Maria von Schurmann ein Anspruch festgeschrieben, „an dem sich auch die zeitgenössische Literatur von Frauen zu messen habe" (ebd.). Gottsched setzt sich in ihren Übersetzungen für höchste literarische Qualität ein und fordert von Literatinnen, eigenen Wagemut zu entwickeln. Die Adaptionsrelation zwischen französischem Original und Übersetzung bietet ihr – mehr noch als das eigene Schreiben – die Möglichkeit, „ihre eigenen intellektuellen Ansprüche zu formulieren und ihre auf das Leipziger Umfeld gemünzte Gesellschaftskritik satirisch zuzuspitzen" (S. 79).

Auch die zweite Übersetzerin, Marianne Wilhelmine de Stevens (1734–?), nutzt die Poetik der Adaptation, um Vorurteile gegenüber schreibenden Frauen zu revidieren. Die von ihr übertragenen Texte stützen sich – anders als bei der Gottsched – auf deutsche Quellen, darunter die Fabeln Christian Fürchtegott Gellerts, die von der an Blindheit erkrankten Literatin vollständig übersetzt und 1777 von Christien Frederic Goutsch verlegt wurden. Besonders berührend nimmt sich dabei die Übersetzung der *Tanzbär*-Fabel aus, deren ausgesprochene Moral zwei menschliche Schwächen an den Pranger stellt: Neid und Prahlsucht. Bei de Stevens wer-

den diese Schwächen nicht thematisiert, ihre Übersetzung versteht sich „als identifikatorischer Akt" (S. 171) mit dem in Missgunst gefallenen Bären. Genau wie dieser begreift auch sie sich als „Ausnahmeerscheinung", der ständigen Gefahr ausgesetzt, „aus der Gemeinschaft ausgeschlossen zu werden" (ebd.). De Steven nimmt das Original als veränderliche Gegebenheit wahr, die es an die eigene biographische Situation anzupassen gilt. Sie fühlt sich frei, in einen Text einzugreifen, ihn als modellierbare Gegebenheit zu nutzen, um auf ihre Lebenssituation im Besonderen und auf die Lebenssituation von schreibenden Frauen im Allgemeinen hinzuweisen. Anders als Gellert, der das Lob der Mittelmäßigkeit anstimmt, stellt de Stevens in ihrer übersetzerischen Adaptation das allgemein-menschliche Bedürfnis nach Anerkennung in den Vordergrund, das sie für eine anthropologische Konstante hält. Das Streben nach Perfektionierung der eigenen Fähigkeiten ist – so ihre Überzeugung – durch die Anerkennung bedingt, ist doch der Mensch nur da ganz Mensch, wo seine Fähigkeiten von der Gesellschaft wahrgenommen und gewürdigt werden.

Die dritte Übersetzerin heißt Marie-Élisabeth de La Fite (1737–1794). Die Tochter französischer Hugenotten verbrachte mehrere Jahre in der Niederlande und trat nach dem Tod ihres Mannes in den Dienst des englischen Hofs ein, wo sie sich als Vorleserin der Königin[3] einen auskömmlichen Broterwerb zu sichern verstand. De La Fite übersetzte Sophie von La Roches *Geschichte des Fräuleins von Sternheim*, den ersten weiblichen Entwicklungsroman deutscher Sprache, der 1777 von Christoph Martin Wieland herausgegeben wur-

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3   Die Rede ist hier von Sophie Charlotte, Herzogin zu Mecklenburg, die durch die Heirat mit König Georg III. zur Königin von Großbritannien und Irland wurde.

de. Ihre übersetzerischen Eingriffe zeichnen sich durch ein ambivalentes Bild aus: Einerseits kritisiert sie stereotype Rollenbilder, indem sie der weiblichen Romanfigur („Madam Hill") mangelnde Bildung vorwirft. Andererseits konsolidiert sie weibliche Klischees, indem sie die gleiche Figur mit genuin weiblichen Tugenden ausstattet: „Madam Hill" kompensiert ihre Bildungsarmut mit überbordender Güte, wodurch die anfänglich geäußerte Kritik wenn nicht aufgehoben, so doch stark abgeschwächt und an den Erwartungshorizont angepasst wird. Offenbar wusste de La Fite sehr genau einzuschätzen, was sie dem französischsprachigen Zielpublikum zumuten konnte. Durch die Verknüpfung einerseits kritischer und andererseits bestätigender Positionen tritt eine Autorenmeinung zutage, mit der sich sowohl konservative als auch progressive Leser identifizieren konnten.

Mit Sophie von La Roche (1730–1807) schließt der von Sanmann beschriebene Quartett-Bund. Die Literatin, die auf Schloss Philippsburg in Ehrenbreitstein einen wirkmächtigen Literatursalon ins Leben gerufen und 1784 die monatliche Frauenzeitschrift *Pomona für Teutschlands Töchter* (Buchdruckerei Johann Paul Enderes) gegründet hatte, machte sich auch um die Übersetzung verdient – wobei allerdings aufgrund fehlender Quellen nicht immer nachzuweisen ist, welche Übersetzungen aus ihrer Feder stammen. Fest steht nur, dass sie die Übersetzung als Medium genutzt hat, um eigene gesellschaftskritische Ansichten zu feministischen Fragen zur Sprache zu bringen. In der höchstwahrscheinlich von ihr erstellten Übersetzung einer satirischen Erzählung von Fanny de Beauharnais[4] gibt sich La Roche als „Weltbürgerin" zu er-

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4   Es handelt sich hierbei um die Erzählung *Moins que rien ou Rêveries d'une Marmotte*, die 1783 unter dem Titel *Weniger als nichts oder Träumerey einer Marmotte* erschienen ist.

kennen, als Kosmopolitin, die sich für „die kulturellen, politischen und sozialen Entwicklungen in Deutschland und in den europäischen Ländern" (S. 225) interessierte und gleichzeitig herrschaftskritisch zur Frage nach der Möglichkeit von Emanzipation und Demokratie Position bezog. Mit der Aufnahme der Erzählung in der *Pomona* verfolgte sie die Absicht, Kritik an den bestehenden Verhältnissen zu üben und transformatorische Anliegen zu verfolgen. So wie die Erzählung ein utopisches Modell von Gleichberechtigung, Solidarität und Kooperation zwischen den Geschlechtern entwirft, so setzte sich auch La Roche für weibliche Teilhabe am politischen Diskurs ein. Die Anonymität der Übersetzerinstanz galt ihr dabei als Garant für die „Richtigkeit und Unantastbarkeit des Textes" (S. 232). Durch strikte Einhaltung der übersetzerischen Treue konnte La Roche die Verantwortung für die in der Erzählung vertretenen kritischen Positionen auf die Autorin abwälzen, ohne selbst Farbe bekennen zu müssen. Ähnlich wie la Fite, die ihr selbstbewusstes Auftreten durch Demutsgesten relativierte, schwankte auch La Roche zwischen zwei vermeintlich gegensätzlichen Positionen.

So gibt Sanmann in ihrer Studie faszinierende Einblicke in die bunte Palette der von den Übersetzerinnen verwendeten Strategien zur Etablierung von weiblicher Mitbestimmung auf dem literarischen Markt. Durch die systematische Sichtung der Literaturproduktion von vier Literatinnen gelingt es ihr, auf die Frage nach den mit weiblicher Autorschaft verknüpften soziokulturellen und gesellschaftspolitischen Bedingungen umfangreiche Antworten zu geben. Eindrucksvoll zeigt sie, „wie vielfältig die literarischen und übersetzerischen Strategien sind" (S. 296), auf die Schriftstellerinnen in der Zeit der Aufklärung zurückgreifen, um ihre individuelle Einschätzung gesellschaftlicher und literarischer Verhältnisse zu untermauern. Es ist müßig, sich auszumalen, wie die Dis-

kussion um den Begriff der „verändernden Übersetzung"
(Novalis) verlaufen wäre, wenn die übersetzenden Frauen
sich an ihr hätten beteiligen können. Umso gesicherter ist es,
dass sie die so genannte übersetzerische „Einbürgerung" als
Programm nutzten, um eigene biographische, literarische
oder politische Anliegen zur Sprache zu bringen. Damit ge-
riert sich das übersetzerische Schreiben „als eine zweit[e]
Tonspur neben der Stimme der übersetzten Autorinnen und
Autoren" (S. 296). Vom Medium für ein erwachendes weib-
liches Selbstbewusstsein entwickelte es sich zum eigenen lite-
rarischen oder politischen Schreibakt. Allerdings lässt sich für
den einschlägigen Zeitraum kaum von einer weiblichen Tra-
ditionsbildung sprechen, etwa in dem Sinne, dass die übersetz-
enden Frauen sich aufeinander berufen und gegenseitig un-
terstützen. Mit Ausnahme von Sophie von La Roche gehör-
ten Sanmanns „Schlüsselfiguren" keinerlei Bündnissen, Dis-
kussionsforen oder Gelehrtenzirkeln an. Sie erfuhren da-
durch nur wenig Unterstützung und mussten sich „eine ge-
sellschaftliche Teilhabe erstreiten, sei es in offensiver oder in
camouflierter Form" (S. 296).

Zweifelsohne enthält *Die andere Kreativität* aufschlussrei-
che Antworten auf die Frage, was der hermeneutische Ansatz
beim Übersetzen leisten kann. Das einzige Bedauern, das sich
für die Rezensentin im Zuge der Lektüre eingestellt hat, ist,
dass unter den erwähnten theoretischen Quellen ein wichti-
ger Name fehlt: Es ist der von Antoine Berman, dem franzö-
sischen Übersetzungsdenker, der sich in seinen Schriften ex-
plizit auf Novalis' Definition der verändernden Übersetzung
beruft. Berman hat wie kaum ein anderer über die mit der
Adaptation verbundenen Implikationen nachgedacht. Dass
seine Überlegungen keinen Eingang in Sanmanns Studien ge-
funden haben, ist bedauerlich, auch wenn dadurch die Quali-

tät ihrer Ergebnisse in den Augen der Rezensentin nicht geschmälert wird.

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Rezension zu: STANLEY, John W. / O'KEEFFE, Brian / STOLZE, Radegundis / CERCEL, Larisa [eds.] (2021): *Cognition and Comprehension in Translational Hermeneutics*. Bucharest: Zetabooks. 521 S. ISBN: 978-606-697-126-3.

Der vorliegende Tagungsband umfasst Beiträge des 3. übersetzungshermeneutischen wissenschaftlichen Symposiums, das, an den Erfolg der ersten Tagungen dieser Konferenzreihe im Mai 2011 und Juli 2013 anknüpfend, am 30. Juni und 01. Juli 2016 an der TH Köln stattfand.

Eine kurze thematische Einleitung der Herausgeber präzisiert das Ziel des dritten Symposions. Es möchte die Translationshermeneutik als vollwertige Teildisziplin der Übersetzungswissenschaft etablieren und als ein Forschungsparadigma umreißen, das sowohl die Theorie als auch die Praxis des

Übersetzens beleuchtet. Der Titel *Cognition and Comprehension* verweist auf die zwei Teilbereiche, die im Mittelpunkt der Disziplin stehen und die Verbindung der mentalen Prozesse von Übersetzern mit den komplexen Verstehensprozessen aufzeigen. Die Aufsätze untersuchen die Fundamente des hermeneutischen Ansatzes in der Translationswissenschaft, den Aspekt hermeneutischer Methoden in der translatorischen Didaktik, die Beziehung zu anderen Wissenschaftszweigen sowie das Verhältnis zwischen dem individuellen Subjekt und dem hermeneutischen Zugang zum Verstehen. Auf Grund der Heterogenität der Beiträge kann der hier rezensierte Sammelband annäherungsweise in folgende thematische Blöcke aufgegliedert werden: Philosophische Zugänge zur hermeneutischen Translation (Oliveira, Salvato, Tochahi, Stolze, Stanley; speziell zu Paepcke: Forget, Gil, Laverdure), Beiträge zu Einzelaspekten hermeneutischer Grundlagen in der Translation (Pym, Robinson, Saki, Svoboda), hermeneutische Methoden in der translatorischen Didaktik, Empirie (Fontanet, Jezewska et al., Siever) und zur Psycholinguistik (Pavlova).

Drei Beiträge von Paepcke-Schülern sind eine Hommage an ihren Lehrer anlässlich seines 100. Geburtstages am 6. Juni 2016. Sie beschäftigen sich mit der von Paepcke initiierten Forschungsrichtung, die seit den 70er Jahren des vorigen Jahrhunderts eine Verbindung zwischen philosophischer Hermeneutik und Übersetzungsstudien herstellte und später als translatorische Hermeneutik einen eigenen methodologischen Zweig der Übersetzungswissenschaft etablierte.

PHILIPPE FORGET stellt in „Grenzen und Möglichkeiten der (paepckeschen) Hermeneutik" ausführlich seine fachlich-persönliche Beziehung zu Paepcke seit den 1970er Jahren dar. Er setzt sich kritisch, mitunter ungewöhnlich emotional, mit dessen konzeptionellen Überlegungen zu Sprache und

Übersetzung auseinander und arbeitet die latenten Widersprüche in Paepckes unreflektiertem Einsatz von Traditionszusammenhängen heraus, die zu einem problematischen Textverständnis führen. Anhand konkreter Beispiele zeigt der Autor, dass Paepcke sich nicht auf den Text als Kriterium für die Bedeutungskonstitution stützt, sondern vielmehr auf historisch vermittelte Begriffskonstruktionen, die den Status von maßgeblichen Sinneinheiten für den Gesamttext erhielten. Der Grund dafür liegt in unreflektierten Vorentscheidungen, die als „a priori-Evidenz" angesehen werden. Die eigentliche Leistung von Paepckes hermeneutischen Arbeiten liegt in der kontrastiven Analyse von sprachenpaarbezogenen (Verstehens-)Konzepten – von traditionellen Begriffen, die historisch gewachsen sind und ihre fortlaufende Aktualisierung in Gemein- und Gegenwartssprache erfahren.

ALBERTO GIL nimmt den von Forget erwähnten *evidentia*-Begriff auf: „Der *Evidentia*-Begriff in seinen rhetorisch-translatologischen Dimensionen. Ein Denkanstoß von Fritz Paepcke". Paepcke hat *evidentia* im Rahmen seines Konzepts translatologisch fruchtbar gemacht und versteht darunter eine neue Erfahrung, die sich unmittelbar, also nicht durch Induktion oder Deduktion, im Umgang mit dem Text einstellt und Ergebnis der Interaktion zwischen dem Leser bzw. Übersetzer und dem Text ist. Gil erweitert und ergänzt den von Quintilian überlieferten rhetorisch-philosophischen Begriff *evidentia*. Dabei sind vor allem zwei Konzeptionen von Bedeutung: 1) Der Begriff der *fidélité créatrice*, die ein Erkennen und das Verstehen von Texten durch Empfinden, Affekte sowie Emotionen ermöglicht und 2) der konzeptionelle Ansatz in übersetzungswissenschaftlichen Studien, der Verstehen mit Einfühlungsvermögen in faktische Gegebenheiten verbindet, welches das Wesentliche sprachlicher Äußerungen im Übersetzungsprozess reproduzierbar macht. Der Transla-

tor sucht den adäquatesten Wortlaut, der es dem Leser ermöglicht, das Gehörte und Gesagte zu visualisieren. Am Beispiel der einfühlsamen italienischen Übersetzung von Gedichten der jungen Dichterin Selma Meerbaum-Eisinger belegt Gil sehr überzeugend und detailliert den translatorischen Wert der Evidenz, die erkennbar wird in der sprachlichen Wiedergabe der Visualisierung.

ELIANE LAVERDURE kommentiert in „Das Spiel des Übersetzens. Grundzüge einer komparativen Studie" aus hermeneutischer Sicht, wie die Subjektivität des Übersetzers in einem intersubjektiven Prozess eine wesentliche Vermittlerrolle bei der Übertragung eines Textes spielt, die weit über den normativen und restriktiven theoretischen Rahmen von sprachlicher Äquivalenz zwischen AT und ZT hinausgeht. Diese Idee wird exemplifiziert mit dem Begriff des „Spiels", der von Hans-Georg Gadamer entwickelt und von Fritz Paepcke in die Übersetzungstheorie eingeführt wurde. Nach diesem Spielmodell ist die Beteiligung des Übersetzers notwendig, aber nicht willkürlich, da er sich an die (Spiel-)Regeln des Textes halten muss und ein Zusammenspiel erfordert zwischen der Freiheit der textspezifischen Formulierung und der Verbindlichkeit der semantischen und syntaktischen Gesetzmäßigkeiten einer Sprache. Dieser Artikel bietet mit der Spielmetapher ein Denkmodell, in dem der Übersetzer in ein gemeinsames Überlieferungsgeschehen einrückt, in dem subjektbezogene Fähigkeiten des Übersetzers – Offenheit gegenüber dem Text, kritische Selbstwahrnehmung, Intuition und Kreativität – zusammen mit intersubjektiven Kriterien in einen Dialog treten. Die Spielmetapher soll also den sowohl subjektiven als auch orts-, zeit-, sozial- und kulturgebundenen Auslegungsprozess beschreiben, der einen Verständnishorizont entwirft, um dem Mitspieler bzw. Leser eine angemessene Teilhabe zu vermitteln. Kritisch sei angemerkt, dass

der Artikel die intersubjektive Rechtfertigung der Subjektivität schuldig bleibt und, mit langen Zitaten Gadamers und Paepckes, längst Bekanntes wiederholt. Auch die Anerkennung des Anderen in der hermeneutisch-dialogischen Begegnung ist hinreichend bewiesen und bedarf nicht mehr der spieltheoretischen Begründung.

Dem Komplex der philosophischen Zugänge zur hermeneutischen Translation ist der Artikel von PAULO OLIVEIRA zuzuordnen: „Übersetzung als Aufbau des Vergleichbaren (Auf Ricœurs Pfad mit Wittgenstein und Toury)". Er diskutiert die Titelproblematik unter sprachphilosophischem Aspekt und wäre in einer entsprechenden Fachzeitschrift besser ausgehoben, da er die Problematik unter translationshermeneutischen Blickwinkel kaum zur Kenntnis nimmt. Oliveira möchte eine Lösung finden für das von Toury gestellte Problem der abstrakten (Un-)Übersetzbarkeit mit Hilfe von Ricœurs Vorstellung vom Übersetzen als „Ausbau des Vergleichbaren" und der Sprachauffassung des späten, pragmatisch ausgerichteten Wittgenstein. Ausgehend von der These, dass der Grund für die Unübersetzbarkeit auf der strengen Trennung von Sprache als System und dem Primat der Praxis beruht, zitiert Oliveira diverse Gewährsleute (Pym, Chesterman, Ricœur, Koller, Toury, Mossop etc.), welche sprachsystembezogene vs. parolebezogene Parameter zur Charakterisierung des Phänomens Übersetzen behandeln. Er stellt die auf diesen unterschiedlichen Sprachauffassungen beruhenden Begriffsbestimmungen von Äquivalenz vor, wobei er neuere translatorische Arbeiten, die den umstrittenen Begriff differenzieren und kommunikative, funktionale und pragmatische Faktoren einbeziehen, nicht zur Kenntnis nimmt. Oliveira beschreibt dann im Sinne Ricœurs und seiner These von der "Übersetzung als Aufbau des Vergleichbaren" Äquivalenz – unter dem Zeichen der Priorität des Gebrauchs

– als eine praktische Operation, die Vergleichbarkeit herstellt, also als ein gültiges Übersetzungsprinzip. Die zitierten Philosophen entwerfen im Schritt hin zu einer Epistemologie des Übersetzens eine Erkenntnistheorie des Gebrauchs (nach Moreno) und konzipieren die Übersetzung als Konstruktion des Vergleichbaren. Während die Relevanz des Themas und die Problemstellung klar umrissen sind, leidet die Darstellung unter den endlosen, oder gar sich widersprechenden Zitaten von Philosophen (von Plato bis Bourdieu und Moreno), die den durchgehenden Gedankengang unterbrechen und wovon nur wenige als theoretischer Rahmen die Argumentation stützen. Der Stand der Übersetzungswissenschaft zur Thematik bleibt unberücksichtigt.

Auch Lucia Salvato geht in ihrer Betrachtung „Ein hermeneutischer Ansatz zur Versöhnung antagonistischer Übersetzungsorientierungen" aus von dem antagonistischen Denken, das die Geschichte der europäischen Übersetzungswissenschaft und Übersetzungspraxis bis heute prägt: wörtliche vs. treue Übersetzung. Seit den Römern steht das Übersetzen als freie rhetorische Übung dem wörtlichen Übersetzungsprozess gegenüber, und Schleiermacher unterscheidet zwischen *Einbürgerung* und *Verfremdung* bzw. *Modernisierung* und *Archaisierung.* Diese zwei Hauptperspektiven haben ihre Entsprechung in pragmatisch orientierten gegenwärtigen Kontrastverhältnissen, zwischen den *source-oriented* und *target-oriented* Theorien, der *linguistics-based orientation* und der *aesthetics-based orientation* (Lawrence Venuti), der *Linguistics/Text-oriented Theory* und der *Non-Linguistics/Context-oriented Theory* (Sergio Bolanos Cuellar). Neuere theoretische Herangehensweisen (Mary Snell-Hornby, Christiane Nord, Sergio Bolanos Cuellar) wollen mit einem pragmatisch-funktionalistischen Ansatz diesen alten Antagonismus im integrativen Zusammenwirken beider Perspektiven überwinden, ebenso wie her-

meneutische Vorschläge, die das Denken, Fühlen und Handeln der am Übersetzungsprozess beteiligten Subjekte einbeziehen. Desgleichen stellt auch dieser Beitrag einen vermittelnden Ansatz vor, der gegensätzliche, aber sich ergänzende Perspektiven berücksichtigt. Als Schlüssel für eine gute Übersetzung schlägt die Autorin daher zwei Hauptkonzepte vor: den Begriff *Kompromiss* von Hans-Georg Gadamer und die Idee der *Verhandlung*, die Umberto Eco eingeführt hat. Salvato präsentiert ihre eigene Übersetzungserfahrung und hermeneutische Betrachtung des Übersetzungsprozesses am Beispiel einiger Gedichte, die sie aus dem Deutschen ins Italienische übersetzt hat. In einer exzellenten analytischen Begründung der einzelnen ‚verhandelten‘ Übersetzungslösungen veranschaulicht sie die Verknüpfung der wissenschaftlichen Reflexion und des notwendigen Praxisbezugs, zwischen Hermeneutik und Übersetzen. Der inhaltlich sehr gut strukturierte Artikel erläutert ausführlich eine hermeneutische Konzeption, die den Übersetzungsprozess als Verhandlung und Sinngebungsprozess nachweist (vgl. hierzu auch Kupsch-Losereit 2012).

Eine phänomenologische Herangehensweise an die Übersetzungsproblematik wählt MASOUD POURAHMADALI TOCHAHI in „Grundelemente einer Phänomenologie des Übersetzens: Übersetzungsbewusstsein und phänomenologische Analyse von Übersetzungsakten im Ausgang von einem nominalen Ausdruck“. Er möchte mit der Phänomenologie und Sprachphilosophie Husserls ein Übersetzungsverständnis anbieten, das deskriptiv an das Übersetzen herangeht. Er stützt sich dabei weitausholend auf phänomenologische Grundbegriffe wie Wortlaut, Sprachbewusstsein, Gegenstand, Bedeutungsintention, thematisches und assoziatives Bedeutungsbewusstsein, Erfüllungsbewusstsein, die beteiligt sind an dem, was Tochahi „Übersetzungsbewusstsein“

nennt. Die schematische Darstellung der phänomenologischen Analyse des übersetzerischen Grundmechanismus verdeutlicht, dass dem Übersetzungsbewusstseins ein thematisches Bedeutungsbewusstsein zugrunde liegt, das einen neuen Identifikationsakt, z. B. von Bezeichnungen in Sprache A und B, ermöglicht. Der Aufsatz lässt ahnen, wie groß die Unterschiede v. a. in semantischer Hinsicht zwischen ‚normalem' Sprachbewusstsein und dem vorgestellten Übersetzungsbewusstsein sind. Daher sei ein kritischer Einwand gegen den von Tochahi übernommenen Husserlschen Bedeutungsbegriff gestattet, demzufolge die Bedeutung eines Ausdrucks immer und überall eine vom Wortlaut, vom realen Gegenstand und auch von aller individuellen Wahrnehmung unabhängige ideal-identische Einheit darstellt. Die Folgerung, dass ein Ausgangstext – aufgrund seiner Idealität – von allen sprachlichen Verhältnissen befreit werden kann und muss, um dann Gegenstand des Übersetzens zu werden, hat mit der übersetzerischen Praxis wenig gemein.

Der Beitrag von RADEGUNDIS STOLZE „Zur Anschlussfähigkeit der Hermeneutik in der Translatologie" deckt sich weitgehend mit dem bereits 2018 bei Zetabooks publizierten Artikel (Band hrsg. von Stanley/O'Keeffe/Stolze/Cercel) und möchte mit dem Vorurteil aufräumen, dass die Hermeneutik den wissenschaftlichen Anforderungen der Übersetzungswissenschaft nicht genüge. Die Übersetzung ist ein Akt des Verstehens und die Translationshermeneutik folglich ein auf fundiertem Verstehen basierender Ansatz der Übersetzungsforschung. Verstehen ist Grundlage von Übersetzungsentscheidungen, die ein Translator aus seiner Perspektive als persönlich Handelnder begründet. Daher diskutiert Stolze Konzepte wie Subjektivität (die dreidimensional ist: kognitiv, sozial und individuell), Intuition, Spekulation (?), objektiver Textsinn (?), Vorläufigkeit der Übersetzung, Kontextgebun-

denheit im kulturellen Kontext. Hermeneutisches Übersetzen – und hier wird der Gegensatz deutlich zu der von Tocchahi beschriebenen objektiv-wissenschaftlichen, deskriptiven Betrachtung der Übersetzungsoperation Husserls – ist immer subjektiv, vorläufig und kontextgebunden und verlangt eine dynamische Übersetzungskompetenz, die vielerlei Faktoren des Verstehens und Formulierens integriert. Die Translationshermeneutik beachtet aus dieser subjektivierenden Perspektive die unterschiedlichen textuellen, kulturellen, kognitiven und situationellen Aspekte, welche die Übersetzungswissenschaft als eigenständige wissenschaftliche Disziplin umfasst, und ist folglich anschlussfähig zu anderen translatorischen Forschungsgebieten wie Sprachwissenschaft, Systemtheorie, Literaturwissenschaft, Kognitionsforschung und Fachsprachenforschung. Die unterschiedliche wissenschaftliche Perspektive von Translationshermeneutik und anderen Forschungsfeldern wird präzise dargestellt. Allerdings gibt es im Text auch sich widersprechende Begriffsbestimmungen z. B. von ,Sinn' oder auch zum ,Verstehen eines Textes', das anhand linguistischer Phänomene begründet werden könne (S. 79).

Auch JOHN STANLEY beschreibt in „Translational Hermeneutics: Understanding (Mis-)Understood?" die Hermeneutik als eine Disziplin, die traditionell das Verstehen und die Verbindung zwischen dem Prozess des Verstehens und der Kommunikation untersucht. In der Erforschung der Übersetzung, so seine Behauptung, ist dieser typisch hermeneutische Ansatz verloren gegangen und wurde durch das wissenschaftlich-naturwissenschaftliche Paradigma und die kognitive Psychologie verdrängt. In diesem Aufsatz geht es darum, gegen diese naturwissenschaftlichen Wissenskonzepte einen hermeneutischen Zugang zu den kognitiven Dimensionen der Subjektivitat und den individuellen Verstehens-

prozessen des Translators zu erforschen, die für die translationale Hermeneutik von höchster Wichtigkeit sind. Wie Texte wahrgenommen und verwendet werden, hängt davon ab, welche Bedeutung eine Person ihnen zuweist und im Verstehensprozess (intuitiv) interpretiert. Dieser Prozess ist individuell-subjektiv, da Vorwissen, Perspektive, Subjektivität, affektive Elemente, Wille, Intuition im Bewusstsein und Vorbewusstsein interagieren und die Entscheidungsfindung vorgeben, wie Stanley in einer Definition des Verstehensprozesses ausführt. Nach Stanleys Meinung sollte die Hermeneutik als Wissenschaft nicht nur grundlegende Begriffe wie „Bedeutung, Sinn, Intuition, Subjektivität, Kreativität, Vorurteil und Verstehen", erst einmal klar definieren, sondern eine empirisch und phänomenologisch fundierte genaue Beschreibung des Verstehensprozesses vorrangig und zügig vorantreiben als Grundlage für die Weiterentwicklung der translationalen Hermeneutik. Zwei kritische Anmerkungen seien hier angeführt: 1. Die Darstellung des naturwissenschaftlichen Paradigmas und der Entwicklung der kognitiven Psychologie ist stark komprimiert und trägt als Hintergrund, vor dem die Hermeneutik verglichen wird, fast schon karikaturhafte Züge. 2. Es gibt schon seit geraumer Zeit sehr wohl Arbeiten, welche translationshermeneutische und kognitive Modelle zur Darstellung von Textverstehensprozessen entwerfen (vgl. z. B. Kupsch-Losereit 1994, 1997, Bălăcescu/Stefanink 2006, Bayer-Hohenwarter 2017).

Vier Beiträge widmen sich Einzelaspekten hermeneutischer Grundlagen in der Translation. ANTHONY PYM setzt sich in seinem Artikel „On *Erlebnis* within Translation Knowledge" mit Gadamers Theorie/Vorstellung von der Übersetzung als Extremfall einer Interpretation kritisch auseinander. Für Gadamer ist Übersetzen ein rein intellektueller Prozess, weit entfernt von gelebter Erfahrung in der überset-

zerischen Praxis. Pym plädiert mit guten Gründen für eine Empirie im Rahmen hermeneutischer Ansätze, welche nicht nur den Intellekt/Geist sondern auch die Gefühle/Empfindungen einer Person betreffen. Er belegt mit Beispielen, wie sich Empfindungen, Einstellungen, Haltungen im translatorischen Wissen niederschlagen und zur Interpretation beitragen. Die gelebte Erfahrung in die übersetzerische Arbeit als hermeneutischer Aktivität einzubeziehen, und die Art und das Wesen von *Erlebnis* bei der Konstitution von Übersetzungswissen zu erforschen, sollte ein empirisches Forschungsziel sein.

DOUGLAS ROBINSON spürt in seinem Artikel „The *xin* of the Foreign: The feeling-based hermeneutics of translation as influenced by ancient chinese thought" dem Einfluss chinesischen Gedankenguts nach. Er untersucht, wie das *xin*, als chinesisches Zeichen ein Piktogramm des menschlichen Herzens, das Herz und Gefühl bedeutet, in der westlichen Welt aufgenommen wurde, indem er in einem kühnen Überblick durch Jahrhunderte, über Kontinente und Länder hinweg, die historischen Quellen akribisch zitiert, aus denen hervorgeht, welche Bedeutungserweiterung bzw. -verschiebung *xin* erfuhr. Über europäische Esoteriker, Missionare, Orientalisten, Philosophen, Schriftsteller nach und innerhalb von Europa übermittelt, beeinflusste *xin* als ‚fühlen, sich einfühlen, mitdenken, denken, das Fühlen des Fremden' vor allem die deutschen Romantiker und fand Niederschlag in Herders und Schleiermachers Theorie vom Übersetzen, in Termini wie ‚Gefühl', ‚sich hineinfühlen' und ‚Gefühl des Fremden'. Die Betonung des durch Fühlen gelenkten Denkens, in Begriffen des alten chinesischen Denkens formuliert, ist eine nützliche Korrektur der Überbetonung des Intellekts im westlichen Denken und auch der Translationswissenschaft. Die Filterung der gefühlsbasierten Hermeneutik der Überset-

zung durch das antike chinesische Denken könnte auch als Hypothese für die künftige Forschung in der sozialen Neurowissenschaft der Hermeneutik dienen.

MOHAMED SAKI weist in „Hermeneutics and paratext: Seamus Heaney's retranslation of *Beowulf*" das Vorwort zu einer Übersetzung als selbstreflexive hermeneutische Analyse nach. Im Paratext stellt sich der Übersetzer, der irische Schriftsteller und Literaturkritiker Heaney, vor als Metaübersetzer, der realistische Angaben zu translatorischen Prozessen macht, die gewählten sprachlichen Mittel begründet und seine übersetzerischen Entscheidungen kommentiert. Er erläutert, wie er den Text im ursprünglichen Kontext von *Beowulf* und zugleich seiner eigenen Geschichtlichkeit, Subjektivität, poetischen Praxis sowie dem kulturellen, intellektuellen, historischen (Hintergrund von Ulster) Kontext des 20. Jahrhunderts verortet. Mit Gadamers Konzepten von *Situiertheit* und *Selbstverständnis* zeigt Saki auf, wie Heaney von einem sprachlich vermittelten und historisch situierten Selbstverständnis à la Gadamer ausgeht, dezidiert die historische *Situiertheit* des eigenen Ortes des Schreibens sowie der eigenen diskursiven Vorgaben einbezieht und im Prozess der Neuübersetzung den kanonischen Text, der im Wandel der Zeit weit entfernt vom modernen Englisch und für den heutigen Leser unzugänglich ist, in zeitgenössischer Sprache wieder verstehbar und die historische Kontinuität des Epos *Beowulf* sichtbar macht. Der Neuübersetzung gelingt dies durch eine Horizontverschmelzung von literarischem Erbe und aktualisiertem kulturellen, historischen Hintergrund. Saki kann in der hervorragenden Analyse des Paratextes überzeugend darlegen, dass die Übersetzung die hermeneutische Tätigkeit *par excellence* ist.

Das bahnbrechende Werk von Jiří Levý, dem jungverstorbenen tschechischen Übersetzungswissenschaftler des

20. Jahrhunderts, hat, dies macht Tomaš Svoboda in seinem Aufsatz „Hermeneutic Reading of the Works of Jiři Levý" deutlich, viele Gemeinsamkeiten mit dem (neo-)hermeneutischen Ansatz in der Übersetzungswissenschaft. Aus chronologischen Gründen kann Levý († 1967) nur als Vorläufer dieser Richtung angesehen werden und der Autor untersucht Übereinstimmungen und Unterschiede zwischen den beiden Ansätzen. Ausgehend von Begriffen und Konzepten in Levýs Arbeiten und jenen der Hauptvertreter des hermeneutischen Ansatzes in der Übersetzungswissenschaft (Paepcke, Stolze), ergeben sich in etwa folgende Übereinstimmungen, einschließlich einiger Aspekte des methodischen Ansatzes: Verstehen als Schlüsselkonzept des Übersetzens, Levýs Konzept der Wahrnehmung auf der einen und dem hermeneutischen Zirkel auf der anderen Seite, der funktionale Aspekt des Textes in Theorie und Übersetzungspraxis, Übersetzen als Entscheidungsprozess, allerdings rational von Algorithmen und nicht von Intuition gesteuert, translatorische Kreativität, die Levý für lehr- und lernbar hält, was heute unter Kenntnis neuerer Forschung geradezu revolutionär ist (vgl. Kussmaul ²2020). Eine teilweise Überschneidung zwischen den beiden Ansätzen ergibt sich in der Anwendung der Spieltheorie und dem Konzept der Subjektivität. Die kognitive Leistung des Übersetzers in den Mittelpunkt der Arbeit zu stellen war bahnbrechend, da dieser Aspekt den Weg für den psycholinguistischen und kognitiven Schwerpunkt heutiger Forschung ebnete. Der Aufsatz beschränkt sich darauf, die begriffliche und thematische Affinität der beiden Ansätze darzulegen, spart den näheren Bezug zu Levýs theoretischem Werk leider aus und weckt so das Interesse, es näher kennen zu lernen.

Dem Komplex hermeneutische Methoden in der translatorischen Didaktik, Empirie widmen sich drei weitere Ar-

beiten. Mathilde Fontanet untersucht den zentralen Begriff der Übersetzungseinheit „Revisiting the Unit of Translation from the Hermeneutical Perspective". Sie bespricht ausführlich die bisherigen, für sie unzureichenden Begriffsdefinitionen, die von syntaktischen, semantischen, makrotextuellen oder funktionalen Texteinheiten ausgehen, und ersetzt diese durch das intuitivere Konzept des *hermeneutischen Halo*. Dieser *Halo* impliziert neben den vorgenannten Einheiten zusätzliche, nicht im Ausgangstext enthaltene Faktoren, die zum Verständnis des Zieltextes notwendig sind: intertextuelle, implizite und enzyklopädische Bezüge. Hermeneutischen Theorien zufolge darf die Übersetzungseinheit also keinesfalls auf sprachliche Einheiten eingeschränkt werden, denn Übersetzer können nicht umhin, zwischen Original und Übersetzung sowie zwischen der mikrotextuellen und der makrotextuellen Ebene zu navigieren und intertextuelle Verzweigungen einzubeziehen. Die Integration der verschiedenen Faktoren in den Übersetzungsprozess gelingt, wenn man von einem *hermeneutischen Halo* ausgeht, der schrittweise kognitive, assoziative, emotionale, interaktive und deduktive Prozesse aktiviert. Die Übersetzung des Textes ist hermeneutisch in dem Sinne, dass sie sich auf eine dialektische Interaktion zwischen den persönlichen Erfahrungen und Kenntnissen des Übersetzers einerseits und dem Originaltext andererseits stützt. So weitläufig diese Beschreibung einer Übersetzungseinheit als *Halo* sein mag, so unumstritten ist, dass Neurowissenschaften, kognitive und funktionale Übersetzungsstudien die Gültigkeit dieses Ansatzes längst empirisch an Hand vieler Textbeispiele überzeugend nachgewiesen haben.

Karoline Jezewska, Kasia Jezewska und John Stanley beschreiben im Beitrag „Introspektion unter der Lupe. Phänomenologische und hermeneutische Ansätze im empirischen Vergleich mit Think Aloud und IPDR" sehr de-

tailliert ein Projekt, das introspektive Methoden für die Übersetzungswissenschaft zu verbessern sucht. Es wurde mit zwei Studentengruppen aus Poznań und Köln durchgeführt mit dem Ziel, einen empirischen Vergleich vorzunehmen von phänomenologischer Methode und hermeneutischer Analyse mit Think-Aloud und IPDR (Integrated Problem Decision Report), und die relativen Stärken und Schwächen – sowohl in pädagogischer als auch in erkenntnistheoretischer Hinsicht – dieser beiden methodischen Paare aufzuzeigen. Dabei wurden die Probanden gebeten, Rollenspiele durchzuführen, in denen Vorstellungsgespräche oder Mitarbeiterbeurteilungen simuliert wurden. Nach Abschluss der umfassenden quantitativen und qualitativen Analyse der verschiedenen Berichte aus den Rollenspielen, haben die Autoren dieses Aufsatzes folgende Schlussfolgerung gezogen: Sowohl die phänomenologische Methode als auch die hermeneutische Analyse, die bislang im Gegensatz zu Think Aloud und IPDR nicht für die Introspektion im Rahmen der Translatologieforschung eingesetzt wurden, erweisen sich als didaktisch effektiv, um die kognitiven Prozesse beim Übersetzen aufzuschlüsseln. Eine kleine Kritik gilt der Tatsache, dass das Ziel des Projekts, introspektive Methoden für Übersetzungspraxis und Übersetzungswissenschaft zu verbessern, nicht erreicht wurde, da das Projekt sich medial mit Rollenspielen auf die *Face-to-Face*-Interaktion beschränkte.

Der Beitrag von HOLGER SIEVER, "Komplexes Denken: Eine Herausforderung auch für die Hermeneutik?", möchte die Modelle vom Übersetzen, welche bis weit in die 80er Jahre des letzten Jahrhunderts die Beziehung zwischen dem Ausgangs- und Zieltext eindimensional unter linguistischem, hermeneutischem oder funktionalem Aspekt (*Skopos*) beschrieben, ersetzen durch ein komplexes Translationsmodell, das sprachliche Phänomene im Wechselverhältnis, nicht

separat voneinander, analysiert. Dieser komplexere Ansatz zur Übersetzung unterscheidet zwei Perspektiven, die der Übersetzer einnehmen kann: die textinterne Perspektive, die Zeichen (Wort, Satz, Text) innerhalb eines Textes, und die textexterne Perspektive, die die Wechselbeziehung von Zeichen mit außertextlichen Phänomenen umfasst. Jede Perspektive ist in drei Dimensionen unterteilt: Bedeutung, Funktion (wozu?) und Information (was?), die ein Übersetzer auf der intratextuellen Ebene, und Sinn, Zweck und Form, die ein Übersetzer auf der außertextlichen Ebene berücksichtigen muss, um einen angemessenen Zieltext zu erstellen. Ein komplexes Modell des Translationsprozesses operiert folglich auf drei semiotischen Ebenen (Wort, Satz, Text), mit zwei Perspektiven (die intratextuelle und extratextuelle Perspektive) von jeweils drei Dimensionen (Bedeutung, Funktion, Information bzw. Sinn, Zweck, Form). Diese Faktoren werden alle zu einem Modell integriert, das gestattet, einen translatorischen Raum zwischen Ausgangs- und Zieltext herzustellen und die Komplexität der zu treffenden Übersetzungsentscheidungen deutlich zu machen. Anwendungsbeispiele belegen überzeugend, dass für den interpretativen Blick des Übersetzers eine über Wort- und Satzsemantik hinausgehende Information notwendig ist, die das Zusammenspiel der drei semiotischen Ebenen und den jeweils drei Dimensionen der textinternen und der textexternen Perspektive erfordert. Die Problemstellung, das vorgestellte komplexe Modell des Translationsprozesses und konkrete Ergebnisse werden gut begründet in die Theorie des komplexen Denkens von Edgar Morin eingebettet.

ANNA PAVLOVA stellt in ihrem Aufsatz „Kognitive Textverarbeitung und Verstehen fürs Übersetzen" die Translationstheorie vor unter dem Aspekt kognitiver und translationshermeneutischer Forschung zum Textverstehen und

wird damit als Einzige dem Bandtitel voll gerecht. Sie möchte die bisher vernachlässigte Verbindung zwischen kognitionswissenschaftlicher und hermeneutischer Forschung herstellen und sich um eine Annäherung der beiden Disziplinen bemühen. Die hermeneutische, um die semantisch-kognitivistischen bzw. psycholinguistischen Erkenntnissen zur Textwahrnehmung und -interpretation ergänzte Darstellung von Verstehensprozessen, leistet damit einen wichtigen Beitrag zu einer interdisziplinären hermeneutischen Übersetzungswissenschaft. Der Appell an die Translationswissenschaftler, „sich intensiver mit kognitions- und neuropsychologischer Forschung zu befassen", läuft aber ins Leere, da es bereits viele Arbeiten zur kognitionstranslatologischen Forschung gibt und auch ein verstehenstheoretisches Paradigma, das sprach- und wissensorientierte kognitive Ansätze und einen bedeutungsorientierten semiotischen Ansatz in der Translation zusammenführt und damit die Verbindung zwischen kognitionswissenschaftlicher und hermeneutischer Forschung herstellt.[1]

Der rezensierte Sammelband will einen Beitrag zur Entwicklung und zum Status der translatorischen Hermeneutik innerhalb der Übersetzungswissenschaft leisten. Mehrere Aufsätze untersuchen daher die Beziehung zwischen Übersetzungswissenschaft und Hermeneutik unter dem Aspekt der philosophischen und hermeneutischen Erforschung von Verstehensprozessen, die beim konkreten Übersetzen ablaufen, und Wissen, Erfahrung, empirische Praxis, subjektives Erleben, methodische Strategien und philosophische Erkenntnisse voraussetzen, um translatorische Entscheidungen

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1   Alves/Jakobsen (2021) geben in ihrem Handbuch einen umfassenden Überblick über den neuesten Stand der Forschung zu kognitiven Übersetzungsstudien.

zu treffen. Artikel, welche von praxisbezogenen Ansätzen ausgehen, behandeln das Verhältnis zwischen dem individuellen Subjekt und dem hermeneutischen Zugang zum Textverstehen und stellen die Translationshermeneutik, auch mit Blick auf die Praxis und methodologische Probleme, als sinnvollen Denkrahmen für Forschungsvorhaben in der Übersetzungswissenschaft vor. Erwähnt sei aber doch, dass im Lichte des sich nun entwickelnden Paradigmas der Übersetzungshermeneutik weiterhin einige Begriffe wie Sinn, Bedeutung, Äquivalenz etc. unzureichende und zu allgemeine Erklärungen erfahren.

Der Sammelband bietet einen guten Überblick über die philosophischen Modelle und hermeneutischen Analysen zum besseren Verständnis der komplexen Übersetzungsproblematik. Während aber die Interrelation zwischen (philosophischer) Hermeneutik und Translation ebenso wie die vorhandenen Erkenntnisse der Translationshermeneutik ausgiebig diskutiert werden, fehlen Beiträge zu kognitionswissenschaftlichen Verstehensmodellen, denen zufolge Verstehen das Resultat kognitiver Prozesse ist, die inferierend Textinhalte mit dem Wissen über sprachliches Handeln sowie mit Erfahrungs- und Weltwissen verknüpfen, um einen kohärenten und in sich stimmigen Textsinn zu erhalten.

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Forum

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MÄLZER, Nathalie / AGNETTA, Marco [éds.] (2021) : *Zum Rhythmuskonzept von Henri Meschonnic in Sprache und Translation* (= *Rhythmus und Translation*, vol. 1). Hildesheim / Zürich / New York : Universitätsverlag Hildesheim / Olms. 419 pages. ISBN 978-3-487-15851-8.

Meschonnic – « une vraie révolution dans l'épistémologie du traduire » (Briu 2021) ? C'est là la question posée par Jean Jacques Briu dans le titre de sa contribution au colloque sur Meschonnic organisé par l'université de Hildesheim en 2019. Elle est représentative pour l'ensemble de la contribution d'un philosophe, poète, linguiste et traductologue pour lequel ces domaines sont indissociables. Nous avons essayé de fournir une réponse en examinant la question du point de vue du traductologue, ce qui était le point de vue des organisateurs de ce colloque dont les contributions ont été publiées dans le volume au titre suivant : *Zum Rhythmuskonzept von Henri Meschonnic in Sprache und Translation.*

   Il s'agit des actes du colloque international *Das Rhythmuskonzept von Henri Meschonnic in Übersetzung und Übersetzungsforschung* qui s'est tenu à l'Université de Hildesheim, du 2 au 4

octobre 2019, à l'initiative de l'institut de traductologie [*Institut für Übersetzungswissenschaft und Fachkommunikation*], dans le cadre d'un projet de recherches qui se propose d'étudier le concept de rythme meschonnicien dans sa pertinence pour l'activité traductive, le but étant d'approfondir et de développer les pistes de recherche amorcées, mais pas assez concrétisées.

Aussi faut-il féliciter d'emblée les éditeurs de ce volume (qui sont aussi les directeurs du projet de recherche dans le cadre duquel il vient s'inscrire) pour la clarté qu'ils ont su introduire dans leur présentation (p. 9–32) des éléments de la pensée meschonicienne pertinents pour le thème de ce volume, ainsi que pour l'ouverture d'esprit dont ils ont fait preuve en ouvrant des pistes de recherches prometteuses, fournissant ainsi un fil directeur et un cadre aux différentes contributions.

Dans la courte introduction à ce volume Mälzer et Agnetta nous rappellent que Meschonnic n'a pas toujours eu cette conception d'un rythme conçu comme une continuité, et que, dans le *Dictionnaire du français contemporain,* auquel il a contribué comme coéditeur il a donné une définition du rythme qui était bel et bien de nature métrique platonicienne, c'est-à-dire d'un « retour à intervalles réguliers d'un son plus fort (ou temps fort) qui alterne avec des temps faibles dans un vers » (p. 14). Ce n'est qu'à la lecture des *Problèmes de linguistique générale* de Benveniste qu'il s'est familiarisé avec la conception héraclitienne d'une organisation de quelque chose qui est en mouvement et qu'il arrive à une définition du rythme comme « organisation du mouvement de la parole par un sujet » (p. 14). Parallèlement ses traductions bibliques à partir de l'hébreu lui ont fait sentir que la dichotomie « vers vs. prose » n'est pas justifiée du point de vue du rythme. Et il critique les traductions existantes qui n'ont traduit que le « récit » c'est-à-dire le sens brut des mots, sans traduire le « réci-

tatif », c'est-à-dire les rythmes du texte, sa prosodie, jusqu'aux violences grammaticales, qui dans leur ensemble représentent ce qui fait la « saveur » d'un texte les « te'amim » (n'oublions pas que l'un des thèmes qui a amené Meschonnic à s'intéresser à Ezra Pound était l'impuissance affirmée de ce dernier à traduire la « mélopée »). Pour y arriver il invite à « rythmiser » le français, lorsque la traduction l'exige.

Et les animateurs de ce projet de recherche de se demander, en guise de conclusion de leur introduction, si ce concept meschonnicien du rythme ne doit pas être considéré comme une invariante à respecter dans tout acte de traduction de quelque nature – fictive ou non-fictive – que soit le texte.

Après cette introduction, le premier article – FABIO SCOTTO : « La poétique du rythme d'Henry Meschonnic » (p. 33–48) – continue, dans la foulée de Mälzer et Agnetta, de nous présenter, dans une première partie, les éléments fondamentaux du concept de rythme chez Meschonnic, pour, dans une deuxième partie, situer la pensée meschonnicienne dans le cadre de la pensée contemporaine sur le rythme. Scotto insiste notamment sur la distinction meschonnicienne entre la dynamique « signifiance » et la statique « signification ». Signifiance qui devient ainsi une invariable à respecter dans la traduction. Ne retrouvons-nous pas là le concept de « *Wirkungsgleichheit* » prôné par Reiß/Vermeer (1984) ? Même si ces deux auteurs ne sont pas entrés dans les détails des éléments suprasegmentaux prosodiques qui viennent se joindre à la chaîne parlée pour « signifier » et qui permettent ce que Meschonnic appelle traduire le « faire » du texte. Quant à l'oralité que – comme nous le rappelle Scotto – Meschonnic voit à juste titre dans chaque discours écrit, n'était-elle pas déjà le principe fondamental dans la rhétorique ancienne qui avait pour principe d'enseigner que tout texte écrit devait l'être en vue d'être reproduit oralement, invitant donc l'auteur de l'écrit à y intro-

duire les marques de l'oralité telles qu'il entendait les voir re-produites oralement ?

Peut-être Scotto aurait-il pu être un peu plus explicite sur les rapports entre cette oralité dans le texte, la dichotomie sourciers/ciblistes et la « trans-subjectivité » quant à la tâche du traducteur qui en découle. En effet, c'est au traducteur, par la suite, de savoir lire les traces de l'oralité que l'auteur aura laissées dans le texte et de les rendre en langue cible. Il lui incombera alors la tâche délicate de respecter à la fois, d'une part, les invariables qui font partie du rythme du texte original et, d'autre part, s'il veut traduire le « faire » du texte original, de respecter l'effet produit sur le récepteur en langue cible, et ceci en fonction des différents éléments (culturels, esthétiques, linguistiques, sociaux etc.) qui conditionnent sa réception à lui, subjective, elle aussi. Le traduire devient ainsi l'illustration par excellence de la « trans-subjectivité » du discours évoquée par Scotto (p. 37). Mais cette circonstance permet-elle vraiment de déclarer nulle et non avenue la dichotomie « sourciers-ciblistes » ladmiralienne, comme le prétend Meschonnic, quitte à ne pas tirer de la *skoposthéorie* les conséquences extrêmes du couple Reiß/Vermeer (1984, 101) d'une « fin qui justifie les moyens » ?

Meschonnic est à la fois philosophe, linguiste, traducteur et poète. Et ce qui fait son mérite d'un point de vue général c'est qu'il place sa réflexion dans un cadre très vaste intégrant une réflexion sur l'homme en tant qu'être social. Et Scotto de conclure :

> En effet, s'il y a dans la réflexion esthétique et traductologique con-temporaine sur le rythme une tendance à la subjectivation des dé-marches orientée vers une personnalisation de la prise de parole et de l'articulation expressive, il n'y a, à bien des égards, que Meschon-nic qui ait su dépasser la dimension purement linguistique et littéraire de ce propos pour en faire à la fois une théorie du langage, de la

littérature et de la société utile non seulement à la littérature mais aux savoirs au sens large. (p. 45)

Suite à cette présentation de la pensée meschonnicienne le volume offre un regard sur les prédécesseurs de cette pensée. Ainsi SEBASTIAN DONAT – « Rhythmus unter den Vorzeichen von (Dis–)kontinuität und Interferenz » (p. 49–62) – fait remarquer que Meschonnic est loint d'être le seul à avoir une réflexion sur l'opposition continu/discontinu dans la conception du rythme, mais que depuis une centaine d'années, un certain nombre de penseurs, parmi lesquels de grands noms, comme Roman Jakobson ou Wolfgang Kayser, se sont penchés sur le problème de la présence du sujet dans le rythme. Donat arrive à la conclusion que continu et discontinu ne s'excluent pas forcément et devraient être traités sous le signe d'une interférence entre expression d'une individualité et dynamique du rythme du vers.

Dans la même foulée suivent des articles sur la relation entre Meschonnic et la pensée de Humboldt dont Meschonnic s'est réclamé *expressis verbis*. Ce qui a fait l'admiration de Meschonnic dans cette pensée, c'est avant tout l'idée d'une conception dynamique de la langue comme *energeia* et MARCO PAJEVIĆ – « Die humboldtschen Grundlagen von Meschonnics Rhythmustheorie » (p. 107–123) – de nous rappeler le titre d'un des articles de Meschonnic – « Continuer Humboldt » (p. 109) – ainsi qu'une citation proclamant que la poétique „est l'étude de l'energeia'', donc de ce qui fait la force d'un texte,

Cette « energeia » n'est d'ailleurs pas sans rappeler le « vortex » que Ezra Pound, dans le cadre du mouvement littéraire du « vorticism » considérait comme ce qui faisait la force d'un texte. Terme dont on peut mesurer la pertinence lorsqu'on sait qu'il a été inspiré par les lectures poundiennes des textes du physicien Helmholtz. Et l'on s'étonne que RA-

FAEL COSTA MENDES – « Ezra Pound, Henri Meschonnic: traduire le rythme » (p. 63–73) – n'en soit pas venu à s'y référer, dans un article où il nous rappelle que, comme pour Humboldt, Meschonnic a cité lui-même Pound, lui reconnaissant une « valeur lançante ». Et il est vrai qu'on reconnait du Meschonnic dans les citations de Pound que nous offre Mendes, comme quand il parle de ce qui fait la « grande littérature », à savoir les virtualités sémantiques multiples concentrées dans des mots du texte qui sont plus que la simple relation de signifié à signifiant que Meschonnic veut voir chez les sémoiticiens: « great litterature is simply language charged with meaning to the utmost degree » (p. 69). C'est cela le « vortex » poundien que l'on retrouve dans l'« energeia » humboltienne. Il faudrait donc aussi examiner dans quelle mesure ce concept de « vortex » créé par Pound a exercé une influence sur Meschonnic, d'autant plus qu'il correspond à la fascination de Meschonnic pour « l'inconnu », ainsi qu'à son ouverture à tous les arts en général, au-delà du cadre de la poésie. Avec le « vortex », Pound introduit un tout nouveau monde dans son esthétique, une esthétique qu'il a développée dans le but de créer sa poésie. Bien qu'il s'exprime principalement en vers, la conception de l'art de Pound est globale, et le « vortex » est bien plus qu'une théorie de la poésie. Son objectif est plutôt de développer une poétique qui relierait tous les différents arts, et peut-être même plus que les arts. Ne retrouve-t-on pas là le projet ambitieux de Meschonnic ?

Même si le « vortex » symbolise cet inconnu, qui fascine aussi Meschonnic, et que Pound n'en a jamais donné une définition précise, on sait que Pound a démontré que la notion de « force » et d'« énergie » de Helmholtz en représentait ce qui fait de l'œuvre d'art une œuvre d'art. Appliquée aux textes littéraires, c'était là la valeur qu'il fallait garder comme invariante dans la traduction. Et c'est le rythme, au sens meschon-

nicien du terme, qui dégage cette force et cette énergie et qui fait qu'une œuvre d'art est une œuvre d'art.

Mais fallait-il introduire le néologisme terminologique de rythme, déroutant, à première vue, pour ceux qui ne pensent pas forcément à Héraclite, pour décrire cela? En effet, dans une approche herméneutique, telle que nous la préconisons, c'est au traducteur de déceler cette force dans le texte à traduire, en se servant de la « *Achtsamkeit* » heideggerienne pour y voir tout ce qui « fait sens » dans le texte et qui constitue son rythme, un texte qui, comme nous le disent les herméneutes Agnetta et Cercel (2017: 190) est un « *Klangereignis* » (un évènement sonore), reprenant la tradition humboldtienne de l'oralité du texte écrit qui doit se lire comme une pièce de musique dont les harmoniques se soutiennent mutuellement pour faire sens. Et ces harmoniques sont les éléments que nous venons de citer et que nous retrouvons chez d'autres auteurs conributeurs à ce volume, comme Bourassa et Savang, qui étudient également l'influence de la pensée humboldtienne sur Meschonnic, tout en attirant l'attention sur d'autres aspects de cette pensée.

Ainsi Lucie Bourassa – « Rythme, traduction, langage: de Humboldt à Meschonnic » (p. 89–106) – nous démontre que, si Meschonnic a pu écrire avec une certaine désinvolture: „Il n'y a pratiquement rien, chez Humboldt, sur le rythme” (p. 89), il y a pourtant un certain nombre de passages qui ont bel et bien pu inspirer les fondements de la conception du rythme telle que la préconise Meschonnic. Il s'agit de passages sur la fonction structurante du discours par l'homme et sur l'oralité qui doit être supposée à la base de tout texte écrit. Et Bourassa de citer Humboldt : « La caractéristique de la langue réside dans le fait que, médiatrice entre l'homme et les objets extérieurs, elle fixe un monde de pensées à des sons" (p. 104). En d'autres termes : pour transmettre son vécu l'être humain

dispose de la double capacité, d'une part, de structurer son discours intellectuellement, en groupant les sons et les mots par unités de sens, et d'autre part, physiquement, en imprimant à ces mots et groupes un accent stucturateur « qui unit les syllabes en un mot et les mots en discours » (p. 91). Humboldt parle à ce propos de « *Diktion* », au sens archaïque du mot : « manière de dire, quant au choix et à l'arrangement des mots » (p. 94) et invite le traducteur au respect particulier de cette « diction » dans la traduction des textes anciens. Et c'est à propos de la traduction de ces textes anciens (Pindare, Echyle) que Humboldt utilise pour la première fois le mot « Rhythmus ». Les passages que Bourassa présente à l'appui de sa thèse sont très convaincants et l'on ne peut que suivre son invitation à continuer d'approfondir cette recherche, qui permettra peut-être de jeter une lumière sur certaines affirmations meschonniciennes parfois quelque peu énigmatiques[1].

MARKO PAJEVIĆ – « Die humboldtschen Grundlagen von Meschonnics Rhythmustheorie und die Folgen für eine dialogische Übersetzungsphilosophie » (p. 107–124) – commence par nous rappeler un certain nombre de jalons qui sont à la base de la conception humboldtienne du langage et du traduire. A côté de la mise en évidence de facteurs comme

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1   Une remarque pourtant, qui vaut aussi pour d'autres contributeurs de ce volume (par ex. Mälzer, p. 336, 345). Comment un jeune chercheur peut-il ne pas être confondu et perturbé en lisant « l'accent est envisagé dans sa dimension cognitive, phonologique » (p. 102), alors qu'on lui a appris que « phonologique » se réfère à la fonction distinctive du phonème, ce dernier étant une abstraction, guère susceptible de représenter une « exhalaison du sentiment » (p. 102). Même contradiction à la page 103, où on peut lire que le discours humboldtien « unit le sensible et le phonologique et qu'on peut les rapprocher de ce que Meschonnic appelle une physique du discours ». Le terme de phonème date du Congrès de Prague (1928) et ne pouvait être connu de Humboldt.

l'oralité, la corporalité, la prosodie, etc., Pajević insiste sur l'approche holistique préconisée par Humboldt, laquelle conduit à la nécessité de créer le texte dans l'acte de lecture, puisque l'auteur du texte écrit ne reproduit la réalité que de façon fragmentaire (p. 110) d'où, pour le comprendre, la nécessité d'un « *Mitdenken* », c'est-à-dire d'une participation active, dans laquelle le texte est considéré comme un partenaire dans la négociation du sens à traduire. Le traducteur doit entrer dans un dialogue de sujet à sujet avec le texte[2]. Inutile de dire que nous avons là la conception gadamérienne du dialogue avec le texte et qu'on ne peut que s'étonner de n'y trouver aucune allusion chez Meschonnic qui pourtant se permet de condamner l'herméneutique au même titre que toutes les approches contemporaines qui, selon lui, n'auraient pas compris ce que veut dire traduire. Après avoir présenté la conception d'un tel traduire, comme dialogue avec le texte, à l'exemple que nous fournit Clive Scott, lequel matérialise son dialogue avec le texte par les gribouillages qu'il sur-inscrit dans le texte et pour qui l'acte de traduire révèle ce que veut dire « lire », Pajević conclut qu'une telle philosophie dialogique de la traduction entraine à prendre conscience de l'autre et aurait, si je me permets de résumer en un mot, un effet socialisant.

Je trouve un peu hardie la traduction de signifiance par « *Sinngebungsprozess* » (p. 108) qui, d'une part, banalise le concept de « signifiance », dans la mesure où ce terme allemand existe déjà dans la pensée de traductologues comme Gerzymisch (2013) et qui, d'autre part, est orienté sur l'auteur du texte, alors que « signifiance » semble plutôt impliquer le récepteur du texte pour qui le texte doit « signifier ». L'accent

2   Conceptions que l'on retrouve toutes dans l'approche herméneutique, comme nous le rappellent Mälzer et Agnetta dans leur introduction (p. 22), où ils renvoient à Cercel (2013, 187–197) pour plus de détails.

dans « signifiance » est plutôt sur « *Wirkung* » (effet), au sens où l'entendent Reiß/Vermeer (1984) lorsqu'ils aspirent à une « *Wirkungsleichheit* » (adéquation de l'effet produit) comme *tertium comparationis* (sans évidemment faire l'affront à Meschonnic de vouloir banaliser sa pensée, en la rabaissant au niveau de la « Skopostheorie »).

Peut-étre, puis-je me permettre, pour légitimer cette critique, une remarque sur le terme de « signifiance » meschonnicien, emprunté à Benveniste et remontant au français médiéval « senefiance ». Ce terme de « senefiance » était un terme clé dans la philosophie et dans la littérature du moyen-âge, où tout pouvait devenir symbole d'autre chose, qu'il s'agisse du célèbre *Roman de la rose* jusqu'aux imitations de *l'Art d'aimer* d'Ovide, tel qu'on les trouvait dans des textes comme celui de Raymont Badaud *L'arbre d'amours et de touz ces fruiz bons et mauvais*. Ces textes avaient une valeur symbolique et servaient à orienter le choix de décisions à prendre dans la vie de tous les jours quand on savait les interpréter. Un des symboles fréquemment utilisés était l'arbre, avec ses branches, ses feuilles et ses racines. Ainsi le chevalier qui vient se plaindre à Dame Amour du fait que sa femme est allée le tromper avec un autre, se voit répondre que ce qui se passe sur la branche de « jalousie » perd de son importance par rapport à la « racine », ce qui est important est que « toujours est revenu à la racine », invitant le mari cocu à se calmer et à attendre le retour de sa femme, dans un contexte, ne l'oublions pas, où ce type de comportement n'offensait pas les règles de l'amour courtois. Dans un certain genre littéraire tout était dans l'interprétation des textes, et sur un plan philosophique plus vaste tout pouvait devenir signe d'autre chose dans certaines conditions.

Si donc Benveniste a pris la peine d'aller chercher ce terme dans la tradition philosophique médiévale c'est certainement en toute conscience de sa valeur heuristique qui est

orientée vers le récepteur du texte et fait confiance à sa compétence interprétative. Et quand on sait la fascination, héritée de Humboldt[3], qu'éprouvait Meschonnic face à l'inconnu dans la langue, on comprend aisément que c'est ce potentiel associatif, ouvert à l'interprétation, du terme médiéval qui a pu inciter Meschonnic à en faire une pièce maîtresse dans sa pensée. Bref : il s'agit là encore d'un problème d'herméneutique et l'on comprend mal l'attitude critique que Meschonnic affiche face à cette approche.

N'avons-nous pas là une invitation à rechercher de l'herméneutique dans l'approche meschonicienne du texte et de la traduction ? Ricœur ne s'est-il pas tourné vers l'herméneutique à partir des années soixante du siècle dernier pour trouver une explication au mal dans le monde par la « voie longue » de l'interprétation des signes et de la symbolique religieuse ? « Senefiance » ne peut « signifier » que pour le lecteur qui redonnera son oralité aux empreintes de la subjectivité que l'auteur du texte aura laissées dans celui-ci et qui sont autant de « signes » qui ne prendront vie que herméneutiquement, dans l'interprétation de toutes les « marques » de la subjectivité imprimées dans le texte en s'appuyant évidemment sur tout ce que Meschonnic résume dans les termes de « continu » ou « récitatif », qu'il s'agisse de répétitions, d'allitérations, de la position des mots dans le discours, … bref de tout ce dont la rhétorique ancienne a pu faire usage pour « signifier » au-delà de la relation statique du signifiant au signifié.

Quand je lis que « le rythme […] concerne l'ensemble des marques par lesquelles les signifiants , linguistiques et extra-linguistiques, *produisent* une sémantique spécifique, distinc-

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3   Comme nous le rappelle Jean-François Savang (« 'Dies unbekannte Etwas'. De l'inconnu de Humboldt au rythme dans le langage » (p. 125–140) : « Selon Henri Meschonnic, 'penser Humboldt', implique qu'il y a plus d'inconnu que de connu dans le langage » (p. 125).

te du sens lexical, et que Meschonnic appelle la *signifiance* »
(p. 173, c'est moi qui souligne), je ne peux que penser à l'her-
méneutique, qui formulerait plus exactement que ce ne sont
pas les signifiants qui produisent cette « sémantique spécifi-
que », mais que celle-ci « se lève à l'orient du texte » comme
dirait Ricœur (1986, 156), et j'ajouterai : ceci sous le regard du
lecteur, comme nous l'apprennent Iser et Jauss avec leur es-
téthique de la réception.

Ce que je viens d'exposer est d'ailleurs corroboré par la
réflexion de HANS LÖSENER – « Auch eine Frage der Stim-
me. Sprache und Ethik bei Henri Meschonnic » (p. 157–170)
– sur la voix et le rythme dans le texte et leur importance pour
les fondements d'une éthique générale dans la langue. Ceci à
condition d'arriver à une définition pertinente du concept de
« voix » parmi les différentes conceptions de ce terme qu'on
peut trouver chez Meschonnic. Aussi Lösener, pour distin-
guer « rythme » et « voix » définit la voix comme la voix dans
le texte, laquelle se manifeste dans la « Rezeption » (p. 167)
par le lecteur. Il s'agit donc d'une « Wirkungskategorie »
(catégorie de l'effet produit) : « Von der Stimme im Text zu
sprechen, bietet sich demnach dann an, wenn es um dessen
Wirkung als geschriebener Rede geht » (ibid.). Et c'est cet
aspect-là qui est déterminant pour la « senefiance ». Nous re-
trouvons là les principes de la « Rezeptionsästhetik » de l'éco-
le de Constance. Et cette « Wirkungskategorie » est à distin-
guer de la « Produktionskategorie » (catégorie de la produc-
tion), avec le rythme par lequel se manifeste la subjectivité de
l'auteur. C'est donc sur la base du langage que se crée une
éthique du respect mutuel : « Die Verbindung von Person
und Stimme ist die Voraussetzung dafür, dass der ethisch
konstitutive Akt der gegenseitigen Anerkennung im Mitei-
nandersprechen vollzogen werden kann » (p. 168). N'avons-
nous pas, là encore, une philosophie du respect mutuel dans

le dialogue telle que nous la recommande Gadamer qui voit sa sublimation dans la « Horizontverschmelzung » ?

Notons que d'après la rhétorique ancienne la dichotomie proposée par Lösener peut paraître artificielle, puisqu'elle part de l'oralité supposée qui précède tout texte écrit, l'auteur ayant pour tâche de mettre les traces de cette oralité dans le texte écrit, de façon à permettre au lecteur de rétablir cette oralité. N'avons-nous pas là une fois de plus une conception herméneutique du texte avec d'un côté un auteur qui, en tant que producteur du texte, fidèle à la rhétorique ancienne, y imprime tous les signes de sa subjectivité émotionnelle et corporelle à l'intention du lecteur qui, lui, aura pour tâche de décripter tous ces signes, fidèle à une herméneutique de la réception et dans le respect de l'auteur (du moins dans la conception gadamérienne, pour Ricœur le « monde du texte » ayant une dynamique propre) ? C'est-à-dire que dans une vision herméneutique on aboutit à cette éthique de l'intersubjectivité de façon tout à fait naturelle par l'intermédiaire du langage du texte qui permet la rencontre de deux subjectivités, d'une part, la subjectivité de l'auteur qui est imprimé dans le texte par ce que Meschonnic appelle donc le rythme et, d'autre part, la subjectivité du lecteur qui perçoit le texte à travers le réseau neuronal engrammatique qui est le résultat de son vécu. Et si l'on comprend avec Meschonnic que la subjectivité c'est bien le sujet dans son historicité, alors on se demande pourquoi il refuse l'approche herméneutique qui exprime cette même rencontre de deux individus dans leur historicité par le concept gadamérien de la « Horizontverschmelzung ».

Ce qui frappe chez Meschonnic – et que Lösener met très bien en évidence dans le rapport de Meschonnic au théâtre, comme lieu privilégié pour l'expression de la corporalité de la voix dans le texte – c'est d'une part sa sensibilité aux

marques de cette oralité et d'autre part sa créativité quand il s'agit de les rendre transparentes pour le lecteur et, plus particulièrement pour le traducteur.

Ces dernières qualités sont très bien mises en évidence par MARCELLA LEOPIZZI – « Le récitatif des traductions bibliques d'Henri Meschonnic : rythme et signifiance du discours » (p. 171–188). Le texte de Leopizzi prend toute sa valeur par la pertinence des exemples qu'elle choisit pour illustrer les concepts de « récitatif », et de « ta'amisation », associés à celui de « signifiance », qui, pour elle, sont les piliers de la poétique meschonicienne du rythme. Leopezzi nous montre les procédés rhétoriques (sans toutefois utiliser le terme de rhétorique) utilisés pour traduire le « faire » dans les textes religieux traduits par Meschonnic. Ainsi « Les blancs sont une sorte de *record of speech in writing* » (p. 179). De même en reliant les phrases par la conjonction « et » au lieu d'introduire des conjonctions de subordination, comme le font d'autres traducteurs dans les passages choisis, Meschonnic situe l'action en quelque sorte hors du temps et « confère aux phrases un cadrage de simultanéité » (p. 180). La polysyndète introduit le sujet avec son oralité dans le récitatif. Elle introduit aussi le rythme, au sens héraclitien du terme, dans la mesure où elle évoque une action en train de se faire. Tout ceci associé aux éléments de la rhétorique classique comme, l'allitération, la répétition, l'anaphore, etc. inspirent à Leopizzi des conclusions, qui, dans la foulée de la poétique meschonicienne, élèvent l'âme du lecteur : « Les textes meschonniciens tressent les mots avec la respiration et le souffle propres à leur énonciation » (p. 184).

Après avoir ainsi groupé les contributions qui présentent les précurseurs de la réflexion meschonnicienne sur le rythme dans une section portant le titre de « Kontrastive Perspektiven auf Meschonnics Rhythmusbegriff » (p. 33–88) et après

avoir présenté la pensée meschonnicienne dans ses aspects qui dépassent le cadre de la réflexion sur le langage vers des considérations anthropologiques, dans une deuxième section, sous le titre de « Zu Meschonnics anthropologischer Sprachauffassung » (p. 89–140) pour aboutir, dans une troisème section, à la présentation des articles qui traitent de la voix et de l'oralité dans la traduction (p. 141–218), les éditeurs de ce volume nous présentent – sous le titre de « (Mit) Meschonnic übersetzen » (p. 219–323) des exemples pratiques des théories meschoniciennes en action, selon sa conception d'une réflexion sur la théorie issue de la pratique et se répercutant à son tour sur la pratique (réflexion qui n'est pas sans rappeler la « pratico-theorie » de la traductrice / traductologue roumaine Irina Mavrodin qui, par ailleurs, ne s'est pas privée, elle aussi, de 'continuer la pensée de Meschonnic', tout en jetant un regard critique sur certaines de ses affirmations). Ces articles évaluent des traductions existantes à la lumière des théories développées par Meschonnic et permettent, notamment dans un esprit didactique, d'améliorer la qualité des traductions en présentant une analyse des principes qui sont à la base des bonnes traductions.

MIRELLA CONENNA – « Traduire la forme chanson. Le cas Brassens » (p. 275–290) – nous montre la mise en pratique d'un de ces principes qu'est le « décentrement ». Dans la pratique du traduire Meschonnic critique « l'annexion », qui consiste à effacer les caractéristiques du texte source qui pourraient paraître étranges au lecteur en langue cible. On a là, en quelque sorte, une critique de la skoposthéorie, telle qu'elle est présentée par Reiß/Vermeer (1984) et telle qu'elle est devenue le principe directeur des ciblistes. Meschonnic pencherait plutôt vers les théories de Walter Benjamin qui laisseraient transparaître [« durchscheinen »] l'original, mais sans aller aussi loin que Benjamin, en s'en tenant à un juste

milieu, mais tout de même, comme le préconise Schleiermacher (sans que celui-ci soit toutefois nommé), en amenant le lecteur vers le texte. Et Conenna de nous citer des « éléments culturels français » (p. 282) introduits par Chierici, dans les traductions des chansons de Brassens vers l'italien, avec les mots comme « rendez-vous » (dans *Don Juan*), *la poupée, fricandó* adapté du français *fricandeau*, etc. (p. 282).

On se demande pourtant s'il n'y a pas une contradiction avec l'analyse que Conenna nous fournit ensuite du poème *Le petit cheval* de Paul Fort, mis en musique par Brassens, où le même traducteur par contre « enjolive le texte par des mots d'astre » italiens, comme « luna, stelle » etc., et « privilégie les diminutifs » comme « calesino, cavallino » qu'il introduit pour créer une atmosphère en se servant des éléments culturels dont il dispose dans la langue cible, ceci dans le but de faire sentir la « force, l'affect » du texte source, en permettant de « faire avec ses moyens à elle, dans la langue d'arrivée, ce que le texte [original] a fait à sa langue » (p. 284). Malgré le charme de la naïveté dans l'expression, on ne peut s'empêcher de retrouver bel et bien, en ces termes, ce que la *skoposthéorie* appelle, plus techniquement, le critère de la « Wirkungsgleichheit » (adéquation de l'effet produit). Quoi qu'il en soit, pour Meschonnic la chanson « fait un seul continu paroles-musique » (p. 280) qui « suggère une atmosphère » dont il faut traduire, « la force, l'affect » (p. 284). On pense bien sûr à la « energeia » de Humboldt ou au « vortex » d'Ezra Pound. Cette fusion « paroles-musique » est corroborée par le témoignage de Brassens qui, se trouvant face au poème du petit cheval, dit : « J'ai pensé qu'en ajoutant de la musique au 'Petit cheval' ça me permettrait de me dire le poème de façon plus agréable qu'en le récitant » (p. 283).

ORNELLA TAJANI – « Traduire avec Meschonnic : *Ma Bohème* de Rimbaud en italien » (p. 261–274) – compare dif-

férentes traductions quant au respect du rythme. Ce rythme joue un rôle fondamental dans la compréhension du poème, dans la mesure où il est censé évoquer le mouvement de la marche du poète décrit dans le texte. Tajani attache une grande importance à la ponctuation, puisque, selon Meschonnic, « La ponctuation est donc une part inaliénable, dans la littérature et dans la poésie, de la poétique d'une œuvre, la part visuelle de sa rythmique » (p. 264). Tajani propose une traduction qui réussit à rendre ce rythme de la marche, en respectant les pauses introduites dans le texte par le poète. Notons qu'elle aurait pu également tenir compte d'un élément cher à Meschonnic, qui est l'organisation consonnantique-vocalique du langage, en attirant l'attention sur la présence des occlusives dans les deux premiers vers, qui contribuent également à rythmer le discours, un peu à la manière du *Stabreim* allemand.

Tajani se réfère toutefois à Bourassa pour convenir de l'impossibilité d'une démarche scientifique pour établir ce rythme, qui laisse toujours place à une part d'arbitraire, « parce qu'à chaque fois on privilégie une certaine 'lecture' du texte » (p. 264). Remarque qui est comme un baume sur le cœur de l'herméneute qui, au cours de ces 400 pages de lecture, en vue du compte-rendu qu'on l'a prié de faire, est quelque peu frustré de lire toujours la même mantra, répétée au fil des différentes contributions et présentant le rythme comme le mouvement imprimé par le sujet à son discours, c'est-à-dire une vision presque toujours unilatérale, du point de vue de la production du texte, dans l'ignorance totale des théories qui envisagent la saisie du sens d'un texte, disons sa « senefiance », du point de vue du récepteur, comme le font les représentants de l'esthétique de la réception, qui ont notamment contribué à paver la voie menant à une herméneutique traductive.

C'est finalement JEAN-JACQUES BRIU (p. 219–232) qui pose-ra la délicate *Gretchenfrage* que le lecteur herméneute – pour lequel ni l'approche holistique du discours, ni la présence du sujet ou de l'oralité dans celui-ci, ni le droit à la créativité dans le traduire, ni le recours aux éléments suprasegmentaux pour interpréter ou pour rendre un sens qui dépasse évidemment la somme des mots individuels, n'ont de secrets – a sur le bout des lèvres : « Le primat de la structure de signifiance sur celle du sens et des signes représente-t-il une vraie « révolution » à l'épistémologie du traduire » (p. 219) ?

Le lecteur herméneute est surpris de constater que Briu, loin de laisser place au moindre scepticisme, que lui, en lec-teur herméneute convaincu, avait soupçonné de pouvoir dé-tecter dans ce titre, défend bec et ongles l'originalité de la ré-flexion meschonnicienne. La contribution de Briu mérite une attention particulière dans la mesure où elle ne se limite pas à présenter de façon pertinente les réflexions de Meschonnic, mais les illustre à l'aide d'exemples qu'il veut convaincants.

Briu a certainement raison de critiquer le traducteur qui dans un passage d'*Aurélien*, ne saisirait pas la différence entre, d'une part, le rythme des passages qui s'étendent sur la des-cription des lieux et, d'autre part, le rythme saccadé qui carac-térise au contraire les passages, où les deux interlocuteurs à bout de souffle, se lancent à peine quelques bribes de phrase, après avoir monté quatre étages. Mais ai-je besoin de faire ap-pel à Meschonnic, comme « révolutionnaire » pour ces expli-cations ? Il y a longtemps que l'herméneute Fritz Paepcke a attiré l'attention sur la présence corporelle dans le texte avec son terme de « Leibhaftigkeit » et que ces idées circulent dans la réflexion de linguistes, traducteurs, philosophes comme Douglas Robinson avec sa conception de la « somaticité », sans parler des recherches de I. Fonagy (1983) en psycho-phonétique.

Briu ne fournit pas une réponse à sa question de savoir si avec Meschonnic on assiste à une « révolution ». Pour Briu la question est purement rhétorique, mais elle invite à la réflexion et provoque à la réponse. En examinant de plus près l'article de Briu, on a plutôt l'impression de retrouver une « tradition » plutôt que d'assister à une « révolution » : la tradition de l'analyse de texte, très convaincante, telle qu'elle est encore pratiquée dans les bons lycées français où une certaine formation à la rhétorique reste à l'honneur.

Au niveau de la discussion, telle qu'elle est menée dans ce colloque, on s'attend toutefois à quelque chose de plus. Briu fait l'effort louable d'illustrer la notion de rythme par des exemples, ce qui témoigne d'un certain courage face aux discussions quelque peu abstraites d'autres contributions, où la définition du rythme comme « organisation du mouvement de la parole par un sujet » qui revient comme un refrain au fil des contributions, crée certes un lien entre celles-ci, mais pas toujours un lien avec la pratique qui est censée en découler. En entrant dans la pratique on s'expose, en effet, plus dangereusement à la critique. Ainsi, en tant qu'ancien assistant du phonologue André Martinet, ma peau se hérisse lorsque Briu, dans sa démonstration de l'oralité dans le discours, qualifie sa transcription de « phonologique » (p. 222) et parle de « phonèmes » (p. 223), lorsqu'il ne s'agit pas du tout de l'abstraction « phonème » et de sa fonction distinctive dans le processus de communication, mais, au contraire, des qualités physiques des sons et de leur effet psychosomatique.

Et c'est là que la description de Briu manque un peu de force. Car il ne s'agit justement que d'une description dont on tire des conclusions un peu faciles qui ne sont pas fondées. Si l'on veut convaincre le lecteur, il ne suffit pas de calculer la fréquence des sons (!) (qui ne sont pas non plus identifiés comme des sons, mais qui sont identifiés par erreur, entre des

traits parallèles, comme des « phonèmes », alors qu'il s'agit au contraire plus que jamais de la corporalité de ces sons) *p*, *t*, *k*, pour en conclure, avec « l'allitération » (encore un terme utilisé abusivement pour désigner la répétition de sons dans le désordre à n'importe quel endroit de la chaîne parlée qu'il s'agisse des initiales ou l'intérieur des mots) de *o* et *a*, à « l'impatience de Marie ». Ce n'est pas un reproche à Briu, car ses efforts sont le premier pas dans la bonne direction, mais les conclusions qu'il tire ressemblent à celles que Meschonnic tire souvent un peu facilement. Et là, on peut certainement argumenter de manière plus fondée. En tant qu'ancien élève d'I. Fonagy, combien une telle étude me semblerait plus riche, si elle pouvait intégrer dans ses réflexions les recherches de ce dernier sur les effets psychosomatiques des sons !

Et c'est là que je me permets une réflexion personnelle. Sauf le respect que j'ai pour la créativité de Meschonnic, notamment en ce qui concerne une terminologie à valeur heuristique, je pense que, sur de nombreux points essentiels, Meschonnic enfonce des portes ouvertes. Sur quoi son représentant, Briu, se fonde-t-il pour supposer qu'un traducteur allemand, par exemple, ne percevrait pas le changement de rythme évoqué plus haut et ne l'intégrerait pas dans sa traduction, car, selon Briu, « il traduirait une phrase après l'autre, à la queue leu leu, comme dans les écoles, même de traducteurs » (p. 222) ? On ne peut que répondre avec étonnement : Il y a belle lurette que l'approche herméneutique prêche une vision holistique du texte et la met en application (cf. par ex. Agnetta/Cercel 2017 pour la prise en considération du ton dans la traduction, ou : Stefanink/Bălăcescu 2015, pour un exemple où le rythme a déterminé le choix traductif). Il y a certainement eu une époque où Nida (1974, 50) pouvait écrire : « What we do aim at, is a faithful reproduction of the bundles of componential features » et c'est l'image de l'ennemi que

Meschonnic s'est construite et contre laquelle il se bat comme Don Quichotte contre des moulins à vent. Mais si Briu (p. 223) prétend que la thèse de Meschonnic : « Tout ce qui fait sens dans un texte, relève, pour Meschonnic, de la 'signifiance' » soit comprise comme une nouveauté révolutionnaire, il ignore le *mea culpa* de Nida (1985, 119) (onze ans après son affirmation phonologique audacieuse) : « We are no longer limited to the idea that meaning is centered in words or even in grammatical distinctions. Everything in language, from sound symbolism to complex rhetorical structures, carries meaning ».

De même, le lecteur se demande s'il est nécessaire d'utiliser le néologisme « désécrire », créé par Meschonnic et présenté par Briu, qui suscite une attente illusoire de nouveauté, pour dénoncer des erreurs de traduction fondamentales et plus qu'évidentes, comme l'omission ou l'ajout de mots, que Briu cite comme exemples de mauvaise traduction chez Alexandre Vialatte, mais qu'un traducteur attentif ne fera de toute façon pas. Et s'il s'agit de rendre de manière équivalente des « assonances », « allitérations », « accents de groupe », on ne peut établir de règles générales, mais il s'agit fondamentalement de traduire en fonction de la fonction génératrice de sens que ces éléments suprasegmentaux ont dans la langue source et de la restitution adéquate de leur effet, par des moyens rhétoriques dont dispose la lange cible, ce qui nous ramène à un critère connu au moins depuis Reiß/Vermeer (1984), celui de la « *Wirkungsgleichheit* », pour le maintien de laquelle Meschonnic plaide comme d'une valeur fondamentale à respecter lorsqu'il affirme que le traducteur doit rendre le « faire », la « force » ou l'« affect » du texte.

Pour être convaincant Briu aurait dû nous montrer, comment il aurait traduit ce texte d'Aragon, quelles conséquences il aurait tiré de son analyse pour la traduction, quel

était la « signifiance » des voyelles *a* et *o* dans le texte et comment on devrait à son sens rendre cette signifiance en allemand. Faire un inventaire et s'en tenir à des statistiques laisse le lecteur sur sa faim. Il y a, en outre, un déséquilibre entre, d'une part, la tentative de faire fructifier les préceptes meschonniciens dans la traduction d'un exemple précis et, d'autre part, une énumération de fautes de traduction chez Vialatte, qui sont tellement évidentes qu'il n'est pas besoin de faire appel au concept du « désécrire » pour les définir ; il s'agit de mauvaises traductions dues à la négligence. Mettre de la terminologie meschonnicienne à toutes les sauces risque d'avoir un effet dilutif sur les termes utilisés. Ce qui attire l'attention sur le problème fondamental d'une présentation rigoureuse de la terminologie meschonnicienne.

C'est à un tel projet terminologique que l'on aurait pu s'attendre dans la dernière partie du volume, consacrée à penser Meschonnic « plus loin » (si je peux m'exprimer ainsi) : « Meschonnic weiterdenken » (p. 323–404). BÉATRICE COSTA – « Théorie du rythme et post-édition : un amalgame impossible ? » (p. 355–366) – y soutient hardiment « qu'une post-édition complète ne peut être vraiment 'complète' que si elle intègre la notion de rythme de Meschonnic. […] Parce que le rythme est 'l'organisation du mouvement de la parole par un sujet', il constitue la catégorie de langage la plus fondamentale lorsqu'il faut rendre un texte humainement intelligible » (p. 355). Encore une de ces affirmations à l'emporte-pièce dont la logique n'est pas évidente pour tout le monde, surtout lorsqu'elle elle est mise à contribution à grand renfort, pour légitimer une structure de la phrase qui devient légitime suite à une simple analyse du texte telle qu'on la pratique (espérons) encore dans les bons lycées français. Et, sans vouloir freiner l'enthousiasme de Costa, je lui recommanderai de s'intéresser un peu plus sérieusement que ne l'a fait Meschonnic

à la pensée herméneutique de Ricœur, plutôt que de reprendre les remarques ironisantes de Meschonnic concernant cet herméneute. Il y a une facilité rhétorique à sortir une phrase de la réflexion ricœurienne et la condamner avec un bon mot comme « Elémentaire. Docteur Bon Sens » (p. 358). C'est inviter superficiellement à avoir les rieurs de son côté, sans réfléchir, au lieu de les inciter à approfondir la réflexion. Si, en effet, Costa avait approfondi cette réflexion, elle aurait constaté qu'on pouvait très bien arriver à ses conclusions concernant la nécessité d'une approche holistique du texte pour arriver à une post-édition complète, en se basant tout bonnement sur les principes de l'herméneutique traductive en général. De même elle aurait constaté que l'analyse systémique telle qu'elle la préconise n'est pas l'apanage de Meschonnic, mais bel et bien aussi l'un des éléments du triptyque qui constituent l'Arc herméneutique ricœurien.

En effet, le débat mené par Costa pour affiner sa compréhension du texte dans le passage du stade de la « proposition de post-édition rapide » à la « proposition de post-édition complète » ne relève-t-il pas tout simplement de l'herméneutique (malgré la condamnation de celle-ci par Meschonnic) ? Et si Costa dépasse le cadre de l'analyse intrinsèque du texte pour évoquer la situation historique dans laquelle elle se situe, ce n'est même plus l'analyse systémique (qui relèverait de la « mort de l'auteur » selon Barthes), mais c'est de l'herméneutique gadamérienne qui recherche l'intention de l'auteur, et ceci dans l'historicité de celui-ci.

La notion de rythme meschonicienne est certes importante et attire l'attention sur certains éléments à respecter dans la traduction, de même que la démonstration de Costa est convaincante pour aboutir à une bonne traduction. Et la critique des traductions automatiques basées sur des systèmes algorithmiques est légitime, elle aussi. Mais est-il vraiment né-

cessaire de faire appel dans ce cas à la notion de « rythme » et d'établir un lien entre la réflexion pratique sur cette traduction et la citation de la p. 355 (qu'elle répète telle qu'elle à la page 362) pour appuyer sa réflexion sur la place de « today » dans le texte ? Ce n'est pas « parce que le rythme est l'organisation de la parole par un sujet » (362) que Costa a changé la place de « today » dans la phrase, comme le suggère son explication. Il n'y a pas un lien contraignant, du moins pour moi, entre cette affirmation théorique et la réflexion interprétative sur la place de « today ». Sa démonstration montre clairement qu'elle a tout simplement changé de focus : du sujet organisateur de la parole l'attention s'est reportée sur le sujet récepteur et interprète du texte source. N'a-t-elle pas plutôt entrepris les changements entre la version rapide et la version complète de sa post-édition en se basant sur ce qu'elle savait d'extérieur au texte, n'a-t-elle pas interprété, dans la bonne tradition herméneutique, en faisant appel à son vécu qui a généré son réseau neuronal à travers lequel elle perçoit et interprète le texte (cf. Stefanink/Bălăcescu 2015) ? Il nous semble que Costa a livré là une parfaite illustration d'une approche herméneutique classique, sans que pour cela il faille faire appel à une conception « révolutionnaire » (selon Briu) du rythme.

Par contre, là où Meschonnic a brillé et fait preuve d'esprit révolutionnaire, c'est dans sa pratique de la traduction biblique, dans laquelle il s'est livré avec toute l'empathie poétique qui le caractérise fondamentalement. S'agissant de textes qui s'inscrivent dans la tradition du micra, c'est-à-dire d'une lecture à voix haute, il s'agissait de traduire non seulement les mots, mais le rythme de l'oralité que l'auteur avait inscrit dans le continu du « récitatif ». Ce rythme était constitué par des structures syntaxiques faisant place à des pauses de plus ou moins grande importance, à des alternances vocaliques/consonantiques et autres éléments suprasegmentaux

qui donnaient un certain « goût » au texte et sa « signifiance » qu'il appartenait au traducteur de rendre en langue cible.

NATHALIE MÄLZER – « Zur Translationsrelevanz der Rhythmusnotationen nach Henri Meschonnic" (p. 323–354) – s'est penchée sur cette traduction biblique de Meschonnic et se propose d'examiner dans quelle mesure le système de notation qu'il a développé dans ce but fait ses preuves dans la pratique, notamment dans la critique des traductions. Dans ce but Mälzer commence par adapter quelque peu ce système pour le rendre plus maniable du point de vue typographique et compare deux traductions d'un passage du *Voyage au bout de la nuit* de Céline dont Meschonnic avait analysé la rythmique dans *Critique du rythme* (1982). Cette analyse avait révélé que la répartition accentuelle des « contre-accents » conférait une certaine « violence rythmique » à ce passage qui est censée être caractéristique du style célinien dit du « peuple ». Mälzer constate que dans les deux traductions la dernière phrase, qui a une importance capitale a été mal traduite : les traducteurs n'avaient pas du tout senti la « force » qu'il y avait dans cette phrase. Reste à savoir, si cette force vient des suites consonantiques-vocaliques, qui constitueraient, du moins en partie, ce que Agnetta et Cercel (2017) appelleraient le « Klangereignis » de ce texte, et qui n'auraient pas été « sentis » par les traducteurs ou si, tout simplement, ils étaient un peu désarçonnés devant cette dernière phrase et n'en ont pas senti la force par manque d'empathie. Personnellement j'aurais tout simplement traduit, dans une première intuition spontanée, par « Und nun Schluss damit ! », qui semble reproduire le rythme de l'original. Là encore, essayer de condamner la version de Grünberg/Rebhuhn en faisant appel aux critères rythmiques meschonniciens de séries consonantiques présentes dans l'original, mais absentes dans la traduction est, à mon sens, abusif. Ne s'agit-il pas tout simplement du passage d'un

style injonctif dans lequel l'auteur s'adresse directement au lecteur, vers une formulation informative, déplacée car en rupture de style avec le reste. Une simple question de rhétorique.

MARCO AGNETTA – « *Décentrer la sémiotique (?)!* Zur Frage der (Un-)vereinbarkeit von Meschonnics Rhythmuskonzept und Semiotik unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des Übersetzungsphänomens » (p. 367–404) – vient finalement clôturer le volume en jetant un regard critique sur les critiques formulées par Meschonnic à l'égard de l'approche sémiotique. Agnetta démontre de façon convaincante que d'une part Meschonnic a une conception très monolithique et étroite de l'approche sémiotique et que d'autre part il est bien obligé, dans beaucoup de cas, d'avoir recours, à son tour, à des visions dichotomiques qu'il condamne chez d'autres traductologues, comme, par exemple, quand avec « décentrement » vs. « annexion », pour caractériser la démarche du traducteur, il reprend en fait l'opposition ladmiralienne de « sourcier » vs. « cibliste » (qui est d'ailleurs, ne l'oublions pas, la dichotomie mise en évidence par Schleiermacher). Et quand, en outre, Meschonnic traite le cibliste d'« esclave du signe », considérant que cette pratique « annexioniste » dans laquelle le traducteur s'efface totalement, est à mettre au compte d'une toute-puissance du signe au détriment du rythme, il donne un bel exemple des raccourcis argumentatifs qui lui sont familiers.

De même l'opposition entre sémantique et sémiotique, introduite par Benveniste et reprise par Meschonnic est une dichotomisation arbitraire, car la sémantique, en tant que science de la signification des signes et d'ensembles de signes, est un domaine de la sémiotique, à côté de la « syntactique » (qui se réfère à l'ordre des signifiants dans la phrase) et de la pragmatique (qui est concernée par l'effet produit en situation de communication). Il n'y a pas non plus d'opposition entre

langue et parole, mais plutôt un continu, la langue étant le réservoir dans lequel vient puiser le traducteur pour alimenter sa parole, conception fondamentale sur laquelle repose notamment la pluralité possible des choix traductifs en fonction de l'interprétation du texte source par le traducteur.

Quant aux dichotomies que Meschonnic reproche aux non-meschonniciens d'avoir introduit dans la recherche, il ne semble pas se rendre compte qu'il les re-introduit subrepticement, par l'entrée des artistes. Ainsi il pense avoir neutralisé l'opposition entre langage littéraire et langage parlé, en affirmant qu'il « peut y avoir de l'oral dans l'écrit comme dans le parlé » (p. 385), mais crée, selon Agnetta, une nouvelle dichotomie entre textes hautement oralisés et textes qui le sont à des degrés moindres. Il me semble qu'à cet endroit Meschonnic joue sur le sens du mot oralité. En effet, clamer hardiment que « la réalisation maximale de l'oralité est la littérature » (p. 385) suppose une autre définition de l'oralité (à savoir celle qui est sous-jacente à la rhétorique ancienne et que je m'approprie pour ma conception de l'herméneutique) que celle à laquelle Meschonnic pense, quand il parle du « parlé » dans l'affirmation suivante : « qu'il y a ou qu'il peut y avoir de l'oral dans l'écrit comme dans le parlé. Et Rabelais est oral. Proust aussi » (p. 385).

Et pour ce qui est pour la dichotomie « linguistique vs. littérature », critiquée comme corollaire de celle qui oppose le « parlé » au « littéraire », Agnetta fait remarquer à Meschonnic que c'est justement l'approche sémiotique qui fournit les bases d'un continu susceptible de surmonter le hiatus qui les sépare. Et c'est encore cette approche sémiotique qui viendra concilier l'opposition entre la notion meschonnicienne du « rythme » et une conception du signe saussurien qui est loin d'être aussi unilatérale et statique qu'on peut l'interpréter à partir de la première version du *Cours de Linguistique Générale*

que nous fournissent Bally et Sechehaye. Et Agnetta de nous inviter à concevoir l'interprétation de textes comme une somme de processus sémiotiques [*Semioseprozesse*] générateurs de contenus cognitifs [*Gedankeninhalte*] dont la légitimation intersubjective devra toujours s'appuyer sur les signifiants concernés.

Bref, Agnetta relève un certain nombre d'excès dans les diatribes menées par Meschonnic contre une sémiotique qui est loin d'être aussi monolithique que Meschonnic veut nous la faire croire. Agnetta arrive néanmoins à la conclusion que ce qui de la part de Meschonnic ne doit finalement être conçu que comme une invitation à la critique est largement susceptible de faire avancer la réflexion sur d'éventuels points faibles dans l'approche sémiotique.

Un de ces points faibles – qui tient d'ailleurs plus du choix de certains passages du *Cours de Linguistique Générale* édité par Bally/Sechehaye sur lesquels s'appuie Meschonnic, alors que d'autres passages les remettent en question dans l'édition de Wunderli – consiste en la conception de la « chaîne parlée » saussurienne comme d'une structure linguistique indépendante du récepteur de cette même chaîne parlée, avec un sens statique bien défini. Agnetta nous fait remarquer que ce que cette chaîne parlée décrit, ce sont les éléments de la chaîne parlée dans sa matérialité et que ce n'est que dans leur réception par le récepteur que des suites d'ondes sonores ou de caractères écrits deviennent des signes. En d'autres termes : ils sont matière morte qui ne prend vie que dans l'acte de communication. Et c'est là, selon Agnetta, que les sémioticiens devraient veiller à mieux mettre en évidence le côté dynamique que représentent les processus sémiotiques qui évoluent en fonction d'une progression dans la compréhension d'un texte au cours de l'activité traductive. Mais quoi qu'il en soit : Agnetta démontre que les théorèmes meschonni-

ciens sont susceptibles de se trouver une place dans la réflexion sémioticienne.

Cette réflexion de Agnetta n'est pas sans rappeler celle de Ricœur qui affirme que le sens est « à l'orient du texte » métaphore filée par Grondin qui continue : « c'est-à-dire le monde du texte qui se lève dans l'interprétation » et je termine en ajoutant « sous le regard du lecteur ». Nous nous trouvons donc tout à coup en plein espace herméneutique. Une herméneutique qui inclut la question des limites floues, des « fuzzy edges » que nous ont fait découvrir les chercheurs cognitivistes. Et le choix du terme médiéval de « senefiance » dont la sémantique aux contours flous, a fait couler bien de l'encre aux chercheurs médiévistes, vient confirmer, chez Meschonnic, cette recherche du mouvement héraclitien hostile à toutes catégorisations commodes. C'est le refus de l'herméneutique qui est à l'origine de la cécité meschonnicienne face à la linéarité saussurienne et rend son argumentation nulle et non avenue. Loin d'être statique, cette linéarité est au contraire la base d'un sens qui se construit au fil de cette linéarité. Et ce sens se construit bel et bien à travers la *subjectivité* du traducteur, autre thème cher à Meschonnic, sauf que Meschonnic centre trop son attention sur le producteur du texte, ce qui incite son disciple Pajević à traduire signifiance par « *Sinngebungsprozess* » (p. 108), alors que je proposerais plutôt « *Sinnerschließungsprozess* » bien que ni l'un ni l'autre ne me semblent vraiment rendre la valeur du « senefiance » dans son halo médiéval, que l'on ne peut saisir dans toute sa sémantique qu'en le situant dans le cadre de la symbolique et de l'allégorique qui caractérise une esthétique médiévale qui a dépassé les limites du religieux pour envahir et dominer une approche philosophique en laquelle tout objet pouvait acquérir une valeur symbolique et être le signe d'autres choses.

A cet endroit Agnetta aurait d'ailleurs pu attirer l'attention sur l'herméneutique traductive qui n'est pas aussi éloignée des considérations meschonniciennes que Meschonnic veut le faire entendre, mais qui a l'avantage, à mon sens, de ne pas négliger les modalités de la réception du texte par le traducteur. Pour le reste les points communs sont nombreux : caractère holistique dans l'approche du texte, subjectivité et légitimation interindividuelle comme évaluation, somaticité, l'oralité du texte, importance des éléments suprasegmentaux, ce sont bien là des considérations fondamentales dans l'approche herméneutique. Quant aux éléments que Meschonnic considère comme des invariables qui seraient à transférer dans le texte cible pour garder le « rythme » (au sens meschonnicien du terme), ils ne devraient pas échapper à la *Achtsamkeit* heideggerienne qui guide le traducteur herméneute et qui devrait présider à toute opération de traduction, dans une démarche herméneutique, sans que celle-ci se réclame forcément du néologisme terminologique de « rythme » aux contours quelque peu flous (sauf mon respect pour Meschonnic). Et c'est cette *Achtsamkeit* qui déterminera les éléments à respecter comme devant être transférés, et ceci en fonction de la fonction qu'ils ont dans le texte en question et non pas de façon automatique; ce qui correspond d'ailleurs à la réponse donnée par Agnetta à la question de savoir si la reprise symmétrique d'une construction syntaxique dans le premier exemple est due à un désir d'esthétique ou si elle a une raison plus profonde. Si, dans un deuxième exemple, Agnetta nous démontre que la position de « Affect » dans une traduction d'un texte de Spinoza doit être mis en prolepse, ceci est dû à l'importance de ce terme chez Spinoza, il me semble qu'un herméneute qui aborde le texte avec la *Achtsamkeit* heideggerienne et l'empathie nécessaire pour entrer dans le jeu du texte et aboutir à une fusion des horizons [*Horizontverschmelzung*] ga-

damérienne aboutirait, dans la mesure où ces compétences auraient été développées de façon pertinente – entre autres par une bonne formation à la rhétorique ancienne – aux mêmes résultats. Quoi qu'il en soit, Agnetta a bien mis en évidence le potentiel inspirant qui anime Meschonnic et qui invite à continuer de 'penser Meschonnic'.

Réflexions post-lecture : Après s'être imposé « du Meschonnic » (pour reprendre un type de formulation désinvolte dans le style meschonnicien) au quotidien de ces dernières semaines, même si c'est à petites doses, le rédacteur de ce c.r. qui a l'habitude de « savourer » pour parler en termes meschonniciens, la lecture d'un ouvrage pendant des mois, avant d'en parler, sort quelque peu abasourdi de la lecture de cet ensemble qui réunit des inconditionnels de ce personnage haut en couleurs. S'il reconnaît sans réserves l'intérêt d'entrer dans le dédales d'une pensée innovatrice et d'une terminologie à valeur heuristique, il doit aussi reconnaître qu'il a l'impression de sortir d'un de ces tubes de RMN où l'on bombarde le patient, qu'il le veuille ou non, toujours des mêmes bruits obsédants qui ne le lâchent pas tout au long de la procédure. Combien de fois ai-je pu lire que « le rythme est l'organisation du mouvement de la parole par un sujet » ! une mantra répétée d'une contribution à l'autre, sans qu'elle soit toujours assez clairement mise en rapport avec l'exemple qu'elle est censée illustrer. Alors, la « véritable bouffée d'oxygène » (p. 363) que Costa veut voir dans les « prémisses meschonniciennes » vient plutôt des contributions des deux coéditeurs, Mälzer et Agnetta, en fin de volume, qui « continuent de penser Meschonnic » en mettant respectivement son système de notation à l'épreuve de la traduction et en recherchant le bien-fondé de certaines critiques meschonniciennes adressées à la sémiotique, mais non sans avoir démontré que bien des affirmations présentées comme innova-

trices par ce dernier, trouveraient aisément leur place dans une argumentation d'ordre sémiologique et, je me permets d'ajouter, tout aussi bien et même mieux encore, herméneutique.

Ce qui frappe dans ce recueil de contributions par rapport à d'autres actes de colloques, c'est cet hommage unisono apporté sur l'autel du « rythme » tel que le conçoit le grand maître des cérémonies Meschonnic. L'espoir d'une remise en question critique que laisse entrevoir le titre de la contribution de Briu – « une vraie 'révolution' dans l'épistémologie du traduire » – est vite étouffé, quand Briu pense nous surprendre en nous informant que cette révolution consiste à considérer que « Tout dans un texte est signifiance », signifiance étant considéré par Briu comme révolutionnaire face au terme de « sens » défini abusivement comme une relation statique limitée au signe tel que nous le décrivent Bally et Sechehaye dans une éditions des écrits de Saussure qui a pourtant été remise en question sur des points décisifs depuis qu'on a découvert le manuscrit original du cours de linguistique tel qu'il a été édité par Wunderli. Il y a belle lurette que les linguistes ont remis en question cette conception du sens. Et on croit relire Nida (1985) remettant en cause ce qu'avait postulé Nida (1974).

Quant à la signification du terme de « signifiance » repris du français médiéval de « senefiance » elle aurait intérêt à être creusée, car celle permettrait d'intégrer dans la pensée meschonnicienne un aspect fondamental qui était bel et bien présent dans la pensée médiévale, à savoir l'interprétation du signe par le récepteur. Seule Costa (p. 363) effleure cette question en ouvrant une porte sur la subjectivité du traducteur « qui s'inscrit dans le texte traduit ». Mais, en s'en tenant malheureusement qu'à ce petit bout de phrase, elle referme la porte sur un tas de considérations fondamentales pour le tra-

ducteur et quasiment absentes de la réflexion meschonnicienne : la subjectivité du traducteur. Et j'insiste sur « subjectivité » et non pas « subjectivation » puisque ce dernier terme implique une volonté d'imprimer sa marque dans le texte, alors
que la tâche du traducteur, que Meschonnic le veuille ou non,
consiste à traduire le texte, même s'il ne peut s'empêcher (!)
d'y laisser la trace de sa subjectivité autant dans l'interprétation du texte source que dans sa création du texte cible. Et
quand je dis « création » c'est à dessein, car il ne peut être
question de cet « effacement » du traducteur contre lequel
Meschonnic croit devoir lutter alors qu'une approche herméneutique du texte démontre l'impossibilité de cet effacement
(cf. Stefanink/Bălăcescu 2015).

Comment alors répondre à la question posée par Briu,
de savoir si le primat de la structure de signifiance sur celle du
sens et des signes est une vraie « révolution » ? De la façon
dont la question est posée on pourrait soupçonner un certain
scepticisme de la part de l'auteur de cette question. Il n'en est
rien pourtant. Briu défend Meschonnic bec et ongles et nous
fournit des exemples pour prouver le bien-fondé de ses
thèses. Qu'en est-il alors ?

Pour le traducteur, la conséquence de la subjectivation
du discours sera de savoir lire les traces de l'oralité que l'auteur
aura laissées dans le texte et de les rendre en langue cible. Il
lui incombera alors la tâche délicate de respecter à la fois,
d'une part, les invariables qui font partie du rythme du texte
original et, d'autre part, s'il veut traduire le « faire » du texte
original, de respecter l'effet produit sur le récepteur en langue
cible, et ceci en fonction des différents éléments (culturels,
esthétiques, linguistiques, sociaux etc.) qui conditionnent sa
réception à lui, subjective, elle aussi. Le traduire devient ainsi
l'illustration par excellence de la « trans-subjectivité » du discours évoquée par Scotto (p. 37). Mais cette circonstance per

met-elle vraiment de déclarer nulle et non avenue la dichoto-
mie « sourciers-ciblistes » ladmiralienne, comme le prétend
Meschonnic, quitte à ne pas tirer de la *skoposthéorie* certaines
conséquences extrêmes du couple Reiß/Vermeer (1984, 101)
d'une « fin qui justifie les moyens », dues à la nécessité d'une
polémique contre une sacralisation du texte de départ sur
fond d'efforts théoriques en vue de la traduction automati-
que, telle qu'elle était envisagée par les structuralistes à cette
époque ? Mais définir la tâche du traducteur en décrétant
qu'« il y a à faire dans la langue d'arrivée, avec ses moyens à
elle, ce que le texte a fait à sa langue » (p. 284), n'est-ce pas
également payer tribut au récepteur du texte ? La *skoposthéorie*
de Reiß/Vermeer, qui et à l'origine de la distinction ladmira-
lienne a été sujet à bien des malentendus, comme nous l'a-
vons signalé dans Bălăcescu/Stefanink (2001). Il n'y a jamais
été question d'un « effacement du traducteur », contre lequel
Connena se croit obligée de revendiquer le « non effacement
du traducteur » (p. 281), reprenant en cela le discours de Me-
schonnic. En établissant le principe de la « *Wirkungsgleichheit* »
(adéquation de l'effet produit) comme *tertium comparationis*, la
skoposthéorie plaidait la même cause que Meschonnic, cité par
Connena : produire sur le lecteur en langue cible le même ef-
fet que produisait sur le lecteur le texte source dans la langue
de départ, comme je l'ai expliqué dans mon c.r. de Reiß/Ver-
meer, faisant remarquer que cela ouvrait la voie à la créativité
du traducteur, qui par conséquent était loin de s'effacer[4].

　　Après la lecture de ces contributions on ressent la néces-
sité de procéder à l'établissement d'un inventaire terminolo-
gique qui mettrait en rapport les différentes innovations ter-

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4　Long (2008, 6) affirme : « Bălăcescu/Stefanink (2003) give skopos
　theory the credit for first allowing creativity in target texts in spite of
　the fact that skopos theory was a proposal meant for non-literary
　texts. »

minologiques de Meschonnic. Les termes viendraient s'éclairer mutuellement et leur sémantique avec tout ce qu'elle suggère pourrait servir de base à la traduction de cette terminologie. Tel que je ressens par exemple le terme de « signifiance », la traduction allemande par « Sinngebungsprozess » que propose Pajević, ne me semble pas assez convaincante, car elle implique uniquement celui qui « donne » le sens. Or si l'on prend en considération le terme médiéval de « senefiance » sur lequel Benveniste et à sa suite Meschonnic se basent, pour ouvrir le regard sur les virtualités sémantiques, véhiculées par ce terme dans la philosophie médiévale, une traduction par « Sinnerschließungsprozess » serait certainement plus appropriée, puisque dans cette tradition « signifiance » est clairement orientée sur le récepteur du signifiant. Et cette sémantique est corroborée par le champ sémantique dont ce terme central fait partie chez Meschonnic. Il a en effet des « éléments satellites » dans le même champ terminologique, si je peux m'exprimer ainsi, qui viennent soutenir cette nuance, comme par exemple le « faire » du texte que le traducteur est censé traduire selon Meschonnic [n'avons-nous pas là une idée de « Wirkungsgleicheit » à laquelle Reiß/Vermeer (1984) aspirent ?]. Michon l'a bien senti, quand il caractérise la poétique de Meschonnic comme une théorie du sujet de l'œuvre comme « transsujet » (cité d'après Scotto, p. 37). Et Eyriès d'inventer le néologisme « allelocentrisme » pour caractériser cette démarche meschonnicienne, fondée sur une « dialectique du dialogue », comme Scotto (p. 45) la met en évidence.

Il est d'autant plus surprenant que dans sa condamnation de tout ce qui n'est pas Meschonnic, y compris l'herméneutique, Meschonnic n'ait pas vu que celle-ci défend les mêmes principes que lui, à savoir une approche holistique du texte et une « Achtsamkeit » heideggerienne à l'affut de tout ce qui est susceptible de faire sens dans un texte, comme la présence

d'isotopies (aspect qui n'est pas présent *expressis verbis* dans la terminologie de Meschonnic), les éléments suprasegmentaux, la corporalité du sujet dans le texte, les métaphores, les symboles, etc. (cf. Stefanink/Bălăcescu 2017). N'oublions pas que si le philosophe protestant qu'était Ricœur a choisi la « voie longue » de la recherche d'explications du mal dans le monde à travers les symboles, ce « tournant herméneutique » qu'a pris l'œuvre de Ricœur dans les années soixante du siècle dernier était bien une recherche de la « senefiance » médiévale qui a inspiré Benveniste, et, à sa suite Meschonnic. Dommage que Meschonnic ait voulu ignorer cette herméneutique plutôt que d'en approfondir le sens.

Si le but du projet de recherches dont fait partie ce colloque est de familiariser les traducteurs/traductologues allemands avec l'approche meschonnienne, une des premières tâches devrait être de démystifier le langage de Meschonnic, si l'on veut motiver les jeunes chercheurs – et c'est bien à eux qu'on doit s'adresser – car il y a longtemps que des vrais professionnels, comme Nida, ont revu leur copie et n'écrivent plus sur leurs étendards « What we do aim at, is a faithful reproduction of the bundles of componential features ».

Alors Meschonnic se battrait-il contre des moulins à vent ? aurait-on affaire à une histoire du type « Les nouveaux habits de l'empereur » ? Certainement pas, des créations terminologiques ont une valeur heuristique (comme nous l'avons démontré dans Bălăcescu/Stefanink 2012), chacune essaie d'attirer l'attention sur un aspect particulier de l'approche théorique mais la tâche devra consister à concrétiser des proclamations comme « il ne s'agit plus de mots à traduire, mais d'historicités » (p. 68) en les basant sur des exemples concrets de traduction, si l'on ne veut en rester à ce que Cercel (2013, 342) a fustigé comme étant des « plakative Aussagen ». De louables efforts dans ce sens ont été entrepris par des auteurs

comme Agnetta et Mälzer, d'autres comme celle de Briu mériteraient d'être approfondies.

L'iconoclastie de Meschonnic est souvent rafraîchissante et stimulante, mais n'y a-t-il pas tout aussi souvent une certaine « mauvaise foi » ou une connaissance insuffisamment approfondie de la matière lorsqu'il voit par exemple un ennemi dans l'herméneutique, avec laquelle il partage au fond tant de choses[5] ?

Et, si l'on veut plaider la cause de Meschonnic, n'aurait-on pas intérêt à démystifier certaines phrases comme celle que Conenna cite pour nous faire comprendre que c'est la « force » et « l'affect » que le traducteur doit traduire : « ce qu'il y a à traduire, c'est l'écoute qui consiste à entendre ce qu'on ne sait pas qu'on entend » (p. 284) ? N'y a-t-il pas là tout simplement une invitation à adopter une attitude de « Achtsamkeit » heideggerienne, telle que la préconise l'approche herméneutique ? Quant à la « force » et « l'affect » qui doivent être traduits, ce n'est pas non plus une proposition aussi nouvelle qu'on veut la faire paraître. C'est, comme on le voit à travers les contributions théoriques de la première partie de ce recueil, l'« energeia » humboldtienne que l'on retrouve dans ces termes de « force » et d'« affect » et, j'ajouterais, de façon encore plus convaincante le « vortex » d'Ezra Pound, qui n'a pas pu échapper à l'attention de Meschonnic et qui a certainement fait partie du paquet d'idées à « valeur lançante » dans lequel il a puisé ; un « vortex » qui, comme on sait, trouve ses racines dans le générateur d'énergie thermodynamique du physicien allemand Helmholtz. Le passage de « I Gather the Limbs of Osiris » cité par Costa Mendes (p. 72)

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5   Comment peut-il affirmer : « L'herméneutique ne connaît que le signe, que le sens. Dans l'ignorance du discours » (Meschonnic 2004, 124) ?

est révélateur à cet égard et ne laisse aucun doute quant à cette affiliation.

Interprétation et herméneutique encore, dans la traduction de « Ma Bohème » par Ornella Tajani, qui fait clairement appel à une interprétation de la part du traducteur lorsqu'elle cite la grande spécialiste de Meschonnic qu'est Lucie Bourassa pour reconnaître qu'« il y a toujours de l'arbitraire, parce qu'à chaque fois on privilégie une certaine 'lecture' du texte » (p. 264). Et il y a fort à parier que la 'lecture' qui mène à la traduction de Tajani – effectivement supérieure aux autres citées dans cet article – est le résultat d'une très grande empathie (due entre autres à sa grande familiarité avec l'œuvre de Rimbaud qu'elle a traduite en italien) et que l'analyse légitimatrice est le produit d'une réflexion ultérieure, tout à fait dans l'esprit d'une démarche herméneutique en traduction.

On peut toutefois s'étonner que personne, dans tout le volume, n'incite à un examen précis de la terminologie. Que peut-on attendre d'une confrontation entre la « signifiance » et les concepts de « sens » et de « signe » sans que ces termes soient définis avec précision ? Toute la terminologie de Meschonnic vise à introduire le mouvement caractéristique de sa définition du rythme jusque dans la terminologie. Une des tâches du centre de recherches de Hildesheim sera de lui trouver des équivalents allemands aussi évocateurs du mouvement que le sont les originaux français. Car les sciences humaines vivent de leur terminologie. Meschonnic avec sa terminologie de la « mouvance » en fournit bien la preuve.

Que retenir de tout cela ? Meschonnic, un imposteur ? Evidemment non ! Mais il a sans doute un peu trop généralisé de façon provocatrice ce qu'il avait appris au cours de ses traductions bibliques, qui ont eu le grand mérite d'attirer son attention sur le rôle joué par le rythme au sens héraclitien du terme, à un moment où la linguistique structurale dominait

tout. Il suffit de se rappeler l'enthousiasme de Mounin (1963) pour lequel le traducteur devait analyser les mots de la langue source en leurs unités de sens minimales pour ensuite trouver en langue cible les mots qu'on pouvait reconstruire à l'aide de ces unités de sens. Mais on a vite déchanté (cf. Stefanink/Bălăcescu 2001). Et ce sont justement des herméneutes comme Fritz Paepcke qui ont tenu haut le flambeau d'une lutte contre les préconiseurs d'une traduction automatique, comme Otto Kade, qui s'étaient donnés pour but de développer une théorie de la traduction, qui ne passerait pas forcément par la saisie du sens à traduire. Ainsi Meschonnic est venu s'encadrer dans un courant de pensée plus vaste en opposition avec le structuralisme primitif en traductologie et a pu surfer sur la vague de l'herméneutique alimentée par des précurseurs de tous bords, qu'il s'agisse des défenseurs de la « Rezeptionsästhetik », comme Iser et Jauss, ou des représentants des lectures plurielles du texte, comme Barthes ou Eco, qui sont venus préparer le terrain pour une réflexion sur la traduction qui se défendait d'écarter l'intuition et la créativité (comme Gerzymisch-Arbogast/Mudersbach 1998, 16 l'ont fait), au contraire de ceux qui espéraient résoudre les problèmes traductifs à coup d'algorithmes (comme Gerzymisch encore en 2013).

En traductologie, le mérite de Meschonnic, c'est d'avoir réuni toutes ces recherches sous le concept de « rythme ». on est en droit d'espérer que les recherches menées dans le cadre du projet dirigé par Agnetta et Mälzer permettront de révéler la « valeur lançante » que l'œuvre de Meschonnic peut certainement avoir pour les recherches en traductologie, comme laissent prévoir les deux articles qu'ils lui ont consacré dans ce volume et qui tranchent nettement avec le reste, où un certain culte de la personne empêche parfois de voir que Meschonnic est porté par un courant général anti-structuraliste, dominé par l'approcher herméneutique, dans laquelle il peut

trouver sa place, en toute modestie, loin des encencements souvent trop abstraits que lui prodiguent certains auteurs de ce volume. Et, pour le mot de la fin, n'oublions pas que Meschonnic n'a cependant jamais nié qu'il s'agissait avant tout de rompre avec des vérités considérées comme établies et d'inciter à de nouvelles approches dans la recherche. Et pour cela, le présent ouvrage fournit sans aucun doute une base saine.

A travers toutes les contributions de ce volume Meschonnic apparaît comme très créatif. Beaucoup de ses innovations terminologiques ont une valeur heuristique qui « donne à penser » (comme disait Ricœur à propos du symbole). Force est de constater cependant que souvent ces innovations terminologiques renvoient à des réflexions déjà connues, même si une innovation terminologique peut mettre en relief un aspect moins évident jusque-là. Bon nombre de ces affirmations meschonniciennes gagneraient à être passées au crible des recherches cognitives, ainsi la formule « Celui qui écrit s'écrit, celui qui lit se lit » peut très bien se trouver légitimée par le fait que le sujet écrivant ou lisant en question perçoit irrémédiablement ce qui fait l'objet de ses activités respectives à travers le réseau neuronal qu'il s'est construit au fil de son vécu personnel, sur la base de ses engrammes. Dire que le rythme est l'organisation du discours par le sujet devient alors une évidence ou, plus précisément, une conséquence logique évidente. Mais Meschonnic n'a pas fait cette recherche, il ne s'est pas donné la peine de convaincre en recherchant, par exemple, les bases psycho-phonétiques de ses affirmations (que nous fournit, par exemple, Fonagy 1983) ; il ne prend pas non plus en considération les résultats des recherches en sciences cognitives, que nous fournissent respectivement des chercheurs comme Lakoff, Rosch, Fillmore, Langacker, Schank ou encore le neurophilosophe Hans Lenk,

dont les recherches peuvent servir à convaincre de la réalité de ce qui se passe dans nos cerveaux en s'appuyant sur des expériences concrètes. Non, Meschonnic ne s'abaisse pas à ces tâches ancillaires ! Il ne cherche même pas à convaincre par des raisonnements logiques. Pas même une seule fois il ne fait appel à des découvertes de la linguistique du discours, telles que les a mises en évidence, par exemple, Greimas avec sa théorie des isotopies. Meschonnic proclame des vérités et ses disciples répètent unisono ces vérités en s'efforçant tant bien que mal d'établir un lien rigoureusement logique entre ces proclamations et la réalité traductive qu'ils essayent d'expliquer pour prouver le bien-fondé des théorèmes du vénéré maître. Et c'est pour combler cet écart entre, d'une part, ce que Cercel (2013, 364) qualifierait de « plakative Aussagen » et, d'autre part, des exemples de traductions créatives trouvées intuitivement, mais dont la légitimation scientifique reste à prouver, que se situe la tâche du groupe de recherches créé à Hildesheim.

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Bernd Stefanink hat eine ungewöhnlich ausführliche Rezension zu dem von Marco Agnetta und mir herausgegebenen Sammelband *Zum Rhythmuskonzept von Henri Meschonnic in Sprache und Translation* (2021, OLMS Verlag) verfasst. Das ist alles andere als selbstverständlich und dafür möchte ich ihm als erstes herzlich danken. Seine Rezension gibt mir Anlass und Gelegenheit, eine, wenn auch nur kurze, Antwort zu verfassen und somit zumindest ansatzweise an eine Meschonnic'sche Gepflogenheit anzuknüpfen: an ein Schreiben im Dialog. Dabei liegt es mir allerdings fern, auch jenen Ton zu übernehmen, der Henri Meschonnic nicht ganz zu Unrecht den Ruf des Polemikers eingebracht hat.

Als Mitherausgeberin des rezensierten Tagungsbandes bietet meine Erwiderung auch die Gelegenheit, Aspekte zu diskutieren, die im Rahmen unserer Konferenz nicht erwähnt wurden. Da ein Call for Papers in der Regel nie alle potentiellen Beiträger zu einem gesetzten Thema erreichen kann, ist es umso erfreulicher, wenn sich auch nachträglich noch Diskussionen und Auseinandersetzungen entzünden, die nicht zuletzt auch zu weiteren Publikationen anregen mögen. Stefanink bespricht in seiner Rezension viele, aber längst nicht alle Beiträge des Sammelbandes.[6] Daher möchte ich meiner

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6   Unerwähnt bleiben die Beiträge von Takuma Ito, Maria Sílvia Cintra Martins, Serge Martin, Shungo Morita, Eduardo Uribe Flores, Paola Giummarra, Wided Bousoffara Dhrayef und nicht zuletzt von Vera Viehöver, die sich bereits mehrfach zu Meschonnic und seiner Bedeutung für Translationstheorie und Praxis geäußert hat (vgl.

Erwiderung gleich vorausschicken, dass ich nicht an Stelle der Beiträger auf die Detailkritik zu jedem Aufsatz eingehen kann, sondern bestenfalls Erläuterungen zu den eigenen Beiträgen sowie zur Anlage und zum Anliegen des Kompendiums anbringen und zu einigen zentralen Kritikpunkten Stellung nehmen werde.

Ein Kritikpunkt Stefaninks lautet ganz pauschal, dass viele der Beiträge im Sammelband Meschonnics Gedankengebäude eher positiv gegenüberstehen. Diese Feststellung lässt sich kaum von der Hand weisen. Der Umstand ist allerdings auch der Tatsache zu verdanken, dass die Tagung im Jahr 2019 ausgerichtet wurde, also dem Jahr, in dem sich Meschonnics Todestag zum zehnten Mal jährte. Mit den Diskussionen um Meschonnics Theoreme war entsprechend auch die Absicht verbunden, dieses Jubiläum zu begehen und den streitbaren Sprachdenker, Dichter und Übersetzer für die deutsche Translationswissenschaft (wieder) zu entdecken. Sicherlich geht die eher bejahende Haltung der Beiträger größtenteils auf diese Tatsache zurück. Es war das Anliegen der Tagung und des Sammelbands, in ein zentrales Konzept seines Denkens einzuführen: das des Rhythmus. Die Tagung bildet den Auftakt zu einem langfristig angelegten Projekt, den Rhythmusbegriffen in der Translationsforschung nachzugehen und deren Tauglichkeit für eine übergreifende Theorie auf den Prüfstand zu stellen.[7]

Viehöver 2015, 2018) und in Begriff ist, dem französischen Autor eine Monographie (voraussichtlich 2023) zu widmen.

7   Eine Folgetagung mit dem Titel *Translation als Um- und Neurhythmisierung. Zur Rolle rhythmischer Verschiebungen in der Kommunikation über Sprach-, Kultur- und Mediengrenzen hinweg*, die genau dieses Ziel verfolgt, findet am 1. und 2. Dezember 2022 unter der Leitung von Marco Agnetta und Katharina Walter vom Institut für Translationswissenschaft an der Universität Innsbruck statt

Stefaninks informierte Rezension hat dankenswerterweise eine Reihe weiterer wichtiger Berührungspunkte zwischen Meschonnics Theoremen und anderen Denkschulen, Begrifflichkeiten oder auch vortheoretischen Rhythmuskonzepten benannt. So schlägt er vor, Ezra Pounds *Vortex* als weiterer Inspirationsquelle für Meschonnics Denken nachzugehen; über die Nähe zum Konzept der *Wirkungsgleichheit* aus der Skopostheorie oder über Parallelen zur hermeneutischen Schule und zur Rezeptionsästhetik nachzudenken; dem mittelalterlichen Begriff der *senefiance* nachzuspüren, den Benveniste ebenfalls für sich entdeckt hat und der, ähnlich wie der Rhythmusbegriff, von Meschonnic übernommen wurde, aber auch umdefiniert wurde zur *signifiance*. All dies sind Aspekte, die ganz gewiss als interessante weitere Beiträge in den Abschnitt zu Meschonnics Vordenkern und Inspirationsquellen gepasst hätten. Auffällige Gemeinsamkeiten und wichtige Unterschiede in der Begrifflichkeit und im Platz, den einzelne Konzepte im Meschonnic'schen Denkgebäude einnehmen, hätten hier herausgearbeitet werden können. Stefanink zeigt zu Recht auf, dass die kontrastive Reflexion der Theoreme Meschonnics, verbunden mit der Frage nach der Originalität seines Denkens, auch nach der Publikation des hier besprochenen Sammelbands weiterhin ein Desiderat darstellen. Vielleicht darf ich an dieser Stelle auf eine weitere geplante Publikation hinweisen. Tatsächlich ist es ein Anliegen der Herausgeber dieses Sammelbandes, gemeinsam mit einer internationalen Arbeitsgruppe ein Handbuch zu Meschonnic in Angriff zu nehmen, das es erlauben würde, unter anderem den Einflüssen auf Meschonnics Denken systematisch nachzugehen und seine teilweise ungewöhnliche Begrifflichkeit vorzustellen. Parallel zu diesem langfristigen und finanziell noch nicht abgesicherten Projekt sind deutsche Übersetzungen einiger (programmatischer) Schriften von

Meschonnic vorgesehen, die der Verbreitung seiner *pensée* dienen und damit einer fruchtbaren Diskussion im deutschsprachigen Raum den Boden bereiten sollen. Denn Meschonnics Denken und Rhythmusbegriff ist einer nicht romanistisch geprägten Leserschaft bisher weitgehend unbekannt geblieben. Erst nach Ausrichtung der Tagung ist ein erstes Buch von Meschonnic in der von einer der Beitragenden, Béatrice Costa, besorgten Übersetzung erschienen (s. Meschonnic 2007/2021). Weitere Übersetzungen befinden sich in Arbeit bzw. im Erscheinen (vgl. Agnetta/Mälzer/Viehöver 2023, i. Dr. sowie Meschonnic 2023, i. Dr.). Eine breitere Diskussion seiner Begriffe und Theoreme, wie sie auch Stefanink geführt sehen möchte, wird im deutschsprachigen Raum überhaupt erst dank dieser Übersetzungen starten können. Wenn der vorliegende Band, wie der Rezensent beklagt, also zu wenig auf Ähnlichkeiten und Unterschiede der Meschonnic'schen Theoreme zur Skopostheorie oder Hermeneutik rekurriert, so liegt dies in erster Linie an der Zielsetzung des Sammelbands und des darin skizzierten Projekts: für eine innerdisziplinär zersplitterte Übersetzungswissenschaft einen Begriff in den Fokus zu nehmen, der verspricht, weitergedacht, als Baustein einer übergreifenden Übersetzungstheorie verwendet werden zu können.

Es liegt in der Natur von Tagungsbänden, dass sie die Systematik eines Handbuchs in der Regel leider nicht leisten. Auch dieser Sammelband kann nur einige Schlaglichter auf das Thema werfen, das die Herausgeber den Beiträgern vorgegeben haben: nämlich sich auf das Rhythmuskonzept Henri Meschonnics zu konzentrieren und es im Licht der aktuellen Translationswissenschaft auf seinen heuristischen Wert zu prüfen. Damit liegt die Perspektive weniger auf einer möglichen und sicherlich wünschenswerten Reflexion über unterschiedliche – wenn auch miteinander verknüpfte – Theoreme

Meschonnics als auf jenem Konzept, das Meschonnic zum Dreh- und Angelpunkt seines Sprachdenkens, seiner Übersetzungspraxis und -theorie gemacht hat. Dies ist auch der Grund dafür, dass die vorliegende Publikation den ersten Band einer neu gegründeten Reihe *Rhythmus und Translation* bildet (und nicht etwa zu Meschonnic und Translation).

Die Gelegenheit, Meschonnic, salopp gesagt, auseinanderzunehmen, wie Stefanink es sich offenbar gewünscht zu haben scheint, wurde nicht ergriffen. Dies liegt an einem weiteren Umstand. Auch wenn sich nur ein Beitrag des Sammelbands explizit mit dem aktuellen (wenn auch gar nicht so neuen) Menetekel der Übersetzungswissenschaft auseinandersetzt, der maschinellen Übersetzung, ist das Thema doch unterschwellig präsent: weil es die Übersetzungswissenschaft seit längerer Zeit in eine Verteidigungshaltung gegen die fortwährend proklamierte unmittelbar bevorstehende Ablösung des Humanübersetzers durch die angeblich dazulernende Maschine zwingt. Diesem Irrglauben ein Umdenken entgegen zu setzen, könnte als das heimliche Motiv für einige Beiträge gelesen werden, Meschonnics Rhythmuskonzept beim Wort zu nehmen und seine Sprachauffassung als Gegengift zu subjektlos generierten, enthistorisierten Texten verstehen. Somit sehe ich in den Beiträgen weniger ein Beweihräuchern Meschonnics, wie Stefanink kopfschüttelnd bemerkt, als vielmehr den Versuch, einer Entwicklung zu trotzen, bei der seit einigen Jahren auf dem Altar der *neural machine translation* (NMT) Ausbildungsstätten geopfert werden, Übersetzungsstudiengänge eingehen und nicht nur Fachfremde sich der Überzeugung hingeben, Sprache und Kreativität könne durch Maschinen imitiert werden, und damit letztlich das Aussterben einer Jahrtausende alten kulturellen Praxis, das Übersetzen, ohne Verlust in Kauf genommen werden.

Ganz gewiss ist Meschonnic nicht der einzige Übersetzer und Sprachdenker, der dieser Vorstellung mit seinen Theoremen etwas Substanzielles entgegenzusetzen vermag. Seine stete Betonung der radikalen Historizität von Sprache, seine nimmermüde Aufforderung, Texte in ihrer spezifischen Art und Weise des Bedeutens zu begreifen, und der Platz, den er dem Subjekt (nicht zu verwechseln mit dem Schriftsteller oder Übersetzer als Individuum) im Schreiben-Übersetzen einräumt, – all dies könnte zeigen, worin sich das maschinelle Übersetzen von dem unterscheidet, was der Humanübersetzer – vielleicht als einziger – vermag. Dazu gehört die Berücksichtigung der performativen Dimension des Textes, die bei Meschonnic als *faire*, als *force* bezeichnet wird. Meschonnic betont aber auch, dass sich an der Übersetzung ablesen lässt, wessen Geistes Kind der Humanübersetzer ist – sprich: welcher Sprachauffassung er anhängt. Auch ein Humanübersetzer kann geistlos übersetzen wie eine Maschine.

Mehrfach kritisiert Stefanink im Laufe seiner Rezension, dass Meschonnics Rede vom *faire*, von der *force* des Textes letztlich nichts anderes sei als ein Etikettenschwindel. Er setzt dies gleich mit der von der Skopostheorie so bezeichneten *Wirkungsäquivalenz* und weist den Rezipienten des Textes eine zentrale Rolle zu. Neben der Herausarbeitung der sicherlich existierenden Schnittmengen und Parallelen wäre es jedoch wichtig, die Unterschiede zur Skopostheorie nicht unter den Teppich zu kehren. Meschonnics Denken ist textzentriert. Seine übersetzungsvorbereitenden Analysen und Kommentierungen seiner Übersetzungen sowie seine Kritik anderer Übersetzungen lassen daran keinen Zweifel. So lohnenswert es erscheinen mag, die Parallelen zur Skoposthoerie herauszuarbeiten, wäre ein Meschonnic-Handbuch dafür vielleicht der geeignetere Ort. Vielleicht ließe sich Stefanink als Beiträger zu diesem Vorhaben gewinnen? Gerade weil die Skopos-

theorie sich explizit auf nicht-literarische Texte bezieht und weil Meschonnic die Unterscheidung zwischen literarischen und nicht-literarischen Texten nicht gelten lässt, böte die Konfrontation dieser beiden Positionen vielleicht auch eine Erweiterung der funktionalistischen Strömung.

Sprichwörtlich im Grabe umdrehen dürfte sich Henri Meschonnic hingegen angesichts des mantraartig an ihn herangetragenen Vorwurfs, er habe letztlich nichts anderes getan bzw. von Übersetzern gefordert, als Texte mit der Heidegger'schen Achtsamkeit zu lesen. Ja, er vertrete gar unwissend die Prinzipien dieser Achtsamkeit. Wer Meschonnics vehemente Kritik an Heideggers sprachlichen Essentialismus kennt, dem muss dieser Vorwurf deplatziert erscheinen. So richtet sich Meschonnics Auffassung von Sprache als einer historischen Anthropologie klar gegen Heidegger, wie u. a. in seinem Buch *Le langage Heidegger* von 1990 nachzulesen ist, das auch den Weg Heideggers zu einem nationalsozialistischen Denken in dessen Sprachauffassung verortet. Selbst wenn man sich Meschonnic als achtsamen Leser und Übersetzer vorstellen möchte, bleibt die entscheidende Frage, worauf sich die Aufmerksamkeit richtet: Denn die Übersetzung verrät die Sprachauffassung des Übersetzers.

Dem Meschonnic'schen Rhythmusbegriff scheint sich Stefanink nicht anschließen zu wollen. So verwundert es ihn, dass Meschonnic einen „terminologischen Neologismus" einführt, indem er ihn auf Heraklit zurückführt. Kritisieren lassen sich fraglos die Weite und die manchmal verwirrenden Unterkategorien zu Meschonnics Rhythmusbegriff, welche sich mitunter auf Phänomene erstrecken, die jenseits der Betonungsdimension eines Textes liegen. Meschonnic begibt sich bei seinen Analysen jedoch nicht einfach auf die Suche nach vordefinierten rhetorischen Stilmitteln, so wie er auch Betonungsmuster nicht bloß als vorgegebenes Metrum be-

greift, das in einem Text einmal realisiert wird und ein anderes Mal nicht. Die *force* eines Textes, folgt man Meschonnic, liege vielmehr darin, mit bekannten Mustern zu brechen und eine eigene Prosodie zu entwickeln, weswegen die Rhetorik hier nur begrenzt als Analyseinstrumentarium dienen kann. Stefanink weist zugleich darauf hin, dass er selbst die rhythmische Dimension von Prosatexten als wichtige übersetzerische Größe betrachtet (etwa in *Meta* 2015: 48). Eine Definition seines Rhythmusbegriffs bleibt er seinen Lesern in dem Beitrag jedoch schuldig. Ebenso wenig expliziert er ihn, wenn er den in seiner Rezension gemachten Übersetzungsvorschlag für den Schlusssatz von Célines *Voyage au bout de la nuit* als gelungene Reproduktion des Original-Rhythmus bewertet. Etwas ratlos macht mich dabei seine Einschätzung meiner deskriptiven Analyse als verurteilende Kritik an den Übersetzern Célines. Wie schon aus dem Titel meines Beitrags hervorgehen sollte, liegt ihr Ziel nicht so sehr darin, die Qualität der untersuchten Übersetzungen zu überprüfen, als vielmehr darin, Dessons und Meschonnics Instrumentarium auf Übersetzungen anzuwenden, in ihrem *Traîté du rythme: Des vers et des proses* (1998) zu kurz gekommene sprachenpaarspezifische Fragen aufzuwerfen, die Grenzen ihrer Methode aufzeigen und dazu einzuladen, sie weiterzuentwickeln.

Überaus dankbar bin ich Stefanink hingegen für den Hinweis auf die Etymologie des Begriffs *signifiance*, der vom mittelalterlichen *senefiance* herrührt und den Meschonnic, wie gesagt, zunächst von Émile Benveniste übernimmt. Mit seiner Reflexion zur Übersetzung von Meschonnics *signifiance*-Begriff ins Deutsche trifft Stefanink eines der Anliegen unseres Projekts, zur Übersetzung von Meschonnics Begrifflichkeit beizutragen und diese diskursiv zu erhellen. So kommt es nicht von ungefähr, dass Stefanink angesichts von Marko Pajevićs Übersetzung von *signifiance* mit *Sinngebungsprozess*, vor-

schlägt, lieber von *Sinnerschließungsprozess* zu sprechen: Hier argumentiert er ganz als Vertreter der Texthermeneutik. Und gerade deswegen verbietet sich meines Erachtens diese quasi vereinnahmende Übersetzung, vielmehr scheint es mir lohnenswert, noch weitere Alternativbegriffe zu diskutieren wie »Sinnentstehungsprozess«, mit dem sich *signifiance* vielleicht noch treffender beschreiben und weder auf eine reine Autoren- noch auf eine Leserperspektive festlegen ließe. Dass Meschonnic mit dem Begriff *signifiance* diese beiden Perspektivierungen umgeht, scheint mir ein wichtiger Aspekt seines Sprachdenkens zu sein (vgl. hierzu Viehöver 2015).

Die Fortführung, Ergänzung und Kritik der im hier interessierenden Sammelband getroffenen Aussagen ist sicherlich das wünschenswerte Ziel aller genannten Bemühungen. Nicht zuletzt dank Stefaninks Ausführungen bietet sich dem Erforscher von Meschonnics sprach- und übersetzungsbezogenem Beitrag eine reichhaltiges und gleichzeitig kontrovers zu diskutierendes Feld, auf das noch ausführlich einzugehen sein wird.

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